STUART, Justice.
Michelin North America, Inc. ("Michelin"), petitions this Court for writs of mandamus directing the Mobile Circuit Court (1) to vacate its order allowing the plaintiff Betty C. Brown ("Brown") to conduct an on-site inspection of Michelin's Ardmore, Oklahoma, tire-manufacturing facility (case no. 1121330), and (2) to vacate its order compelling Michelin to answer certain interrogatories and to comply with certain document requests propounded by Brown (case no. 1121341). We grant the petition in case no. 1121330 and grant the petition in part in case no. 1121341.
On May 25, 2010, Brown and her husband, George A. Brown ("George"), were traveling west on Interstate 10 in Mobile when the tire mounted on the rear passenger side of their 1992 Ford Explorer sport-utility vehicle ("the subject tire") failed, causing an automobile accident in which George was killed and Brown was injured. The subject tire was a P265/70R15 110S B.F. Goodrich Radial Long Trail T/A passenger tire, manufactured in 2004 at an Ardmore, Oklahoma, facility operated by Michelin, which owns the B.F. Goodrich brand. On November 11, 2011, Brown sued Michelin and others, in her individual capacity and as personal representative of George's estate, alleging that her injuries and George's death were the result of tread separation in the subject tire; her complaint specifically asserted products-liability,
Michelin thereafter objected to the scope of Brown's discovery request, arguing that she sought information that was both confidential and irrelevant, inasmuch as she sought information related to tires other than just B.F. Goodrich Radial Long Trail T/A passenger tires manufactured at the Ardmore facility with the same specifications as the subject tire. Eventually, Michelin and Brown agreed to a protective order governing the handling of documents and information deemed by Michelin to be confidential, and Michelin did thereafter produce some of the requested discovery. Michelin was ultimately unwilling, however, to produce all the discovery Brown requested, and, on March 17, 2013, Brown moved the trial court to compel Michelin to "fully and completely respond" to 10 outstanding interrogatories and 22 outstanding requests for production. On April 5, 2013, Michelin filed its response, arguing that Brown's request was overbroad and that some of the requested information was protected trade secrets. Michelin supported its response with an affidavit sworn by Douglas J. Slagh, a senior technical advisor for Michelin.
Also on April 5, 2013, Brown moved the trial court to enter an order requiring Michelin to allow Brown to inspect Michelin's Ardmore facility and to take photographs of and to videotape the manufacturing processes used by Michelin at that facility. On April 23, 2013, Michelin filed its response to Brown's motion to inspect, arguing that she sought discovery of trade secrets protected under Alabama law and that the information sought was neither necessary nor relevant to her claims against Michelin. Michelin also moved for a protective order barring Brown from entering its Ardmore facility. Both parties thereafter filed additional briefs on the issue of the plant inspection.
On July 10, 2013, the trial court conducted a hearing at which it heard arguments regarding both Brown's motion to compel and her motion to inspect, and, on August 5, 2013, the trial court entered separate orders granting both motions.
Using that guideline, Michelin was ordered to produce complete responses to the 10 outstanding interrogatories and 22 outstanding requests for production by August 19, 2013.
Meanwhile, on August 14, 2013, Michelin moved the trial court to stay its order granting Brown's motion to compel so it could seek appellate review of that order as well. In conjunction with that motion to stay, Michelin also moved the trial court to reconsider its order granting Brown's motion to compel and to enter a protective order in favor of Michelin with regard to 3 of the outstanding interrogatories and 12 of the outstanding document requests. As grounds for its motion, Michelin argued that the order to compel would require it "to produce irrelevant, trade secret documentation while imposing undue burdens and excessive costs" upon it. Michelin supported its motion with another affidavit from Slagh, his third filed in this case.
On August 15, 2013, Brown filed a response opposing the August 14 motions filed by Michelin and asking the trial court to strike the affidavit filed by Slagh in conjunction with those motions. On Friday, August 16, 2013, Michelin filed an emergency motion with this Court to stay proceedings in the trial court on the basis that the trial court had not yet ruled on its August 14 motions and the ordered discovery was due on Monday, August 19, 2013. Later that day, however, the trial court denied Michelin's August 14 motions and granted Brown's motion to strike Slagh's affidavit. On August 19, 2013, Michelin petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate its August 5, 2013, order granting Brown's motion to compel with respect to 3 identified interrogatories and 12 identified document requests. That petition was docketed as case no. 1121341.
