CHARLES S. COODY, Magistrate Judge.
In this action, the pro se Plaintiff, James Bryson Graham, alleges that, on or before June 9, 2000, Southtrust Bank, now Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. ("Wells Fargo"), and two of its employees, Defendants Joe Godwin and Keith Petty, defrauded him and wrongfully converted money from one of his accounts at the bank. Graham further alleges that Defendants Wells Fargo, Malone, Carn, Godwin, and/or Petty engaged in a conspiracy to induce Defendant Judges McLauchlin and/or Quattlebaum to deprive him of due process under color of state law by entering orders in the absence of subject matter jurisdiction. (Doc. 1). Now pending before the court are the motions to dismiss filed by Defendants Carn (Doc. 13), Wells Fargo (Docs. 18, 39), Malone (Doc. 21), Godwin, Petty, and Wells Fargo (Doc. 25), and Judges McLauchlin and Quattlebaum (Doc. 29). Having considered the motions and Graham's response, and for good cause, the court concludes that the motions to dismiss are due to be granted and that this case is due to be dismissed.
Because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, it is a basic premise of federal court practice that the court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action before it can act. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir. 1994). Thus, federal courts only have the power to hear cases as authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377.
This court operates under an independent obligation to examine its own jurisdiction at each stage of the proceedings, even if no party raises the jurisdictional issues and both parties are prepared to concede it. FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990). Further, Fed R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) requires that, "[i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action."
In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court must accept well-pled facts as true, but the court is not required to accept a plaintiff's legal conclusions. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 664 (2009) ("[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions"). In evaluating the sufficiency of a plaintiff's pleadings, the court must indulge reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor, "but we are not required to draw plaintiff's inference." Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1248 (11th Cir. 2005). Similarly, "unwarranted deductions of fact" in a complaint are not admitted as true for the purpose of testing the sufficiency of plaintiff's allegations. Id.; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681 (stating conclusory allegations are "not entitled to be assumed true").
A complaint may be dismissed if the facts as pled do not state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. See Iqbal, 556 U.S, at 679 (explaining "only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss"); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 561-62, 570 (2007) (retiring the prior "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts" standard). In Twombly, the Supreme Court emphasized that a complaint "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Factual allegations in a complaint need not be detailed but "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Id. at 555 (internal citations and emphasis omitted).
More recently, in Iqbal, the Supreme Court reiterated that although Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, it does demand "more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Iqbal, 556 U.S. 678. A complaint must state a plausible claim for relief, and "[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. The mere possibility the defendant acted unlawfully is insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Id. at 679. The well-pled allegations must nudge the claim "across the line from conceivable to plausible." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
Further, "[c]ourts do and should show a leniency to pro se litigants not enjoyed by those with the benefit of a legal education." GJR Invs., Inc. v. County of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds by Iqbal, 550 U.S. 662. A plaintiff's pro se status must be considered alongside the pleading requirements of Twombly and Iqbal. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007) (applying Twombly to a pro se complaint). "A document filed pro se is `to be liberally construed,' and `a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'" Id. at 94 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Cf. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(e) ("All pleadings must be construed so as to do justice"). However, the leniency shown to pro se litigants does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party, or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action." GJR, 132 F. 3d at 1369 (citing Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1109 (10th Cir. 1991)); Pontier v. City of Clearwater, 881 F.Supp. 1565, 1568 (M.D. Fla. 1995)).
On June 17, 2002, Graham and an individual named Leon M. "Mike" Holland filed a complaint in the Dale County, Alabama, Circuit Court against Wells Fargo's predecessor, Southtrust Bank, and against Keith Petty and Joe Godwin ("the 2002 state court action"). (Doc. 21-1).
On June 10, 2011, Joe Godwin, Keith Petty, and Wells Fargo Bank filed a complaint against Graham and Holland ("the 2011 state court action"). Godwin v. Graham, Dale County Circuit Court Case No. CV-2011-900069.00 (June 20, 2011, Complaint).
