WINDOM, Presiding Judge.

Calvin L. Stallworth, currently an inmate on Alabama's death row at Holman Correctional Facility, appeals the circuit court's denial of his petition for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Rule 32, Ala. R.Crim. P.

In October 1998, Stallworth was convicted of two counts of capital murder for murdering Nancy Dukes and Linda Morton during the course of a robbery. The jury, by a vote of 10 to 2, recommended that Stallworth be sentenced to death. The circuit court followed the jury's recommendation and sentenced Stallworth to death. After remanding the case for the trial court to correct its sentencing order, this Court affirmed Stallworth's convictions and sentences of death. See Stallworth v. State, 868 So.2d 1128 (Ala.Crim. App.2001), cert. denied, 868 So.2d 1189 (Ala.2003). The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari review. See Stallworth v. Alabama, 540 U.S. 1057, 124 S.Ct. 828, 157 L.Ed.2d 711 (2003). This Court issued a certificate of judgment making Stallworth's direct appeal final on June 27, 2003. See Rule 41(a), Ala. R.App. P.

In June 2004, Stallworth filed a postconviction petition attacking his convictions and death sentence. He filed amended petitions in October 2005 and in June 2006.1 The State filed its answer to the postconviction petition, and Stallworth filed a brief in response to that answer. In May 2007, the circuit court issued an order dismissing the majority of Stallworth's claims after it found that the claims were insufficiently pleaded or failed to state claims upon which relief could be granted. In June 2009, the circuit court held an evidentiary hearing on the three claims that were not summarily dismissed. On May 12, 2010, the circuit court issued an order denying relief on those claims. Stallworth filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court.

This Court, in its opinion on direct appeal, set out the following facts surrounding Stallworth's convictions:

868 So.2d at 1136-38 (footnotes omitted).

Standard of Review

Stallworth appeals the circuit court's partial denial and partial summary dismissal of his petition for postconviction relief attacking his capital-murder conviction and sentence of death. According to Rule 32.3, Ala. R.Crim. P., Stallworth has the sole burden of pleading and proving that he is entitled to relief. Rule 32.3, Ala. R.Crim. P., provides:

When it reviewed Stallworth's claims on direct appeal, this Court applied a plain-error standard of review and examined every issue regardless of whether the issue was preserved for appellate review. See Rule 45A, Ala. R.App. P. However, the plain-error standard does not apply when evaluating a ruling on a postconviction petition, even when the petitioner has been sentenced to death. See Ferguson v. State, 13 So.3d 418, 424 (Ala.Crim.App. 2008); Waldrop v. State, 987 So.2d 1186 (Ala.Crim.App.2007); Hall v. State, 979 So.2d 125 (Ala.Crim.App.2007); Gaddy v. State, 952 So.2d 1149 (Ala.Crim.App.2006). "The standard of review this Court uses in evaluating the rulings made by the trial court is whether the trial court abused its discretion." Hunt v. State, 940 So.2d 1041, 1049 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (citing Elliott v. State, 601 So.2d 1118, 1119 (Ala.Crim.App. 1992)). However, "[t]he sufficiency of pleadings in a Rule 32 petition is a question of law. `The standard of review for pure questions of law in criminal cases is de novo. Ex parte Key, 890 So.2d 1056, 1059 (Ala.2003).'" Ex parte Beckworth, [Ms. 1091780, July 3, 2013] ___ So.3d ___, ___ (Ala.2013) (quoting Ex parte Lamb, 113 So.3d 686, 689 (Ala.2011)).

The majority of the claims raised by Stallworth in his brief to this Court were summarily dismissed before the evidentiary hearing after the State filed its answer to Stallworth's postconviction petition and after Stallworth filed a detailed response to that answer. Many of the claims that were summarily dismissed were claims that Stallworth was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel.

In discussing the pleading requirements related to postconviction petitions, this Court has stated:

Washington v. State, 95 So.3d 26, 59 (Ala. Crim.App.2012).

Hyde v. State, 950 So.2d 344, 356 (Ala. Crim.App.2006).

When pleading claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court has stated:

950 So.2d at 356.

Moore v. State, 502 So.2d 819, 820 (Ala. 1986).

Moreover, an evidentiary hearing is not necessary in every case in which the petitioner alleges claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Alabama Supreme Court has stated:

Ex parte Hill, 591 So.2d 462, 463 (Ala. 1991). "[A] circuit judge who has personal knowledge of the facts underlying an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel may summarily deny that allegation based on the judge's personal knowledge of counsel's performance." Partain v. State, 47 So.3d 282, 286 (Ala.Crim.App.2008) (citing Ex parte Walker, 800 So.2d 135 (Ala. 2000)). Here, the circuit judge who presided over Stallworth's postconviction proceedings was the same judge who presided over Stallworth's capital-murder trial and the same judge who sentenced Stallworth to death.2

Last, "[t]his Court may affirm the judgment of the circuit court for any reason, even if not for the reason stated by the circuit court." Acra v. State, 105 So.3d 460, 464 (Ala.Crim.App.2012).

With these principles in mind, this Court reviews the claims raised by Stallworth in his brief to this Court.

I.

Stallworth first argues that the circuit court erred in denying him relief on the three claims that were the subject of the postconviction evidentiary hearing: (1) that counsel was ineffective for failing to have the blood smear on the inside of Stallworth's jacket tested for the presence of EDTA;3 (2) that counsel was ineffective for failing to employ and present the testimony of a DNA expert; and (3) that counsel was ineffective for failing to secure and present the testimony of a blood-spatter expert.

The circuit court's entire findings after the hearing consisted of the following:

(C.R. 774.)

Rule 32.9, Ala. R.Crim. P., provides, in pertinent part:

In interpreting the scope of this Rule, the Alabama Supreme Court has stated:

Ex parte Grau, 791 So.2d 345, 347 (Ala. 2000).

Again in Ex parte McCall, 30 So.3d 400, 404 (Ala.2008), the Alabama Supreme Court cited the mandatory nature of Rule 32.9(d), Ala. R.Crim. P., and said: "[O]nce a hearing has been held Rule 32.9(d)[, Ala. R.Crim. P.,] requires findings of fact in support of the judgment. Under our decision in Ex parte Grau, [791 So.2d 345 (Ala.2000),] the trial court's failure to issue such findings is grounds for reversal." On numerous occasions, this Court has remanded cases on postconviction appeal to the circuit court for that court to make specific findings of fact pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Ex parte Grau after an evidentiary hearing was held on a postconviction petition. See Smith v. State, 160 So.3d 40 (Ala.Crim. App.2010); Andrews v. State, 38 So.3d 99 (Ala.Crim.App.2009); Johnson v. State, 988 So.2d 1069 (Ala.Crim.App.2007); Getz v. State, 984 So.2d 1221 (Ala.Crim.App. 2006); Wiggins v. State, 987 So.2d 1153 (Ala.Crim.App.2006); Tarver v. State, 940 So.2d 312 (Ala.Crim.App.2004); Sims v. State, 869 So.2d 1181 (Ala.Crim.App.2003); Holloway v. State, 848 So.2d 1017 (Ala. Crim.App.2002); Adkins v. State, 930 So.2d 524 (Ala.Crim.App.2001).

Therefore, in compliance with the above-cited cases, this cause is hereby remanded to the circuit court for that court to make specific findings of fact concerning all three claims of ineffective assistance of counsel that were the subject of the postconviction evidentiary hearing.

