NOTICE

This is a summary disposition issued under Alaska Appellate Rule 214(b). Summary disposition decisions of this Court do not create legal precedent and are not available in a publicly accessible electronic database. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d).

SUMMARY DISPOSITION

Kevin Glover was convicted of operating a vehicle under the influence of a controlled substance, driving with a revoked license, fourth-degree weapons misconduct (possession of a weapon while under the influence), and third-degree weapons misconduct (felon in possession) after he collided with a road sign while under the influence of methamphetamine.1 He raises three arguments on appeal. We find no merit to these arguments and we therefore affirm his convictions.

First, Glover argues that the State failed to provide timely notice of its intent to call an expert witness, and that the superior court erred when it allowed that witness to testify. Eight days before the trial was scheduled to begin, the State notified Glover's defense counsel that it intended to call a forensic scientist to testify about the levels of methamphetamine in Glover's blood at the time of the accident. Glover asked the court to preclude the expert's testimony because the expert notice was untimely under Alaska Criminal Rule 16. The court acknowledged that the notice was untimely and that Glover was prejudiced, but proposed to continue the trial to give Glover's attorney more time to prepare. Glover's attorney rejected this proposal and elected to proceed with the trial as planned.

On appeal, Glover argues that the court erred when it failed to place the burden on the State to demonstrate why Glover was not prejudiced by the State's discovery violation, and that we should therefore remand for the State to meet its burden. As we have just explained, however, the court found that Glover would be prejudiced if required to proceed without more time to prepare. Thus, the court offered a continuance, which Glover refused. Any error in burden placement is therefore irrelevant to this appeal.

Glover also argues that precluding the expert witness's testimony was the only appropriate sanction for the State's discovery violation. We disagree. Suppression of evidence is not ordinarily an appropriate remedy for a discovery violation; rather, a court may either grant a continuance or, if the trial has already started and the defendant has been prejudiced by the violation, grant a mistrial.2 Here, the violation occurred before the start of trial and the superior court offered to grant a continuance. Defense counsel rejected this offer, stating that she had "spent all weekend looking over the new discovery" and was "ready to go to trial." We therefore find no abuse of discretion in the court's decision to proceed with the trial as scheduled and its refusal to suppress the testimony of the expert witness.

Glover next argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to sever the third-degree weapons misconduct (i.e., felon in possession) charge from the charges for operating under the influence and driving with a revoked license. According to Glover, these charges should have been severed because the evidence required to prove the driving charges was not independently relevant and admissible to prove the felon in possession charge.3 But Glover's argument ignores the fourth charge against him: fourth-degree weapons misconduct for being in possession of a weapon while under the influence of an intoxicating substance. The charge for third-degree weapons misconduct was closely related to the charge for fourth-degree weapons misconduct, since these charges concerned possession of the same gun at the same time; and the fourth-degree weapons misconduct charge was closely related to the operating under the influence charge, because they stemmed from the same episode of being under the influence of methamphetamine. All of these charges were therefore properly joined together under Alaska Criminal Rule 8, and Glover has failed to show any unfair prejudice requiring severance under Alaska Criminal Rule 14. (We note that the superior court properly bifurcated the third-degree weapons misconduct charge so that the jury did not hear evidence of Glover's prior felony convictions until after it had reached a verdict on the other charges.4)

Finally, Glover argues that the superior court violated the double jeopardy clause of the Alaska Constitution when it refused to merge the two weapons misconduct convictions for sentencing purposes. We disagree. Imposing multiple punishments for multiple offenses arising from the same course of conduct does not violate double jeopardy when the differences between the offenses are "substantial or significant enough to warrant multiple punishments."5 In making this determination, we look to "the nature of personal, property or other rights sought to be protected, and the broad objectives of criminal law such as punishment of the criminal for his crime, rehabilitation of the criminal, and the prevention of future crimes."6

Here, the two offenses implicate significantly different societal interests. The third-degree weapons misconduct statute is designed to prevent felons (who present a danger based on their criminal history) from possessing firearms. The fourth-degree weapons misconduct statute is designed to prevent individuals under the influence of drugs or alcohol (who present a danger based on their current state of intoxication) from possessing firearms. We therefore hold that the superior court did not err in refusing to merge Glover's two convictions for weapons misconduct.

The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.