PER CURIAM.
Willie Jerome Davis ("the husband") appeals from a judgment ("the divorce judgment") of the Elmore Circuit Court ("the trial court") divorcing him from LaQuana Vonsha Davis ("the wife") and dividing their marital assets. This court assigned that appeal case no. 2130821. The husband also appeals from the trial court's subsequent order entered in the divorce action that, among other things, directed the wife to pay attorney Jerry M. Blevins an attorney fee for legal services he had provided to the husband in an unrelated criminal matter. This court assigned that appeal case no. 2140086.
This is one of two proceedings in which the husband has sought appellate review in this court in regard to the divorce action. In the other proceeding, he previously filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in which he sought, among other things, to have this court direct the trial court to supplement the record on appeal in case no. 2130821 with documentation that he said indicated that he had not received notice of the final hearing in the divorce action. Ex parte Davis, 169 So.3d 1038, 1042 (Ala.Civ.App.2014). This court granted the husband's petition in part, holding that the record on appeal in case no. 2130821 was due to be supplemented pursuant
In Ex parte Davis, this court set forth the following facts relevant to the dispositive issue in case no. 2130821, the appeal of the divorce judgment, stating:
Ex parte Davis, 169 So.3d at 1040.
One of the provisions of the divorce judgment ordered the wife to execute the settlement check ("the check") issued by the United States Department of Agriculture arising out of litigation brought on behalf of African-American farmers and to use the proceeds to "extinguish the legal services debt owed by [the husband] to . . . Blevins for the legal defense provided by attorney Blevins to the [husband] in the United States District Court Criminal case which led to the [husband's] conviction and incarceration in the federal penitentiary under a life sentence." The check had been made payable only to the husband.
On April 4, 2014, while the husband's postjudgment motion was pending, Blevins filed a motion to intervene in the divorce action. In his motion, Blevins asserted that the wife had paid him only $30,000 out of the proceeds of the check—the total
The husband, who is represented by counsel on appeal, filed a timely notice of appeal of the September 10, 2014, order. He also filed a motion to consolidate the appeals from the divorce judgment and from the September 10, 2014, order. This court granted the motion and entered an order consolidating the appeals on December 16, 2014.
On appeal, the husband contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion seeking to vacate the divorce judgment and a new trial. The motion was based on the husband's assertion that he was not given the opportunity to be heard at the March 5, 2014, hearing in the divorce action; thus, he says, he was denied his right to due process.
"It is generally understood that an opportunity for a hearing before a competent and impartial tribunal upon proper notice is one of the essential elements of due process." Ex parte Weeks, 611 So.2d 259, 261 (Ala.1992). "The hallmarks of procedural due process are notice and `the opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."'" Alabama Republican Party v. McGinley, 893 So.2d 337, 344 (Ala.2004) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), quoting in turn Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965)).
So important is procedural due process to our system of justice that the failure to provide parties with proper notice and an opportunity to be heard before the entry of a judgment can render that judgment void. See Ex parte Third Generation, Inc., 855 So.2d 489, 492-93 (Ala.2003). In Neal v. Neal, 856 So.2d 766, 781-82 (Ala. 2002), our supreme court explained:
(Final emphasis added.)
On January 2, 2014, less than a month after the wife filed the complaint in the divorce action, the husband, who was acting pro se at that time, answered the complaint and filed a motion for appointment of counsel or a representative to "represent him in the event that [the trial court] should set a hearing date in this case." In the motion, the husband explained that he was incarcerated and could not be physically present at any hearing. The husband also asked that, if someone could not be appointed to represent him, he "would like to be present by teleconference, internet, or by phone. The staff of this institution can be contacted and they have assured me that they can make any necessary accommodations." The trial court denied the motion.
On January 24, 2014, the trial court entered an order scheduling the final hearing in the divorce action for March 5, 2014. The record contains an envelope indicating that the notice of the scheduled hearing sent to the husband at the prison at which he is incarcerated was returned to the circuit clerk's office because the address did not include the husband's "Register Number" at the prison. The envelope also bears a stamp indicating that the address was insufficient and that the letter could not be forwarded. There is nothing in the record to indicate that an attempt was made to resend the notice with the husband's register number included in the address. The husband had included his register number as part of the address he provided in his answer to the complaint and in subsequent filings. The case-action summary does not include a notation that the notice was returned to the clerk's office; however, the docket sheet for this case available on the alacourt.com Web site, which contains information derived from the State Judicial Information System, indicates an entry stating "bad address."
