WISE, Justice.

The City of Gadsden, the defendant below ("the City"), filed a permissive appeal pursuant to Rule 5, Ala. R.App. P., from a January 15, 2013, order of the Etowah Circuit Court denying the City's motion for a summary judgment as to Roy Harbin's breach-of-contract claim against the City. We reverse and remand.

Facts and Procedural History

Harbin started working as a police officer for the City in 1972. It is undisputed that he did not have a written employment contract with the City. In 1972, Harbin also started mandatory participation in the Policemen's and Firemen's Retirement Fund of the City of Gadsden ("the PFRF"), which was established by Act No. 226, Ala. Acts 1959. At that time, the PFRF provided, in part, that, after 20 or more years of service, a participant would receive

In 1975, the PFRF was modified by Act No. 904, Ala. Acts 1975, and the above-quoted "sliding scale provision" was eliminated. The PFRF was again modified in 1980 by Act No. 80-442, Ala. Acts 1980. Finally, in 2002, all the funds in the PFRF were transferred to the Employees Retirement System of Alabama ("the ERS"), which then administered the retirement program for the City's police officers. Harbin retired in 2012 and currently receives pension payments under the ERS.

On January 11, 2007, Harbin sued the City, alleging breach of contract and seeking equitable relief. Afterward, he amended his complaint five times. In the fifth amended complaint, which was filed in 2011, Harbin alleged the following regarding the contract he contends was breached:

Harbin also alleged that he paid into the PFRF for 20 years, from 1972 until 1992, and that, therefore, he "became fully eligible for 20 years of retirement benefits in 1992."

The City answered the complaint and denied Harbin's allegations. Specifically, it denied that it had ever had an employment contract, an employment agreement, or a memorandum of understanding with Harbin. The City also denied that there had ever been anything called a "City Retirement Plan."

On November 7, 2012, Harbin filed a motion for a partial summary judgment as to the issues whether he had a contract with the City and whether that contract included a pension. He asserted that, when he was hired in 1972, the City agreed to provide a 20-year retirement program that was provided for by statute by which, after 20 years of service, he would receive 50% retirement benefits calculated on a sliding scale and lifetime major-medical insurance coverage. Harbin also asserted that the "agreement or contract was confirmed and ratified by employee handbooks issued by the City of Gadsden." In support of the motion, he submitted excerpts from the City's employee handbooks from 1975, 1981-84, 1984-87, and 1987-91.

On November 27, 2012, the City filed a motion for a summary judgment. Referencing Harbin's admission in his deposition, it argued that Harbin never had a written employment contract with the City; instead, it argued that the terms of his employment were established by rules promulgated by the City's Civil Service Board. In support thereof, it attached to its motion a copy of the Civil Service Board Rules, as adopted by the Civil Service Board on May 25, 1994.

Noting that Harbin had submitted excerpts from employee handbooks, the City asserted that those handbooks simply referred to the statutory provisions that set forth the terms and conditions of the PFRF. Also, citing this Court's decision in Board of Trustees of Policemen's & Firemen's Retirement Fund of Gadsden v. Cary, 373 So.2d 841, 843 (Ala.1979), the City argued that, because Harbin was hired in 1972 and had not yet vested when the legislature amended the PFRF in 1975, the legislature had the authority to amend the terms of the PFRF so that Harbin was no longer eligible to receive the benefits that were available under the PFRF that was in place when he was hired.

In Cary, employees of the City filed an action seeking to have their rights declared following the 1975 amendment of the PFRF. This Court held that the benefits of those employees who had retired before the effective date of the 1975 amendment and of those employees who had served for at least 20 years at the time the 1975 amendment became effective and continued to serve could not be reduced and thus were not subject to the modifications in the 1975 amendment. Cary, 373 So.2d at 842-43. However, with regard to employees who had not become eligible for retirement before the effective date of the 1975 amendment, this Court stated:

373 So.2d at 843.1

On January 11, 2013, Harbin filed a response in opposition to the City's summary-judgment motion. Although he admitted that the City had never given him a written employment contract, he asserted that the City had assured him and had agreed with him that, if he worked 20 years, he would receive retirement benefits that would include a pension consisting of 50% of his wages, based on a sliding-scale provision that allowed for annual increases, and lifetime family medical benefits. Harbin also asserted that the assurances and agreement were explained and ratified by the chief of police and by the employee handbooks issued by the City. Finally, he asserted:

The trial court conducted a hearing on the summary-judgment motions on January 15, 2013. During the hearing, Harbin asked the court to rule as a matter of law that a contract existed between him and the City and to allow a jury to determine whether there had been a breach of that contract and damage as a result of the breach. Harbin once again conceded that he did not have written contract with the City. Nevertheless, without specifying a basis for such a finding, he asked the trial court to rule as a matter of law that a contract existed and that that contract included a pension.

The City argued that the contract to which Harbin referred was actually an act of the legislature — i.e., the statute that created the PFRF — and that the PFRF was governed by a board of trustees. Citing Cary, it also argued that, in 1975, the legislature made changes to the manner in which retirees would be paid. The City further argued that the legislature controlled and set the terms and conditions of the PFRF and that the City contributed what it was required under the PFRF to contribute. It additionally argued that the fact that the City had employee handbooks that said that its police officers participated in the PFRF "doesn't change anything" and "just says the officers are a part of this legislative scheme." Finally, it argued that participating in a pension scheme set up by the legislature is not akin to entering into a contract with the City. Therefore, the City concluded, no contract existed between it and Harbin.

