PARKER, Justice.1

PETITION DENIED. NO OPINION.

STUART, BOLIN, SHAW, MAIN, WISE, and BRYAN, JJ., concur.

PARKER, J., concurs specially.

MOORE, C.J., and MURDOCK, J., dissent.

PARKER, Justice (concurring specially).

I agree with this Court's decision to deny the petition for a writ of mandamus filed by Cornell L. Tatum, Sr., Charlie Hardy, and Charles Lancaster ("the petitioners"). I write specially to emphasize that a circuit court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to apply judicial notions of due process to church proceedings when the highest adjudicatory body of a church decides a purely ecclesiastical matter. Additionally, I write to note that a circuit court may recognize a decision by the highest adjudicatory body of a church concerning a purely ecclesiastical matter and, based on that decision, enjoin persons from taking unauthorized actions on behalf of the church.

To understand the limited scope of the ecclesiastical matter in the present case, a recitation of the facts before this Court is necessary. On December 14, 2008, the Greenwood Missionary Baptist Church ("the church") adopted a set of bylaws entitled "Bylaws for the Governance of Greenwood Missionary Baptist Church" ("the bylaws"). The bylaws, which vest the governance of the church in its members, state:

The bylaws mandate that a board of deacons ("the board") be established for the church. The board is responsible for holding in trust all property belonging to the church, determining the use of the church building for all non-religious purposes, designating the financial institution at which church funds are deposited, and securing the services of all staff at a salary authorized by the church. The board is "ordained to their work according to Acts 6:1-8 and 1 Timothy 3:8-13."2

The bylaws set forth the following procedure by which deacons are selected:

The bylaws also require that individual deacons "shall actively hold office provided they faithfully discharge their duties." Furthermore, the bylaws state that "[t]he [c]hurch may, for good and sufficient cause, remove any Deacon from office at any appropriate time it deems necessary."

Prior to April 20, 2014, the petitioners were deacons of the church. On April 20, 2014, the congregation of the church called a meeting at which the members of the church who attended unanimously passed a motion to remove the petitioners from their positions as deacons.

Following the April 20, 2014, meeting, a letter was sent to the board, purportedly on behalf of the church. The letter advised the board, in pertinent part:

The letter is signed "The Greenwood Missionary Baptist Church" and states "see attached for signatures." Included with the letter is an attachment entitled "Greenwood Missionary Baptist Church Church Meeting." The attachment is dated April 20, 2014, and contains 95 signatures; nothing before this Court indicates how many members are in the church.

On April 21, 2014, a letter was sent to each of the petitioners, purportedly on behalf of the church. Each letter stated, in pertinent part:

On April 24, 2014, Tatum sent a letter addressed to "Members of Greenwood Missionary Baptist Church," which stated, in pertinent part:

It is undisputed that Marlin King, Deborah Banks, and Helen King ("the plaintiffs") are members in good standing of the church. On June 5, 2014, the plaintiffs filed a complaint against the petitioners before Judge Thomas Young in the Macon Circuit Court ("the circuit court") requesting: 1) "an order enjoining [the petitioners] from taking any act as a member of [the board] of [the church]," and 2) "an [o]rder declaring that the recent votes of the congregation are valid and that [the petitioners] have been removed as members of [the board]." The plaintiffs filed their complaint "on behalf of themselves and the concerned members of [the church]."

On July 18, 2014, the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint, alleging that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. The petitioners alleged, in part, that "[t]his case involves religious and ecclesiastical matters concerning who and who is not a member of [the board] and Board of Trustees of [the church], which is a religious matter that should be decided by [the board] and Board of Trustees of [the church]."

On July 21, 2014, the circuit court held a hearing at which the petitioners' motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction was discussed. On July 25, 2014, the circuit court issued a preliminary injunction enjoining the petitioners from "undertaking any act as a member of [the board] of [the church] including any participation in Deacon meetings or performing any duties or responsibilities of a deacon while this order is in effect." On July 29, 2014, the circuit court denied the petitioners' motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

On August 27, 2014, the petitioners petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to vacate its order denying their motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; the petitioners did not ask this Court to direct the circuit court to vacate the preliminary injunction.

