OPINION AND ORDER

MYRON H. THOMPSON, District Judge.

On June 20, 2013, an on-the-record status conference was held and counsel for all defendants in this criminal case were present. This cause is before the court on oral motions to continue made by counsel for defendants Bobbie Jean Chilsom and Sara Chilsom and a written motion to continue made by counsel for defendant Edmond Lewis Harris, Jr. The government does not oppose the requests. For the reasons set forth below, the court finds that jury selection and trial, now set for August 5, 2013, should be continued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7). And because this continuance is a "reasonable period of delay" under § 3161(h)(6), jury selection and trial should also be continued for defendants Shawn A. Johnson, Sharon Johnson, Shirley Johnson, Printice Johnson, Dennis Coleman, Richard Jamar Pinkston, Jr., Telvin Brown, Sunquesha Gaston, Philanthia Roberts, and Samuella McMillian.

While the granting of a continuance is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge, United States v. Stitzer, 785 F.2d 1506, 1516 (11th Cir. 1986), the court is limited by the requirements of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161. The Act provides in part:

18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). The Act excludes from the 70-day period any continuance based on "findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial." § 3161(h)(7)(A). Further, with respect to defendants who do not themselves request a continuance, the Act also excludes from the 70-day period any "reasonable period of delay" attributable to continuances granted to codefendants. § 3161(h)(6). In granting a continuance, the court may consider, among other factors, whether the failure to grant the continuance would "result in a miscarriage of justice," § 3161(h)(7)(B)(i), or "[w]hether the case is so unusual or so complex ... that it is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation" without granting a continuance. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(ii).

The court concludes that, in this case, the ends of justice served by granting a continuance outweigh the interest of the public and all defendants in a speedy trial. Counsel for three of the defendants have represented that, given their obligations to clients in other ongoing cases and the sizeable discovery in this case, counsel cannot be prepared to afford adequate representation at trial in August. Given these circumstances, additional time to prepare for trial should be afforded.

Because the court decides it proper to grant a continuance under § 3161(h)(7)(A) to the three defendants who moved for one, the court further finds that that delay is a "reasonable" one under § 3161(h)(6) with respect to the non-moving defendants.

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Accordingly, it is ORDERED as follows: