MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
MARK E. FULLER, District Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Court has pending before it a bevy of motions filed by the horde of parties pursuing this case. The pending pleadings include a Motion to Realign the Parties (Doc. # 23) filed by the defendant and third-party plaintiff, Tudor Insurance Company ("Tudor"); a Motion to Strike Third Party Complaint (Doc. # 28) filed by the plaintiff, Title Pro Closings, L.L.C. ("Title Pro"); a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 37) filed by third-party defendant Bruce Hall ("Hall"); a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 48) filed by third-party defendant Chicago Title Insurance Company ("Chicago Title"); and, finally, a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 49) filed and joined by a number of individual third-party defendants. Because the Court warned Tudor that adding new claims or parties would cause the Court to revisit its earlier decision to exercise its discretionary authority to hear the parties' declaratory judgment actions (see Doc. # 21), Title Pro's motion to strike and the motions to dismiss filed by the third-party defendants will be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. They will be granted to the extent necessary to return the claims and parties to state court, which is the more appropriate venue. The motions will otherwise be denied as moot.
II. BACKGROUND
This case had a thorny procedural history before the filing of the five motions now before the Court. Yet even further into the briar patch the parties have gone. Finding the way out of the thicket will require first describing the underlying state court actions and how they came to be in federal court. Next, it will be necessary to discuss a related action that Tudor filed in federal court and has since dismissed. And finally, a brief description of the posturing in the case at hand, along with an overview of the pending motions, will be necessary too.
A. The Peterses' state court lawsuit
This adventure began on April 27, 2010, when Robert and Bethanie Peters ("the Peterses") filed suit against Title Pro and another defendant, Tammy Peters,1 in the Circuit Court of Houston County, Alabama.2 The Peterses' various claims against Title Pro and Tammy Peters sounded in negligence, breach of contract, and fraud. Shortly after the Peterses filed suit, Title Pro sent its insurer, Tudor Insurance Company, a letter informing Tudor about the Peterses' claims. Even though the insurer had not been joined in the action, Tudor filed a motion to stay the proceedings, which the state court denied. But Tudor would get to participate soon enough: Title Pro filed a misnamed "Cross-Claim for Declaratory Judgment" against the insurer on August 27, 2010, thereby joining Tudor in the action as a third-party defendant.
On July 27, 2011—a little less than a year after impleading Tudor—Title Pro filed a motion to sever its declaratory judgment action against Tudor and have it set for trial. In effect, Title Pro's severance motion sought to cleave its declaratory action against Tudor from the underlying suit brought by the Peterses so as to have the question of insurance coverage decided separately. The state circuit court granted the motion on August 7, 2011, and calendared the case for trial. Tudor then removed the now-severed case to federal court. Title Pro moved to remand the action, but this Court denied the motion, finding that Tudor properly removed the case and that the Court should exercise its discretionary authority under the Declaratory Judgment Act. See Title Pro Closings, L.L.C. v. Tudor Ins. Co., ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, No. 1:11-cv-673, 2012 WL 125117 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 17, 2012).
B. The other state court lawsuits against Title Pro
In addition to the state court suit filed by the Peterses, a number of other plaintiffs sued Title Pro and Tammy Peters in the Circuit Court of Houston County, Alabama, right around the same time.3 On May 28, 2010, Tudor filed a declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. The case was assigned to Judge Thompson and styled Tudor Insurance Company vs. Title Pro Closings, L.L.C., No. 1:10-cv-483. In its complaint, Tudor joined Title Pro as a defendant along with the Peterses, Chicago Title Insurance, and the various state court plaintiffs. Tudor sought a declaration that it owed no duty to defend and indemnify Title Pro as to the claims filed by the state court plaintiffs.
Meanwhile, in state court, the individual plaintiffs amended their complaints to add attorney Bruce Hall as a defendant. They alleged that Hall, as a principal of Title Pro, caused their losses. Hall filed a declaratory judgment action asking for a declaration that Tudor had the duty to defend and indemnify him. But due to the pending action in Judge Thompson's court dealing with the same question, Tudor filed a motion to dismiss Hall's declaratory action, which Judge Moulton, the state court judge presiding over the case, granted on September 1, 2011.
Back in federal court, on November 4, 2011, Tudor asked Judge Thompson to grant summary judgment in its favor, as did Chicago Insurance Company. Judge Thompson denied both motions on January 9, 2012, and set a trial date. Two days later, Tudor developed cold feet and filed a motion to dismiss its declaratory judgment action without prejudice. Judge Thompson granted the motion.
After Tudor dismissed the case, Hall revived his state court declaratory judgment action, asking Judge Moulton to rescind the circuit court's previous order, which had dismissed Hall's claim due to the pendency of the same claim before Judge Thompson. On February 2, 2012, Judge Moulton granted Hall's motion and reinstated his request for a declaration on Tudor's duty to defend and indemnify him. Presumably Judge Moulton reasoned that, because the claim was no longer pending in federal court, he could go ahead and hear it in state court.
C. The posturing in this case
On February 10, 2012—less than a month after Tudor dismissed the declaratory judgment action pending before Judge Thompson, and eight days after Hall revived his declaratory judgment claim—the insurer attempted to assert the exact same claims in this case by filing a third-party complaint. Tudor added as third-party defendants the various state court plaintiffs who had sued Title Pro, Tammy Peters, and Bruce Hall. (Doc. # 22.) He also added Hall himself and Chicago Title Insurance Company. (Id.) Tudor added these litigants because, "the [t]hird[-][p]arty [d]efendants clearly have an interest in the subject of the action, and the disposition of this action in their absence may leave the original parties to this lawsuit subject to the risk of incurring inconsistent obligations." (Id. at ¶ 22.) Having added all the necessary parties, Tudor sought a declaration that "it no longer has any duty to defend Title Pro Closings . . . or R. Bruce Hall with respect to civil litigation filed in the Circuit Court of Houston County, Alabama" and that it "has no duty to indemnify" them. (Id. at ¶ 23.)
Tudor's third-party complaint prompted the five motions now pending before the Court. First, Tudor filed a Motion to Realign Parties (Doc. # 23), asking the Court to rearrange the litigants on the side of the "v" corresponding to their respective interests. Second, Title Pro filed an Objection To and Motion to Strike Defendant's Third Party Complaint (Doc. # 28) that essentially asks to have the case sent back to state court. To support its position, Title Pro discusses how Hall revived his state court declaratory judgment action after Tudor voluntarily dismissed its case before Judge Thompson, and from there argues that state court is the proper place to have the insurance coverage issues litigated due to the pendency of Hall's motion. Third, Bruce Hall filed a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 37) that incorporates the arguments in Title Pro's Motion to Strike. Fourth, Chicago Title Insurance Company filed a Motion to Dismiss Tudor Insurance Company's Third Party Complaint (Doc. # 48). Chicago Title Insurance argued, among other things, that the Court should decline to exercise its discretionary authority to decide Tudor's declaratory judgment action and instead leave the resolution of the issues to Alabama's state courts. Fifth, and finally, the state court plaintiffs that were joined as third-party defendants in Tudor's third-party complaint filed a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 49) adopting the arguments made by Title Pro in its Motion to Strike and by Chicago Title Insurance in its Motion to Dismiss.
The parties raised a number of collateral issues in these various motions, but the Court will discuss only whether it should exercise its discretionary authority to decide Tudor's request for a declaration that it owes neither a defense nor indemnity to Title Pro and Bruce Hall.
III. DISCUSSION
Under the Declaratory Judgment Act, a federal court "may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking" such a declaration. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (emphasis added). Given the permissive language in the Act, the Supreme Court, starting with its decision in Brillhart v. Excess Insurance Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491 (1942), has "repeatedly characterized the Declaratory Judgment Act as `an enabling Act, which confers a discretion on the courts rather than an absolute right upon the litigant.'" Assurance Co. of Am. v. Legendary Home Builders, 305 F.Supp.2d 1266, 1270 (S.D. Ala. 2003) (quoting Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 287 (1995)). In other words, when it passed the Act, "Congress sought to place a remedial arrow in the district court's quiver; it created an opportunity, rather than a duty, to grant a new form of relief to qualifying litigants." Wilton, 515 U.S. at 288. Hence "there is . . . nothing automatic or obligatory about the assumption of `jurisdiction' by a federal court to hear a declaratory judgment action," and "the normal principle that federal courts should adjudicate claims within their jurisdiction yields to considerations of practicality and wise judicial administration." Legendary Home Builders, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 1270 (citing Guar. Nat'l Ins. v. Beeline Stores, 945 F.Supp. 1510, 1514 (M.D. Ala. 1996) (M. Thompson, J.)).
Comity concerns also factor into the equation. Indeed, the Brillhart Court made clear that federal courts should defer to prior pending state court actions to avoid "[g]ratuitous interference with the orderly and comprehensive disposition of a state court litigation." 315 U.S. at 495. Federal courts should therefore err on the side of dismissing declaratory judgment actions in favor of pending state court suits involving the same parties and the same issues of state law.
Here, the Court initially decided to exercise its discretionary authority to hear the declaratory judgment action removed by Tudor. See Title Pro Closings, L.L.C. v. Tudor Ins. Co., ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, No. 1:11-cv-673-MEF, 2012 WL 125117 (M.D. Ala. Jan 17, 2012). At the time, the Peterses had a pending state court action against Title Pro on liability and damages, and Title Pro had pending a declaratory judgment action against Tudor in federal court. Thus the two cases had different sets of adverse parties and dealt with two different issues. Since then, however, the circumstances have changed: Tudor has voluntarily dismissed the declaratory judgment action pending before Judge Thompson, Hall has revived his state court declaratory judgment action, and Tudor has filed a third-party declaratory judgment complaint adding Hall, the state court plaintiffs, and Chicago Title Insurance. Each one of these procedural developments favors dismissing the actions now pending before this Court and allowing the state court to decide the disputes.
The Court exercised its discretionary authority over the removed declaratory judgment action because there was "no pending declaratory judgment action in the underlying suit." Title Pro, ___ F. Supp. 2d at ___, 2012 WL 125117 at *4. Indeed, the Court relied on how federal courts "routinely adjudicate[] coverage disputes brought under the Declaratory Judgment Act when there is an underlying state court cases on the merits, which involves different issues and different parties (as is the case here)." Id. But this is no longer the case. Once Tudor dismissed its case before Judge Thompson, it allowed Hall to revive his state court declaratory judgment action. And Hall took full advantage of the opportunity: he successfully revived his claim on February 2, 2012. So by the time Tudor filed its third-party complaint in this Court ten days later, there was already a state declaratory judgment action pending between the insurer and Hall. As a result, this case no longer involves different issues and different parties than the underlying state court case. These developments vitiate the Court's reasoning for initially deciding that the removed declaratory judgment action "falls outside of Brillhart's reach." Title Pro, ___ F. Supp. 2d at ___, 2012 WL 125117 at *4.
Equally important, if Tudor is allowed to proceed with its third-party declaratory judgment action, it would get a second crack at a case it voluntarily dismissed before Judge Thompson after pursuing it past the summary judgment stage. Allowing the insurer to do this would sanction judge shopping, encourage procedural gamesmanship, and let multiply duplicative litigation, thereby ignoring "considerations of practicality and wise judicial administration," Beeline Stores, 945 F. Supp. at 514, which the Court must account for when deciding to exercise its discretionary authority. Discouraging these inefficient litigation tactics4 is yet another sound reason for dismissing Tudor's claim. Accordingly, the Court will grant the motions to dismiss so as to have the parties litigate their disputes once and for all in state court.5
IV. CONCLUSION
Having fully considered the parties' briefs, and for the reasons discussed above, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:
1. Title Pro's Motion to Strike Third Party Complaint (Doc. # 28) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED AS MOOT IN PART. It is granted to the extent that the motion asks for the Court to decline to exercise its discretionary authority over the matter. It is otherwise denied as moot as the state court will have jurisdiction to decide the other arguments made therein.
2. Bruce Hall's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 37), which incorporates Title Pro's Motion to Strike, is likewise GRANTED IN PART and DENIED AS MOOT IN PART. It is granted to the extent that it asks for Tudor's complaint to be dismissed and for the Court to decline to exercise its discretionary authority over the matter. It is otherwise denied as moot.
3. Chicago Title Insurance Company's Motion to Dismiss Tudor Insurance Company's Third Party Complaint (Doc. # 48) is also GRANTED IN PART and DENIED AS MOOT IN PART. It is granted to the extent that it asks the Court to decline to exercise its discretionary authority over the matter. The rest of the requests for relief found in the motion are denied as moot.
4. The assorted state court plaintiffs' Motion to Dismiss Third-Party Complaint (Doc. # 49) is too GRANTED IN PART and DENIED AS MOOT IN PART. It is granted to the extent that it asks the Court to decline to exercise its discretionary authority over the matter; it is otherwise denied as moot.