Before this Court the petitioners allege, in part, that the circuit court exceeded its discretion when it denied the petitioners' motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Specifically, the petitioners argue that the circuit court exceeded its discretion because, the petitioners argue, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution deprives the circuit court of subject-matter jurisdiction and because, the petitioners argue, the circuit court purportedly violated the Alabama Religious Freedom Amendment ("ARFA"), Ala. Const.1901, Art. I, § 3.01.

The petitioners allege that the First Amendment of the United States Constitution deprives the circuit court of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing as follows:

In Ex parte Bole, 103 So.3d 40 (Ala. 2012), this Court set out the standard for determining whether, under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, a state court has jurisdiction over a church dispute:

103 So.3d at 53 (quoting Abyssinia Missionary Baptist Church v. Nixon, 340 So.2d 746, 748 (Ala.1976)). See also Foster v. St. John's Baptist Church, Inc., 406 So.2d 389, 391 (Ala.1981) ("Alabama follows the general rule expressed in Odoms v. Woodall, 246 Ala. 427, 429, 20 So.2d 849 (1945): `The civil courts will not take jurisdiction of a controversy arising out of the removal of a minister if the right to the position is merely spiritual or ecclesiastical....'" (emphasis added)); Putman v. Vath, 340 So.2d 26, 28 (Ala.1976)(citing Odoms, supra). Additionally, Justice Murdock, then a judge on the Court of Civil Appeals, stated in his opinion concurring specially in McGlathery v. Richardson, 944 So.2d 968, 975 (Ala.Civ.App.2006)(Murdock, J., concurring specially):

In Hundley v. Collins, 131 Ala. 234, 32 So. 575 (1902), the Christian Church of Huntsville was "`independent, not subject to the control of any higher or other ecclesiastical judicature.'" 131 Ala. at 242, 32 So. at 578. Following a meeting of its congregation in which Orville M. Hundley was charged with "disorderly conduct in a great degree," Hundley was removed as a member and deacon. Id. Hundley filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in which he alleged that the Christian Church of Huntsville had improperly removed him as a member because, he asserted, among other reasons, he was not given notice of the meeting and the congregation did not vote on the charges of which he was accused. Id. The trial court denied Hundley's petition, and this Court affirmed its denial, stating:

Hundley, 131 Ala. at 242-43, 32 So. at 578 (emphasis added).

I recognize that "this Court has reviewed the actions of churches in expelling members or electing officers. See, e.g., Yates v. El Bethel Primitive Baptist Church, 847 So.2d 331 (Ala.2002); Abyssinia Missionary Baptist Church v. Nixon, 340 So.2d 746 (Ala.1976); In re Galilee Baptist Church, 279 Ala. 393, 186 So.2d 102 (1966)." Lott v. Eastern Shore Christian Ctr., 908 So.2d 922, 928 (Ala.2005). However, to the extent that Yates v. El Bethel Primitive Baptist Church, 847 So.2d 331 (Ala.2002), Abyssinia Missionary Baptist Church v. Nixon, 340 So.2d 746 (Ala.1976), and In re Galilee Baptist Church, 279 Ala. 393, 186 So.2d 102 (1966), stand for the proposition that a circuit court may apply judicial notions of due process to church proceedings when a church decides a purely ecclesiastical matter, this Court appears to have modified that proposition by recognizing Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States of America & Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976), in Lott. Lott involved the termination of church membership and the right of an allegedly wrongfully terminated member to examine the church's financial records. This Court stated:

Lott, 908 So.2d at 929-30 (footnote 3 omitted).

Thus, this Court's recognition of Milivojevich in Lott seems to have modified principles relied upon by this Court in Yates, Nixon, and In re Galilee Baptist Church. Accordingly, this Court has recognized that civil courts may not require churches to employ judicial notions of due process in disciplining, suspending, or expelling members; civil courts certainly may not review a church's actions in that regard when no property rights of the church are at issue.

