Memorandum decisions of this court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d) and Paragraph 7 of the Guidelines for Publication of Court of Appeals Decisions (Court of Appeals Order No. 3). Accordingly, this memorandum decision may not be cited as binding authority for any proposition of law.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Judge ALLARD.
Rodney O. Hebert was convicted of driving with a revoked license. He argues that the district court should have compelled the Municipality to produce the Anchorage Police Department's policy on high speed pursuits in non-emergency situations. He asserts that this information was relevant to his claim that he was entitled to exclusion of the evidence arising from his traffic stop because the officer who stopped him allegedly violated this department policy. Hebert also argues that he was entitled to suppression of the evidence because the officer stopped him based on impermissible profiling, not based on reasonable suspicion to believe he had committed a crime. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that Hebert's claims have no merit and we affirm the district court's decisions.
Facts and proceedings
On July 3, 2011, Anchorage Police Officer Kevin Palmatier was parked along the Glenn Highway running license plate numbers through his computer to check for motor vehicle offenses. When Palmatier ran the license plate number of a motorcycle that passed by, he learned that it was registered to Rodney Hebert, and that Hebert's driver's license was revoked. Palmatier decided to get closer to the motorcycle to determine if Hebert was the driver. The motorcycle was traveling the speed limit, or close to it, and Palmatier was traveling at a speed that allowed him to catch up to the motorcycle within three or four miles.
When Palmatier was approximately a car-length from the motorcycle, he compared the physical description of the registered owner with the current driver and concluded that they appeared to be the same person. Palmatier then pulled Hebert over and issued him a citation.
Hebert was charged with driving with a revoked license.1 Before trial, he moved to suppress all evidence arising from the stop, arguing that Palmatier stopped him because he is Alaska Native, or because he "look[ed] like a gang-banger ... or some kind of Hells Angel or ... criminal," and that Palmatier had no reasonable suspicion for the stop. District Court Judge Brian K. Clark denied the motion to suppress, finding that Palmatier had not stopped Hebert on a pretext, and that he had reasonable suspicion to believe Hebert was driving with a revoked license.
Hebert then filed a motion to compel the Municipality to produce information concerning the police department's policies "relating to officers abiding by traffic regulations while on duty in a non-emergency situation." Hebert asserted that he was entitled to suppression of the evidence against him if Palmatier violated department policy by exceeding the speed limit to effect his stop.
District Court Judge William H. Fuld denied the motion, concluding that Hebert had not shown that the information he sought was relevant to any viable defense. Hebert filed motions for reconsideration, which Judge Clark denied.
Hebert was convicted of driving with a revoked license. He appeals.
The district court did not err in denying the motion to compel
Hebert argues that the district court violated his due process right to present a defense by denying his motion to compel the Anchorage Police Department's internal policy on high speed pursuits.2 The district court assumed for purposes of Hebert's motion that Officer Palmatier had violated department policy by speeding and treated the issue as a purely legal question: whether Hebert was entitled to suppression of the evidence based on this assumed violation of department policy.
On appeal, Hebert relies on federal authority holding that evidence may be subject to suppression if it is obtained in violation of local police procedures governing inventory searches. But it does not follow from this authority (which relates to concerns about the authenticity and inevitability of an inventory search) that a defendant is entitled to exclusion of the evidence any time a police officer violates the law or department policy during a traffic stop.
The question of whether the exclusionary rule should be applied in a particular context depends on a balancing of interests. The court must balance "the degree to which application of the exclusionary rule can be expected to deter police misconduct" and "the degree to which the integrity of the judicial system would be compromised by the use of the illegally obtained evidence," against "the need to use the illegally obtained evidence to further other important societal purposes."3
In State v. Sundberg,4 the Alaska Supreme Court addressed whether the exclusionary rule was an appropriate sanction for an officer's use of excessive force in arresting a fleeing burglary suspect.5 The court assumed for purposes of argument that the officer had used force in excess of what was allowed by statute, but it concluded that the exclusionary rule was not an appropriate sanction for that violation.6
In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the exclusionary rule would provide some disincentive to the use of unlawful force by police officers in making arrests, but it weighed this benefit against "society's interest in the apprehension, prevention, and trial of offenders."7 The Court concluded that other potential deterrents — namely, "the possibility of criminal sanctions; police departmental proceedings; civil rights actions; and common law tort suits against the offending officer" — were not "so ineffective that invocation of an exclusionary rule is the only viable alternative."8
The Court also identified another reason why application of the exclusionary rule was not appropriate:
[T]he conventional search and seizure setting usually involves a relatively static factual circumstance where the object of police efforts is to obtain evidence of criminal conduct. In stark contrast, the fleeing offender-arrest situation normally does not involve intentional police efforts to obtain evidence of criminality. This latter setting often requires law enforcement officers to make rapid decisions within the framework of fluid and confused factual situations which do not permit significant reflection, the obtaining of legal advice, or the intervention of, and decision from, a neutral and detached judicial officer.9
The reasoning in Sundberg applies with equal force here.
Under Alaska law, it is well settled that when the police have reasonable suspicion to believe a person is driving with a suspended or revoked license, "the situation is one `requiring immediate police response to protect the public.'"10 Thus, an officer enforcing this law, like an officer chasing a fleeing burglary suspect, will often be required to make rapid decisions in fluid factual situations without time for significant reflection.11 More importantly, Hebert has not argued, much less shown, that the other potential deterrents mentioned in Sundberg — e.g., the possibility of criminal sanctions, police departmental proceedings against the offending officer, or common law tort suits — are so inadequate that the exclusionary rule should apply.
We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in ruling that Hebert had failed to demonstrate that the information he sought was relevant to any viable defense and we uphold the district court's decision to deny the motion to compel.
Hebert's stop was supported by reasonable suspicion
Hebert next argues that Palmatier lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him. Hebert's claim, more specifically, is that Palmatier impermissibly targeted him for investigation based primarily on his race (Alaska Native) and that, because of this, the evidence later obtained to justify his stop — the evidence that he was driving with a revoked license — should not be considered in assessing the legality of the stop.
Judge Clark treated this argument as a claim that Hebert had been subjected to a pretextual stop. Hebert frames his claim differently, arguing that he was stopped based on impermissible racial profiling. Regardless of the precise legal doctrine underlying Hebert's argument, he has not established the factual basis of his claim — that he was targeted for investigation based on his race or other impermissible profiling. Judge Clark found that Palmatier credibly testified that, at the time he stopped Hebert, he was running license plate checks through his computer for traffic enforcement purposes. The judge found that the documentary evidence produced by the Municipality supported this testimony. Based on these findings, the judge concluded that Palmatier initiated his investigation of Hebert not because of his race but because a license plate check revealed that the registered owner of the motorcycle he was driving had a revoked license. Hebert has not shown that these findings were clear error.
Judge Clark ruled that, once Palmatier established that the owner of the motorcycle had a revoked license, and that Hebert physically resembled the owner, he had reasonable suspicion to stop Hebert. We agree that these circumstances gave Palmatier reasonable suspicion for the stop. We therefore affirm the district court's decision to deny the motion to suppress.
Conclusion
We AFFIRM the district court's judgment.
