MOORE, Chief Justice.
Sara Johnson Crossfield appeals from a summary judgment entered by the Limestone Circuit Court in favor of the Limestone County Commission ("the Commission") in Crossfield's action to reverse the Commission's decision to vacate a portion of Dogwood Flats Road
In early 2013, the Commission proposed to vacate a portion of Dogwood Flats Road pursuant to § 23-4-1 et seq., Ala.Code 1975 (which addresses vacating streets and highways). The relevant section of Dogwood Flats Road lies near Tanner and runs north and south for a distance of approximately 2,230 feet. In April 2013, the Commission advertised the proposed road vacation for four consecutive weeks in a local newspaper. The Commission notified
On May 6, 2013, the Commission held a public hearing concerning the proposed road vacation. Crossfield attended the hearing and voiced her objections to the proposed road vacation pursuant to § 23-4-2(a) ("Any citizen alleging to be affected by the proposed vacation may submit a written objection to the governing body or may request an opportunity to be heard at the public hearing held as required herein.").
After the hearing, the Commission adopted a resolution vacating the relevant portion of the road. The Commission found that the portion of the road sought to be vacated was no longer in use by the general public and that it was in the public interest to vacate that portion of Dogwood Flats Road. The Commission found that the vacation of the road would not deprive any owner of any right to convenient and reasonable means of ingress and egress.
On June 5, 2013, Crossfield filed an appeal of the Commission's vacation of the road in the Limestone Circuit Court ("the trial court") pursuant to § 23-4-5, Ala. Code 1975 ("Any party affected by the vacation of a street, alley, or highway pursuant to this chapter may appeal within 30 days of the decision of the governing body vacating the street to the circuit court of the county in which the lands are situated...."). Crossfield alleged that she was a "party affected by the vacation of a portion of Dogwood Flat[s] Road" and asked the trial court to set aside the vacation of the road. Crossfield alleged, among other things, that the Commission had obstructed her access to Piney Creek, which lies to the east and south of Crossfield's property.
On June 21, 2013, the Commission moved the trial court to dismiss Crossfield's appeal on the grounds that "Crossfield is not a person affected by the vacation and lacks standing to appeal the decision of the [Commission] to vacate the subject portion of Dogwood Flats Road." The Commission's motion to dismiss included copies of public records relevant to the vacation of the road and an affidavit from Richard Sanders, Limestone County's engineer who coordinates the Commission's vacation of county roads. Sanders's affidavit states:
On September 23, 2013, the Commission moved the trial court to convert its motion to dismiss into a motion for a summary judgment, which motion the trial court granted. On October 8, 2013, Crossfield filed a response to the Commission's motion. On November 20, 2013, Crossfield filed an affidavit on her own behalf in opposition to the Commission's motion for a summary judgment. Crossfield's affidavit states, in pertinent part:
On November 25, 2013, the trial court held a hearing on the Commission's motion for a summary judgment at which testimony was presented. At the hearing, the Commission argued that Crossfield did not have standing to appeal the vacation of Dogwood Flats Road because she was not an abutting landowner. Crossfield argued that she had standing to appeal because the vacation of the road denied her convenient access to Piney Creek and because the value of her property would be diminished as a result of the back-up of water in the ditches along Dogwood Flats Road, which would no longer be maintained by the County.
On December 12, 2013, the trial court granted the Commission's motion for a summary judgment and dismissed Crossfield's appeal. The trial court's order states:
On January 17, 2014, Crossfield filed her notice of appeal to this Court pursuant to § 23-4-5 ("From the judgment of the circuit court, an appeal may be taken within 42 days by either party to ... the Supreme Court....").
Summary judgment is proper if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.
Pritchett v. ICN Med. Alliance, Inc., 938 So.2d 933, 935 (Ala.2006) (quoting Capital Alliance Ins. Co. v. Thorough-Clean, Inc., 639 So.2d 1349, 1350 (Ala.1994)) (internal citations omitted). "Questions of law are reviewed de novo." Alabama Republican Party v. McGinley, 893 So.2d 337, 342 (Ala.2004).
The issue before this Court is whether Crossfield was a "party affected by the vacation" of Dogwood Flats Road and thus has standing to contest the Commission's decision pursuant to § 23-4-5, which provides:
(Emphasis added.) Section 23-4-2, Ala. Code 1975, provides that vacation of a road "shall not deprive other property owners of any right they may have to convenient and reasonable means of ingress and egress to and from their property, and if that right is not afforded by the remaining streets and alleys, another street or alley affording that right must be dedicated." (Emphasis added.)