In the interest of judicial economy, this Court will address the validity of the circuit court's summary dismissal of claims raised in Stallworth's second amended postconviction petition.

II.

Stallworth argues that the circuit court erred in summarily dismissing his claims concerning the prosecutor's arguments and his counsel's failure to object to those arguments.

As stated above, "[t]he sufficiency of pleadings in a Rule 32 petition is a question of law. `The standard of review for pure questions of law in criminal cases is de novo. Ex parte Key, 890 So.2d 1056, 1059 (Ala.2003).'" Ex parte Beckworth, ___ So.3d at ___ (quoting Ex parte Lamb, 113 So.3d at 689). "Legal conclusions are never accorded a presumption of correctness on appellate review." Ex parte Cain, 838 So.2d 1020, 1026 (Ala.2002) (citing Ex parte Perkins, 646 So.2d 46, 47 (Ala.1994)). "When applying the de novo standard of review, this Court is not obligated to rely on the same analysis as that employed by the trial court." State v. C.M., 746 So.2d 410, 414 (Ala.Crim.App.1999) (citing Ex parte Graham, 702 So.2d 1215, 1221 (Ala. 1997)).

A.

First, Stallworth asserts that the circuit court erred in summarily dismissing his claim that the prosecutor's guilt-phase closing arguments denied him a fair trial. The circuit court found that this claim was procedurally barred by Rules 32.2(a)(2) and (a)(5), Ala. R.Crim. P., because it could have been raised at trial or on direct appeal but was not. This Court has consistently and frequently held that such claims are procedurally barred in a postconviction proceeding because the claim could have been raised at trial or on direct appeal. See Ingram v. State, 959 So.2d 1151 (Ala.Crim.App.2006); Boyd v. State, 746 So.2d 364 (Ala.Crim.App.1999); Fortenberry v. State, 659 So.2d 194 (Ala. Crim.App.1994); Cade v. State, 629 So.2d 38 (Ala.Crim.App.1993). "It is well settled that `the procedural bars of Rule 32 apply with equal force to all cases, including those in which the death penalty has been imposed.'" Nicks v. State, 783 So.2d 895, 901 (Ala.Crim.App.1999) (quoting State v. Tarver, 629 So.2d 14, 19 (Ala.Crim.App. 1993)).

Because this claim could have been, but was not, raised at trial or on appeal, the circuit court correctly held that the claim was procedurally barred. Rules 32.2(a)(3) and 32.2(a)(5), Ala. R.Crim. P. Therefore, the circuit court did not err by dismissing this claim.

B.

Stallworth next argues that the circuit court erred in summarily dismissing his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to improper prosecutorial arguments. Specifically, Stallworth pleaded that his counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the following arguments made by the prosecutor during his guilt-phase closing arguments:

(Trial R. 4610.)

(Trial R. 4642-43.)

(Trial R. 4643.) Stallworth also challenges the prosecutor's comments that the murders shattered the Foley community. According to Stallworth, these arguments were designed to inflame the passion of the jury and to appeal to the jurors' emotions. Therefore, he asserts, they were improper, and his counsel should have objected.

The State, in its answer, argued that these claims should be summarily dismissed because: "(1) Stallworth's attorneys cannot be ineffective for failing to raise unsuccessful objections; and (2) there is no reasonable probability that any such objections would have affected the outcome of Stallworth's case." (C.R. 164.)

The circuit court summarily dismissed these claims citing Rule 32.7(d), Ala. R.Crim. P., which states, in pertinent part:

As the State correctly noted in its answer, the circuit court instructed the jury that arguments of counsel were not evidence and that it was not to base its verdict on sympathy or emotion. The circuit court gave the following instruction: "You are not to consider as evidence the indictments that I read to you, the arguments of the attorneys, and any rulings by this court on matters of evidence." (Trial R. 4668-69.) "It is well settled that jurors are presumed to follow, not disregard, the trial court's instructions." Brooks v. State, 973 So.2d 380, 409 (Ala.Crim.App.2007).

Moreover, to constitute reversible error, a prosecutor's arguments must have "so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting [verdict] a denial of due process." Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986). That high standard was not met in this case. The majority of the comments to which Stallworth argues counsel should have objected appear to be appeals for justice. "There is no impropriety in a prosecutor's appeal to the jury for justice and to properly perform its duty." Price v. State, 725 So.2d 1003, 1033 (Ala. Crim.App.1997). "Because the substantive claim underlying the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel has no merit, counsel could not be ineffective for failing to raise this issue." Lee v. State, 44 So.3d 1145, 1173 (Ala.Crim.App.2009). This claim was due to be summarily dismissed pursuant to Rule 32.7(d), Ala. R.Crim. P.

Moreover, even if counsel should have objected to the prosecutor's arguments, the absence of objections did not affect the outcome of the trial. This Court has reviewed the trial record and the prosecutor's arguments. Here, the prosecutor's comments were not particularly egregious. Further, the circuit court instructed the jurors not to consider the attorneys' arguments in their deliberations and not to allow passion or prejudice to influence their decision. Accordingly, the prosecutor's arguments did not "so infect[] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting [verdict] a denial of due process," Darden, 477 U.S. at 181, 106 S.Ct. 2464, and there is no reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different. Washington v. State, 95 So.3d 26, 59 (Ala.Crim.App.2012). Consequently, the circuit court correctly dismissed these claims for failure to state a claim or for failure to raise a material issue of fact or law that would entitle Stallworth to relief. Rule 32.7(d), Ala. R.Crim. P.

III.

Stallworth next argues that the circuit court erred in summarily dismissing his claims that his trial attorneys were ineffective for failing to call certain witnesses.

Day v. Quarterman, 566 F.3d 527, 538 (5th Cir.2009); see also Glass v. State, 227 S.W.3d 463, 468 (Mo.2007).

Ex parte Beckworth, ___ So.3d at ___.

For Stallworth to meet his burden of pleading his claims that his counsel was ineffective for failing to present the testimony of a certain witness, he must plead, among other things, facts establishing the following: (1) the identity of the witness; (2) the content of the witness's expected testimony; (3) that the testimony was favorable to the defendant; (4) that the witness was available to testify at Stallworth's trial and would have testified; and (5) that a reasonable investigation would have led counsel to the witness.

A.

Stallworth first asserts that his counsel was ineffective for failing to call Dollie Williams as a witness in his defense. In his second amended petition, Stallworth pleaded that counsel failed to interview and to call Williams. At the time of Morton's murder, Williams was working as an employee at a restaurant located across the street from the Diamond store. Attached to Stallworth's postconviction petition is an affidavit executed by Williams. In the affidavit Williams states that around 12:00 p.m. on December 14, 1997, she saw a man running from the Diamond store, that the man was wearing dark colored clothes, that he was of a heavy build, and that the person was not Stallworth, whom she knew.

In its answer to Stallworth's petition, the State asserted:

(C.R. 141-42.) There was testimony at Stallworth's trial indicating that Morton's murder occurred at approximately 1:00 p.m. on December 14, 1997.