5. Tudor Insurance Company's Motion to Realign the Parties (Doc. # 23) is DENIED AS MOOT.
CIVIL APPEALS JURISDICTION CHECKLIST
1. Appealable Orders: Courts of Appeals have jurisdiction conferred and strictly limited by statute:
(a) Appeals from final orders pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291: Only final orders and judgments of district courts, or final orders of bankruptcy courts which have been appealed to and fully resolved by a district court under 28 U.S.C.§ 158, generally are appealable. A final decision is one that "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 701 F.2d 1365, 1368 (11th Cir. 1983). A magistrate judge's report and recommendation is not final and appealable until judgment thereon is entered by a district court judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
(b) In cases involving multiple parties or multiple claims, a judgment as to fewer than all parties or all claims is not a final, appealable decision unless the district court has certified the judgment for immediate review under Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). Williams v. Bishop, 732 F.2d 885, 885-86 (11th Cir. 1984). A judgment which resolves all issues except matters, such as attorneys' fees and costs, that are collateral to the merits, is immediately appealable. Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 201, 108 S.Ct. 1717, 1721-22, 100 L.Ed.2d 178 (1988); LaChance v. Duffy's Draft House, Inc., 146 F.3d 832, 837 (11th Cir. 1998).
(c) Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a): Appeals are permitted from orders "granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions . . ." and from "[i]nterlocutory decrees . . . determining the rights and liabilities of parties to admiralty cases in which appeals from final decrees are allowed." Interlocutory appeals from orders denying temporary restraining orders are not permitted.
(d) Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and Fed.R.App.P. 5: The certification specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) must be obtained before a petition for permission to appeal is filed in the Court of Appeals. The district court's denial of a motion for certification is not itself appealable.
(e) Appeals pursuant to judicially created exceptions to the finality rule: Limited exceptions are discussed in cases including, but not limited to: Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 1225-26, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949); Atlantic Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, Inc., 890 F.2d 371, 376 (11th Cir. 1989); Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 157, 85 S.Ct. 308, 312, 13 L.Ed.2d 199 (1964).
Rev.: 4/04
2. Time for Filing: The timely filing of a notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional. Rinaldo v. Corbett, 256 F.3d 1276, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). In civil cases, Fed.R.App.P. 4(a) and (c) set the following time limits:
(a) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1): A notice of appeal in compliance with the requirements set forth in Fed.R.App.P. 3 must be filed in the district court within 30 days after the entry of the order or judgment appealed from. However, if the United States or an officer or agency thereof is a party, the notice of appeal must be filed in the district court within 60 days after such entry. THE NOTICE MUST BE RECEIVED AND FILED IN THE DISTRICT COURT NO LATER THAN THE LAST DAY OF THE APPEAL PERIOD — no additional days are provided for mailing. Special filing provisions for inmates are discussed below.
(b) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(3): "If one party timely files a notice of appeal, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date when the first notice was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by this Rule 4(a), whichever period ends later."
(c) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4): If any party makes a timely motion in the district court under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of a type specified in this rule, the time for appeal for all parties runs from the date of entry of the order disposing of the last such timely filed motion.
(d) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(5) and 4(a)(6): Under certain limited circumstances, the district court may extend the time to file a notice of appeal. Under Rule 4(a)(5), the time may be extended if a motion for an extension is filed within 30 days after expiration of the time otherwise provided to file a notice of appeal, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause. Under Rule 4(a)(6), the time may be extended if the district court finds upon motion that a party did not timely receive notice of the entry of the judgment or order, and that no party would be prejudiced by an extension.
(e) Fed.R.App.P. 4(c): If an inmate confined to an institution files a notice of appeal in either a civil case or a criminal case, the notice of appeal is timely if it is deposited in the institution's internal mail system on or before the last day for filing. Timely filing may be shown by a declaration in compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746 or a notarized statement, either of which must set forth the date of deposit and state that first-class postage has been prepaid.
3. Format of the notice of appeal: Form 1, Appendix of Forms to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, is a suitable format. See also Fed.R.App.P. 3(c). A pro se notice of appeal must be signed by the appellant.
4. Effect of a notice of appeal: A district court loses jurisdiction (authority) to act after the filing of a timely notice of appeal, except for actions in aid of appellate jurisdiction or to rule on a timely motion of the type specified in Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4).