The City noted that litigation had ensued as a result of the 1975 amendment to the PFRF and that the defendant in that litigation was the board of trustees of the PFRF, not the City. See Cary, 373 So.2d at 843. It also argued that, because Harbin had not vested in 1975, the terms of his pension were subject to modification, as determined in Cary.

Harbin disputed the City's argument that, under this Court's decision in Cary, the terms of his agreement with the City were changed by the 1975 amendment because he had not yet served 20 years before the legislature adopted the 1975 amendment. Instead, he argued that Cary "says that rights to a contract vest when they're made and when you complete your contract after twenty years, in this case forty years, then your rights are vested and you're entitled to the agreement that you made." Upon questioning by the trial court, Harbin indicated that it was his position that persons who were employed by the City at the time of the change in 1975 were locked into the retirement plan that was in place when they joined if they remained employed and served 20 years, that the plan could not be changed if the employee served 20 years, and that only people who were hired after the effective date of the 1975 amendment were subject to the 1975 amendment.

Despite his previous arguments, during the hearing, Harbin also stated that his breach-of-contract claim was "not based solely on the change of the legislature" and that his case did "not hinge on the fact of whether or not the legislature changed [his] agreement." He then argued:

Thereafter, Harbin also stated: "If I agree to work for you and I work twenty years or forty years, there's definitely a contract." Further, when the trial court asked him "what are the four corners of that contract," Harbin simply stated: "I didn't ask you to define that." Finally, Harbin's counsel acknowledged the following:

After the hearing, the trial court denied Harbin's motion for a partial summary judgment, denied the City's motion for a summary judgment, and granted the City's motion to strike Harbin's affidavit and evidentiary submissions. The City asked the trial court to certify a controlling question of law for an appeal by permission pursuant to Rule 5, Ala. R.App. P. The trial court certified the requested controlling question, and the City filed a petition for permissive appeal in this Court. This Court granted the petition and ordered an answer and briefs.

Question Certified for Interlocutory Appeal

The trial court certified the following as the controlling question of law for this interlocutory appeal:

Standard of Review

Brown v. W.P. Media, Inc., 17 So.3d 1167, 1169 (Ala.2009).

Discussion

The City argues that we should reverse the trial court's denial of its motion for a summary judgment and render a summary judgment in its favor. Specifically, it contends, as it did in its summary-judgment motion, that Harbin has not established that he had a contract with the City addressing his retirement benefits. First, the City points out that it is undisputed that Harbin did not have a written contract with the City. It also contends that, at most, Harbin appears to rely on the terms and conditions of the PFRF as it existed when he was hired in 1972, which terms and conditions were created and governed by the legislature. The City notes that, despite this Court's decision in Cary, Harbin has asserted that changes the legislature made to the PFRF in 1975 and 1980 do not apply to him because he served as a police officer for at least 20 years before retiring. However, it asserts, based on this Court's decision in Cary, that the legislature had the authority to make the changes it made to the PFRF in 1975; that, as part of those changes, the legislature eliminated the provisions Harbin relies on; and that Harbin continued to participate in the plan and was bound by the changes. Therefore, the City concludes, it was not a party to a contract with Harbin, and the trial court should have entered a summary judgment in its favor.

In his brief to this Court, Harbin admits that he asked the trial court to hold that a contract existed between him and the City "without specifying the precise terms of the contract." In response to the City's summary-judgment motion, Harbin did not establish precisely what contract he contended the City had breached. At most, throughout his pleadings in the trial court, Harbin alleged that, because he paid into the PFRF for 20 years from 1972 until 1992, he became fully eligible for 20 years of retirement benefits as they existed when he was hired by the City. Harbin's argument is based on the assumption that, because he worked for 20 years after he was hired in 1972, he was entitled to the retirement benefits the City offered when he was hired in 1972. However, as the City argued in response to Harbin's motion for a partial summary judgment, that assumption is erroneous, based on this Court's decision in Cary. The City argues that, because Harbin had not worked for the City for 20 years at the time the statute governing the PFRF was amended in 1975, his rights had not vested, and the terms of the PFRF that applied to him were subject to modification by the legislature.

Nevertheless, even after the City presented its argument as to Cary, Harbin continued to pursue his argument, asserting:

As set forth above, the holding in Cary was clear. Because Harbin had not retired and was not eligible to retire before the effective date of the 1975 amendment, his rights under the PFRF had not vested and were therefore subject to modification by the 1975 amendment. Nothing in Cary supports Harbin's arguments to the contrary.

Even during the evidentiary hearing, as set forth in more detail above, Harbin never articulated, even when specifically asked by the trial court, exactly what contract he contends the City breached. At various times, he appeared to rely on oral representations made by the chief of police when he was hired, on the written provisions in the various employee handbooks for City employees, and on the statutes establishing and modifying the PFRF.

Ex parte Alfa Mut. Ins. Co., 799 So.2d 957, 962 (Ala.2001).

Locke v. City of Mobile, 851 So.2d 446, 448 (Ala.2002). In its motion for a summary judgment, the City demonstrated that Harbin had not presented sufficient evidence to establish an essential element of his claim — i.e., that a contract actually existed between him and the City. Therefore, the burden shifted to Harbin to present substantial evidence to establish that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of a contract between him and the City. Because he did not present substantial evidence to establish such a genuine issue, Harbin did not satisfy his burden. Therefore, the City was entitled to a summary judgment.2

Conclusion

For the above-stated reasons, we reverse the trial court's judgment denying the City's motion for a summary judgment and remand this case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

STUART, BOLIN, PARKER, and MAIN, JJ., concur.

MOORE, C.J., recuses himself.