After conducting an initial review of Michelin's petition in case no. 1121341, this Court, on August 20, 2013, entered an order staying all proceedings in the trial court and ordering Brown to file a response. On September 4, 2013, we likewise ordered Brown to file a response in case no. 1121330. Brown thereafter filed a response in each case and separately moved to strike both Michelin's petition for the writ of mandamus in case no. 1121341 as well as Slagh's affidavit upon which that petition relied. Responses and replies to the various filings were thereafter filed by the parties, and, for convenience, we have now consolidated Michelin's two petitions for the purpose of issuing one opinion.
In both case no. 1121330 and case no. 1121341, Michelin seeks mandamus review of orders entered by the trial court deciding discovery matters. This Court has stated:
Ex parte Mobile Serv. Gas Corp., 123 So.3d 499, 504 (Ala.2013). Accordingly, we review the trial court's rulings to see if the trial court exceeded its discretion.
We first consider Michelin's petition in case no. 1121330 challenging the trial court's order giving Brown the right to inspect Michelin's Ardmore facility. Michelin argues that the trial court exceeded its discretion in granting Brown's motion to inspect inasmuch as its order doing so failed to recognize Michelin's right to protect its trade secrets and compelled the disclosure of irrelevant information. For the reasons that follow, we agree.
This Court has recognized that "[t]he Alabama Rules of Evidence provide that trade secrets are, in some cases, privileged and not admissible at trial." Ex parte Miltope Corp., 823 So.2d 640, 644 (Ala.2001). Specifically, Rule 507, Ala. R. Evid., provides:
A party asserting the trade-secret privilege has the initial burden of showing that the information sought to be shielded from disclosure constitutes a trade secret the disclosure of which would result in injury. Ex parte Miltope, 823 So.2d at 644. If such a showing is made, the burden then
In this case, the trial court, in its order granting Brown's motion to inspect, avoided directly deciding whether Michelin had established that the manufacturing processes, techniques, and equipment used at its Ardmore facility constituted trade secrets, stating:
However, although the trial court did not decide this issue, we note that the evidence in the record, specifically the affidavit of Jack Glazener, a Michelin employee who has worked at the Ardmore facility continuously since 1971, indicates that the manufacturing processes, techniques, and equipment Michelin uses at its Ardmore facility do in fact constitute trade secrets as that term is defined in the Alabama Trade Secrets Act, § 8-27-1 et seq., Ala.Code 1975.
Brown argues that the information she seeks does not meet the definition of a trade secret because Michelin has itself produced a video available online entitled "How Tires are Made" and because Glazener acknowledged in his affidavit that he has himself conducted some public tours of the Ardmore facility in the past. However, there is no indication that the Michelin-produced video contains footage of the Ardmore facility or the manufacturing processes, techniques, and equipment used there. Moreover, with regard to Brown's claim that the tours conducted at the Ardmore facility undermine Michelin's claim that the information sought constitutes trade secrets because Michelin has not
Based on the totality of the evidence concerning Michelin's efforts to maintain security and limit access to its Ardmore facility, we do not agree with Brown's argument that the trade-secret privilege should not apply because Michelin has not exerted "efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy." § 8-27-2(e).
Having concluded that Michelin has met its initial burden of showing that the information sought to be shielded from disclosure constitutes a trade secret the disclosure of which would result in injury to Michelin, we next turn to whether Brown has shown that the information sought is both necessary and relevant to the litigation. In its order granting Brown's motion to inspect, the trial court concluded that Brown had met this burden and that it would be unjust were she not permitted to take and then use the videotape and photographs of the Ardmore facility "in the presentation of her case at trial." In the brief filed in support of her motion to inspect, Brown also focused on her need to show the jury the videotape and photographs of the Ardmore facility, stating:
It is no doubt true that videotape and photographs of Michelin's manufacturing processes, techniques, and equipment would likely assist Brown in presenting her case to the jury. However, we do not agree that this is a sufficient basis on which to conclude that it is necessary for Brown to have access to those trade secrets. As the Supreme Court of Indiana has explained, "`[n]ecessity' means that without discovery of the particular trade secret, the discovering party would be unable to present its case `to the point that an unjust result is a real, rather than a merely possible, threat.'" Bridgestone Americas Holding, Inc. v. Mayberry, 878 N.E.2d 189, 196 (Ind.2007) (quoting In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 106 S.W.3d 730, 733 (Tex.2003)). See also Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Superior Court, 7 Cal.App.4th 1384, 1395, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 709,
Brown's expert witness, Troy Cottles, states that he had been employed by the tire industry for 17 years and that he spent over 14 of those years "in a plant environment." Brown has also identified a video produced by Michelin describing the tire-making process to some extent. It thus seems apparent that Brown will be able to present her case and describe and explain the tire-making process to the jury even without access to Michelin's Ardmore facility and the trade secrets it maintains there. There is simply no basis on which to conclude that not having photographs and videotape will render Brown unable to present her case to the point that an unjust result is a real threat. Mayberry, 878 N.E.2d at 196.
