ALLARD, Judge.
This consolidated case raises the question of whether the statewide three-judge sentencing panel has the authority to impose a sentence below the presumptive range to lessen, or eliminate, the risk that a defendant will be deported.
The State argues that federal law prohibits state courts from modifying a sentence for the purpose of influencing the federal immigration consequences of a conviction. It also argues that the Alaska Statutes do not authorize the three-judge panel to impose a sentence below the presumptive range based on the collateral consequences of deportation. Lastly, it argues that adjusting a sentence to lessen the risk of deportation violates the equal protection clause, because the non-citizen offender may receive a more lenient sentence than a citizen would based on the same conduct.
For the reasons explained below, we conclude that the three-judge panel has authority to impose a sentence below the presumptive range based on the harsh collateral consequences of deportation and that this authority is not preempted by federal law.
With respect to Michael Silvera, the three-judge panel has already concluded that Silvera's potential deportation was a "harsh collateral consequence" that qualified as a non-statutory mitigating factor and has already imposed a sentence below the presumptive range. We therefore affirm Silvera's sentence.
With respect to Jose Manuel Perez, the three-judge panel did not directly decide whether deportation would qualify as a harsh collateral consequence. Instead, the panel assumed that Perez had established this non-statutory mitigating factor and concluded that consideration of this factor would justify imposing a sentence below the presumptive range for one of Perez's convictions. We therefore remand Perez's case to the three-judge panel for further proceedings.
Michael Silvera has been a lawful resident of the United States since 1978. He served in the Armed Forces for more than six years and received an honorable discharge. In 2007, he was convicted of second-degree assault for assaulting a man with a knife during a drunken incident in a taxicab in Nome.
The three-judge panel concluded that "harsh collateral consequences" is an appropriate non-statutory mitigating factor. It then found that Silvera had established that factor by showing: (1) that he was at substantial risk of deportation to Jamaica if he received a sentence of 1 year or more; (2) that he would lose his medical benefits if he were deported; and (3) that he would not be able to afford the medical care he needed, even assuming it was available in Jamaica, because his illness had prevented him from working. The panel also found that Silvera was not at high risk of reoffending. Based on these findings, the panel concluded that a sentence within the presumptive range would be manifestly unjust. It therefore imposed a sentence that would not subject Silvera to deportation as an aggravated felon: a sentence of 364 days to serve.
In 2011, Jose Perez was convicted of fourth-degree assault
At the time of sentencing, Perez had been a lawful permanent resident of the United States for twenty-six years, since he was ten years old. As a first felony offender, he faced a presumptive term of 1 to 3 years for the interference with official proceedings conviction
Like Silvera, Perez asked the sentencing court to refer his case to the three-judge sentencing panel for consideration of the proposed non-statutory mitigator of "harsh collateral consequences." The consequence Perez faced was deportation as an aggravated felon if he received a sentence of 1 year or more for his interference with official proceedings conviction.
The three-judge panel found, as a factual matter, that Perez would be deported if he received a sentence of 1 year or more for his interference with official proceedings conviction. The panel assumed, without deciding, that deportation would be a harsh collateral consequence in Perez's case.
The State argues that federal law preempts state sentencing law and that, because the federal government has exclusive authority over deportation decisions, the three-judge sentencing panel is prohibited from modifying a sentence for the purpose of influencing the defendant's risk of deportation.
The law of federal preemption is derived from the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the United States Constitution, which declares that federal law shall be "the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." The Alaska Supreme Court generally applies a two-step analysis to preemption questions:
In this analysis, courts must assume that the historic police powers of the states are not superseded "unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."
The State does not assert that Congress has enacted a statute expressly forbidding state courts from considering deportation consequences at sentencing. Instead, it argues that Congress's regulation of immigration is so pervasive that it establishes Congress's intent to displace any state action aimed at influencing who will be deported.