A review of the record of Stallworth's trial shows that counsel presented a vigorous and extensive defense.4 Counsel called 21 defense witnesses and Stallworth to testify. Several witnesses testified that other individuals were seen at or near the Diamond store at the time of Morton's murder. Debra Jones testified that during the time of Morton's murder, she had worked at the Diamond store and that several months after the murder, a customer named Greg Rolling had threatened her when he said, "She was next." Jocelyn Riebe testified that she had worked at the Diamond store and that she went to the store the day that Morton was murdered and waited until Morton's body had been removed. She said that a cowbell had been hanging from one of the entrance doors but the bell was lying on the ground.5 Riebe mentioned the bell, she said, to one of the investigators. At the time of Morton's murder, an individual named Elbie Bolder swept the floors at the Diamond store, and Morton did not like to be alone with Bolder because, she said, he made her nervous and could be obnoxious. Virginia Chute testified that she worked at the Diamond store when Morton was killed, that she went to the store after she had heard that Morton had been killed, that the bell that had been hanging on one of the entrance doors that morning was no longer there but was lying on the ground outside the store, that she told police about the bell, and that, when she came back to work after Morton's funeral, the bell was still lying on the ground outside the store. Chute testified that she worked the night shift before Morton came to work on December 14, 1997, and that a man she knew as Greg sat outside the store in his truck for about three hours that night and it scared her. Teresa Roberts testified that around 12:00 p.m. on the day Morton was murdered, she was at the Auto Zone, a store right across the street from the Diamond store, and she saw two black men walk from the Diamond store and cross the street. According to Roberts, one hour later, around 1:00 p.m., she saw the same two men in the parking lot of the Diamond store. Margaret Stead testified that on December 14, 1997, she was at the Diamond store getting gas, that her receipt was timed 12:42 p.m., and that two big, black men were in a car next to the pump she was using. Richard Gonzalez testified that on December 14, 1997, he was on County Road 59, near the location of the Diamond store, going north between 12:30 and 1:00 p.m. and a car turned off Highway 20 and was moving at a great rate of speed, around 100 mph. The two men in the vehicle were white, and their heads were shaved.

Stallworth also presented testimony that he had an alibi at the time of Morton's murder. Shirley Dailey testified that she had known Stallworth his entire life, that on the day Morton was murdered Stallworth came to her house that morning, that her mother called to tell her that a clerk at the Diamond store had been killed, that she and several others who were at her house went to the store, that Stallworth stayed at her house with the kids, that on her way to the store she saw Greg Rolling, that Rolling had been stopped by two police officers near the Diamond store, and that Stallworth did not act unusual that day. Debra Williams, Shirley Dailey's daughter, testified that Stallworth was at Shirley Dailey's house when they heard the sirens at the Diamond store on December 14, 1997. Walter Reed, Stallworth's stepfather, testified that at around 2:00 p.m. on December 17, 1997, Stallworth was at his house, that Stallworth spent most of the rest of the day at his house, and that Stallworth did not act strangely that day.

Stallworth's attorneys also recalled Lieutenant Huey Mack, Jr., to the stand. Lt. Mack testified that there was a drainage pond behind the Diamond store and that several times after Morton's murder he went to that pond to look for evidence. In April 1998, after the pond had dried up, Mack recovered a knife. The State had argued that a knife found in Stallworth's fiancée's home was the murder weapon.

Here, Stallworth was represented in the circuit court by three attorneys. Given the number of witnesses that counsel presented and the fact that Dollie Williams was expected to testify that she saw a man coming out of the Diamond store an hour before the murder, Stallworth failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Rule 32.7(d), Ala. R.Crim. P. "[T]he notion that the result could have been different if only [the attorneys] had put on more than the [21] witnesses [they] did, or called expert witnesses to bolster his case, is fanciful." Wong v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15, 28, 130 S.Ct. 383, 175 L.Ed.2d 328 (2009). Thus, this claim was due to be summarily dismissed. Rule 32.7(d), Ala. R.Crim. P.

B.

Stallworth next argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to present the testimony of Catherine Corazzini. In his second amended petition, Stallworth pleaded the following concerning Corazzini:

(C.R. 44-45.)

The State in its answer asserted the following:

(C.R. 142-43.) The circuit court summarily dismissed this claim citing Rules 32.6(b) and 32.7(d), Ala. R.Crim. P.

Attached to Stallworth's petition was an affidavit executed by Corazzini. Corazzini stated that she and her family left Alabama and moved to Virginia in May 1998. Corazzini also stated that she was then a resident of Virginia. Stallworth failed to plead that Corazzini was available to testify in Alabama in October 1998 and that she would have testified. Thus, Stallworth failed to plead the full facts in support of this claim and it was due to be summarily dismissed pursuant to Rule 32.6(b), Ala. R.Crim. P.

Moreover, counsel is not ineffective for failing to call a witness who is unavailable. As the Supreme Court of Florida has stated:

Nelson v. State, 73 So.3d 77, 88-89 (Fla. 2011) (footnote omitted). "A defendant cannot establish ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's failure to call a witness who is unavailable." White v. State, 964 So.2d 1278, 1286 (Fla.2007) (citing Melton v. State, 949 So.2d 994, 1004 (Fla.2006)). "Counsel cannot be held ineffective for failing to track down a witness whose whereabouts are unknown." Harris v. Upton, 292 Ga. 491, 495, 739 S.E.2d 300, 305 (2013) (citing Moore v. State, 278 Ga. 397, 603 S.E.2d 228 (2004)). "Counsel cannot be said to be ineffective for failing to call an unavailable witness." Williamson v. Moore, 221 F.3d 1177, 1181 (11th Cir.2000).

Furthermore, Stallworth failed to plead prejudice in counsel's failure to present Corazzini's testimony. Certainly, there is no prejudice in counsel's failure to produce a witness who would have testified that she saw a black male leave the Diamond store, a public business, at 12:00 p.m. on December 14, 1997, when Morton's murder occurred at approximately 1:00 p.m. that same day and witnesses testified that Morton was alive after 12:00 p.m.

Based on the testimony that counsel presented at Stallworth's trial as detailed in Section III.A. of this opinion, this claim was due to be summarily dismissed.

C.

Stallworth next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present the testimony of Diane Caudill. In his second amended petition, Stallworth pleaded that Caudill had "told the police that she had seen Sherman Packer running from the Diamond [store] on the day of Morton's murder. Defense counsel failed to call her to testify at trial." (C.R. 45.)

The State asserted in its answer that Stallworth failed to plead sufficient facts to entitle him to relief; i.e., he failed to plead the time that Packer was seen running from the Diamond store. The State asserted the following in its answer:

(C.R. 145.) The circuit court dismissed this claim pursuant to Rules 32.6(b) and 32.7(d), Ala. R.Crim. P.

An affidavit executed by Caudill was attached to Stallworth's postconviction petition. Caudill states that she saw Packer at the Diamond store at around 11:15 a.m. on the morning of December 14, 1997. Stallworth did not plead in his postconviction petition the time Caudill saw Packer.

Clearly, this claim was properly summarily dismissed pursuant to Rules 32.6(b) and 32.7(d), Ala. R.Crim. P., because Stallworth failed to plead the full facts entitling him to relief when he failed to plead the time Caudill saw Parker run from the Diamond store. Also, Stallworth failed to plead facts that would establish prejudice given the time that Caudill says she saw Packer at the Diamond store.