On August 4, 2011, Dale County Circuit Judge McLauchlin entered the following order:
Therefore, it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED as follows:
Godwin v. Graham, Dale County Circuit Court Case No. CV-2011-900069.00 (August 4, 2011, Order).
Following an appeal by Graham and Holland, on May 18, 2012, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals issued a notice of affirmance without an opinion. Godwin v. Graham, Dale County Circuit Court Case No. CV-2011-900069.00 (May 18, 2012, Notice). On June 7, 2012, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals issued a certificate of judgment affirming the Dale County Circuit Court's judgment in the 2011 state court action. Godwin v. Graham, Dale County Circuit Court Case No. CV-2011-900069.00 (June 7, 2012, Certificate of Judgment).
On November 26, 2012, Graham filed a pro se complaint in this court challenging the judgments in the 2002 and 2011 state court actions, arguing that those judgments are void for lack of jurisdiction, and alleging that the judgments were the result of a conspiracy to deprive him of due process. (Doc. 1).
Construed in the light most favorable to Graham, his complaint contains the following allegations against Judges Quattlebaum and McLauchlin:
(Doc. 1).
Graham demands relief in the form of "the return of property seized and foreclosed upon plus an additional amount the court sees as needed to make [Graham] whole." (Doc. 1 p. 6).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not a device for obtaining collateral review of state court judgments. Sibley v. Lando, 437 F.3d 1067, 1070 (11th Cir. 2005). Further, assuming that Graham's complaint could conceivably be construed as containing a claim under § 1983 alleging that Judges Quattlebaum and McLauchlin deprived him of property under color of state law and without due process, the state court judges are immune from suit. First, to the extent that Graham seeks to hold Judges Quattlebaum and McLauchlin liable for a money judgment
Second, to the extent that Graham seeks to hold Judges Quattlebaum and McLauchlin liable for damages under § 1983 in their individual capacities, absolute judicial immunity bars Graham's claims. Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980) ("`[J]udges defending against § 1983 actions enjoy absolute immunity from damages liability for acts performed in their judicial capacities.'" (quoting Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 734-35(1980)).). Absolute judicial immunity precludes recovery of damages for acts performed by a judge while acting in a judicial capacity unless the judge acted in the "clear absence of all jurisdiction." Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978); Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (2000). Judicial immunity applies even to judicial acts that were erroneous, malicious, or in excess of the judge's jurisdiction. Bolin, 225 F.3d at 1239; see Stump, 435 U.S. at 357 n.7 (noting the distinction between "excess of jurisdiction" and "the clear absence of jurisdiction").
Graham does not allege that Judges McLauchlin and Quattlebaum were acting in any capacity other than as a state circuit court judges. Moreover, "[t]he factors determining whether an act by a judge is a `judicial' one relate to the nature of the act itself, i. e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i. e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity." Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 361-362 (1978). Graham alleges that Judges Quattlebaum and McLauchlin entered orders and judgments in cases in which he was a litigant without first requiring loan documents or a promissory note to be filed with the court clerk. Entering orders and judgments in disputes between litigants is inherently a judicial function, and Graham alleges that he was injured in his capacity as a party to the cases in which the judges performed those functions. Therefore, the court concludes that Graham is seeking to recover damages for acts performed in a judicial capacity. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) ("It is a judge's duty to decide all cases within his jurisdiction that are brought before him.").
Graham alleges that Judges McLauchlin and Quattlebaum did not have jurisdiction to rule in the cases before them because, he alleges, the original promissory note and loan document were not first tendered to the court. In support of this argument, Graham cites the irrelevant
(Doc. 45 p. 1)
Clearfield contains no such quotation.
Ex parte Seymour, 946 So.2d 536, 538 (Ala. 2006).
Article VI, § 142, Ala. Const. 1901 provides that "[t]he circuit court shall exercise general jurisdiction in all cases except as may otherwise be provided by law. . . . It shall have authority to issue such writs as may be necessary or appropriate to effectuate its powers, and shall have such other powers as may be provided by law." Section 12-11-30, Ala. Code 1975 provides that "[t]he circuit court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction of all civil actions in which the matter in controversy exceeds ten thousand dollars ($10,000), exclusive of interest and costs. . . . The circuit court shall have other powers as provided by law."