The flaw in the State's argument is that Congress expressly reserved a role for state courts in determining when a crime is an "aggravated felony" under federal law. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act,
The State argues that Congress did not intend these state sentencing decisions to be motivated by a desire to influence the defendant's risk of deportation. To support this argument, the State observes that Congress in 1990 eliminated judicial authority to make binding recommendations against deportation in criminal cases.
Beginning in 1917, when Congress first authorized deportation based on certain criminal convictions, sentencing judges had the authority to make a "judicial recommendation against deportation," known as a JRAD, for non-citizens convicted of crimes of moral turpitude, and this recommendation had the effect of binding the executive branch to disregard the conviction as a basis for deportation.
But as the defendants point out, Congress did away with this judicial authority as part of a broader effort to streamline the deportation of non-citizens convicted of criminal offenses. The same 1990 legislation that eliminated the JRAD procedure also limited the Attorney General's authority to grant discretionary relief from deportation to defendants convicted of aggravated felonies.
Even accepting that Congress intended to preempt state courts from issuing binding decisions on deportation in criminal cases, that does not mean Congress intended to prohibit state courts from considering the risk of deportation in deciding whether to impose a term of imprisonment that would lead to the defendant's classification as an aggravated felon. As already explained, Congress expressly reserved a role for state courts in determining when a defendant has committed an aggravated felony for purposes of federal immigration law; it reserved no such role for state courts in deciding whether a criminal defendant should be deported. For this reason, courts have consistently ruled that the federal government's exclusive power over the administration and enforcement of immigration laws deprives criminal courts of the authority to order a defendant to leave the United States or to require a defendant to leave or remain outside the United States as a condition of probation.
We acknowledge that two federal circuits have held that Congress intended to prohibit federal courts from granting a downward adjustment in the federal sentencing guidelines to lessen the likelihood of deportation.
The State claims that the sentencing hearings conducted by the three-judge panel in Silvera's and Perez's cases were de facto immigration hearings. This claim is not supported by the record. In both cases, the three-judge panel addressed state sentencing considerations, and they did not purport, as the State argues, to substitute their judgment for that of federal immigration officials based on "myriad humanitarian, political, and national security factors." It may be that federal immigration officials weigh some of the same factors in deportation proceedings that state courts traditionally consider at sentencing, but this potential overlap does not establish Congress's clear and manifest purpose to prohibit state courts from considering the totality of legally relevant circumstances at sentencing — including the risk and consequences of deportation.
The State also argues that the decisions of the three-judge panel provided Silvera and Perez with an exemption from deportation that Congress expressly proscribed. Specifically, the State points to 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b), which bars the Attorney General from cancelling the deportation of a non-citizen who has been convicted of an aggravated felony.
For these reasons, we reject the State's claim that federal law prohibits the three-judge sentencing panel from considering the harsh collateral consequences of deportation and, if manifest injustice would otherwise result, from imposing a sentence below the presumptive range based on that consideration.
The Alaska Legislature's goal in enacting presumptive sentencing was to reduce
The State argues that this statutory scheme does not permit the three-judge panel to impose a sentence below the presumptive range based on the harsh collateral consequences of deportation. It argues that mitigating a sentence to lessen the risk that a defendant will be deported defeats the legislative goal of promoting uniformity in sentencing
The Alaska Supreme Court and this Court have previously recognized that the harsh collateral consequences of a criminal conviction, including deportation, are appropriate sentencing considerations.
The State argues that a judicial finding that a defendant faces deportation will always be impermissibly speculative, because immigration officials have broad discretion in deciding whether to initiate deportation proceedings. To support this argument, the State relies on State v. Mendoza,
As a preliminary matter, we do not agree that the State has established that immigration officials have broad discretion to decide whether to deport aggravated felons. A policy
We have no doubt that deportation will be speculative in some cases — but it will be practically certain in others. For this reason, even if we were not bound by the decisions of our supreme court holding that deportation is a proper consideration at sentencing, we would not be persuaded by the reasoning of the Minnesota Court of Appeals.
