MOORE, Judge.

Beverly Chancy appeals from summary judgments entered by the Autauga Circuit Court ("the trial court"). We affirm in part and reverse in part.

Facts and Procedural History

On February 25, 2008, Chancy filed a complaint in the trial court against Johnson Properties, L.L.C., Wayne M. Johnson, Chancy Lakes Homeowners Association, Inc., Brad Wiggins, Kathleen Wiggins, Cedric Butler, Bridgette Butler, Joseph A. Wolf, Cathee W. Wolf, Roger P. Traywick, Andrea Traywick, Scott Post, Brent Post, Christy C. Post, and Buffi Post; Chancy also sued a number of fictitiously named defendants. Chancy asserted in her complaint that, in September 2003, Johnson had approached Chancy with a proposal to purchase from Chancy approximately 40 acres of property in Autauga County ("the subject property") in order to develop a subdivision and that Chancy and Johnson had negotiated the terms of an agreement for the sale of that property.

According to Chancy, the terms of the agreement for the sale of the subject property included the reservation of an access easement ("the easement") allowing Chancy to access approximately 197 acres of property that she owned that lay adjacent to the subject property. Chancy further asserted that she and Johnson had agreed that the easement would be shown on any proposed subdivision plat, that it would be addressed in the restrictive covenants that would bind the lots within the subdivision, and that it would be designed and maintained to meet the City of Prattville's requirements for a public road. Chancy asserted that she and Johnson had also agreed that any proposed subdivision plat involving the subject property would first be submitted to Chancy for her approval. Chancy further asserted that the terms of the agreement were memorialized in a written document labeled "Agreement." Chancy attached the Agreement, signed by both Chancy and Johnson, to her complaint.

Chancy asserted that, pursuant to the Agreement, Johnson recorded restrictive covenants for the subdivision, which was named Chancy Lake, in the Autauga Probate Office in a document entitled "Declaration of Protective Covenants for Chancy Lake" ("the Declaration"). Chancy attached a copy of the Declaration, signed by Johnson as manager of Johnson Properties and notarized on April 2, 2004, to the complaint. Attached to the Declaration was a survey/plat that depicted the properties bound by the covenants and the location of the easement. The Declaration stated, in pertinent part:

Chancy asserted that Johnson and Johnson Properties proceeded to sell parcels of property in the subdivision without first obtaining Chancy's approval as agreed upon. She further asserted in the complaint that a gate had been erected by the Chancy Lake Homeowners Association ("the Association") at the entrance of the subdivision, that the gate was always locked and could only be opened with a code, and that members of the Association had withheld the access code from Chancy, thereby denying her access to her adjoining property. Chancy asserted that the easement now functions as a drainage culvert for the subdivision and as an overflow ditch for the subdivision pond and that the easement is blocked by power poles and water-drainage infrastructure. Moreover, according to Chancy, the easement was never paved or improved and, thus, does not meet the City of Prattville's requirements for a public road. According to Chancy, in October 2007, the members of the Association executed a document entitled "Declaration of Amendment to the Declaration of Protective Covenants of Chancy Lake" ("the Amendment"), which deleted Article X of the Declaration in its entirety; the Amendment also deleted Section 5.1, Article V, of the Declaration. A copy of the Amendment, which had been signed by each of the members of the Association, was attached to Chancy's complaint.

Chancy asserted claims of breach of contract and fraudulent misrepresentation against Johnson and Johnson Properties; a claim of "interference with access easement/intentional violation of [Chancy's] property rights" against the Association and each of the members of the Association; and claims of continuing trespass, nuisance, invasion of her right to privacy, and the tort of outrage against all the parties named in her complaint. Chancy also sought injunctive relief and a judgment declaring that Chancy had an easement by adverse possession, by prescription, by necessity, or by implication.

The members of the Association, Brad Wiggins, Kathleen Wiggins, Cedric Butler, Bridgette Butler, Joseph A. Wolf, Cathee W. Wolf, Roger P. Traywick, Andrea Traywick, Scott Post, Brent Post, Christy C. Post, and Buffi Post (hereinafter sometimes collectively referred to as "the Association members"), and the Association filed a number of separate and joint answers to Chancy's complaint. On April 4, 2008, Johnson filed an answer to the complaint and a motion to dismiss; on June 5, 2008, the trial court entered an order granting Johnson's motion to dismiss on Chancy's claim of the tort of outrage.

The Association members and the Association filed a number of separate and joint summary-judgment motions. A number of the Association members filed affidavits in support of those motions.

