Memorandum decisions of this court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d) and Paragraph 7 of the Guidelines for Publication of Court of Appeals Decisions (Court of Appeals Order No. 3). Accordingly, this memorandum decision may not be cited as binding authority for any proposition of law.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Judge ALLARD.

Jesse A. Katairoak was convicted of misconduct involving a controlled substance in the fourth degree based on cocaine found on his person during a search incident to his arrest. The superior court ruled that the search was unlawful, but that the evidence was admissible under the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule because the cocaine would have been found during an inventory search at the jail.

Katairoak appeals, arguing that the inevitable discovery exception is inapplicable in his case. Alternatively, Katairoak argues that the evidence should have been suppressed under Alaska Evidence Rule 412. For the reasons described below, we affirm the superior court's ruling.

Background facts

Trooper Robert Alton Bressler was driving southbound on Easy Street in Fairbanks on December 7, 2009, when he saw Katairoak merge onto Easy Street from Lakeview Terrace. Trooper Bressler did not see Katairoak stop or signal before merging onto Easy Street, so he conducted a traffic stop.

When Trooper Bressler caught up to Katairoak's vehicle in front of the Frontier Lodge, Katairoak exited his vehicle and ran toward the side of the hotel. Trooper Bressler called out to Katairoak to stop and pursued him on foot. During the chase, Katairoak turned and confronted Trooper Bressler, saying "no, man, don't do this, don't do this." Bressler drew his taser and ordered Katairoak to lie down and put his hands behind his back. Katairoak fell to the ground, either because he was tasered or because he slipped. Katairoak stood back up and Trooper Bressler "took [Katairoak] to the ground," where Katairoak continued to resist. In an attempt to detain Katairoak, Trooper Bressler pepper-sprayed him in the face and then delivered two "elbow strikes." After a second trooper arrived, they were able to handcuff Katairoak. Katairoak was also placed in a spit mask. The troopers identified Katairoak, discovered he had warrants for probation violations, and arrested him on those grounds.

Trooper Bressler then conducted a search incident to arrest, finding cash and twenty-eight grams of cocaine in a clear plastic bag in Katairoak's pocket.

Katairoak was transported to the Fairbanks Correctional Center. When he arrived at the jail, Katairoak's face was red, his eyes were swollen shut, he had mucus dripping from his nose area, and he had trouble breathing with the spit mask on. Katairoak met with medical staff and then showered. His clothes were put in a bag.

Trooper Bressler later conducted an inventory search of Katairoak's vehicle and found one methadone pill in the center console.

Prior proceedings

A grand jury indicted Katairoak on two counts of misconduct involving a controlled substance. Four additional misdemeanor counts were added by information.

Katairoak moved to suppress the evidence of the cocaine and cash found in his pockets, and to dismiss the charges, arguing, inter alia, that the police had conducted an unlawful search incident to his arrest.

Superior Court Judge Michael P. McConahy agreed that the search was unlawful. The judge concluded, however, that the cocaine in Katairoak's clothes would have been discovered during the booking inventory at the jail, and that the evidence was therefore admissible under the doctrine of inevitable discovery.

Following the superior court's ruling, Katairoak filed another motion, arguing that the evidence should be suppressed under Evidence Rule 412, because that rule, which generally prohibits the use of illegally obtained evidence, does not directly provide for an inevitable discovery exception. The superior court denied the motion.

Katairoak subsequently waived his right to a jury and the parties proceeded to a bench trial on stipulated facts. The trial judge found Katairoak guilty of misconduct involving a controlled substance in the fourth degree. All other charges were dismissed. Katairoak was sentenced to 5 years to serve, with no time suspended.

This appeal followed.

Did the superior court err in concluding that the evidence was admissible under the doctrine of inevitable discovery?

In Smith v. State,1 the Alaska Supreme Court recognized inevitable discovery as an exception to the exclusionary rule under Alaska law.2 The supreme court held that "if the prosecution can show, by clear and convincing evidence, that illegally obtained evidence would have been discovered through predictable investigative processes, such evidence need not be suppressed as long as the police have not knowingly or intentionally violated the rights of the accused in obtaining that evidence."3 The superior court applied this doctrine in the present case, finding "by clear and convincing evidence that the contraband would have been inevitably discovered upon a valid booking inventory at jail."

Katairoak challenges this ruling on four different grounds. He argues first that the inevitable discovery exception should not apply in his case because the troopers knowingly or intentionally violated his rights. He next argues that the inevitable discovery exception should not apply to inventory searches because they are not "investigative." Katairoak also argues that the State did not establish by clear and convincing evidence that the cocaine would have been inevitably discovered during an inventory search at the jail. Finally, Katairoak argues that Alaska Evidence Rule 412 constituted a separate ground for suppression in his case. We address each contention in turn.

Katairoak's contention that the inevitable discovery exception should not apply because the troopers knowingly and/or intentionally violated Katairoak's rights.

As noted above, under Smith, the inevitable discovery doctrine does not apply if the police knowingly or intentionally violated the rights of the accused in obtaining the evidence at issue.4

Katairoak asserts that the superior court erred by failing to make explicit findings regarding whether the officers knowingly and/or intentionally violated his rights. Katairoak further asserts that any such finding would be clearly erroneous because the record shows that the troopers knowingly or intentionally violated his rights by (1) subjecting him to police brutality; (2) conducting an illegal vehicle search; and (3) conducting an illegal search incident to arrest.

The superior court explicitly rejected Katairoak's claims that he had been subjected to police brutality and that the police had conducted an illegal vehicle search. The court found that Katairoak's version of events was not credible, and that the defense witness who testified as to the circumstances of the vehicle search was also not credible. The court further found that the police actions in tasering, pepper-spraying, and putting Katairoak in a spit-mask were legitimate responses to Katairoak's actions. Katairoak has not demonstrated that these findings were clearly erroneous.

In addition, although the superior court ruled that the search incident to Katairoak's arrest was illegal, the court did not find that the troopers acted in bad faith or with any awareness of the illegality of the search. Moreover, in its order applying the inevitable discovery doctrine, the superior court specifically recognized that the exception would not apply if the troopers had knowingly or intentionally violated Katairoak's rights. We conclude that the superior court implicitly found that the troopers did not knowingly or intentionally violate Katairoak's rights. We further conclude that this finding is supported by the record and is not clearly erroneous.

Katairoak's contention that the inevitable discovery doctrine does not apply to inventory searches

Under Smith v. State, the inevitable discovery doctrine applies "if the prosecution can show, by clear and convincing evidence, that illegally obtained evidence would have been discovered through predictable investigative processes."5 Katairoak points to this language to argue that the inevitable discovery exception does not apply to inventory searches because they are not "investigative" in nature.

The Alaska Supreme Court in Smith did not intend to limit the inevitable discovery exception to "investigative" searches. Rather, when the decision is considered as a whole, the court's clear intent was to ensure that illegally obtained evidence would only be admitted under the inevitable discovery doctrine if it was obtained through predictable, valid, and inevitable procedures.6 A valid inventory search at a correctional center is precisely defined by the regularity and inevitability of its procedures.7 Therefore, excluding all inventory searches from the inevitable discovery doctrine would distort the supreme court's holding in Smith.

Moreover, this Court has previously upheld the admission of illegally obtained evidence that would have been discovered during an inventory search at the jail.8 In Anderson v. State, the defendant was arrested on misdemeanor charges with a set bail amount.9 Under these circumstances, the officers were required to give him a reasonable opportunity to post bail before subjecting him to a pre-incarceration inventory search.10 When Anderson arrived at the correctional center, an officer immediately emptied his pockets to search for contraband, discovering methamphetamine.11 This was an illegal search. However, Anderson did not post bail within an hour, at which point he would have been subject to a valid full inventory search.12 The trial court therefore found that the exclusionary rule did not apply to the methamphetamine, because it would have been inevitably discovered during the later valid inventory search, and this Court affirmed that decision.13

Accordingly, we reject Katairoak's argument that the inevitable discovery exception does not apply to inventory searches.

Katairoak's contention that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the cocaine would have been inevitably discovered through a valid inventory search.

At the evidentiary hearing, Officer Douglas Harvey, the records sergeant and booking supervisor at the Fairbanks Correctional Center, testified that he had not witnessed Katairoak's inventory search personally but that under the correctional center's policies and procedures, defendants booked on a no-bail probation warrant were required to remove all items from their pockets; remove any coat, outer garment, or head covering for inspection; have their body and extremities frisked; and be strip-searched prior to being housed in the institution. Relying on this testimony, the superior court found "by clear and convincing evidence that the contraband would have been inevitably discovered upon a valid booking inventory at jail."

Katairoak argues that this was clear error. He asserts that the State could not meet its burden unless it produced the officers who personally witnessed Katairoak's processing. Katairoak also asserts that Officer Harvey's testimony actually supported Katairoak's claim that different procedures were followed in his case because he had been pepper-sprayed, and that the cocaine would not necessarily have been discovered. Officer Harvey testified that because Katairoak had been pepper-sprayed,"[t]he procedures ... would be to get Mr. Katairoak seen by medical [personnel], and decontaminated at the time."

On appeal, we are required to view the record in the light most favorable to upholding the trial court's ruling.14 Here, the record supports the trial court's finding that the cocaine and cash in Katairoak's clothing would have necessarily and inevitably been discovered during the routine inventory process the jail had in place (had the police not already removed the items). Although we recognize that it is possible to interpret Officer's Harvey testimony as suggesting that different procedures are used when a person has been pepper-sprayed and must be decontaminated and seen by medical personnel, the more plausible interpretation of his testimony (and clearly the superior court's understanding of his testimony) was that the person is first subject to decontamination and medical assistance and then subject to normal inventory procedures. We conclude that the trial court's findings on this issue were not clearly erroneous.

Katairoak's contention that Alaska Evidence Rule 412 required the superior court to suppress the evidence.

Katairoak's final argument is that the cocaine should have been suppressed pursuant to Alaska Evidence Rule 412, which he argues abrogated the inevitable discovery exception under Alaska law.

Alaska Evidence Rule 412 was adopted by the Alaska Supreme Court in 1979, and later amended by the legislature in 2004.15 The rule states that "[e]vidence illegally obtained shall not be used over proper objection by the defendant in a criminal prosecution," except under certain circumstances. Katairoak points out that the plain language of Rule 412 does not include an exception for evidence that would have been inevitably discovered. He therefore argues that the illegally obtained evidence in his case should have been suppressed under Rule 412, notwithstanding the fact that it might otherwise be admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine.

Katairoak's reading of Evidence Rule 412 is incompatible with the intended scope of the rule and prior case law interpreting and applying the rule. Contrary to Katairoak's characterizations, Evidence Rule 412 is not a separate basis for suppressing illegally obtained evidence; rather, the rule codifies Alaska's exclusionary rule.16 Thus, when the Alaska Supreme Court recognizes an exception to the exclusionary rule under Alaska law — such as the inevitable discovery doctrine elucidated in Smith v. State — that exception applies to Rule 412.17 Accordingly, we conclude that the superior court did not err in denying Katairoak's separate motion to suppress under Rule 412.

Conclusion

The superior court's judgment is AFFIRMED.