The State next argues that considering the harsh collateral consequences of deportation is inconsistent with the Chaney goals of rehabilitation, general and specific deterrence, affirmation of societal norms, and public safety, and also does not advance the interests of crime victims, because these goals are "not impaired by enforcing properly promulgated federal law." This argument frames the analysis too narrowly; the question is whether consideration of potential deportation consequences will, in appropriate cases, lead to a sentence that better advances the Chaney sentencing goals. Alaska courts have already answered that question in the affirmative.
The State contends that allowing courts to adjust a sentence to avoid the risk of deportation contravenes the legislative goal of uniformity in sentencing. This argument finds some support in our observation in our earlier decision in Silvera that a non-citizen who is sentenced to a term below the presumptive range because of the prospect of deportation may, in some instances, receive a more lenient sentence than an identical citizen who is not subject to deportation.
The State argues that, because of the procedural fairness and prosecutorial discretion built into the federal immigration system, it can never be manifestly unjust to refrain from mitigating a sentence to lessen the risk of deportation. But this argument ignores the statutory context in which an Alaska court's finding of manifest injustice is made. The question before Alaska courts is not whether it would be manifestly unjust for the federal government to deport a defendant; the mandate of Alaska sentencing courts is to determine whether a sentence within the
We conclude that the three-judge panel has the statutory authority to impose a sentence below the presumptive range based on the harsh collateral consequences of deportation. If the three-judge panel were precluded from considering this factor as a matter of law, there is a substantial risk that unduly harsh sentences would be imposed on non-citizens in particular cases, defeating the legislature's goal of uniformity in sentencing.
The State next argues that adjusting a sentence purely to avoid the immigration consequences of a conviction violates the federal and state equal protection clauses, because a non-citizen defendant in these circumstances might receive a more lenient sentence than would be imposed on a citizen defendant. This claim was not raised below, and the three-judge panel did not rule on it, so we review it for plain error.
The State's argument rests on the premise that Silvera and Perez received favorable treatment based on their status as non-citizens.
Moreover, to establish an equal protection violation, a party must show that the persons being compared are similarly situated.
Permitting sentencing courts to consider immigration consequences will not invariably result in more lenient sentences for non-citizens. In some cases, sentencing courts may determine that the defendant's risk of deportation does not establish a non-statutory mitigating factor and that referral to the three-judge panel is not warranted. In other cases, the three-judge panel may reject the sentencing court's finding of a non-statutory mitigating factor, or it may conclude that, even though the factor was established, it would not be manifestly unjust to sentence the defendant within the presumptive range.
Even in cases where the three-judge panel departs from the presumptive sentencing range based on the harsh collateral consequences of deportation, the result will not necessarily be a sentence that is more lenient than the sentence that would be imposed on a citizen. In Perez's case, for example, the three-judge panel ultimately proposed a composite sentence that was no different than
We acknowledge that there may be some cases, such as Silvera's, where the sentence imposed by the three-judge panel is more lenient than the sentencing judge would have imposed if the defendant did not face deportation. But even then, the critical question for purposes of equal protection analysis is whether the sentence complies with the Chaney criteria. Notably, the State has not challenged Silvera's sentence as clearly mistaken.
We conclude that the State's generalized equal protection concerns are without merit and that its concerns about overly lenient sentences in particular cases are most appropriately addressed in those individual cases through the existing legal framework of the Chaney criteria and Alaska sentencing law.
Silvera's sentence is AFFIRMED. Perez's case is REMANDED to the three-judge panel for a determination of (1) whether deportation is a harsh collateral consequence qualifying as a non-statutory mitigating factor in his case and, if so, (2) whether a sentence within the presumptive range would be manifestly unjust given that harsh collateral consequence and the Chaney criteria. We do not retain jurisdiction.