Memorandum decisions of this Court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d) and Paragraph 7 of the Guidelines for Publication of Court of Appeals Decisions (Court of Appeals Order No. 3). Accordingly, this memorandum decision may not be cited as binding authority for any proposition of law.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Judge, SUDDOCK.

Stephen Joseph Harmon was convicted in 1993 of first-degree murder and first-degree sexual assault and was sentenced to a composite term of 129 years with a parole eligibility restriction of 99 years.1 He appealed his convictions and sentence to this Court, and we affirmed.2

Harmon subsequently filed four petitions for post-conviction relief, challenging, among other things, the legality of his sentence in light of the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Blakely v. Washington.3 Each of those petitions was denied.4

Harmon filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief — his fifth such petition — on October 31, 2013. Harmon then requested to withdraw his petition and refile it as a motion to correct an illegal sentence under Alaska Criminal Rule 35(a). In his motion, Harmon argued that his sentence was illegal because he was denied the right to a jury trial on two statutory aggravators — essentially renewing his earlier Blakely claim.

Harmon specifically relied on Ex parte Siebold, in which the United States Supreme Court noted that an indictment and conviction based on an unconstitutional act of Congress "cannot be a legal cause of imprisonment."5 According to Harmon, Siebold required reversal of his convictions because the statute under which he was sentenced was later determined to be unconstitutional under Blakely.

Superior Court Judge Michael A. MacDonald denied Harmon's Rule 35(a) motion, concluding that Harmon was procedurally barred from raising issues that had been decided in his prior petitions for post-conviction relief. The judge also concluded that Harmon's motion to correct his sentence failed on the merits.

On appeal, Harmon first argues that the superior court erred in "ordering" him to convert his petition for post-conviction relief into a motion to correct an illegal sentence under Criminal Rule 35(a). But the record does not support this claim. To the contrary, the record demonstrates that it was Harmon himself — and not the superior court — who made the decision to refile his claim as a Rule 35(a) motion.

Regardless of how Harmon's claim is framed, he is not entitled to relief. First, the Blakely rule does not apply to Harmon's sentence for first-degree murder because the sentencing range for first-degree murder is not affected by aggravating or mitigating factors.6 Moreover, as the supreme court explained in State v. Smart, the Blakely rule does not apply to defendants whose convictions were final when Blakely was decided.7 Blakely was decided on June 24, 2004, over eight years after Harmon's convictions became final.8 Harmon argues that Smart was wrongly decided and should be reversed. Whatever the merits of this contention, we are bound by the supreme court's decisions.

We accordingly AFFIRM the judgment of the superior court.