However, beyond just asserting the need for photographs and videotape to be used in presenting her case, Brown also argues that an inspection will provide Cottles with additional support for his conclusion that the subject tire was defective inasmuch as he would have an opportunity to view Michelin's tire-making process and to determine where and how the defect might have occurred. Thus, Brown argues, access to Michelin's manufacturing processes, techniques, and equipment — its trade secrets — is both necessary and relevant. Michelin argues that Brown's claim of necessity is belied by the fact that Cottles, without having access to Michelin's trade secrets, already has formulated and rendered an expert opinion that the subject tire was defective based solely on an inspection of the subject tire. Therefore, Michelin argues, Brown cannot establish that access to the Ardmore facility is truly necessary. See, e.g., Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. App.4th at 1396-97, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d at 716 (explaining that access to defendant's trade secret would be "helpful" inasmuch as it might assist plaintiffs' expert in determining why an observed defect occurred, but access to trade secret was nevertheless not permitted because it was not necessary for plaintiffs "to carry their burden of proof" regarding the existence of a defect).
Moreover, Michelin argues that Brown cannot meet her burden of showing that the information she seeks is relevant because, Michelin argues, even though the subject tire was manufactured at the Ardmore facility, it was manufactured in 2004, over nine years before this discovery dispute, and the Ardmore facility no longer manufactures that tire and has in fact undergone significant changes. In his affidavit, Glazener explained the changes in the Ardmore facility since the subject tire was manufactured there:
In Morton v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 288 F.R.D. 126 (N.D.Miss.2012), the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi considered a motion to inspect a tire-manufacturing facility filed by a plaintiff in a case brought pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act, 41 U.S.C. § 121 et seq. That court ultimately granted the motion and held that the plaintiff was entitled to inspect the facility and to take photographs of the equipment the defendant manufacturer alleged the plaintiff was unable to operate because of his disability. 288 F.R.D. at 133. In its review of the relevant caselaw, the court reviewed several cases in which courts had declined to allow inspections based on the time that had elapsed since an alleged defective tire was manufactured:
288 F.R.D. at 132. See also Hajek v. Kumho Tire Co., No. 4:08CV3157 (D.Neb. Feb. 8, 2010) (not reported in F.Supp.2d) ("[A]s to plaintiffs' request to tour or inspect Kumho's manufacturing plant, the plant has changed since the accident tire was manufactured in 2005. There is no showing that touring and assessing the plant's current structure, mechanisms, ventilation, or general cleanliness [in 2010] would be relevant or lead to discovering information relevant in determining why a tire manufactured in 2005 failed on August 17, 2006.").
Thus, in these cases, courts have essentially held that plaintiffs are unable to make the relevance showing necessary to justify the inspection of a tire-manufacturing facility and concomitant disclosure of trade secrets when the tire had been manufactured as recently as five years before the discovery requests were made. In the instant case, the subject tire was manufactured over nine years before, and it is undisputed that the Ardmore facility has undergone significant change in that time. We agree with the rationales of the courts cited above, and we accordingly conclude that Brown has not established that the information she seeks by way of an inspection of the Ardmore facility is necessary and relevant to this litigation. For this reason, the trial court exceeded its discretion when it granted Brown's motion for an on-site inspection of Michelin's Ardmore facility, and the trial court is hereby directed to vacate its August 5, 2013, order granting that motion.
