BRYAN, Judge.
Shirley Denise Turner ("Shirley") appeals from a judgment in favor of Carl Angelo Green ("Carl"). We dismiss the appeal.
On January 14, 2009, Carl, acting pro se, sued Shirley, who is one of Carl's siblings, in the Etowah Circuit Court ("the trial court"). Carl's complaint alleged that his and Shirley's deceased mother, Helen Aurtmishell Green ("Helen"), had devised a parcel of real property located in Etowah County ("the property") to him in her will ("the will"), that the will had been probated, and that Shirley had subsequently had Jane Ann Devereaux ("Jane"), who was also a child of Helen, execute a quitclaim deed purporting to convey any interest she might have in the property to Shirley. The complaint sought a determination that Carl owned the property.
The record indicates that Shirley was served with process on January 22, 2009. Acting pro se, Shirley answered the complaint on February 17, 2009. In her answer, Shirley denied that she had done
On February 20, 2009, Carl moved for a summary judgment. On May 7, 2009, the trial court held a hearing regarding Carl's summary-judgment motion. On May 8, 2009, the trial court entered an order stating that it was reserving its ruling on Carl's summary-judgment motion and granting Carl 30 days to amend his complaint to state a quiet-title claim and to add any additional necessary parties.
On June 3, 2009, Carl requested that the sheriff serve process on the rest of Helen's next of kin, i.e., Jane; Dale Bernard Green ("Dale"), one of Helen's two surviving sons other than Carl; Alonzo H. Green ("Alonzo"), Helen's other surviving son; and Tiffany Radford ("Tiffany")
On June 8, 2009, Shirley filed a pleading titled "Objection" in which she asserted that Helen had been mentally incompetent when she executed the will, that Carl had procured Helen's execution of the will by exercising undue influence over her, and, therefore, that Carl was not entitled to a judgment determining that he was the sole owner of the property.
On November 9, 2009, an attorney filed a notice of appearance on behalf of Carl. On December 14, 2009, the trial court set the action for trial on February 1, 2010.
On February 1, 2010, the trial court held a bench trial. Although the record does not indicate that Carl had amended his complaint in accordance with the trial court's instruction in its May 9, 2009, order, and although the record indicates that Jane, Dale, Alonzo, Tiffany, and Terrence had not yet been served with process, the trial court, on February 2, 2010, entered a judgment, which stated, in pertinent part:
Shirley neither filed a Rule 59(e), Ala. R. Civ. P., postjudgment motion within 30 days after the entry of the February 2, 2010, judgment nor filed a notice of appeal within 42 days after the entry of the February 2, 2010, judgment.
On March 30, 2010, 56 days after the entry of the February 2, 2010, judgment, an attorney filed a motion titled "Motion to Reconsider" on behalf of Shirley. In pertinent part, that motion stated:
(Emphasis added.) The motion then asserted a counterclaim stating claims of adverse possession and unjust enrichment against Carl. The gravamen of Shirley's adverse—possession claim was that she owned the property because, she alleged, she had been in adverse possession of it for more than 10 years. The gravamen of her unjust-enrichment claim was that, if the property was owned by Carl, she was entitled to be compensated for improvements she had made to the property that Carl had allowed her to make without objection.
Carl filed a response in which he (1) asserted that Shirley's motion to reconsider was untimely; (2) moved the trial court to set aside the February 2, 2010, judgment only insofar as it purported to adjudicate the rights of Jane, Dale, Alonzo, Tiffany, and Terrence on the ground that they had not been served with process before the entry of the February 2, 2010, order; and (3) sought an order authorizing service by publication on Jane, Dale, Alonzo, Tiffany, and Terrence.
The trial court held a hearing regarding Shirley's motion on June 2, 2010. On June 3, 2010, the trial court entered an order that stated:
(Capitalization in original.)
On June 14, 2010, Carl moved for an order authorizing service on Jane, Dale, Alonzo, Tiffany, and Terrence by publication. The trial court granted that motion on June 21, 2010.
After service was effected on Jane, Dale, Alonzo, Tiffany, and Terrence by publication, the trial court held a bench trial regarding Carl's complaint and Shirley's counterclaim on February 14, 2011. On February 22, 2011, the trial court entered a judgment. In pertinent part, that judgment stated:
On March 18, 2011, Shirley moved to alter, amend, or vacate the February 22, 2011, judgment. The trial court denied that motion on May 18, 2011. The February 22, 2011, judgment was appealed to the supreme court by Shirley only. The supreme court transferred Shirley's appeal to this court pursuant to § 12-2-7(6), Ala. Code 1975.