The present case involves a purely ecclesiastical matter: Whether the petitioners remain deacons of the church. There is no property right at issue because there is no property right to the position of church deacon. According to the bylaws, the deacons are "ordained to their work according to Acts 6:1-8 and 1 Timothy 3:8-13." Deacons "shall actively hold office provided they faithfully discharge their duties," and "[t]he church may, for good and sufficient cause, remove any Deacon from office at any appropriate time it deems necessary." Neither the petitioners nor the plaintiffs allege that the petitioners had a property right in their positions as deacons. In fact, as set out above, the petitioners alleged in their motion to dismiss that "[t]his case involves religious and ecclesiastical matters concerning who and who is not a member of [the board] and Board of Trustees of [the church], which is a religious matter that should be decided by [the board] and Board of Trustees of [the church]." Thus, the right to hold the position of deacon in the church is "merely spiritual or ecclesiastical."

I note that it appears that church deacons have the authority to affect the church's property. However, that fact alone does not mean that a "property right" is at issue in this case. See Foster, 406 So.2d at 391 ("`The civil courts will not take jurisdiction of a controversy arising out of the removal of a minister if the right to the position is merely spiritual or ecclesiastical....'" (quoting Odoms v. Woodall, 246 Ala. 427, 429, 20 So.2d 849, 851 (1945)(emphasis added))). I further note that the plaintiffs have requested an injunction prohibiting the petitioners from continuing to serve as deacons. It appears that the plaintiffs are concerned that the petitioners may not respect the church's decision to remove them from their positions as deacons and may attempt to continue to exercise the authority of a deacon. Of course, should the petitioners do so, their actions would potentially affect the property of the church. However, that possibility does not transform this case into a "property right" case. The plaintiffs are merely asking that the petitioners, having been removed from their positions as deacons, be enjoined from taking unauthorized actions as deacons. The plaintiffs' request for an injunction is reasonable considering that, if the petitioners no longer have the authority to act as deacons, any action they take as deacons could constitute a crime against the church or a tort.

In their complaint, the plaintiffs request that the circuit court issue an order "declaring that the recent votes of the congregation are valid" and "declaring that ... [the petitioners] have been removed as members of [the board]." I understand this to mean that the plaintiffs are requesting the circuit court to determine whether the church properly followed its own procedures when its members voted on April 20, 2014, to remove the petitioners as deacons and, based on that determination, to declare who is and is not a member of the board. Under Lott and Hundley, supra, and because who holds the position of deacon in the church is a purely ecclesiastical matter that does not involve a property right of the petitioners, the circuit court lacks jurisdiction to do so.

However, the mere fact that the subject matter of a church dispute concerns an ecclesiastical or spiritual issue does not preclude a circuit court from recognizing a decision rendered by the highest adjudicatory body of a church and, based on that decision, enjoining persons from taking unauthorized actions on behalf of the church.

Hundley v. Collins, 131 Ala. at 246, 32 So. at 579(quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 722-25, 20 L.Ed. 666 (1871)). See also Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713, 96 S.Ct. 2372 ("[T]he general rule [is] that religious controversies are not the proper subject of civil court inquiry, and that a civil court must accept the ecclesiastical decisions of church tribunals as it finds them.").

The remainder of the plaintiffs' complaint requests "an order enjoining [the petitioners] from taking any act as a member of [the board] of [the church]." This request does not require the circuit court to decide a purely ecclesiastical or spiritual matter. Instead, this request merely requires the circuit court to recognize the outcome of a dispute purportedly resolved by the highest adjudicatory body in the church and act in light thereof. Specifically, if the plaintiffs demonstrate that the highest adjudicatory body of the church determined that the petitioners were no longer deacons, the circuit court would have jurisdiction to enjoin the petitioners from performing unauthorized acts as deacons, which actions, as stated above, could constitute a crime against the church or a tort.

