Memorandum decisions of this Court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d) and Paragraph 7 of the Guidelines for Publication of Court of Appeals Decisions (Court of Appeals Order No. 3). Accordingly, this memorandum decision may not be cited as binding authority for any proposition of law.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Judge SUDDOCK.

Leeann Rose Wilde was convicted of fourth-degree misconduct involving a controlled substance after she admitted, during a traffic stop, to possessing cocaine and a crack pipe. On appeal, she argues that evidence discovered during the stop should have been suppressed because it was the product of a custodial interrogation without prior Miranda warning. For the reasons explained below, we conclude that the investigatory stop was not custodial for purposes of Miranda. We accordingly affirm the judgment of the superior court.

Background facts

Anchorage Police Officers Jason Whetsell and Christopher Nelson saw Wilde walking up and down Spenard Road in Anchorage at various times between 8 p.m. and 4 a.m. as a man walked in front of her. Wilde would stop or slow when vehicles drove near, and the man would look back over his shoulder. The officers suspected Wilde was engaging in prostitution or drug activity. Then, around 4 a.m., the officers observed Wilde enter a vehicle after speaking with the driver. The officers followed the vehicle in their K-9 unit patrol vehicle. The driver lingered at a stop sign at a clear intersection for thirty seconds and then made a left turn, activating his turn signal while turning.

The officers stopped the vehicle for failing to properly signal the turn. Officer Whetsell asked Wilde to exit the vehicle, and she did so. Wilde denied she was involved in prostitution. She claimed that the driver, a stranger, was just giving her a ride. The officer then asked her whether she had any drugs on her, and she admitted possessing cocaine.

After Wilde confessed to possessing cocaine, the officers let the driver depart. Officer Nelson asked Wilde if she possessed a crack pipe; she admitted she did. Wilde then produced the cocaine and a crack pipe. She was arrested and subsequently indicted on one count of fourth-degree misconduct involving a controlled substance.1

Wilde moved to suppress the evidence against her, arguing that it was the product of an un-Mirandized custodial interrogation. After holding an evidentiary hearing, Superior Court Judge Philip R. Volland denied Wilde's motion to suppress, finding that the investigatory stop was justified by both the observed traffic violation and the officers' reasonable suspicion of prostitution or drug activity. The judge also found that the ensuing questioning by the officer was not so coercive as to constitute custody for purposes of Miranda. Wilde now appeals this ruling.

Why we conclude that Wilde was not subjected to a custodial interrogation

Miranda v. Arizona requires exclusion of statements made by a suspect during custodial interrogation unless the suspect is first warned "that he has the right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed."2 An interrogation is "custodial" if there is "restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest,"3 such as when the suspect "is detained under circumstances substantially more coercive than the typical traffic stop."4

Here, Judge Volland found that when Wilde confessed to possession of cocaine the stop had not ripened to Miranda custody based on the following facts: (1) Wilde was asked to get out of the vehicle based on the officers' legitimate reasonable suspicion of prostitution or drug activity; (2) Wilde was not restrained in any way, and stood on the sidewalk only ten feet away from the vehicle when Officer Whetsell questioned her; (3) Wilde confessed two minutes into the stop and before Officer Nelson had finished questioning the driver; (4) the officers' dog remained in the patrol vehicle at all times; (5) Wilde felt she could have told Officer Whetsell to not bring his dog around her; and (6) the entire stop lasted about ten minutes.

Wilde challenges this ruling on appeal, arguing that the circumstances were substantially more coercive than the typical traffic stop because Officer Whetsell immediately accused her of being a prostitute. But we have previously held that an officer's accusatory statements, standing alone, are insufficient to establish Miranda custody.5 Viewed under the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that this was a routine investigative stop similar to the investigative stops involved in Blake v. State,6 McCollum v. State,7 and Shay v. State.8

Wilde also argues that she was subject to custodial interrogation because the officers released the driver of the vehicle, leaving her alone on the sidewalk with two police officers at 4 a.m. But Wilde's confession that she possessed cocaine was uttered within the first two minutes of the stop and before the driver departed. And even if Wilde was in custody after she confessed to possession of cocaine, the crack pipe, which she admitted possessing a few minutes later, was properly admitted because it would have been discovered during a search incident to arrest.

We therefore uphold the trial court's ruling that Wilde was not subjected to a custodial interrogation.

Conclusion

We AFFIRM the judgment of the superior court.