Kathleen Wiggins stated in her affidavit that she and her husband, Brad, had purchased Lot 1 of the Chancy Lake subdivision from Olivia Post in April 2005. Bridgette Butler filed her affidavit, in which she stated that she and her husband, Cedric, had purchased Lot 2 of the Chancy Lake subdivision on August 8, 2007, from Keith Wheeler and Heather Wheeler and that the Butlers' deed had contained an "erroneous legal description" because it included a "thirty (30) foot easement for ingress/egress." She stated that Johnson and/or Johnson Properties had executed a "Corrective Deed" on November 1, 2007, which changed the type of easement that existed on their property from an easement for ingress/egress to a "thirty (30) foot drainage easement."

Joseph A. Wolf filed an affidavit in which he stated that he and his wife, Cathee, had purchased Lot 3 of the Chancy Lake subdivision from Rick Church in October 2006 and that the deed to their property contains a 20-foot drainage easement, although, he stated, it is his "understanding that this is incorrect and has been corrected by Johnson Properties, LLC." He further stated that the gate controlling access to the Chancy Lake subdivision had already been installed and was functional at the time they purchased their lot.

Roger Traywick and his wife, Andrea, stated in their respective affidavits that they had purchased Lot 5 of the Chancy Lake subdivision from Johnson Properties in April 2004. Scott Post and his wife, Christy, both stated in their respective affidavits that they had purchased Lot 6 of the Chancy Lake subdivision from the Traywicks in September 2005. Brent Post and his wife, Buffi, both stated in their affidavits that they had purchased Lot 7 of the Chancy Lake subdivision from Johnson Properties in May 2005.

Each of the Association members asserted that they had not made any contracts or agreements with Chancy regarding the purchase of their lots or any future use or restriction on the use of their properties or common areas in the subdivision and that, at the time they purchased their respective lots, the Declaration had already been prepared. Additionally, they asserted that their deeds did not contain an easement allowing Chancy to cross their property or other subdivision property and that they had not altered the drainage of Chancy Lake, which is located within the subdivision.

Johnson Properties filed an answer on September 22, 2008. Also on September 22, 2008, Johnson and Johnson Properties filed a joint motion for a summary judgment. On September 23, 2008, Johnson Properties filed an amended answer and a counterclaim against Chancy.

On October 15, 2008, Chancy filed a response to the summary-judgment motions filed by the Association members and the Association.1 In that response, Chancy conceded that those parties were entitled to a summary judgment on her claims of breach of contract, fraudulent misrepresentation, invasion of her right to privacy, and the tort of outrage. With regard to her claim of "interference with access easement/intentional violation of [Chancy's] property rights," Chancy asserted that an easement had been properly created by the Declaration, that the Amendment did not properly extinguish or revoke the easement, and, thus, that the movants' assertions to the contrary were without merit. Chancy argued, therefore, that whether the movants' revocation of the easement was a proper termination of the easement created a genuine issue of material fact. Chancy also asserted that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the blocking of the easement was proper. Chancy attached her affidavit, in which she stated that she had not approved the Declaration.

On September 30, 2008, Chancy filed an answer to the counterclaim filed by Johnson Properties. Also on September 30, 2008, Chancy filed a response to Johnson and Johnson Properties' summary-judgment motion.

On February 24, 2009, the trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of the Association, the Traywicks, and all the Posts (sometimes hereinafter referred to collectively as "the Association appellees") on all counts in Chancy's complaint. On March 11, 2009, the Butlers filed a motion for a ruling on their summary-judgment motion. Chancy filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the Association appellees on March 11, 2009. The Association appellees filed a response to Chancy's motion to alter, amend, or vacate the summary judgment on March 16, 2009. The Wolfs filed a response to Chancy's motion to alter, amend, or vacate on March 17, 2009.2

Chancy filed an amended complaint on March 23, 2009. The Butlers filed an amended answer on March 24, 2009. The Association appellees filed a motion to dismiss Chancy's amended complaint or, in the alternative, for a judgment on the pleadings on March 27, 2009. On that same date, the Association appellees filed an answer to Chancy's amended complaint and a motion to dismiss the amended complaint. The Wolfs filed an answer to Chancy's amended complaint on March 30, 2009.

On June 5, 2009, the trial court entered an order denying Chancy's motion to alter, amend, or vacate the summary judgment entered in favor of the Association appellees; granting the summary-judgment motions filed by the Wolfs, the Wigginses, and the Butlers; denying Johnson and Johnson Properties' summary-judgment motion; and granting the motions to dismiss Chancy's amended complaint filed by the Wolfs and the Association appellees. On June 25, 2009, the Butlers filed a motion to dismiss Chancy's amended complaint or, in the alternative, for a judgment on the pleadings. On June 25, 2009, Chancy filed a motion for certification of the summary judgments pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., and a motion to stay the proceedings at the trial-court level; those motions were granted by the trial court on July 13, 2009.