On March 5, 2014, the trial court entered an order stating:
The wife then submitted a proposed judgment, which awarded the wife the marital residence and the check. The trial court adopted the proposed judgment in its divorce judgment entered on March 6, 2014.
We first note that
M.S. v. State Dep't of Human Res., 681 So.2d 633, 635 (Ala.Civ.App.1996). In M.S., a child-dependency case, the juvenile-court clerk's office mailed the child's parents notice of the date of the scheduled dependency hearing, but the notice was returned to the clerk because the clerk had used an incorrect zip code. The clerk made no further effort to contact the parents, who were not present at the hearing. Id. This court reversed the judgment entered in that case, concluding that the juvenile court, through its clerk, had assumed the duty of notifying the parents of the hearing and that its failure to do so denied the parents their right to procedural due process. Id.
Similarly, in this case, the circuit clerk's failure to notify the husband of the hearing in the divorce action after the notice the clerk sent was returned deprived the husband of his right to procedural due process. "`A judgment or order that is entered in violation of principles of procedural due process is void. See Ex parte Third Generation, Inc., 855 So.2d 489, 492 (Ala.2003) (discussing Neal [v. Neal, 856 So.2d 766 (Ala.2002)], and concluding that a judgment is void if it violates principles of procedural due process).'" Ex parte Montgomery, 97 So.3d 148, 152-53 (Ala.Civ.App.2012) (quoting Ex parte Montgomery, 79 So.3d 660, 670 (Ala. Civ.App.2011)). Accordingly, the divorce judgment entered on March 6, 2014, is void. Because a void judgment will not support an appeal, see, e.g., Landry v. Landry, 91 So.3d 88, 90 (Ala.Civ.App.2012) ("A void judgment will not support an appeal."), we must dismiss the appeal from the divorce judgment (case no. 2130821), albeit with instructions to the trial court to vacate the March 6, 2014, judgment.
As to case no. 2140086, the husband appealed the award of legal fees to Blevins for his representation of the husband in a separate criminal matter. As mentioned, in the divorce judgment, the trial court ordered the wife to use proceeds from the check to pay Blevins an unspecified amount for the work he had done in the criminal matter, but, for the reasons discussed, we have held that that judgment is void. After the divorce judgment was entered, Blevins filed a motion to intervene in the divorce action to obtain payment for his work in the criminal matter. On September 10, 2014, the trial court entered an order in the divorce action directing the wife to pay Blevins legal fees in the amount of $9,980.50.
Rule 71, Ala. R. Civ. P., provides:
(Emphasis added.) The Committee Comments on 1973 Adoption of Rule 71 state, in part:
Because the divorce judgment is void, and, further, because Blevins, as a creditor of
THOMPSON, P.J., and PITTMAN, THOMAS, and DONALDSON, JJ., concur.
MOORE, J., concurs specially.
2140086-APPEAL DISMISSED.
PITTMAN, THOMAS, and DONALDSON, JJ., concur.
THOMPSON, P.J., concurs specially.
MOORE, J., concurs in the result, with writing.
THOMPSON, Presiding Judge, concurring specially in case no. 2140086.
I write specially to emphasize that I believe that Jerry M. Blevins, the attorney who represented Willie Jerome Davis ("the husband") in a criminal matter unrelated to the divorce action, lacked standing to intervene in the divorce action.
"[S]tanding is a component of subject-matter jurisdiction and can be raised at any time." Ex parte Overton, 985 So.2d 423, 427 (Ala.2007) (citing State v. Property at 2018 Rainbow Drive, 740 So.2d 1025 (Ala.1999)).
K.R. v. Lauderdale Cnty. Dep't of Human Res., 133 So.3d 396, 403-04 (Ala.Civ.App. 2013).
