Filed: May 10, 2017
Latest Update: May 10, 2017
Summary: Memorandum decisions of this Court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d) and Paragraph 7 of the Guidelines for Publication of Court of Appeals Decisions (Court of Appeals Order No. 3). Accordingly, this memorandum decision may not be cited as binding authority for any proposition of law. MEMORANDUM OPINION Judge SUDDOCK . Twenty-three-year-old Juan Jose Argueta was charged with two counts of first-degree sexual abuse of a minor and two counts of second-deg
Summary: Memorandum decisions of this Court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d) and Paragraph 7 of the Guidelines for Publication of Court of Appeals Decisions (Court of Appeals Order No. 3). Accordingly, this memorandum decision may not be cited as binding authority for any proposition of law. MEMORANDUM OPINION Judge SUDDOCK . Twenty-three-year-old Juan Jose Argueta was charged with two counts of first-degree sexual abuse of a minor and two counts of second-degr..
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Memorandum decisions of this Court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d) and Paragraph 7 of the Guidelines for Publication of Court of Appeals Decisions (Court of Appeals Order No. 3). Accordingly, this memorandum decision may not be cited as binding authority for any proposition of law.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Judge SUDDOCK.
Twenty-three-year-old Juan Jose Argueta was charged with two counts of first-degree sexual abuse of a minor and two counts of second-degree sexual abuse of a minor.1 The State alleged that Argueta committed numerous acts of sexual abuse on his eleven-year-old stepsister, J.G., over an approximately one-year period. The State alleged that Argueta engaged in sexual intercourse with J.G. on about twenty occasions, and penetrated her digitally and touched her breasts on other occasions.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Argueta pleaded guilty to one consolidated count of attempted first-degree sexual abuse of a minor.2 He admitted all of the facts alleged and agreed to open sentencing. Argueta faced a presumptive sentencing range of 20-30 years, with at least 3 years of suspended time and 10 years of probation.3
At his sentencing, Argueta moved for a referral to the three-judge sentencing panel.4 He argued that he had exceptional rehabilitative prospects based on his youth, his lack of criminal history, and his remorse. Argueta argued that if the court did not refer his case to the three-judge panel, the court should impose the lowest sentence in the presumptive range: 23 years with 3 years suspended and 10 years of probation.
The State in turn requested a sentence near the bottom of the sentencing range: 25 years with 3 years suspended and 10 years of probation. Although the State did not ask the court to find aggravators, it noted that two aggravators would apply: that Argueta and J.G. resided in the same household, and that Argueta was ten or more years older than J.G.5
Superior Court Judge Philip R. Volland rejected Argueta's request for a referral to the three-judge panel. The judge found that Argueta's rehabilitative prospects were good but not exceptional. The judge explained that Argueta had not shown why his criminal conduct had occurred, and why it would not reoccur. The judge also found that Argueta would likely require intensive sex offender treatment.
Based on Argueta's multiple instances of abuse, the judge characterized the case as serious in comparison with other sexual abuse of a minor cases. Concluding that a sentence within the presumptive range would not be manifestly unjust, the judge accepted the State's sentencing recommendation and sentenced Argueta to 25 years with 3 years suspended and 10 years of probation.
Argueta now argues that his sentence is excessive and that the judge should have referred his case to the three-judge panel for sentencing. To justify a referral to the three-judge panel based on exceptional prospects for rehabilitation in a sexual abuse case, a defendant must show:
"[T]hat [the defendant] can adequately be treated in the community and need not be incarcerated for the full presumptive term in order to prevent future criminal activity." Such a prediction of successful treatment and non-recidivism should only be made when the sentencing court is reasonably satisfied both that it knows why a particular crime was committed and that the conditions leading to the criminal act will not recur — either because the factors that led the defendant to commit the crime are readily correctable or because the defendant's criminal conduct resulted from unusual environmental stresses unlikely ever to recur.6
Here, the superior court concluded that Argueta had failed to adequately explain why he committed his crime, and why such conduct would not reoccur. The court further found that Argueta's long course of sexual abuse of J.G. constituted significant criminal behavior that required intensive treatment. The superior court was not clearly erroneous in concluding that Argueta failed to establish that he had exceptional prospects for rehabilitation by clear and convincing evidence.7
Argueta also argues that the judge was clearly mistaken in not imposing a sentence at the bottom of the sentencing range — a sentence of 20 years to serve, rather than the 22 years actually imposed.
The clearly mistaken standard of review contemplates that judges presented with the same set of facts will impose different sentences within the permissible range of sentences.8 Here, Argueta inflicted multiple acts of sexual abuse on an eleven-year-old girl over a substantial period of time. The superior court appropriately reviewed the facts of the case and considered the applicable Chaney criteria. Based on our review of the record, we conclude that Argueta's sentence is not clearly mistaken.9
We AFFIRM the sentence imposed by the superior court.