Chancy filed her notice of appeal to the Alabama Supreme Court on August 13, 2009; that court transferred the appeal to this court, pursuant to § 12-2-7(6), Ala. Code 1975.

Standard of Review

Prince v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 804 So.2d 1102, 1103-04 (Ala.Civ.App.2001).

Discussion

Chancy argues on appeal that the trial court erred by entering a summary judgment in favor of the Association and the Association members, on her claims of interference with her access easement, intentional violation of her property rights, trespass, and nuisance and on her claims seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. Because Chancy does not appeal the summary judgment in favor of the Association and the Association members (hereinafter sometimes collectively referred to as "the appellees") on her claims of breach of contract, fraudulent misrepresentation, invasion of the right to privacy, and the tort of outrage, we affirm the trial court's summary judgment as to those claims.

With regard to the remaining claims of interference with her access easement, intentional violation of her property rights, nuisance, and trespass and on her claims seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, Chancy asserts on appeal that she had been expressly conveyed an easement via the Declaration and that that easement was never properly terminated. Thus, Chancy argues that there remains a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the Association members' attempt to revoke the easement by recording the Amendment was a proper termination of her easement and that, therefore, summary judgment was improper.

In Bruner v. Walker, 366 So.2d 695, 696-97 (Ala.1978), the Alabama Supreme Court stated:

Alabama law has recognized that an easement may be created by contract. See Cleek v. Povia, 515 So.2d 1246 (Ala.1987) (holding that an oral agreement to create an easement was enforceable). In McCarthy v. Nicrosi, 72 Ala. 332 (1882), the Alabama Supreme Court determined that an easement had been created by a written contract between the parties that stipulated that a sewer should be constructed at the joint expense of the parties. An easement was created in favor of the owner of the upper lot to allow the water to drain across the lower lot. Id.

In the present case, Chancy and Johnson stipulated in the Agreement, a written contract signed by both Chancy and Johnson, that Johnson would ensure access to Chancy's adjoining property through the subject property. Thus, Johnson purchased the subject property subject to an access easement. See Bruner, supra. In turn, Johnson recorded the Declaration, which referred in Article X to an "easement for ingress/ingress" in favor of Chancy's adjoining property.

To the extent that the appellees3 assert that an easement was not created by the Declaration, we look to this court's discussion of "the proper interpretation of agreements creating licenses or easements" in Blackburn v. Lefebvre, 976 So.2d 482, 489-91 (Ala.Civ.App.2007):

Based on the discussion in Blackburn, we conclude that the Declaration created an easement in favor of Chancy. The Declaration is a written document that indicates that the covenants therein will run with the land and be binding. The Declaration also references an "easement for ingress/egress" as recorded on the plat for the Chancy Lake subdivision, which indicates that it is an interest in land, rather than permission to perform certain acts thereon. Moreover, to the extent that the conditions for modification or termination of any of the provisions in the Declaration outlined in Article XI conflict with the intent to create a binding easement expressed in Article X and thereby create an ambiguity, reference to the Agreement indicates that Johnson's intent was to create a binding easement.

The appellees assert that, to the extent the Declaration created an easement in favor of Chancy, that easement was subject to Article XI of the Declaration and, thus, the Amendment properly terminated that easement. Chancy argues, however, that the easement could not be terminated by the Amendment. We agree with Chancy.

"`An easement, although an incorporeal right, . . . is yet properly denominated an interest in land, . . . and the expression "estate or interest in lands" is broad enough to include such rights; for an easement must be an interest in or over the soil.'" West Town Plaza Assocs., Ltd. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 619 So.2d 1290, 1295 (Ala.1993) (quoting Oates v. Town of Headland, 154 Ala. 503, 505, 45 So. 910, 911 (1908)). A landowner cannot convey a greater interest in property than he possesses. See Benefield v. Benefield, 953 So.2d 418, 425 (Ala.Civ.App.2006) (where widow possessed a life estate, her purported conveyance of the property in fee simple to her son was ineffective; she conveyed only her life estate); Bonner v. Pugh, 376 So.2d 1354, 1357 (Ala.1979) (when a person who has only a life estate purports to transfer an estate greater than the life estate, his or her conveyee acquires, as against the owner of a future interest in such land, no right, privilege, power, or immunity greater than those possessed by the conveyer).