Furthermore, Stallworth's trial counsel did call Caudill to testify at a pretrial hearing on Stallworth's motion to suppress his statements to police. Caudill testified that on December 14, 1997, she saw Stallworth twice. Earlier in the day, she said, he was wearing dark clothes but later that day he asked her and a friend to take him to a Walmart discount store where he bought a jersey. Stallworth's attorneys questioned Caudill using a statement she had given to police. Caudill denied most of comments that were contained in her statement to the police. It is clear from reviewing the record of Stallworth's trial that Stallworth's attorneys were aware of Caudill, that they called her as a witness at a pretrial hearing, and that counsel did not overlook Caudill, but instead chose not to call her in Stallworth's defense. "Decisions regarding what evidence to present and whether to call or question witnesses are presumed to be matters of trial strategy." People v. Rockey, 237 Mich.App. 74, 76, 601 N.W.2d 887, 890 (1999) (citing People v. Mitchell, 454 Mich. 145, 163, 560 N.W.2d 600 (1997)). "[A] trial counsel's choice of whether to call witnesses is generally accorded a presumption of deliberate trial strategy and cannot be subject to second-guessing in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel." Saylor v. Commonwealth, 357 S.W.3d 567, 571 (Ky.Ct.App.2012). This claim was due to be summarily dismissed because it was insufficiently pleaded and because it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

D.

Stallworth next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present the testimony of Lynn Brewton. Stallworth pleaded the following in regard to this claim:

(C.R. 45-46.)

The State asserted the following in its answer:

(C.R. 145-46.) The circuit court summarily dismissed this claim citing Rules 32.6(b) and 32.7(d), Ala. R.Crim. P.

The record of Stallworth's trial shows that Thomas Harris testified that on December 14, 1997, he was at the Pizza Hut restaurant across the street from the Diamond store and at around 12:45 p.m. he saw a black male wearing a dark hooded jacket come out of the woods behind the Diamond store and head to the store. He said that the male was about 5'8". On cross-examination he indicated that when shown a lineup he could not identify Stallworth as the man he saw behind the Diamond store on December 14. Also, as detailed in Part III.A. of this opinion, defense counsel presented numerous witnesses who testified that they saw individuals at the Diamond store at the time of the murder.

Testimony was presented that was cumulative of Brewton's testimony. "This Court has previously refused to allow the omission of cumulative testimony to amount to ineffective assistance of counsel." United State v. Harris, 408 F.3d 186, 191 (5th Cir.2005) (citing Murray v. Maggio, 736 F.2d 279, 282 (5th Cir.1984)). "[T]he withholding of cumulative testimony will not ordinarily satisfy the prejudice component of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel." Taylor v. State, 352 N.W.2d 683, 687 (Iowa 1984) (citing Schrier v. State, 347 N.W.2d 657, 665 (Iowa 1984)).

This claim was due to be summarily dismissed because there was no material issue of fact or law that would entitle Stallworth to relief. Rule 32.7(d), Ala. R.Crim. P.

E.

Stallworth also argues, for the first time in his brief to this Court, that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call witnesses Khanisha Moore-Wiggins and Carrie Clark to testify. As the State argues in its brief, these claims were not raised in Stallworth's second amended postconviction petition and are not properly before this Court. "It is well settled that `[a]n appellant cannot raise an issue on appeal from the denial of a Rule 32 petition which was not raised in the Rule 32 petition.' Arrington v. State, 716 So.2d 237, 239 (Ala.Crim.App.1997)." Mashburn v. State, 148 So.3d 1094, 1106 (Ala.Crim. App.2013). See also Ex parte Clemons, 55 So.3d 348, 351 (Ala.2007) ("We cannot, however, consider the issue whether the trial court erred in failing to consider Clemons's borderline intellectual capacity as a mitigating factor in the sentencing phase of his trial because the issue was not presented to the trial court in Clemons's Rule 32 petition."); Dunaway v. State, [Ms. CR-06-0996, Dec. 18, 2009] ___ So.3d ___, ___ (Ala.Crim.App.2009) ("This issue was not raised in Dunaway's consolidated amended Rule 32 petition. Therefore, it is not properly before this Court."); Hooks v. State, 21 So.3d 772, 795 (Ala. Crim.App.2008) ("These claims were not raised in Hooks's third amended postconviction petition. They are raised for the first time on appeal; thus, they are not properly before this Court.").

Therefore, the claims related to witnesses Moore-Wiggins and Clark are not properly before this Court.

IV.

Stallworth next argues that the circuit court erred in refusing to hold a hearing on his claim that the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), by failing to disclose exculpatory evidence to him. Specifically, Stallworth pleaded that the State failed to disclose statements that Catherine Corazzini had made to a captain with the Foley Police Department. Stallworth attached an affidavit executed by Corazzini to his postconviction petition. In the affidavit, Corazzini said that she told police that she saw a man run from the Diamond store on the day of Morton's murder and that person did not fit Stallworth's description.

Stallworth did not plead that this Brady claim was based on newly discovered evidence but instead pleaded that his constitutional rights had been violated by the State's failure to disclose this evidence. A Brady claim may be raised in a postconviction petition as either a claim of newly discovered evidence under Rule 32.1(e), Ala. R.Crim. P., or a constitutional claim under Rule 32.1(a), Ala. R.Crim. P. See Washington v. State, 95 So.3d 26 (Ala. Crim.App.2012).

In its answer, the State asserted that this claim was procedurally barred pursuant to Rules 32.2(a)(3) and 32.2(a)(5), Ala. R.Crim. P., because Stallworth could have raised this issue in a motion for a new trial or on direct appeal. The State asserted:

(C.R. 169.)

Recently, the Alabama Supreme Court in Ex parte Beckworth, [Ms. 1091780, July 3, 2013] ___ So.3d ___ (Ala.2013), reversed this Court's decision affirming the summary dismissal of Beckworth's postconviction petition after finding that Rule 32.3, Ala. R.Crim. P., imposes no duty on a postconviction petitioner to plead any ground of preclusion. The Supreme Court stated:

___ So.3d at ___.

The basis for the Supreme Court's decision in Beckworth was that the circuit court summarily dismissed Beckworth's postconviction petition only three days after the State filed its response raising the procedural default grounds in Rule 32, Ala. R.Crim. P., and before Beckworth had an opportunity to respond to the State's assertion of those default grounds. Unlike the situation in Beckworth, in this case Stallworth was given an opportunity to respond to the State's assertion of the procedural bars in Rule 32.2, Ala. R.Crim. P. In fact, in Stallworth's response he specifically mentions the State's assertions, but never answered why those procedural default grounds were not applicable in his case. Thus, the facts in Beckworth are distinguishable from the facts presented in this case.

The Alabama Supreme Court in Ex parte Pierce, 851 So.2d 606 (Ala.2000), stated:

851 So.2d at 613-14.

According to the Alabama Supreme Court's decision in Ex parte Pierce, which was not modified by its more recent decision in Ex parte Beckworth, the circuit court correctly dismissed this claim pursuant to Rules 32.2(a)(3) and 32.2(a)(5), Ala. R.Crim. P., because it could have been raised at trial or on direct appeal but was not.

Moreover,

Williams v. State, 710 So.2d 1276, 1296-97 (Ala.Crim.App.1996).

Stallworth pleaded that Corazzini saw a black male exit the Diamond store at the time of Morton's murder. However, the affidavit executed by Corazzini and attached to Stallworth's second amended petition states that she saw the male exit the store at 12:00 p.m. Testimony was presented indicating that Morton's murder occurred at approximately 1:00 p.m. and that customers saw her alive after 12:00 p.m. Corazzini's testimony would be neither exculpatory or material.6 Thus, even if Corazzini's statement was suppressed, there was no Brady violation.

V.