The trial court allowed Blevins to intervene in the divorce action, and, as part of that action, it awarded Blevins an attorney fee for his representation of the husband in a separate criminal matter in federal court. In his motion, Blevins sought to intervene pursuant to Rule 24(a)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P., governing intervention of right, or, alternatively, Rule 24(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., allowing permissive intervention.
Rule 24(a)(2) provides that,
(Emphasis added.)
Rule 24(b) provides, in pertinent part, that,
There is no statutory authority that would allow a third-party creditor to intervene in a divorce action. My research has revealed no Alabama caselaw regarding
Olsen v. Olsen, 247 P.3d 77, 81 (Wyo.2011).
In the context of a third-party creditor's attempting to enforce a settlement agreement reached between divorcing parties in Alabama, our supreme court has written:
Costanza v. Costanza, 346 So.2d 1133, 1135 (Ala.1977). The Costanza court, quoting Wilson v. Wilson, 53 Ala.App. 194, 201, 298 So.2d 616, 621 (1973), went on to say:
346 So.2d at 1135-36 (emphasis added).
In Alabama, division of marital property in a divorce action is not governed by community-property law. I agree with the opinion of the Wyoming Supreme Court and the cases cited therein that the purpose of a divorce action is the dissolution of the marriage between the parties; it is not to see that creditors of the parties are paid. The divorce of the parties does not inure to the benefit of their creditors. As the Committee Comments on 1973 Adoption of Rule 71, Ala. R. Civ. P., aptly point out, to allow creditors to become involved in divorce proceedings would unnecessarily complicate the trial court's task of dissolving the marriage and resolving ancillary issues such as the division of marital property, alimony, custody, and child support. The rationales expressed in both Olsen and Costanza lead me to conclude that a third-party creditor does not have standing to intervene in a divorce action.
Accordingly, I believe that Blevins lacked standing to intervene in the husband and the wife's divorce action; thus, the trial court in the divorce action never obtained jurisdiction over Blevins's claim for payment of an attorney fee in the separate criminal matter.
MOORE, Judge, concurring specially in case no. 2130821 and concurring in the result in case no. 2140086.
I agree with the main opinion that case no. 2130821 should be dismissed because it arises from a default divorce judgment entered by the Elmore Circuit Court ("the trial court") on March 6, 2014, in a manner inconsistent with the due-process rights of Willie Jerome Davis ("the husband"). I note that our disposition of that appeal renders the entire judgment void, including the provision treating the settlement check issued to the husband by the United States Department of Agriculture as marital property, awarding that check to LaQuana Vonsha Davis ("the wife"), and ordering the wife to use the proceeds of that check to extinguish any debt owed by the husband to Jerry L. Blevins, his criminal defense attorney, for attorney's fees.
As to case no. 2140086, I concur in the result. The record shows that, on April 4, 2014, Blevins moved the trial court to intervene in the divorce action in order to enforce the provisions of the default divorce judgment requiring the wife to pay his fees. The trial court erred in granting the motion to intervene. When a trial court equitably allocates the debts of the parties in a divorce judgment, it may order one party to pay the debt of another party, but, pursuant to Rule 71, Ala. R. Civ. P., that order does not thereby vest in the creditor the right to enforce the divorce judgment. See Kaleta v. Kaleta, 452 So.2d 1338 (Ala.Civ.App.1984). Because Blevins had no right to enforce the divorce judgment, the trial court should not have allowed him to intervene for that purpose.
That said, the trial court purported to enforce a provision of the default divorce judgment, which is void, for the benefit of Blevins. A void judgment is a complete nullity without any effect from its inception. Ex parte Full Circle Distrib., L.L.C., 883 So.2d 638, 643 (Ala.2003). "[A]ll proceedings founded on [a] void judgment are themselves regarded as invalid." 46 Am. Jur.2d Judgments § 29 (2006). Because a void judgment entered without subject-matter jurisdiction will not support an appeal, the husband's appeal in case no. 2140086 is due to be dismissed. See Bernals, Inc. v. Kessler-Greystone, LLC, 70 So.3d 315 (Ala.2011). Thus, I agree with the result reached by the main opinion.