The Commission maintains that Crossfield has not provided substantial evidence showing that she is an affected party with standing to appeal. According to the Commission, Crossfield is not an affected party because (1) she is not an abutting landowner and (2) she has not been denied access to a waterway. Crossfield maintains that she does not have to be an abutting landowner in order to appeal the vacation of the road. She asserts that she can bring an action to prevent the vacation of Dogwood Flats Road because, she says, she has a special interest in the road and suffers "damages different in kind and degree from those suffered by the public."
Ownership of land abutting the portion of the road to be vacated is not a
Section 23-4-5 does not define the phrase "party affected" used therein. However, § 23-4-2(b) protects "other property owners of any right they may have to convenient and reasonable means of ingress and egress to and from their property." In addition, we have held that individuals who suffer "a special injury" from the vacation of a road have standing to contest the vacation. An individual suffers a special injury when he or she has suffered damage "different in kind and degree from [that] suffered by the public in general." Hall v. Polk, 363 So.2d 300, 302 (Ala.1978). For example, a special injury could be "an obstruction [that] forces the owner of land abutting on the obstructed road into a circuitous route to the outside world or denies convenient access to a waterway." Id.
However, a claimed injury is too remote to support standing when there is a "lack of a close connection between the wrong and the injury." Moody, 431 So.2d at 513. We have referred to the requirement of a close connection as the "rule of remoteness," id.; see also Gwin, 366 So.2d at 694.
In Hall v. Polk, we held that the petitioner, who lived directly east of a river, had standing when the roadway that was obstructed was the only "direct, convenient access" to the river from the petitioner's property. 363 So.2d at 302. Although a more circuitous route to the river was available, we held that the petitioner suffered a special injury because of his proximity to the river and the obstruction of convenient access. 363 So.2d at 303. We also have held that property owners had standing as the result of a right derived from owning property in a subdivision. See Jackson v. Moody, 431 So.2d 509, 513 (Ala.1983)(holding that the interest in an access road to the dedicated beach area for those residing in the subdivision is not remote); Gwin, 366 So.2d at 694 (holding that petitioners had standing because they purchased land in a subdivision as laid out by the subdivision map).
Crossfield stated that the vacation of Dogwood Flats Road affects the value, safety, drainage, and survival of her property and that the vacation of the road bars her "with a chain and padlocks from the Piney Creek." However, Crossfield failed to provide substantial evidence demonstrating that the road vacation affected her legal rights, her convenient access to Piney Creek, or the value, safety, and drainage of her property. Unlike the petitioner in Hall, Crossfield has not shown that the portion of the road vacated is her only direct and convenient means of access to Piney Creek. Evidence of a chain and a padlock on one road does not show that there is no other convenient way to get to Piney Creek. Crossfield has not demonstrated any other non-remote special injury,
Crossfield has not shown that she would suffer a specific injury different in kind and degree from that suffered by the general public and that passes muster under the rule of remoteness; therefore she is not an "affected" party pursuant to § 23-4-5.
Crossfield's evidence, even when viewed in the light most favorable to her as the nonmovant, does not create a genuine issue of material fact that would preclude a summary judgment for the Commission. Therefore, the summary judgment in favor of the Commission is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
STUART, BOLIN, PARKER, and MAIN, JJ., concur.
MURDOCK, SHAW, WISE, and BRYAN, JJ., dissent.
MURDOCK, Justice (dissenting).
I dissent. The Limestone County Commission's decision to vacate over 2,000 feet of Dogwood Flats Road may be due to be upheld on the merits, but I cannot agree that Sara Johnson Crossfield does not have standing to challenge that decision.
As the main opinion notes, one who establishes that he or she has a "special injury" resulting from the vacation of a road has standing to challenge that vacation. The main opinion further observes that "[a]n individual suffers a special injury when he or she has suffered damage `different in kind and degree from [that] suffered by the public in general.'" 164 So.3d at 552 (quoting Hall v. Polk, 363 So.2d 300, 302 (Ala.1978)).
Crossfield's home and property abut Dogwood Flats Road at a point only 400 feet north of the vacated section. That fact alone gives Crossfield an interest in the roadway different from that of the general public. Furthermore, the rendition of the facts provided by the main opinion makes it clear that the vacation of Dogwood Flats Road will deprive Crossfield of a relatively direct means of access to Piney Creek. Moreover, Crossfield testified by affidavit that the vacation of Dogwood Flats Road will affect the value of her property, safety, and drainage. Thus, both Crossfield's allegations and the undisputed facts establish that she suffered the kind of "special injury" required to allow her to challenge the vacation of Dogwood Flats Road.
SHAW, WISE, and BRYAN, JJ., concur.