Stallworth next argues that the circuit court erred in summarily dismissing his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective at the penalty phase of his capital-murder trial because counsel failed to present mitigation evidence.

Stallworth pleaded in his second amended petition that his trial counsel failed to present the following evidence: that his childhood was unstable and that he was neglected; that his mother was involved with men who were violent and abusive to her; that he was raised in poverty; that he was a caregiver to his mother; that he was subjected to physical and emotional abuse; and that he was a caring person. Stallworth did not set out specific acts that occurred in his life that would prove the assertions but merely made general assertions and at the end of each paragraph identified an individual. Specifically, Stallworth pleaded that counsel should have presented the testimony of the following individuals:7 (1) Ollie May Reed — Stallworth's mother, (2) Stephanie Rollin, (3) Cynthia Lauing, (4) Amy Lawrence, (5) Eunice Stallworth, (6) Shirley Nickson, (7) President Prim, (8) Vera James, (9) Deborah Pickens, (10) Theo Williams, (11) Randy Williams, and (12) Ines Holmes.

The State asserted in its answer that Stallworth ignored the evidence that counsel had presented in mitigation, that counsel is not ineffective for failing to present all mitigation evidence, and that Stallworth failed to plead how he was prejudiced. The circuit court summarily dismissed this claim citing Rules 32.6(b) and 32.7(d), Ala. R.Crim. P.

During Stallworth's penalty phase before the jury, counsel presented the testimony of Stallworth's mother, Ollie May Reed; Alex Lavon Baker, Stallworth's younger brother; and Deborah Denise Pickens, Stallworth's fiancee at the time of the murders.8 Counsel also stated for the record that two other witnesses were due to appear but were not present. These witnesses were identified as President Prim and an unknown individual. (Trial record p. 4715-16.) The record shows that counsel said that he had spoken to Prim on the telephone and was assured that he would be there momentarily. Counsel requested and was granted a short recess; however, Prim did not appear at the penalty-phase hearing.

Reed testified that Stallworth is the oldest of her 5 children; that he had a good relationship with his siblings and took care of them; that, when he was between the age of 5 and 8, he witnessed her being mistreated and beaten by men and he begged them to stop hurting his mother; that Stallworth sought help for her when she suffered from asthma when he was young; that Stallworth has asthma; that Stallworth was never a disciplinary problem; that Stallworth lived with his grandmother, her mother, until he was 18; that her uncle Prim was a father figure to Stallworth; that Stallworth was engaged to Deborah Pickens; that Stallworth and Pickens had a baby; that Stallworth took care of Pickens and the baby; that Stallworth was close to his family; and that Stallworth was popular in the neighborhood.

Baker, Stallworth's younger brother, testified that Stallworth is 10 years his senior; that when Stallworth was not working out of town on a shrimp boat, he spent a lot of time with him and his siblings; that Stallworth was kind to all the kids in the neighborhood; and that Baker loved his brother.

Pickens, Stallworth's fiancée, testified that she had known Stallworth for about nine years; that they lived in the same neighborhood; that she first met Stallworth when they were in high school; that Stallworth was popular around the neighborhood; that she had been engaged to Stallworth for three years; that they had a one-year-old daughter; that Stallworth is a wonderful father and was there when she needed him; that Stallworth spent a lot of time with her and the baby; and that Stallworth was caring and frequently did odd jobs for the older people in the neighborhood who needed help.

At the sentencing hearing before the judge, Stallworth's counsel presented the testimony of seven friends and family members: (1) Shirley Dailey, (2) President Prim, (3) Ollie Mae Reed, (4) Deborah Pickens, (5) Anna Lee Jones, (6) Lena Stallworth Harvey, and (7) Sonya Marie Prim. Counsel also attempted to call Stallworth's employer as a witness but he was not present at the courthouse.

Dailey, a longtime friend of Stallworth, testified that Stallworth was a nice, respectful child. She asked the court to spare his life. Prim, Stallworth's mother's uncle, testified that Stallworth lived with him and his wife for two years, that Stallworth never got into trouble, that Stallworth was a good child, and that Stallworth went to Sunday school every week. Prim asked the court to spare Stallworth's life. Reed, Stallworth's mother, asked the court to spare her son's life. Pickens, Stallworth's fiancée, testified that she has a child with Stallworth, that Stallworth was a good person, that Stallworth needed time with his child, and she asked the court to spare Stallworth's life.9 Jones, a friend, testified that Stallworth was a good boy and that he looked after her. She asked the court to spare Stallworth's life. Harvey, Stallworth's great aunt, testified that Stallworth was an obedient and nice child, that he was never in trouble, that Stallworth was afraid of his own shadow, and that it would be an injustice to sentence him to death. Sonya Prim testified that Stallworth was a good person who tried to help everyone, that he never hurt anyone, and that the court should spare his life.

During the guilt phase, Stallworth had also presented the testimony of two clinical psychologists. Dr. John William Davis, a clinical psychologist, testified that he performed intelligence and personality tests on Stallworth. It was his opinion that Stallworth had a full-scale IQ of 77, which means Stallworth is borderline mentally retarded. He said that Stallworth was dependent on others, that he looked to others for guidance, that he was insecure, that he suffers from anxiety, and that he needs a structured environment. Dr. Daniel L. Koch, a clinical psychologist, testified that he was hired to determine whether Stallworth was highly suggestible as it related to his confession. It was Dr. Koch's opinion that Stallworth "has significantly more suggestibility than does the average person." (Trial R. 3664.)

Fairley v. State, 812 So.2d 259, 262 (Miss. Ct.App.2002). "A petitioner's failure to `show how, but for the attorneys' errors, the results of the proceedings would have been different' justifies a district court's decision to summarily dismiss the ineffective assistance of counsel claim." Everett v. State, 757 N.W.2d 530, 535 (N.D.2008) (quoting Hughes v. State, 639 N.W.2d 696, 699 (N.D.2002)). "[F]ailing to introduce additional mitigation evidence that is only cumulative of that already presented does not amount to ineffective assistance." Jalowiec v. Bradshaw, 657 F.3d 293, 319 (6th Cir.2011) (citing Nields v. Bradshaw, 482 F.3d 442, 454 (6th Cir.2007)).

Foust v. Houk, 655 F.3d 524, 539 (6th Cir.2011). See Johnston v. State, 63 So.3d 730, 743 (Fla.2011) ("[T]he substance of almost all the information now presented by Johnston was presented to the jury. Therefore, counsel was not deficient in failing to present additional mitigation evidence."); Landrum v. Mitchell, 625 F.3d 905, 930 (6th Cir.2010) ("The petitioner must present new evidence that differs both in strength and subject matter from the evidence actually presented at sentencing, not just cumulative mitigation evidence."); Jones v. State, 998 So.2d 573, 587 (Fla.2008) ("We have repeatedly held that counsel is not ineffective for failing to present cumulative evidence."); Ford v. Hall, 546 F.3d 1326, 1328 (11th Cir.2008) ("Counsel is not required to call additional witnesses to present redundant or cumulative evidence."); Havard v. State, 988 So.2d 322, 337 (Miss.2008) ("Not calling witnesses who will testify negatively for a client or who will testify to matters cumulative in nature is not deficient performance by counsel."); Commonwealth v. Spotz, 587 Pa. 1, 71, 896 A.2d 1191, 1232 (2006) ("[A] defendant is not prejudiced by the failure of trial counsel to pursue cumulative evidence of the defendant's background...."); Lyons v. State, 269 Ga.App. 27, 31, 602 S.E.2d 917, 921 (2004) ("Trial counsel's failure to present cumulative evidence does not amount to ineffective assistance."); Skillicorn v. State, 22 S.W.3d 678, 683 (Mo.2000) ("Counsel is not ineffective for not putting on cumulative evidence."); Coulter v. State, 343 Ark. 22, 31, 31 S.W.3d 826, 832 (2000) ("[T]he omission of a witness when his or her testimony is cumulative does not deprive the defense of vital evidence.") State v. Ferguson, 20 S.W.3d 485, 509 (Mo.2000) ("[C]ounsel's failure to present additional evidence that would have been cumulative does not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel.").