Admittedly, however, it is unclear whether the April 20, 2014, vote constituted a decision by the highest adjudicatory body of the church. In a Baptist church, the majority of the congregation is the highest adjudicatory body, unless the church bylaws provide otherwise. McKinney v. Twenty-Fifth Ave. Baptist Church, Inc., 514 So.2d 837, 839 (Ala.1987) ("In each Baptist church the majority of the members of the church control the business of the church."); Williams v. Jones, 258 Ala. 59, 62, 61 So.2d 101, 103 (1952) ("Each Baptist church is within itself a pure democracy; it is the right of the majority to rule; the will of the majority having been expressed, it becomes the minority to submit; church action is final." (emphasis added)); Gewin v. Mt. Pilgrim Baptist Church, 166 Ala. 345, 349, 51 So. 947, 948 (1909) ("The Baptist church is congregational in its policy. It is democratic in its organization. It is the right of each congregation to rule itself in accordance with the law of the church. The will of the majority having been expressed, it becomes the minority to submit. There are no appellate judicatories." (emphasis added)). The bylaws vest governmental authority in the church members, and "as such it is subject to the control of no other ecclesiastical organization." None of the church's "boards, committees or officers can usurp [the members'] executive, governmental or policy-making powers except as provided for in these by-laws." And, "the church" may remove the deacons "at any appropriate time it deems necessary." Thus, in the church, the highest adjudicatory body of the church with respect to removing a deacon is a majority of its members.

Furthermore, on April 20, 2014, members of the church held a meeting and voted to remove the petitioners as deacons of the church. It is undisputed that the motion to remove passed 95-O. However, nothing before this Court suggests that the 95 church members voting in support of the motion to remove the petitioners as deacons represented a majority of the members of the church. Thus, it is not clear from the facts before this Court that the motion passed at the April 20, 2014, meeting was a decision by the highest adjudicatory body of the church and, therefore, capable of recognition by the circuit court.

This lack of clarity, however, does not require that this Court grant the petitioners' petition. See Ex parte Board of Trs. /Dirs. & /or Deacons of Old Elam Baptist Church, 983 So.2d 1079, 1093 (Ala.2007)(holding that the trial court had jurisdiction for the limited purpose of determining whether the appropriate authority in the church had terminated the plaintiff's membership and stating: "As these proceedings go forward, the trial court should focus its inquiry on whether `the expulsion was the act of the authority within the church having the power to order it.'"). Furthermore, under the standard of review applicable to a petition for a writ of mandamus, the petitioners are the ones who must demonstrate that they have a clear legal right to the relief they seek. The petitioners have not demonstrated that the April 20, 2014, meeting was not a decision by the highest adjudicatory body of the church. Accordingly, the petitioners have failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to the relief sought.

Next, the petitioners argue that the circuit court exceeded its discretion when it denied the petitioners' motion to dismiss the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because, the petitioners argue, the circuit court, in failing to grant the motion to dismiss, violated ARFA. Section V of ARFA provides, in pertinent part:

§ 3.01, Ala. Const.1901. The petitioners' argument, however, is based on a faulty premise.

The petitioners argue that, in order to grant the relief the plaintiffs seek, the circuit court must "interpret ambiguous bylaws of the church and ... decide internal disputes of the church, without making the church a party to the case and without giving the church an opportunity to decide the interpretation of its own bylaws and to decide its own internal disputes." As set forth above, that is not correct; in fact, the opposite is true. Should the circuit court determine that the plaintiffs are entitled to an injunction, the circuit court would not have to decide any ecclesiastical matter of the church, but would simply be recognizing the decision of the highest adjudicatory body of the church and enjoining the petitioners. As discussed above, the circuit court does not have jurisdiction to apply judicial notions of due process to the church's vote, but it does have the jurisdiction to recognize the decision of the church. The plaintiffs need not prove that the decision was validly reached following standards of due process — that is irrelevant in this case. The plaintiffs must demonstrate only that the decision was reached by the highest adjudicatory body of the church. Once that fact is established, the circuit court may protect the jurisdiction of the church by recognizing its decision and providing any necessary legal protections. Accordingly, the circuit court has not violated ARFA by denying the petitioners' motion to dismiss because the circuit court has not made a decision burdening the petitioners' freedom of religion. Instead, at this point in the proceedings, based on the facts asserted by the plaintiffs and uncontroverted by the petitioners, the circuit court has upheld the jurisdiction of the church.

