Memorandum decisions of this court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d) and Paragraph 7 of the Guidelines for Publication of Court of Appeals Decisions (Court of Appeals Order No. 3). Accordingly, this memorandum decision may not be cited as binding authority for any proposition of law.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

MANNHEIMER, Judge.

Matthew William Pierce appeals his convictions for driving under the influence, for consuming alcoholic beverages as a minor, and for operating a motor vehicle after consuming alcoholic beverages as a minor. Pierce contends that he was subjected to a traffic stop of unlawful scope or duration, and that the evidence obtained from that traffic stop should therefore be suppressed.

Pierce was driving six of his friends around in a GMC Suburban at 4:45 a.m. on a Sunday, and he was initially stopped for speeding. (Pierce was traveling 30 miles per hour on a narrow two-lane road that had a 20-mile-per-hour speed limit, and he does not dispute that the officer had good cause to stop him for speeding.)

The officer who stopped Pierce, University Police Lieutenant Scott Chafin, approached the Suburban and contacted Pierce. Chafin immediately noticed a moderate odor of alcohol coming from the vehicle. He also noticed that Pierce's eyes were bloodshot and watery.

When Chafin asked for IDs from the people in the Suburban, he found that Pierce and four of his friends were under 21 years of age.

Chafin asked Pierce to step out of the Suburban "to make sure that he was okay to be driving." When he asked Pierce if he had been drinking, Pierce answered no. Chafin nevertheless decided to have Pierce perform field sobriety tests.

Pierce performed poorly on these tests. And during the administration of the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, Chafin could tell that there was an odor of alcoholic beverages emanating from Pierce. Chafin again asked Pierce if he had been drinking, and this time Pierce admitted drinking one beer several hours earlier.

Chafin arrested Pierce for driving under the influence, and a later Datamaster test revealed that Pierce had a blood alcohol level of .091 percent.

On appeal, Pierce does not contest that he was properly stopped for speeding, but he argues that the officer had no justification for extending the traffic stop to investigate the possibility that Pierce was under the influence.

As Pierce acknowledges, the question is whether, given the facts known to Lieutenant Chafin when he asked Pierce to perform the field sobriety tests, there was a reasonable suspicion that Pierce was committing a motor vehicle offense involving alcoholic beverages.1

We say "motor vehicle offense involving alcoholic beverages" rather than "driving under the influence" because Pierce was younger than 21 years of age. Because Pierce was a minor (for purposes of the alcoholic beverage laws), he would be committing a crime by driving a motor vehicle after consuming any amount of alcoholic beverages, regardless of whether he was impaired. See AS 28.35.280.

Here, Lieutenant Chafin knew that Pierce was driving around with a group of friends, most of whom were under-age, in the early hours of Sunday morning. The interior of Pierce's vehicle smelled of alcoholic beverages, and Pierce had bloodshot, watery eyes. Moreover, Pierce had been speeding — traveling 30 miles per hour in a 20-mile-per-hour zone.

Pierce argues that there are many reasons why a person might have bloodshot and watery eyes. This is true, but the fact that there were alternative explanations for the condition of Pierce's eyes does not defeat a finding of reasonable suspicion.

Pierce also points out that when Chafin asked him to get out of the car and perform the field sobriety tests, Chafin knew only that the interior of Pierce's vehicle smelled of alcoholic beverages. It was not until Chafin administered the horizontal gaze nystagmus test to Pierce that he was able to discern the odor of alcohol coming from Pierce personally. Pierce argues that, because the vehicle was also occupied by a number of other people, the fact that there was a generalized odor of alcohol coming from the vehicle was not sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion that further investigation was warranted.

But this was Pierce's vehicle, and the other people in the vehicle were Pierce's acquaintances, and most of them were under-age. Given the time of day (just before 5:00 on a Sunday morning), it was reasonable to suspect that Pierce and his companions were a group of young people socializing together. Thus, if Pierce's vehicle smelled of alcoholic beverages, it was reasonable to suspect that Pierce was among the people who had been drinking.

For these reasons, we conclude that the officer had reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop to investigate the possibility that Pierce was committing a driving offense involving alcoholic beverages. And having Pierce perform field sobriety tests was a reasonable method of investigating this possibility.

The judgement of the district court is AFFIRMED.