The 2002 state court action was a civil action in which the amount in controversy exceeded $10,000. (Doc. 21-1 ¶¶ 10, 14, 43). Therefore, it was a "type of case" over which Judge Quattlebaum had subject matter jurisdiction. Ala. Code 1975 § 12-11-30; Seymour, 946 So. 2d at 538 (holding that subject matter jurisdiction concerns the court's power to decide "certain types of cases" based on "the nature of the cause of action and of the relief sought").
Graham appears to argue that, without original copies of the loan documents, the defendants in the 2002 state court action had no "standing" and, therefore, subject matter jurisdiction was lacking. (Doc. 45 p. 2).
In the 2011 state court action, the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief from alleged harassment and collection threats from Graham. Alabama law provides that "[i]njunctions may be granted . . . by the judges of the . . . circuit courts." Ala. Code 1975 § 6-6-500. See also Ala. R. Civ. P. 65& 65(dc) (establishing rules of procedure for issuance of injunctions by circuit courts). Accordingly, Judge McLauchlin had jurisdiction to rule on the complaint for injunctive relief. Id.; see also Seymour, 946 So. 2d at 53 ("Subject-matter jurisdiction concerns a court's power to decide certain types of cases."). Judge McLauchlin did not rule on the request by the plaintiffs in the 2011 state court action for an award of attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to the Alabama Litigation Accountability Act, see Ala. Code 1975 §§ 12-19-270 et seq. Accordingly, for purposes of the judicial immunity analysis, it is not necessary for this court to consider whether Judge McLauchlin had jurisdiction to rule on the request for attorneys' fees.
The court finds no merit in Graham's argument that the plaintiffs in the 2011 state court action lacked "standing" because they did not submit the original loan documents or promissory note to Judge McLauchlin. Under Alabama law, to have standing to seek an injunction, a party must demonstrate that he or she will "suffer immediate harm if the requested relief is not granted." Ex parte Ala. Dept. of Mental Health & Retardation, 837 So.2d 808, 811 (Ala. 2002). The plaintiffs in the 2011 action alleged, and Judge McLaughlin agreed, that Graham was pursuing them with forged "judgments" and was threatening without legal justification to undertake "a variety of collection efforts," including filing liens against their property, if they did not pay him $1,605,808. Godwin v. Graham, Dale County Circuit Court Case No. CV-2011-900069.00 (June 20, 2011, Complaint & August 4, 2011, Order). Thus, the plaintiffs in the 2011 state court action had standing to seek injunctive relief because they demonstrated that they would suffer immediate and irreparable harm if the court did not enjoin Graham from carrying out his threats. See Ex parte Ala. Dept. of Mental Health, 837 So. 2d at 811.
Accordingly, judicial immunity precludes Graham's claims against Judges Quattlebaum and McLauchlin in their individual capacities because his complaint seeks relief for acts performed in their judicial capacity and within their jurisdiction as judges of the Dale County Circuit Court. Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-57 ("[J]udges of courts of superior or general jurisdiction are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
In his complaint, Graham alleges that "there appear[ed] to be a scheme to interfere with the court's ability to impartially adjudicate the complaint." (Doc. 1 p. 3). Graham's pro se complaint is subject to the requirements of Iqbal and Twombly, supra. See Hopkins v. Saint Lucie County School Bd., 399 Fed. Appx. 563, 565 (11th Cir. 2010) (unpublished) (citations omitted) ("While the pleadings of pro se litigants are "liberally construed," they must still comply with procedural rules governing the proper form of pleadings."); see also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007) (considering the requirements of Twombly alongside the plaintiff's pro se status). However, in determining whether Graham's allegation of a conspiracy to influence the judicial process presents a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court affords appropriate deference to Graham's pleading in light of his pro se status. See Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93-94. Therefore, keeping Graham's limited experience and lack of legal training in drafting formal pleadings in mind, the court has considered whether the facts alleged in his complaint are sufficient to state a claim against Defendants Wells Fargo, Malone, Carn, Godwin, and/or Petty for conspiracy to deprive Graham of his constitutional rights under color of state law in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (establishing liability for the deprivation of constitutional rights under the color of state law); Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28 (1980) (holding that an otherwise private person acts "under color of" state law, and may be subject to liability under §1983, when engaged in a conspiracy with state officials to deprive another of federal rights); see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 ("Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." (Citations omitted.)).