By virtue of the Agreement, Johnson owned an interest in the subject property that was subject to the easement in favor of Chancy. The Agreement did not assign any limitations to the easement, and, thus, Johnson did not possess a right to limit the easement without Chancy's consent. See Romar Dev. Co. v. Gulf View Mgmt. Corp., 644 So.2d 462, 465 (Ala.1994) ("[B]ecause [the] contract created the easement, that contract also defines the extent of the easement."). Because Johnson could not convey a greater interest in the subject property than he possessed, he could not convey the subject property with the limitation imposed by Article XI of the Declaration, which provided a manner of modifying or terminating the easement without Chancy's consent. See Ex parte Folsom, 42 So.3d 732 (Ala.2009) (where easement was not ambiguous and granted rights over an area of real property, owner of servient estate was not entitled to unilaterally modify the terms of the easement), and West Town Plaza, 619 So.2d at 1296 ("`The owner of the servient estate must abstain from acts interfering with the proper enjoyment of the easement by the owner of the dominant estate. . . .'" (quoting Brown v. Alabama Power Co., 275 Ala. 467, 470, 156 So.2d 153, 154 (1963))). We conclude, therefore, that to the extent Article XI of the Declaration attempted to limit the easement, that provision of the Declaration is void.4 We conclude also that the Amendment did not terminate the easement and that Chancy maintains an easement across the subject property.

Although we conclude that Article XI of the Declaration did not act to limit the easement, we note that the conveyance of the easement without limitation in the Declaration remains valid. "As this Court has held before, `an ineffectual attempt to convey a greater estate or interest would not invalidate the conveyance of that property conveyable.' Francis v. Sandlin, 150 Ala. 583, 587, 43 So. 829, 830 (1907)." Ex parte Powell, 763 So.2d 230, 233 (Ala.1999).

Because we conclude that Chancy possesses an express easement across the subject property, we reverse the trial court's summary judgments in favor of the appellees on Chancy's claims of interference with her access easement and intentional violation of her property rights and her claim seeking injunctive relief, each of which are dependent on her possession of an express easement. Additionally, our determination that Chancy possesses an express easement obviates the need to address her argument that the trial court erred by entering summary judgments in favor of the appellees on her claim seeking a declaratory judgment, which requested only a declaration that Chancy possessed an easement by adverse possession, by prescription, by necessity, or by implication and a judicial determination as to the rights and responsibilities of the parties concerning the easement.

Chancy last argues on appeal that the trial court erred in entering summary judgments in favor of the appellees on her claims of nuisance and trespass. Those claims both rely on Chancy's assertion that a lake exists in the middle of the Chancy Lake subdivision and that the appellees have intentionally altered or interfered with the natural drainage of that lake, causing it to drain through the easement reserved in favor of Chancy and onto Chancy's adjacent property. The appellees argue that Chancy has presented no substantial evidence indicating that the appellees have caused drainage onto her property or that damage has resulted therefrom; the appellees submitted affidavits stating that they had not taken any actions to interfere with the natural drainage of Chancy Lake onto Chancy's property.

Chancy cites Johnson's affidavit, which states that Johnson Properties began construction of a surface-water retention pond after purchasing the subject property, and she concedes that Johnson is the party that altered the natural flow of drainage from Chancy Lake. She asserts, however, that each current lot owner, i.e., the Association members, owns a portion of the lake and that they have made no effort to halt or correct the artificial flow of water toward Chancy's adjacent property.

Chancy cites Carlton v. Hollon, 4 So.3d 439 (Ala.2008), for the proposition that the lot owners may be held liable for failing to correct the drainage when they have had reasonable time to correct the condition. In Carlton, Carlton and Hutchinson owned real property adjacent to property owned by the Hollons. 4 So.3d at 440. Carlton and Hutchinson sued the Hollons and the previous owner of the Hollons' property, the Webbs, alleging that, when the Webbs owned the property, the Webbs had removed timber and made changes to the surface of their property, which had altered the natural water drainage onto Carlton's and Hutchinson's property. Id. at 440-41. Although the Hollons testified that they had not cut any timber or otherwise altered the surface of their property, the Alabama Supreme Court determined that "a landowner may be held liable for failing to correct a condition on the landowner's property that was created by the previous landowner when that condition causes injury to an adjacent landowner's property, and the current landowner has had a reasonable time to correct the condition." Id. at 443. See also Sloss Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Nance, 216 Ala. 237, 113 So. 50 (1927).

In her affidavit, Chancy stated that she had never observed anyone attempting to make any improvements to limit or remedy the damage to her property caused by the drainage of the lake. Based on Carlton, we conclude that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding Chancy's claims of trespass and nuisance such that summary judgment was improper. We therefore reverse the trial court's judgments with regard to those claims.

Conclusion

We affirm the trial court's summary judgments with regard to Chancy's claims of breach of contract, fraudulent misrepresentation, invasion of the right to privacy, and the tort of outrage and her claim seeking a declaratory judgment against the appellees. We reverse the trial court's judgments with regard to Chancy's claims of interference with her access easement, intentional violation of her property rights, nuisance, and trespass and her claim seeking injunctive relief, and we remand the cause for further proceedings.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.

THOMPSON, P.J., and PITTMAN, BRYAN, and THOMAS, JJ., concur.