Moreover, the petitioners do not cite any authority in support of their argument that the circuit court's decision denying their motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction infringed upon the petitioners' freedom of religion. Assuming the petitioners have been removed from their positions as deacons, the decision to remove the petitioners from their positions was made by the church; no action taken by the circuit court removed the petitioners from those positions. As a result, it is unclear what religious freedom of the petitioners could possibly be burdened by the circuit court. Additionally, although I recognize that the circuit court issued a preliminary injunction enjoining the petitioners from acting as deacons in the church, the petitioners do not make any argument concerning that injunction. Thus, because the petitioners have failed to provide any authority for their argument that the circuit court's decisions have infringed upon the petitioners' freedom of religion, I am not convinced that they have demonstrated a clear legal right to the relief sought.

Further still, I question the applicability of ARFA to the present case. Section VI of ARFA provides that ARFA applies to "all government rules and implementations thereof, whether statutory or otherwise, and whether adopted before or after the effective date of this amendment." Section IV of ARFA defines "rule" as: "[a]ny government statute, regulation, ordinance, administrative provision, ruling guideline, requirement or any statement of law whatever." Pursuant to the plain language of ARFA, a circuit court's decision denying a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction does not appear to be either a "rule" or the implementation of a "rule" as defined by ARFA.

Additionally, a circuit court's decision denying a motion to dismiss is not an "implementation" of any rule of civil procedure; this is too expansive a reading of ARFA. There are 12 states with provisions similar to ARFA. James W. Wright Jr., Making State Religious Freedom Restoration Amendments Effective, 61 Ala. L.Rev. 425, 426 (2010). None of those states has interpreted its respective provisions as "implementing" a rule of civil procedure.

I recognize that our caselaw concerning the issues presented in this case is convoluted; nonetheless, a single, overarching principle is evident: When the highest adjudicatory body of a church resolves a purely ecclesiastical matter, civil courts must recognize that decision as final and may not apply judicial notions of due process to the church proceedings by which that decision was reached. After recognizing the church's decision, the civil court may then act to protect the church by enjoining unauthorized actions.

Such an act by a civil court does not impinge the jurisdictional boundary between the church and civil government; it solidifies it. By recognizing the church's decision as final, a civil court may act to protect a church from the actions of dissatisfied, dissociated members — an act that lies within a civil court's jurisdiction and outside the jurisdiction of a church. As the plaintiffs aptly stated in their argument before the circuit court:

Thus, for the reasons set out above, I agree with this Court's decision to deny the petition for a writ of mandamus.

MOORE, Chief Justice (dissenting).

I dissent from the decision of the Court denying the petition for a writ of mandamus because I believe that the petitioners have established a clear legal right to a dismissal of this action, which involves an ecclesiastical dispute. The issue is whether a circuit court may judicially enforce the purported will of a church's highest governing authority or instead allow to remain in church leadership those whom the church purports to remove. The circuit court may do neither.

I. The Jurisdictional Separation of Church and State

Courts refrain from inserting themselves into disputes between rival church factions. Davis v. Ross, 255 Ala. 668, 671, 53 So.2d 544, 546 (1951). "As is the case with all churches, the courts will not assume jurisdiction, in fact ha[ve] none, to resolve disputes regarding their spiritual or ecclesiastical affairs." Abyssinia Missionary Baptist Church v. Nixon, 340 So.2d 746, 748 (Ala.1976).4 If a church's decision that a plaintiff seeks to have enforced implicates an ecclesiastical dispute, the courts are powerless to intervene, as I discussed in my special writings in Yates v. El Bethel Primitive Baptist Church, 847 So.2d 331, 354 (Ala.2002) (Moore, C.J., dissenting), and Burns Church, Inc. v. Alabama District Council of Assemblies of God, Inc., 168 So.3d 1188, 1192 (Ala.2014) (Moore, C.J., dissenting).