Based strictly on Graham's allegation that "there appear[ed] to be a scheme to interfere with the court's [sic] ability to impartially adjudicate the complaint," (Doc. 1 p. 3), it is unclear which of the two state court actions Graham contends "appeared" to involve a "scheme" to improperly influence a judge. Moreover, standing alone, the allegation that there "appear[ed] to be" a scheme or conspiracy is, at most, a speculative legal conclusion without factual support; as such, is not entitled to the assumption of truth. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) ("[T]he [Twombly] plaintiffs' assertion of an unlawful agreement was a `legal conclusion' and, as such, was not entitled to the assumption of truth."). Taken as a whole, however, Graham's complaint does contain allegations that Defendants Wells Fargo, Malone, Carn, Godwin, and/or Petty attempted to influence Judge Quattlebaum and/or Judge McLauchlin to enter orders that deprived him of his property in the absence of subject matter jurisdiction. (Doc. 1; see also Doc. 45 p. 2 (Graham's argument that "[t]he right to take property without authority is the central question for this court to rule on").
To prevail on a conspiracy claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove not only that a conspiracy existed for the purpose of depriving the plaintiff of his constitutional rights, but also that the conspiracy actually resulted in an "actionable wrong" that deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional right. Grider v. City of Auburn, Ala., 618 F.3d 1240, 1259-60 (11th Cir. 2010) ("A plaintiff may state a § 1983 claim for conspiracy to violate constitutional rights by showing a conspiracy existed that resulted in the actual denial of some underlying constitutional right. . . . The conspiratorial acts must impinge upon the federal right; the plaintiff must prove an actionable wrong to support the conspiracy." (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). Graham alleges that a conspiracy between private parties and the state court judges culminated in an actionable wrong when Judges Quattlebaum and/or McLauchlin entered judgments in the absence of subject matter jurisdiction, thus allegedly "tak[ing] property without authority" under the color of state law. (Doc. 45 p. 2). However, as explained in Part III.A. of this opinion, in both state court cases, the respective judges did have subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, there can be no merit to Graham's contention that the private parties engaged in a conspiracy to prompt Judges Quattlebaum and/or McLauchlin to commit an "actionable wrong" that deprived him of due process by entering judgments unsupported by subject matter jurisdiction. (Doc. 45 p. 2). See Grider, 618 F.3d at 1259-60 (holding that, to prevail on a conspiracy claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must show that the conspiracy resulted in an "actionable wrong" that "that resulted in the actual denial of some underlying constitutional right").
Therefore, Graham's complaint fails to state a complaint upon which relief can be granted with respect to his allegation that Defendants Wells Fargo, Malone, Carn, Godwin, and/or Petty engaged in a conspiracy to induce Judge McLauchlin and/or Quattlebaum to deprive him of due process under color of state law by entering orders in the absence of subject matter jurisdiction.
Graham alleges that, "at the time of entering the promissory note" and guarantee agreement for the Playmaker loan, "the Defendants" fraudulently suppressed the fact that they "knew" Playmaker, Inc., would fail and that Graham would lose his investment. (Doc. 1 p. 2). The only "Defendants" who could conceivably have had any duty to disclose material facts about the Playmaker loan "at the time of entering the promissory note" were Wells Fargo and the two named Defendants who were agents or employees of what was then Southtrust Bank: Godwin and Petty.