Given the extensive evidence counsel presented in mitigation, a large portion of which was cumulative to the mitigating evidence Stallworth pleaded should have been presented, this claim was properly dismissed because Stallworth failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. "[T]he notion that the result could have been different if only [counsel] had put on more than the nine witnesses he did, or called expert witnesses to bolster his case, is fanciful." Wong v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. at 28, 130 S.Ct. 383.

VI.

Stallworth next argues that the circuit court erred in summarily dismissing his claims that his trial counsel was ineffective during the jury-selection process.

A.

First, Stallworth argues that his counsel failed to question the prospective jurors about their exposure to media coverage regarding the case. Stallworth pleaded the following in his second amended petition in regard to this claim:

(C.R. 52.)

In its answer, the State asserted the following:

(C.R. 153-54.) The circuit court found that this claim lacked specificity and was due to be dismissed pursuant to Rule 32.6(b), Ala. R.Crim. P.

In Washington v. State, 95 So.3d 26 (Ala.Crim.App.2012), the appellant asserted in his postconviction petition that his counsel was ineffective "for failing to conduct effective voir dire examination." 95 So.3d at 63. In affirming the circuit court's summary dismissal of this claim, this Court stated:

Washington, 95 So.3d at 64. See also Moody v. State, 95 So.3d 827 (Ala.Crim. App.2011).

Stallworth failed to plead the identity of any juror who was biased against him as a result of counsel's alleged failure to conduct an adequate voir dire; therefore, Stallworth failed to plead the full facts that would entitle him to relief. This claim was due to be summarily dismissed pursuant to Rule 32.6(b), Ala. R.Crim. P.

Moreover, the record shows that counsel moved that the prospective jurors complete a nine-page juror questionnaire. (Trial C.R. 806.) However, the trial court allowed the jurors to complete a questionnaire that had been approved by the Alabama Supreme Court. (Trial R. 903.) (A copy of a sample juror questionnaire is contained in Sample Form 56 of the Appendix to the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure.) The record also shows that the circuit court questioned the jurors about their general qualifications to sit on the jury and the extent of their exposure to pretrial publicity regarding the case. Each juror who indicated that he or she had heard or read about the case was questioned individually at the bench about exposure to pretrial publicity and the ability to be impartial. (Trial R. 1182-1222.) After jurors who indicated that they could not be impartial were removed, the remaining jurors completed the approved juror questionnaire. The day after the questionnaires were completed, counsel then asked follow-up questions concerning the jurors' responses on the questionnaires. The record shows that the jurors were questioned about their exposure to pretrial publicity in the case. This claim is refuted by the record and is without merit. McNabb v. State, 991 So.2d 313, 320 (Ala. Crim.App.2007) (holding that "because this claim was clearly refuted by the record, summary denial was proper pursuant to Rule 32.7(d), Ala. R.Crim. P.").

B.

Second, Stallworth argues that the circuit court erred in summarily dismissing his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to conduct an adequate voir dire to determine the views of prospective jurors on the death penalty.

Stallworth pleaded in his second amended petition that his trial counsel was ineffective because counsel failed to ensure that the jurors were "life qualified" or failed to ask whether the jurors would automatically vote for death. Stallworth pleaded:

(C.R. 53-54.)

The State asserted the following in its answer:

(C.R. 156.)

To survive summary dismissal of a postconviction claim, a petitioner must comply with the full-fact pleading requirements of Rule 32.6(b), Ala. R.Crim. P. "Unlike the general requirements related to civil cases, the pleading requirements for postconviction petitions are more stringent." Daniel v. State, 86 So.3d 405, 410-11 (Ala.Crim. App.2011) (footnote omitted). Stallworth was required to plead full facts to support each claim; therefore, he was required to identity each juror who served on the jury who was biased against him. See Washington, supra; Daniel, supra. Stallworth failed to do so.10 Further, in the context of an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, Stallworth failed to plead any facts that, if true, would establish a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different. See Hyde v. State, 950 So.2d 344, 356 (Ala.Crim.App. 2006) ("To sufficiently plead an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel, a Rule 32 petitioner not only must `identify the [specific] acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment,' Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), but also must plead specific facts indicating that he or she was prejudiced by the acts or omissions, i.e., facts indicating `that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.' 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052."). Thus, this claim was properly dismissed according to Rule 32.6(b), Ala. R.Crim. P.

C.

Stallworth next argues that the circuit court erred in summarily dismissing his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to question the prospective jurors about their possible racial bias.

The record shows that Stallworth's trial counsel moved that he be allowed to question the jurors extensively about racial bias. (Trial C.R. 290.) That motion was granted. (Trial R. 338.) On direct appeal, this Court considered the issue of whether the circuit court improperly restricted Stallworth's voir dire related to racial bias. This Court stated:

Stallworth v. State, 868 So.2d 1128, 1148 (Ala.Crim.App.2001).

This Court specifically held that counsel extensively questioned the jurors about racial bias. "Because the substantive claim underlying the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel has no merit, counsel could not be ineffective for failing to raise this issue." Lee v. State, 44 So.3d 1145, 1173 (Ala.Crim.App.2009). The circuit court correctly dismissed this claim because it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

D.

Stallworth next argues that the circuit court erred in summarily dismissing his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to strike for cause or to use a peremptory strike to remove certain jurors who, he asserts, were biased in favor of the State.

In his second amended petition, Stallworth pleaded that his counsel should have struck a juror who knew the prosecutor, a juror who knew a lieutenant who testified for the State, and a juror who knew several State witnesses. Stallworth did not specifically identify any of the challenged jurors by name.

The State asserted in its answer that this claim was insufficiently pleaded because counsel failed to identify the jurors who should have been challenged for cause or removed by the use of peremptory strikes. The circuit court found that this claim was dismissed pursuant to Rules 32.6(b) and 32.7(d), Ala. R.Crim. P.

In his brief to this Court, Stallworth attempts to do what he should have done in his petition — he identifies by name the challenged jurors. "This court will not consider an argument raised for the first time on appeal; its review is limited to evidence and arguments considered by the trial court." Myrick v. State, 787 So.2d 713, 718 (Ala.Crim.App.2000).

Moreover,

Teague v. Scott, 60 F.3d 1167, 1172 (5th Cir.1995) (quoting Garland v. Maggio, 717 F.2d 199, 206 (5th Cir.1983)).

This claim was due to be summarily dismissed pursuant to Rule 32.6(b), Ala. R.Crim. P., because Stallworth failed to plead the full facts that would entitle him to relief.

E.

Stallworth next argues that the circuit court erred in summarily dismissing his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to question the jury panels consistently.

Stallworth pleaded the following concerning this claim:

(C.R. 58-69.)