I noted in my special writing in Yates, 847 So.2d at 354, that the jurisdictional separation of church and state ultimately originates from an acknowledgment of the sovereignty of God. Historically, church-state separation was a tenet of English common law, which later passed into American jurisprudence and became incorporated into the religion clauses of the First Amendment. 847 So.2d at 352-53 (Moore, C.J., dissenting). Church-state separation, as part of the common law of England, which our legislature expressly adopted as "the rule of decisions," binds the Alabama judiciary. See § 1-3-1, Ala. Code 1975.5

II. An Internal Church Dispute

The respondents, the plaintiffs below, argue that this case is about a mere "procedural matter" and not an ecclesiastical matter. However, any decision by the circuit court regarding the ability of the petitioners to serve as deacons in the church necessarily requires the court to resolve a number of antecedent issues that are inextricably intertwined with church governance.6 These issues are, at a minimum, (1) the meaning of the church bylaws, (2) the structure of church governance, and (3) the propriety of the procedure leading to the votes to remove the petitioners from the board of deacons. The circuit court's preliminary injunction illustrates the danger inherent in determining a question of church leadership.

A. Construing Church Bylaws

Resolving this dispute would require the judiciary to construe the bylaws of Greenwood Missionary Baptist Church. In its order entering a preliminary injunction in the instant case, the circuit court acknowledged that the provision in the bylaws for removal of deacons is ambiguous, stating that "[t]he Bylaws do not give this Court any guidance as to what exactly that sentence means." Nevertheless, the court disregarded the petitioners' allegation that only the pastor or the board of deacons may call a meeting to remove a deacon because "[t]hat language does not appear in the Bylaws." The court interpreted the bylaws to determine that the plaintiffs showed a likelihood of success on the merits. However, to do so is to invade the autonomy of Greenwood Missionary Baptist Church to have the final say on the meaning of its own rules of governance. The United States Supreme Court warned courts against presuming to interpret church-governing documents:

Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 733-34, 3 Wall. 679, 20 L.Ed. 666 (1871) (second emphasis added). "`Since the opinion in Watson, the Supreme Court has consistently refused to address church controversy.'" Ex parte Bole, 103 So.3d 40, 55 (Ala.2012) (quoting Yaggie v. Indiana-Kentucky Synod Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, 860 F.Supp. 1194, 1197 (W.D.Ky.1994)).

Construction of a church-governing document by the court is particularly invasive when the document is ambiguous. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for United States of America and Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 723, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976) ("The constitutional provisions of the American-Canadian Diocese were not so express that the civil courts could enforce them without engaging in a searching and therefore impermissible inquiry into church polity."). Additionally, "canon law [is] admittedly not always consistent." 426 U.S. at 718, 96 S.Ct. 2372. Resolving such issues and applying church law to a church dispute is simply beyond the competence of civil courts. 426 U.S. at 714 n. 8, 96 S.Ct. 2372.7

B. Resolving Issues of Church Governance

Not only would a resolution of this case require the circuit court to construe church-governing documents, but, having done so, the court would necessarily have to determine ecclesiastical questions of church polity. Specifically, the court must determine the nature of the governmental structure of Greenwood Missionary Baptist Church, the entity or entities exercising ultimate authority over the church, and the interrelationship between the congregation and the board of deacons, both of which purport to act under color of church law. In short, this action requires the court to referee a power struggle between the congregation and three deacons, with the pastor caught in the middle.

