Memorandum decisions of this court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d) and Paragraph 7 of the Guidelines for Publication of Court of Appeals Decisions (Court of Appeals Order No. 3). Accordingly, this memorandum decision may not be cited as binding authority for any proposition 333of law.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

MANNHEIMER, Judge.

A jury convicted Patrick H. Torrence of third-degree assault for placing his co-worker Justin Giles in a chokehold. At Torrence's trial, the State called a forensic nurse, Tara Henry, to testify concerning the physical signs and symptoms of strangulation. Henry testified that Giles's injuries and symptoms were consistent with the State's allegation that he had been strangled.

After Torrence was convicted, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he asserted that Henry's testimony on these subjects would have been inadmissible if his defense attorney had offered the proper objections — and that his attorney was therefore incompetent for failing to object to Henry's testimony.

The superior court ultimately concluded that even if Torrence's attorney had made the objections that Torrence now described, these objections would have been overruled and Henry's testimony would still have been admitted at Torrence's trial. The superior court therefore denied Torrence's petition for post-conviction relief.

Torrence now appeals the superior court's denial of his petition. For the reasons explained in this opinion, we agree with the superior court that Henry's testimony was admissible despite Torrence's proposed objections, and we therefore affirm the superior court's decision.

Underlying facts

In July 2005, Patrick Torrence and Justin Giles were employed at the Barrett Inn in Anchorage. On July 7th, the two men became involved in an argument that turned into a physical altercation in the lobby of the hotel. While attempting to get away from Torrence, Giles tripped and fell to the ground, at which point Torrence put Giles in a chokehold.

Based on this episode, Torrence was charged with second-degree assault under AS 11.41.210(a)(1) — intentionally causing physical injury to another person by means of a dangerous instrument.

At Torrence's trial, Giles described the assault. He testified that, once the chokehold was applied, he could no longer breathe. His vision began to recede, and he felt extreme pressure in his head "like [his] eyes were going to pop right out of [his] head." He then lost consciousness for some time. When he regained consciousness, he was still face down on the ground.

Another hotel employee, Leticia Nuesca, witnessed the assault. She saw Torrence atop Giles's back, holding Giles face-down on the floor with a hand around Giles's throat. Nuesca testified that Torrence strangled Giles for 20 to 30 seconds, while Nuesca begged Torrence to stop.

Giles testified that, after the attack, his neck was bruised, he felt "surprisingly bad pain on the sides of [his] throat", and he suffered from "an excruciatingly painful throbbing headache". Giles also stated that, for several days after the attack, he experienced soreness in his neck, he had difficulty swallowing, and his voice sounded different.

During his testimony, Giles referred to 16 photographs that had been taken of him after the attack. One photograph showed that Giles had red marks on his neck. Another photograph showed that Giles had a red dot in his left eye; Giles reported that more dots appeared in his eye later.

Torrence took the stand at his trial. He admitted strangling Giles for the purpose of cutting off his circulation, although Torrence asserted that the strangulation lasted no more than 10 seconds, and that he had acted in self-defense.

At the conclusion of the trial, the jury acquitted Torrence of second-degree assault, but the jury convicted Torrence of the lesser offense of third-degree assault (recklessly causing physical injury by means of a dangerous instrument). In other words, the jury rejected the State's allegation that Torrence had intended to cause physical injury to Giles, but the jury concluded that Torrence had acted recklessly with respect to this result.

This Court affirmed Torrence's conviction on direct appeal. Torrence v. State, unpublished, 2009 WL 3489383 (Alaska App. Oct. 28, 2009).

Tara Henry's testimony at Torrence's trial

At Torrence's trial, the State called Tara Henry to give expert testimony concerning the physical signs and symptoms of strangulation. Henry had worked as a forensic nurse for ten years, including work at Alaska Regional Hospital, at Valley Hospital, and at Alaska CARES, where she conducted forensic examinations of victims of sexual assault and domestic violence.

Henry testified that she had more than 2,000 hours of training in the specialties of diagnosing and responding to sexual assault and domestic violence. She also had received training in the assessment of strangulation and in recognizing its "pathophysiology" — that is, recognizing the physical signs and symptoms manifested by people who have been strangled.1 Henry had participated in hundreds of strangulation cases, involving both live and deceased victims. She had also trained nurses, physicians, paramedics, law enforcement officers, and attorneys throughout Alaska on how to identify and investigate strangulation cases.