The State asserted in its answer that this claim was insufficiently pleaded because Stallworth failed to identify by name any juror who was biased; thus, he failed to plead the full facts entitling him to relief. This claim was due to be summarily dismissed pursuant to Rule 32.6(b), Ala. R.Crim. P.

VII.

Stallworth next argues that the circuit court erred in summarily dismissing his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to retain an expert to examine the knife recovered from Stallworth's fiancée's house — the house where Stallworth was living at the time of the murders.

Stallworth pleaded the following in his second amended petition:

(C.R. 46-47.)

The State asserted the following in its answer:

(C.R. 148-49.) The circuit court summarily dismissed this claim pursuant to Rules 32.6(b) and 32.7(d), Ala. R.Crim. P.

The record of Stallworth's trial shows that defense counsel questioned Dr. Julia Gooden, the forensic pathologist who conducted the autopsy on Linda Morton, about whether the injuries inflicted on Morton could have been caused by a "double-edged" knife, and she said that it was possible. Counsel then produced several different knives and asked Dr. Gooden if the wounds could have been inflicted by those knives. Also, counsel questioned Dr. James C.V. Downs, the medical examiner who conducted the autopsy on Nancy Dukes, about whether her injuries could have been caused by a "serrated knife." Counsel then asked Dr. Downs if the injuries could have been caused by the knives he had shown to Dr. Gooden. Both State pathologists indicated that the wounds could have been caused by the knives counsel had brought into court.

During Stallworth's defense case, counsel recalled Lt. Mack with the Baldwin County Sheriff's office. Lt. Mack testified that there was a drainage pond behind the Diamond store and that several times after Morton's murder he went to that pond to look for evidence. In April 1998, after the pond had dried up, Mack said, he recovered a knife.

Brown v. State, 292 Ga. 454, 456, 738 S.E.2d 591, 594 (2013). "[T]he failure to call an expert and instead rely on cross-examination does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel." State v. Nicholas, 66 Ohio St.3d 431, 436, 613 N.E.2d 225, 230 (1993).

Miller v. Anderson, 255 F.3d 455, 459 (7th Cir.2001) (citations omitted).

Cornell v. State, 277 Ga. 228, 229, 587 S.E.2d 652, 654 (2003) (footnote omitted).

The record clearly shows that counsel conducted a thorough cross-examination of both State experts and challenged the State's theory that the knife found in Stallworth's fiancée's house was the only knife that could have been the murder weapon. Accordingly, the circuit court correctly dismissed this claim because there was no material issue of fact or law that would entitle Stallworth to relief. Rule 32.7(d), Ala. R.Crim. P.

VIII.

Stallworth next argues that the circuit court erred in summarily dismissing his claim that counsel's closing argument in the penalty phase was ineffective because counsel relied solely on mercy.

In his second amended petition, Stallworth pleaded the following:

(C.R. 63.)

In its answer, the State asserted:

(C.R. 166.)

In Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 124 S.Ct. 1, 157 L.Ed.2d 1 (2003), the United State Supreme Court reversed a holding of a California court that counsel was ineffective during closing arguments. In noting the rarity of such a finding, the court stated:

540 U.S. at 5-6, 124 S.Ct. 1.

Courts have held that an attorney is not ineffective in relying on a mercy argument in closing.

Powers v. State, 883 So.2d 20, 35 (Miss. 2003).

Solomon v. Commissioner of Correctional Services, 786 F.Supp. 218, 228 (E.D.N.Y. 1992). See Coleman v. Brown, 802 F.2d 1227, 1236 (10th Cir.1986).

In this case, the circuit court found three aggravating circumstances: (1) that the murders were committed during a robbery; (2) that Stallworth was under a sentence of imprisonment when he committed the murders; and (3) that the murders were especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel as compared to other capital murders. The circuit court found no statutory or nonstatutory mitigation evidence after considering the evidence Stallworth presented. Given the circumstances of this case, counsel was not ineffective for relying on mercy in the closing.

IX.

Finally, Stallworth argues that the circuit court erroneously failed to sanction the State for failing to preserve evidence and erroneously failed to rule on his motion for sanctions. These arguments are not preserved for appellate review. After the circuit court denied relief on Stallworth's Rule 32 petition without ruling on his motion for sanctions, Stallworth did not file a motion to reconsider, objecting to the circuit court's failure to rule on his motion for sanctions. Accordingly, Stallworth's argument that the circuit court erroneously failed to rule on his motion is not properly preserved for this Court's review. See Broadnax v. State, 130 So.3d 1232, 1241 (Ala.Crim.App.2013) ("The record reflects that Broadnax did not raise this issue in the circuit court, by way of postjudgment motion, or otherwise. Cf. Loggins v. State, 910 So.2d 146, 149 (Ala.Crim. App.2005) (recognizing a motion to reconsider as a valid postjudgment motion in the Rule 32 context). It is well settled that `[t]he general rules of preservation apply to Rule 32 proceedings.' Boyd v. State, 913 So.2d 1113, 1123 (Ala.Crim.App. 2003). See also Slaton v. State, 902 So.2d 102, 107-08 (Ala.Crim.App.2003) (holding that the appellant's claim that the circuit court erred in adopting State's proposed order was not preserved for review when it was never presented to the circuit court). Therefore, this issue was not properly preserved for this Court's review and will not be considered.").

Likewise, Stallworth failed to preserve his argument that the State should have been sanctioned for failing to preserve evidence. It is well settled that "`[t]o preserve an issue for appellate review, the issue must be timely raised and specifically presented to the trial court and an adverse ruling obtained.'" Cochran v. State, 111 So.3d 148, 153-54 (Ala.Crim. App.2012) (quoting Mitchell v. State, 913 So.2d 501, 505 (Ala.Crim.App.2005)). An issue is not properly preserved for appellate review when the appellant failed to obtain an adverse ruling. McWhorter v. State, 142 So.3d 1195, 1210 (Ala.Crim.App. 2011). Here, Stallworth never obtained an adverse ruling on his motion for sanctions and did not object to the circuit court's failure to rule. Therefore, this issue is not preserved for this Court's review.

For the reasons stated in Part I of this opinion, this case is remanded to the Baldwin Circuit Court for that Court to make specific findings of fact as to the three claims that were the subject of the postconviction evidentiary hearing. Due return should be filed in this Court within 60 days from the date of this opinion.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.

WELCH, KELLUM, and BURKE, JJ., concur.

JOINER, J., concurs specially, with opinion.

JOINER, Judge, concurring specially.

I concur with the main opinion. I write specially to clarify my basis for doing so as to Part VI.B.

In footnote 9, the main opinion states:

___ So.3d ___, ___ n. 9. I do not read this footnote as suggesting that the circuit court, in summarily dismissing Calvin L. Stallworth's claim that counsel was ineffective for not attempting to determine the prospective jurors' views on the death penalty, could have focused solely on the allegations in the petition and ignored the additional facts regarding this claim that Stallworth alleged in his reply to the State's answer to his petition. Even with the additional allegations made in his reply, however, I agree with the main opinion's conclusion that the claim was not sufficiently pleaded.

On Return to Remand

WINDOM, Presiding Judge.

Calvin L. Stallworth, currently an inmate on Alabama's death row at Holman Correctional Facility, appeals the circuit court's denial of his petition for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Rule 32, Ala. R.Crim. P., in which he challenged his two capital-murder convictions and sentences of death.