We next consider Michelin's petition in case no. 1121341 challenging the trial court's order requiring it to produce complete responses to Brown's 10 outstanding interrogatories and 22 outstanding requests for production. Michelin does not challenge the entire scope of the trial court's order, instead focusing its objections on 3 interrogatories and 12 requests for production. Michelin argues that it should not be compelled to respond to these discovery requests for three reasons: (1) the requests, it says, are too broad inasmuch as they seek the disclosure of information that Michelin alleges is not relevant; (2) the requests, its says, seek the disclosure of protected trade secrets and, Michelin alleges, Brown has not established that those trade secrets are relevant
Before considering the merits of these individual arguments, we first consider Brown's argument that Michelin's excessive-burden argument is not properly before this Court. Brown made her initial discovery requests in November 2011, and, after she and Michelin were unable to resolve Michelin's objections regarding those requests, Brown, in March 2013, moved the trial court to compel Michelin to respond to her requests. Thereafter, the parties filed multiple briefs with the trial court regarding Brown's motion to compel, and the trial court held two separate hearings — on April 26, 2013, and July 10, 2013 — to specifically discuss the proper scope of discovery. Michelin's filings during this time included two affidavits from its expert Slagh detailing its objections to Brown's discovery requests. Those affidavits and Michelin's arguments during this time frame were exclusively devoted to Michelin's claims that the discovery requests were too broad and sought the disclosure of protected trade secrets — Michelin did not argue that responding to the requests would impose an excessive and undue burden upon it. On August 5, 2013, the trial court granted Brown's motion to compel, and it was not until August 14, 2013, when Michelin moved the trial court to reconsider and to enter a protective order in Michelin's favor that Michelin first asserted an excessive-burden argument, supported by a third affidavit sworn by Slagh. Brown then moved the trial court to strike that affidavit, and, on August 16, 2013, the trial court did so, stating:
Michelin now reasserts its excessive-burden argument to this Court and argues that the trial court improperly struck Slagh's third affidavit. Brown meanwhile has moved this Court to strike Slagh's third affidavit from the materials before us and further argues that we should strike Michelin's entire petition in case no. 1121341 because, she says, it relies heavily on that affidavit. Although we deny the motion to strike Michelin's petition, we agree that the trial court acted within its discretion in striking Slagh's third affidavit. Accordingly, because that affidavit was not considered by the trial court, we give it no consideration in deciding the merits of Michelin's petition for the writ of mandamus. See Ex parte Verbena United Methodist Church, 953 So.2d 395, 399 (Ala. 2006) ("We have not relied upon [plaintiff's] affidavit because, as previously stated, when this Court considers a mandamus petition, we can review only the evidence that was before the trial court.").
Michelin argues that Slagh's third affidavit was proper and timely because, it argues, under this Court's decision in Ex parte Reynolds Metals Co., 710 So.2d 897 (Ala.1998), it was required to file a motion for a protective order after the trial court granted Brown's motion to compel before it could petition this Court for mandamus relief. See Ex parte Horton Homes, Inc.,
However, the fact that courts sometimes consider new evidence submitted in support of a motion for a protective order filed after an order compelling discovery has been entered does not mean that all courts are always required to do so. "This Court has repeatedly recognized that a trial court has broad and considerable discretion in controlling the discovery process." Pensacola Motor Sales, Inc. v. Daphne Auto., LLC, 155 So.3d 930, 941 (Ala.2013). In this case, the parties have quibbled about the scope of discovery for over two years. The trial court has held two hearings specifically to address the issue of Michelin's objections to Brown's discovery requests. At those hearings, the trial court repeatedly expressed its frustration with the slow pace of the case, the time the case was requiring, and even the parties' propensity to file motions and evidentiary filings in an untimely fashion. In no filings leading up to those hearings or at the hearings themselves did Michelin make a cogent argument that the discovery requests would impose an undue and excessive burden upon it. Only after the trial court had entered its ruling granting Brown's motion to compel — following five months of discussion and multiple hearings on that specific issue — did Michelin assert an excessive-burden argument for the first time. In light of that delay, we cannot say that the trial court exceeded its discretion in declining to consider Michelin's belated argument, and Slagh's affidavit supporting it, on the basis that they came "far too late."
We emphasize, however, that this is not to say that courts have no discretion to consider new evidence submitted in accordance with a motion seeking a protective order following an order compelling discovery. Certainly, if the order compelling discovery has been entered in a perfunctory manner, it would be entirely appropriate to do so. However, in this case, the trial court expended a great deal of time, effort, and oversight over the course of a five-month period attempting to resolve the parties' dispute regarding the scope of discovery. After granting the parties ample time and opportunity to submit evidence and make arguments in support of their respective positions, it entered an order compelling the discovery requested. Only then did Michelin assert for the first time that Brown's discovery requests would impose an undue and excessive burden upon it. Based on these circumstances, we hold that the trial court acted within its discretion when it struck the affidavit filed to support this new and belated argument. To rule otherwise would allow Michelin to effectively negate five months of proceedings on Brown's motion to compel.