In a case involving an internal church dispute over the ownership of real property, the United States Supreme Court, in the following probing analysis, explained the inherent pitfalls:

Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 605, 99 S.Ct. 3020, 61 L.Ed.2d 775 (1979) (emphases added).8 Contrary to the plaintiffs' suggestion that matters of church governmental procedure are within the cognizance of the courts, analyzing such procedure entangles the courts in issues of an inherently ecclesiastical nature.

In briefing before this Court, the parties disputed whether language contained in the bylaws precludes members of the congregation from suing each other. Neither this Court nor the circuit court is competent to answer that question or any other question about the meaning of a religious document. On the other hand, churches are equipped to apply articles of faith. Setting secular standards for construing the governing documents of religious organizations is as perilous an endeavor as setting standards for evaluating claims of clergy malpractice:

Bailey v. Faulkner, 940 So.2d 247, 259 (Ala.2006) (Parker, J., concurring). When confronted with a request to restore an elder whom a church had expelled, this Court stated:

Hundley v. Collins, 131 Ala. 234, 243, 32 So. 575, 578 (1902) (emphasis added). When the judiciary purports to interpret church-governing documents, it necessarily excludes all religious implications from the text, regardless of the church's intent in adopting the text, in a manifest affront to religious freedom.

C. Resolving Procedural Propriety of Church Meeting

In addition to determining church polity, a resolution of this matter by the circuit court would also require the court to scrutinize whether the meeting held by the congregation at which the deacons were removed was procedurally proper.9 Such an inquiry is unconstitutional for reasons similar to those previously discussed.

Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 708-09, 96 S.Ct. 2372 (emphasis added). "Milivojevich, read in its entirety, holds that civil court review of ecclesiastical decisions of church tribunals, particularly those pertaining to the hiring or firing of clergy, are in themselves an `extensive inquiry' into religious law and practice, and hence forbidden by the First Amendment." Young v. Northern Illinois Conference of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184, 187 (7th Cir.1994). Although Milivojevich involved a church with a hierarchical government structure, "the same considerations apply, regardless of whether the church has a congregational, rather than a hierarchical, form of government." Lott v. Eastern Shore Christian Ctr., 908 So.2d 922, 930 n. 4 and 930 (Ala.2005) ("`[T]his Court must not interfere with the fundamental ecclesiastical concern of determining who is and who is not [a Church] member.'" (quoting Burgess v. Rock Creek Baptist Church, 734 F.Supp. 30, 33 (D.D.C.1990))).

D. Giving Effect to a Purported Church Decision

The plaintiffs argue that Greenwood Missionary Baptist Church has, through its congregation, already interpreted its bylaws and that the plaintiffs merely want to enforce that interpretation as conclusive. The principle that the judiciary must treat a decision by the church's highest adjudicatory body as final and binding arose in the context of a party seeking to have a church's decision overturned. See Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 706-07, 96 S.Ct. 2372 (involving a defrocked bishop who sued, in part, "to have himself declared the true Diocesan Bishop"); Hundley, supra (involving an expelled member seeking to compel his restoration to church membership); and Lott, 908 So.2d at 924 (involving a church member who sought a temporary restraining order to prevent his church from disciplining him). The instant case, however, presents the inverse situation: Supporters of a decision purporting to be that of the church seek to have the church's decision affirmed against parties adversely affected. The statement by this Court and the Supreme Court of the United States that a church's decision is final and binding means only that the judiciary lacks power to reverse a church's decision; it does not mean that the judiciary possesses power to affirm that same decision.

A court's involvement in a religious matter is not sanitized merely because the court purports to ratify, rather than annul, a church's decision. What violates church autonomy is not the substance of the court's ultimate determination, but the judiciary's very participation in the intra-church conflict.

Note, Religious Societies-Applicability of Hierarchical Church Law to Property Disputes Resolved by Civil Courts, 30 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 1102, 1104 (1955) (emphasis added). In backing a church's decision with the force of law, a civil court risks running afoul of both Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause principles.