With regard to Torrence's case, Henry explained how the act of strangling involves the exertion of pressure on a person's neck to the point where it blocks the person's airway and/or the blood vessels traveling to the person's brain. The visible signs of strangulation include bruising on the neck, redness and abrasions on the neck, swelling of the neck, and petechiae (i.e., pinpoint, round spots, commonly occurring as a cluster, that appear on the skin as a result of bleeding under the skin).2 The results of strangulation can include a loss of consciousness, a loss of bowel control, and vomiting. Strangulation can also cause several types of internal injuries, some of which can result in death.

Henry testified that she had reviewed various evidentiary materials connected to Torrence's case: police reports, photographs of Giles taken after the attack, the audio of the 911 call placed by Giles, the audio recordings of interviews conducted by police officers, Giles's grand jury testimony, and the security video from the hotel lobby.

Based on these materials, Henry concluded that Giles manifested several physical signs and symptoms that were consistent the State's allegation that Giles had been strangled. Henry pointed to Giles's inability to talk, his sensation of extreme pressure inside his head, the disruption of his vision, his loss of consciousness, and his headache and neck and throat pain after the attack. Henry also noted that Giles exhibited redness and abrasions on his neck, swelling on his neck, and petechiae in his eye.

Torrence's petition for post-conviction relief

After this Court affirmed Torrence's conviction on appeal, Torrence filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he claimed that his trial attorney was incompetent for failing to object to various aspects of Tara Henry's testimony. The superior court ultimately denied this petition.

For purposes of the present appeal, the significant aspect of the superior court's decision was the court's ruling that, even if Torrence's attorney had objected, the trial judge would properly have found that Henry was qualified to testify concerning the physical signs and symptoms of strangulation, and that Henry was further qualified to offer an opinion that the injuries and symptoms that Giles exhibited following the attack were consistent with his account of having been strangled.

Torrence's argument in this appeal

In his brief to this Court, Torrence does not dispute that Henry had sufficient expertise to offer an opinion as to whether Giles's injuries and symptoms were "consistent with", or "tended to corroborate", the State's allegation that Torrence had strangled Giles.

Indeed, Torrence acknowledges that this Court has previously held that this sort of testimony can properly be offered by a police officer who has been trained to look for the particular signs and symptoms of strangulation. Carter v. State, 235 P.3d 221, 226 (Alaska App. 2010).

However, Torrence argues that Henry's testimony improperly exceeded the scope of her expertise. According to Torrence, Henry did not merely say that Giles's injuries and symptoms indicated, or were consistent with, strangulation. Rather, Torrence asserts that Henry gave the jury a medical opinion that Giles definitely had been strangled.

With regard to Torrence's assertion that Henry was not qualified to offer a "medical" opinion on this issue, the record does not support Torrence's position. The testimony regarding Henry's training and experience supports the conclusion that she was well qualified to offer an opinion on the symptoms of strangulation.

Henry's lack of a medical degree is not determinative of this question. The Alaska Supreme Court recently addressed this point of law in Martha S. v. Office of Children's Services, 268 P.3d 1066 (Alaska 2012). In its decision, the supreme court rejected the argument that a psychologist should have been barred from offering an expert opinion because he was not licensed to practice psychology in Alaska:

Martha S., 268 P.3d at 1076-77 (footnotes omitted).

Just as important, Torrence's other argument — his assertion that Henry testified that Giles "definitely" had been strangled — is not supported by the record. We have examined the portion of Henry's testimony that Torrence objects to. Henry did not tell the jury that Giles had definitely been strangled. Instead, she told the jury that Giles had identifiable "signs and symptoms of strangulation".

Under our decision in Carter, it was proper for Henry to testify that Giles's physical signs and symptoms were "consistent" with being strangled, and Henry's testimony did not exceed this scope.

Finally, we note that the record fails to show that Torrence was prejudiced by the challenged testimony. As we explained earlier in this opinion, Torrence took the stand at trial and conceded that he strangled Giles. His defense was that he had done so in self-defense, and that the strangulation lasted no more than 10 seconds.

Conclusion

The judgement of the superior court is AFFIRMED.