We must still, however, consider the two arguments that are properly before
(Michelin's petition, pp. 7-8.)
The parties' dispute regarding the breadth of discovery basically centers on what tires are relevant to Brown's claim. Michelin takes the position that Brown is entitled only to discovery related to P265/70R15 110S B.F. Goodrich Radial Long Trail T/A passenger tires manufactured at the Ardmore facility from 2002-2006, approximately two years before and two years after the subject tire was manufactured. In support of this argument, Michelin cites Slagh's affidavits, in which he acknowledges that "[m]ost modern automotive tires share some basic features" but states that the various models of tires that Michelin produces are otherwise so different in terms of "size, load capacity, components, compounds, number of plies, recommend pressures, speed ratings, and intended applications" that they cannot be considered to be substantially similar to the subject tire and are therefore of no relevance to the instant case. Slagh further states that P265/70R15 110S B.F. Goodrich Radial Long Trail T/A passenger tires like the subject tire were manufactured only at the Ardmore facility and that even a tire manufactured and marketed
Brown's expert Cottles, however, responded to this argument in his affidavit, stating that "Michelin's position limiting the scope of time and scope of tires subject to discovery is highly evasive because it allows Michelin to conceal a substantial amount of highly relevant evidence relating to design and manufacturing defects at issue in the subject tire." Cottles further states:
Thus, the trial court was essentially tasked with making a discovery determination in the face of contradictory expert affidavits — Michelin's expert stated that only information related to P265/70R15 110S B.F. Goodrich Radial Long Trail T/A passenger tires was relevant to Brown's claims, while Brown's expert stated that information related to almost any Michelin-produced tires within a 10-year time span was relevant and discoverable. Toward the end of the July 10 hearing on this issue, the trial court noted the difficulty in bridging the gap between these two positions and stated that without having some standard by which to reasonably narrow the scope of discovery it was inclined to accept the broad scope proposed by Brown. Counsel for Michelin offered to help the court find a compromise position, stating:
The trial court welcomed Michelin to submit such a compromise; however, Michelin failed to follow up on its offer, and the offered materials were never submitted to the trial court. Accordingly, the trial court entered a ruling based on the arguments that were made and the evidence that was before it. As noted, much of that evidence appears to be incompatible; in such instances the decision is left to the discretion of the trial court. Based on the record before us, we cannot say that the trial court exceeded its discretion in defining the scope of discovery as it did.
Michelin also argues that the trial court exceeded its discretion by compelling the production of protected trade secrets. Michelin specifically objects to the production
In Ex parte Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 987 So.2d 1090 (Ala.2007), this Court reviewed a discovery order entered in another case in which it was alleged that a tire failure had resulted in an automobile accident resulting in fatalities. Although we upheld the vast majority of the order entered by the trial court, we nevertheless held that Cooper Tire was entitled to an order prohibiting discovery of any materials that did not relate to the failure of Cooper tires as a result of tread separation, stating:
987 So.2d at 1104. In the instant case, it is likewise alleged that the automobile accident at the center of the case was the result of tread separation. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in Ex parte Cooper Tire, we hold that Michelin is protected from being required to disclose information, including data for returns and warranty claims, concerning defects or tire failure not related to tread separation. As we stated in Ex parte Cooper Tire: "[W]e defer to the trial court's management of the discovery process as to all other aspects of its order[] to compel production, and we conclude that in entering th[at] order[] the trial court did not exceed its discretion." 987 So.2d at 1109.
Michelin petitioned this Court for writs of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate its order allowing Brown to inspect Michelin's Ardmore tire-manufacturing facility (case no. 1121330) and to vacate its order compelling Michelin to answer certain interrogatories and to comply with certain document requests propounded by Brown (case no. 1121341). For the reasons explained in this opinion, we grant Michelin's petition in case no. 1121330 and direct the trial court to vacate its order requiring Michelin to allow Brown to inspect its Ardmore facility. We grant Michelin's petition in part in case no. 1121341 and direct the trial court to modify its order compelling discovery to exclude the production of any materials that do not relate to the failure of Michelin tires as a result of tread separation; in all other respects, the petition is denied.
