NOTICE

This is a summary disposition issued under Alaska Appellate Rule 214(b). Summary disposition decisions of this Court do not create legal precedent and are not available in a publicly accessible electronic database. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d).

SUMMARY DISPOSITION

Michael Saofaga Jr. pleaded guilty to two counts of theft in the second degree.1 Count I encompassed the theft of six different vehicles between August and October 2015. Count II was for the theft of a seventh vehicle, which occurred in December while Saofaga was on bail release for the earlier thefts.

Saofaga was twenty-one years old at the time of the thefts. Prior to this case, he had two prior misdemeanor convictions: operating a motor vehicle without insurance, and theft by shoplifting.2 He has no prior juvenile record.

Second-degree theft is a Class C felony. At the time Saofaga was sentenced, the presumptive range for a first felony offender convicted of a Class C felony was "probation, with a suspended term of imprisonment of zero to 18 months."3 But at sentencing, the trial court found two aggravating factors as to Count I and one aggravating factor as to Count II.4 Specifically, the court found that AS 12.55.155(c)(9) (more than one victim) and AS 12.55.155(c)(10) (most serious conduct) applied to Count I, the consolidated count involving six different vehicle thefts. The court also found that AS 12.55.155(c)(12) (on release from another charge) applied to Count II. Based on these aggravating factors, the court was authorized to impose up to 5 years on each count.

At sentencing, Saofaga's attorney requested a probationary sentence with 18 months of suspended time. The State requested a sentence of 5 years with no probationary period. The superior court imposed 3 years to serve on Count I with no probationary period, and 18 months suspended on Count II with three years' probation. The two sentences were imposed consecutively. In its sentencing remarks, the superior court focused on the seriousness of the conduct, the number of victims harmed, and the need for individual and general deterrence, as well as community condemnation and reaffirmation of societal norms. However, the superior court also recognized Saofaga's youth and minor prior criminal history, and the court made clear that it considered Saofaga's potential for rehabilitation when it imposed the suspended sentence with probation supervision.

On appeal, Saofaga challenges his composite sentence as clearly mistaken. But Saofaga does not challenge any of the aggravating factors found by the court, nor does he directly engage with the superior court's explanation for its sentence. Instead, Saofaga argues that his sentence is clearly mistaken under the Austin rule — i.e., the rule we set forth in Austin v. State that in typical cases, "a first offender should receive a more favorable sentence than the presumptive sentence for a second offender."5 Austin, however, was decided in 1981 and has long since been superseded by statute.6 We therefore reject Saofaga's argument on this point.

To the extent that Saofaga is also arguing that his sentence is excessive under current statutory standards, we reject that claim. When we review an excessive sentence claim, we independently examine the record to determine whether the sentence is clearly mistaken.7 The "clearly mistaken" standard contemplates that different reasonable judges, confronted with identical facts, will differ on what constitutes an appropriate sentence, and that a reviewing court will not modify a sentence that falls within a permissible range of reasonable sentences.8 We have independently reviewed the sentencing record in this case. Given the scale of Saofaga's crime spree and the number of victims harmed, we conclude that the composite sentence imposed here is not clearly mistaken.

The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.