The procedural history and facts of Stallworth's crime were detailed in this Court's opinion issued on November 8, 2013, and will not be repeated. Stallworth v. State, [Ms. CR-09-1433, Nov. 8, 2013] ___ So.3d ___, ___ (Ala.Crim.App.2013). This Court affirmed the circuit court's disposal of all but three of the claims raised in Stallworth's second-amended Rule 32 petition. Id. This Court held, however, that the circuit court had erred by failing to address the following three claims that were the subject of the Rule 32 evidentiary hearing: (1) that counsel was ineffective for failing to have the blood smear on the inside of Stallworth's jacket tested for the presence of disodium salt of ethylenediamine tetraacetic acid (EDTA);1 (2) that counsel was ineffective for failing to employ and present the testimony of a DNA expert; and (3) that counsel was ineffective for failing to secure and present the testimony of a blood-spatter expert. Stallworth, ___ So.3d at ___. Accordingly, this Court remanded the cause with instructions for the circuit court to address those claims.

On December 10, 2013, the circuit court issued an order in which it made specific findings of fact concerning the three claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The circuit court noted that, during the evidentiary hearing, Stallworth called only one of the three attorneys that represented him at trial and "did not ask his trial counsel any questions related to the [ineffective-assistance-of-counsel] claims." (C. on Return to Remand 103.) Further, Stallworth "successfully objected to the State asking one of Stallworth's trial counsel, Wayne Doerr, questions regarding Stallworth's [ineffective-assistance-of-counsel] claims on cross-examination during Stallworth's case." Id. After Stallworth rested, the State recalled Doerr to testify. During the State's case, Stallworth again failed to question counsel regarding counsel's decisions related to his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. The circuit court denied the claims, finding that Stallworth had effectively abandoned them or, alternatively, that he had failed to prove them by a preponderance of the evidence.

Initially, this Court notes that the three claims this Court ordered the circuit court to address on remand were claims on which the circuit court held an evidentiary hearing. According to Rule 32.3, Ala. R.Crim. P., Stallworth has the sole burden of proving that he is entitled to relief on those claims. Rule 32.3, Ala. R.Crim. P., provides:

In its supplemental order, the circuit court denied each of Stallworth's three claims of ineffective assistance of counsel because Stallworth failed to meet his burden to establish that he was entitled to relief.2 See Rule 32.3, Ala. R.Crim. P. Specifically, the circuit court found that Stallworth failed to meet his burden because he failed to present any testimony from trial counsel relating to these claims. This Court agrees.

To prevail on his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, Stallworth must satisfy the two-prong test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). First, he must present evidence establishing the specific acts or omissions that he alleges were not the result of reasonable professional judgment on counsel's part and prove that these acts or omissions fall "outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance." Id. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052. If he meets this burden, he must then show that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. "The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112, 131 S.Ct. 770, 792, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693, 104 S.Ct. 2052).

Further, the Supreme Court of the United States has explained:

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. "Strickland specifically commands that a court `must indulge [the] strong presumption' that counsel `made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.'" Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, ___, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1407, 179 L.Ed.2d 557 (2011) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-690, 104 S.Ct. 2052). Courts are "required not simply to give the attorneys the benefit of the doubt, but to affirmatively entertain the range of possible reasons ... counsel may have had for proceeding as they did." Cullen, 563 U.S. at ___, 131 S.Ct. at 1407 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

Further, the presumption that counsel performed effectively "`is like the "presumption of innocence" in a criminal trial,'" and the petitioner bears the burden of disproving that presumption. Hunt v. State, 940 So.2d 1041, 1059 (Ala.Crim.App. 2005) (quoting Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1314 n. 15 (11th Cir.2000) (en banc)). "Never does the government acquire the burden to show competence, even when some evidence to the contrary might be offered by the petitioner." Id. "`"An ambiguous or silent record is not sufficient to disprove the strong and continuing presumption [of effective representation]. Therefore, `where the record is incomplete or unclear about [counsel]'s actions, [a court] will presume that he did what he should have done, and that he exercised reasonable professional judgment.'"'" Hunt, 940 So.2d at 1070-71 (quoting Grayson v. Thompson, 257 F.3d 1194, 1218 (11th Cir.2001), quoting in turn Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1314 n. 15, quoting in turn Williams v. Head, 185 F.3d 1223, 1228 (11th Cir.1999)). Thus, to overcome the strong presumption of effectiveness, a Rule 32 petitioner must, at his evidentiary hearing, question trial counsel regarding his or her actions and reasoning. See, e.g., Broadnax v. State, 130 So.3d 1232, 1255-56 (Ala.Crim.App.2013) (recognizing that "[i]t is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel without questioning counsel about the specific claim, especially when the claim is based on specific actions, or inactions, of counsel that occurred out-side the record[, and holding that] circuit court correctly found that Broadnax, by failing to question his attorneys about this specific claim, failed to overcome the presumption that counsel acted reasonably"); Whitson v. State, 109 So.3d 665, 676 (Ala. Crim.App.2012) (holding that a petitioner failed to meet his burden of overcoming the presumption that counsel were effective because the petitioner failed to question appellate counsel regarding their reasoning); Brooks v. State, 929 So.2d 491, 497 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (holding that a petitioner failed to meet his burden of overcoming the presumption that counsel were effective because the petitioner failed to question trial counsel regarding their reasoning); McGahee v. State, 885 So.2d 191, 221-22 (Ala.Crim.App.2003) ("[C]ounsel at the Rule 32 hearing did not ask trial counsel any questions about his reasons for not calling the additional witnesses to testify. Because he has failed to present any evidence about counsel's decisions, we view trial counsel's actions as strategic decisions, which are virtually unassailable."); Williams v. Head, 185 F.3d at 1228; Adams v. Wainwright, 709 F.2d 1443, 1445-46 (11th Cir.1983) ("[The petitioner] did not call trial counsel to testify ... [; therefore,] there is no basis in this record for finding that counsel did not sufficiently investigate [the petitioner's] background."); Callahan v. Campbell, 427 F.3d 897, 933 (11th Cir.2005) ("Because [trial counsel] passed away before the Rule 32 hearing, we have no evidence of what he did to prepare for the penalty phase of [the petitioner's] trial. In a situation like this, we will presume the attorney `did what he should have done, and that he exercised reasonable professional judgment.'").

Here, Stallworth failed to overcome the presumption that trial counsel performed effectively. At trial, three attorneys — Wayne Doerr, Deidre Lee, and Greg Dawkins — represented Stallworth.3 During the Rule 32 hearing, Stallworth called only Doerr to testify. Stallworth asked no questions related to trial counsel's strategic decisions regarding the services of EDTA, DNA, or blood-splatter experts. In fact, Stallworth failed to elicit any evidence relating to trial counsel's reasoning and strategies at trial. Further, Stallworth failed to present any testimony indicating that trial counsel failed to hire a DNA or blood-spatter expert. On the other hand, the State presented testimony from Doerr establishing that trial counsel had hired — and had paid for with their own money — both a DNA expert and a crime-scene expert.

Because Stallworth failed to present any evidence regarding counsel's reasoning relating to experts, the circuit court correctly found that he failed to meet his burden to overcome the presumption that counsel acted reasonably and effectively.4 Broadnax, 130 So.3d at 1255-56; Whitson, 109 So.3d at 676. Therefore, this Court cannot say that the circuit court abused its discretion by denying relief.

For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court's judgment is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

WELCH, KELLUM, BURKE, and JOINER, JJ., concur.