Crowder v. Southern Baptist Convention, 828 F.2d 718, 721 (11th Cir.1987) (emphasis added). See also Little v. First Baptist Church, Crestwood, 475 U.S. 1148, 1150, 106 S.Ct. 1802, 90 L.Ed.2d 347 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("This participation in the decisionmaking of an ecclesiastical body is both dangerous and unwarranted. Courts have no business `helping' a religious organization to make its wishes known.").

As its name implies, subject-matter jurisdiction refers to the power of a court to entertain the subject matter of a given lawsuit. I agree with Justice Parker that the subject matter of this dispute involves, at its core, an ecclesiastical controversy. I also agree with the principle that "the courts will not assume jurisdiction, in fact ha[ve] none, to resolve disputes regarding [churches'] spiritual or ecclesiastical affairs." Nixon, 340 So.2d at 748. A lack of subject-matter jurisdiction does not mean that a court has power to grant relief to one party but not to the other. Church-state separation does not permit a trial court to affirm a church's decision when the church is the plaintiff, while requiring the court to dismiss the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction when a disaffected member or officer is the plaintiff. To grant relief to either party in a purely ecclesiastical matter is to assume jurisdiction where none exists. "[I]f a trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, it has no power to take any action other than to dismiss the complaint." Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Transp., 978 So.2d 17, 26 (Ala.2007) (emphasis added). See also Hundley, 131 Ala. at 246, 32 So. at 579 (affirming the trial court's dismissal of the underlying action). Dismissal is what the petitioners request today, and they have a clear legal right to it.

E. Inadequacy of Other Remedies

The plaintiffs also state that they "have no other avenue to enforce the Church's decision to remove the Petitioners." The circuit court determined that the prospect of irreparable harm justified its preliminary injunction in part because "alleged obligations of the Church are not being met," "[t]he pastor is not being paid," and "[t]he medical insurance for him and his family [has] lapsed." While I sympathize with the plight of those impacted by this unfortunate situation, the judicial branch does not exist to resolve every dispute. "[E]ach church is a law unto itself in the management of its own affairs." Barton v. Fitzpatrick, 187 Ala. 273, 278, 65 So. 390, 392 (1914).

The Alabama Constitution vests our unified judicial system with "the judicial power." § 139, Ala. Const.1901. This power is limited in scope and is constrained by "God-ordained jurisdictional boundaries." Ex parte Christopher, 145 So.3d 60, 79 (Ala.2013) (Moore, C.J., concurring specially). I noted the following in my special writing in Christopher:

145 So.3d at 79 (Moore, C.J., concurring specially). "[T]he nature of church and state as distinct spheres of government precludes state oversight of matters ... that belong to the jurisdiction of the church." Bailey, 940 So.2d at 258 (Parker, J., concurring specially).

Ultimately, the lack of an adequate remedy in the church setting is an insufficient condition for judicial interference. As one court candidly observed: "Even if wrongs exist in the ecclesiastical setting, and the administration of a church is inadequate to provide a remedy, the preservation of the free exercise of religion is deemed so important a principle that it overshadows the inequities which may result from its liberal application." Hawkins v. Friendship Missionary Baptist Church, 69 S.W.3d 756, 758 n. 3 (Tex.App.2002).

III. Conclusion

In determining whether civil courts have cognizance to resolve a church dispute, "[i]t is not enough that a schism or division has developed among the members on account of differences of opinion in the interpretation and application of the declared doctrines and practices of the society; such matters must be settled by the society for itself in its own way." Williams v. Jones, 258 Ala. 59, 62, 61 So.2d 101, 104 (1952). I believe that the instant action invites judicial interference with the sovereign authority of Greenwood Missionary Baptist Church to settle its internal conflict in its own way. I would decline that invitation and instruct the circuit court to do the same. Accordingly, I would grant the petition in part and instruct the circuit court to dismiss the case for want of subject-matter jurisdiction. I therefore respectfully dissent.

MURDOCK, Justice (dissenting).

I respectfully dissent. I believe mandamus relief should be granted on the ground that one or more parties necessary and indispensable to the adjudication of this matter have not been included in this action. See Rule 19, Ala. R. Civ. P.