As a threshold matter, Carl asserts that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to vacate the February 2, 2010, judgment insofar as it ruled in his favor with respect to his claim against Shirley. Rule 4(f), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides:
The February 2, 2010, judgment adjudicated all claims against Shirley, the only defendant who had then been served with process. Thus, under Rule 4(f), the February 2, 2010, judgment was a final, appealable judgment with respect to Shirley. See Franklin v. Catledge, 59 So.3d 738, 740-41 (Ala.Civ.App.2010); Bedell v. Quality Cas. Ins. Co., 958 So.2d 344 (Ala.Civ. App.2006); and Williams v. Fox Television Stations of Birmingham, Inc., 959 So.2d 1120 (Ala.Civ.App.2006), overruled on other grounds by Ex parte Luker, 25 So.3d 1152 (Ala.2007).
Although the February 2, 2010, judgment also contained language purporting to adjudicate Carl's claim against Jane, Dale, Alonzo, Tiffany, and Terrence, that language was void because Jane, Dale, Alonzo, Tiffany, and Terrence had not then been served with process and, therefore, the trial court did not have in personam jurisdiction over them. See Northbrook Indem. Co. v. Westgate, Ltd., 769 So.2d 890, 893 (Ala.2000) ("`Failure of proper service under Rule 4 deprives a court of jurisdiction and renders its judgment void.' Ex parte Pate, 673 So.2d 427, 428-29 (Ala. 1995).").
With respect to Shirley, however, the February 2, 2010, judgment was a valid, final judgment for the reasons discussed above. Rule 59(e) provides that a trial court, on the motion of a party, can alter, amend, or vacate a final judgment it has entered if the motion is filed within 30
Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides that a trial court, on the motion of a party made more than 30 days after the entry of a final judgment, can relieve a party from that final judgment based on the following grounds:
However, Shirley's "Motion to Reconsider," which was filed more than 30 days after the entry of the February 2, 2010, judgment, did not seek relief from the February 2, 2010, judgment based on any of the grounds enumerated in Rule 60(b); rather, it merely asserted that the February 2, 2010, judgment was not final with respect to Shirley because Jane, Dale, Alonzo, Tiffany, and Terrence had not been served with process before the February 2, 2010, judgment was entered. Moreover, the order entered by the trial court on June 3, 2010, which purported to vacate the February 2, 2010, judgment in its entirety, did not cite any of the grounds enumerated by Rule 60(b) as its basis. Consequently, we conclude that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the June 3, 2010, order insofar as it purported to vacate the February 2, 2010, judgment with respect to Shirley because (1) the February 2, 2010, judgment was a final judgment with respect to Shirley under Rule 4(f), (2) Shirley did not file a timely Rule 59(e) motion challenging the February 2, 2010, judgment, (3) the trial court did not act sua sponte to vacate the February 2, 2010, judgment within 30 days after it was entered pursuant to Rule 59, (4) Shirley's "Motion to Reconsider" did not seek relief from the February 2, 2010, judgment based on any of the grounds enumerated by Rule 60(b), and (5) the trial court's June 3, 2010, order purporting to vacate the February 2, 2010, judgment with respect to Shirley did not purport to do so on the basis of any ground enumerated by Rule 60(b).
Moreover, we conclude that the February 2, 2010, judgment barred Shirley from asserting the counterclaim she included in her "Motion to Reconsider." In pertinent part, Rule 13(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides:
"Failure to properly assert a compulsory counterclaim in the original proceeding bars future litigation by the parties on that claim." Sanders v. First Bank of Grove Hill, 564 So.2d 869, 872 (Ala.1990).
Carl's claim and both of the claims Shirley purported to assert in her "Motion to Reconsider" shared a common issue: who owned the property. Consequently, we conclude that the claims Shirley purported to assert in her "Motion to Reconsider" were compulsory counterclaims that she was required to file in Carl's action against her. The February 2, 2010, judgment was a final judgment that terminated Carl's action with respect to Shirley, see Rule 4(f); Franklin; Bedell; and Williams, and, therefore, barred her from subsequently asserting those claims in her "Motion to Reconsider," see Sanders. Thus, to the extent that the judgment entered by the trial court on February 22, 2011, purported to rule against Shirley both with respect to Carl's claim against her and her claims against him, it was a nullity.
Shirley did not file a notice of appeal within 42 days after the entry of the February 2, 2010, judgment, and, therefore, this court has no jurisdiction to review that judgment. See Rules 2(a)(1), 3(a)(1), and 4(a), Ala. R.App. P. Moreover, because the February 22, 2011, judgment was void insofar as it purported to rule against Shirley, she was not aggrieved by that judgment. "A party that is not aggrieved by a trial court's judgment cannot appeal from that judgment. See ShoMe
Under Rule 4(f), the action properly proceeded against Jane, Dale, Alonzo, Tiffany, and Terrence after they were served with process, and the February 22, 2011, judgment was valid with respect to them. However, none of them have appealed the February 22, 2011, judgment. Accordingly, this court has no jurisdiction over the appeal before us. Because we have no jurisdiction over the appeal, we must dismiss it.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
THOMPSON, P.J., and PITTMAN, THOMAS, and MOORE, JJ., concur.