1121330 — PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
BOLIN, PARKER, WISE, and BRYAN, JJ., concur.
MOORE, C.J., and MAIN, J., dissent.
1121341 — PETITION GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART; WRIT ISSUED.
BOLIN, PARKER, MURDOCK, WISE, and BRYAN, JJ., concur.
MOORE, C.J., and MAIN, J., concur in part and dissent in part.
MOORE, Chief Justice, (dissenting in case no. 1121330 and concurring in part and dissenting in part in case no. 1121341).
In case no. 1121330, I dissent from issuing the writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate its order granting Betty C. Brown's motion to inspect Michelin's Ardmore, Oklahoma, tire-manufacturing facility. In case no. 1121341, I concur in the main opinion insofar as it denies the petition for a writ of mandamus and I dissent to the extent that this Court grants the petition for a writ of mandamus and directs the trial court to modify its order granting Brown's motion to compel answers to the 3 identified interrogatories and the 12 identified document requests to exclude the production of any materials unrelated to the failure of Michelin's tires as a result of tread separation.
MAIN, Justice, (dissenting in case no. 1121330 and concurring in part and dissenting in part in case no. 1121341).
In case no. 1121330, I must respectfully dissent. In case no. 1121341, I concur in part and dissent in part.
I do not believe mandamus relief is proper in the context of most discovery matters. This Court has recognized four circumstances in which a discovery order may be reviewed by a petition for a writ of mandamus. See Ex parte Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB, 872 So.2d 810, 813 (Ala.2003); see also Ex parte Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 879 So.2d 1134, 1137 (Ala.2003) (citing Ocwen). Those circumstances are:
Ex parte Guaranty Pest Control, Inc., 21 So.3d 1222, 1226 (Ala.2009). I am not convinced that Michelin has adequately alleged that any of these circumstances apply here. Further, I am not persuaded that this Court should expand the discovery categories available for review by mandamus.
Guaranty Pest Control, 21 So.3d at 1225-26.
In case no. 1121330, regarding that portion of the trial court's order allowing for an on-site inspection of Michelin's tire-manufacturing facility, I cannot say that Michelin has met the standard of showing that the trial court exceeded its discretion in entering its order giving Brown the right to inspect Michelin's facility. Likewise, in case no. 1121341, I do not believe that Michelin has shown that the trial court exceeded its discretion in compelling Michelin to answer certain interrogatories and to comply with certain document requests propounded by Brown. Accordingly, I cannot conclude that Michelin has shown a clear legal right to the relief sought in its petitions in case no. 1121330 and case no. 1121341. Thus, I believe Michelin's petitions for a writ of mandamus should be denied in both cases.
Based on my review of this case, I cannot say that the trial court clearly exceeded its discretion in allowing the on-site inspection of Michelin's facility (case no. 1121330). See, e.g., Ex parte Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 987 So.2d 1090 (Ala.2007). When you consider the extensive hearing that the trial court conducted and the trial court's order granting the on-site inspection, which is substantially similar to the order proposed by Michelin's counsel after the hearing, I do not believe that Michelin has shown a clear legal right to the writ. Instead, I contend that "[t]his Court itself should be able to restrict the abuse of using petitions for a writ of mandamus in discovery matters by restricting the use of extraordinary writs to extraordinary instances
Turning to the trial court's order compelling Michelin to answer certain interrogatories and to comply with certain document requests propounded by Brown (case no. 1121341), I cannot say that the trial court exceeded its discretion by compelling the production of what Michelin asserts are trade secrets. As I mention in my discussion of case no. 1121330, a discovery order forbidding any disclosure of asserted trade secrets is a "rarity." Warrior Lighthouse; Cooper Tire. Additionally, I do not believe that the trial court's discovery order regarding certain interrogatories and document requests is so overbroad as to violate Michelin's privilege relating to its trade secrets. I also cannot say that the trial court's order should be limited to tread separation as the majority opinion concludes. The majority opinion cites Cooper Tire in holding that the writ should issue in part as to certain interrogatories and document requests. I, however, believe Cooper Tire is distinguishable from this case. The complaint in this case is not limited to tread separation. Thus, I cannot say that the trial court exceeded its discretion in its order on certain interrogatories and document requests propounded by Brown.
Because I conclude that the trial court did not exceed its discretion, I would deny Michelin's petitions for a writ of mandamus in case no. 1121330 and case no. 1121341.