Setting aside the obvious temporal discrepancies posed by Graham's argument regarding Wells Fargo's right to execute a setoff without first filing original loan documents in a lawsuit that had not yet been instituted by Graham, the court must first determine whether it has jurisdiction over Graham's state law claims. In Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and in District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983) ("Rooker-Feldman"), the Supreme Court held that it alone sits as the only federal court with jurisdiction to review a state court's judgment. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 292 (2005). Thus, after state court proceedings have ended, a federal district court has no jurisdiction over a federal case brought by the loser of the state court action who complains of an injury caused by the state-court judgment and who seeks review and rejection of that judgment. Id.; see also Casale v. Tillman, 558 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009) ("[F]ederal district courts cannot review state court final judgments.").
In the 2002 state court action, Graham alleged that Godwin, Petty, and Wells Fargo's predecessor, Southtrust Bank, fraudulently induced him to enter into the Playmaker loan and guarantee agreement by misrepresenting and suppressing material facts, including the extent of Graham's potential personal liability and their alleged foreknowledge that Playmaker, Inc. would not be a viable investment and that it was likely to default on the loan. (Doc. 21-3). Graham alleged that, as a result of the alleged fraud, he suffered financial loss, including the $404,452.15 withdrawn from his personal checking account as a setoff against the Playmaker loan. (Doc. 21-1 ¶¶ 25, 42). On March 5, 2004, Judge Quattlebaum entered an order finding (1) that Wells Fargo, Godwin, and Petty did not fraudulent misrepresent or suppress material facts; (2) that Graham could not have reasonably relied on any alleged misrepresentation; (3) that Wells Fargo, Godwin, and Petty had no duty to disclose the allegedly suppressed facts; and (4) that, in any event, Graham's complaint was barred by the statute of limitations. (Doc. 29-1).
Graham's state law claim in this court for fraud against Wells Fargo, Godwin, and Petty, is identical to the one he brought against them in the 2002 state court action, and he seeks review and rejection of the judgment on his fraud claim in the 2002 case. (Doc. 1). Therefore, Graham's fraud claim falls within the boundaries of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and this court is without subject matter jurisdiction to consider the claim. See Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F.3d 1266, 1274 (11th Cir. 2009) (defining "the boundaries of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine" to include "`cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.'" (quoting Exxon, 544 U.S. at 284)); see also Casale, 558 F.3d at 1260 (holding that Rooker-Feldman "doctrine applies . . . to federal claims [that were] raised in the state court" and that were subject to a final judgment in the state court). Graham forfeited his opportunity to obtain review and rejection of the summary judgment entered by Judge Quattlebaum when the Alabama Supreme Court dismissed his appeal from that judgment for failure to file a brief in support of the appeal. (Doc. 29-1). He cannot obtain review of that judgment in this court. Casale, 558 F.3d at 1260 ("The Rooker-Feldman doctrine makes clear that federal district courts cannot review state court final judgments because that task is reserved for state appellate courts or, as a last resort, the United States Supreme Court.").
Likewise, Rooker-Feldman precludes review of Graham's allegation that Wells Fargo, Godwin, and Petty wrongfully "converted" $404,452.15 from his checking account. Although Graham did not allege a separate claim for conversion in the 2002 state court action, he did allege that, in furtherance of the alleged fraud, Petty, Godwin, and Wells Fargo's predecessor Southtrust Bank wrongfully withdrew $404,452.15 from his checking account as a setoff against the Playmaker loan. (Doc. 21-1 ¶¶ 25, 42). In this case, Graham alleges that "there was no basis for the . . . setoff" because the setoff was the product of a fraud and because Wells Fargo did not file "the original mortgages and promissory note" in the 2002 state court action before Judge Quattlebaum. (Doc. 1. pp. 1-2). Graham's claim for "conversion" is so inextricably intertwined with Judge Quattlebaum's judgment that resolving the "conversion" claim in Graham's favor would effectively nullify the state court judgment on Graham's fraud claim. Furthermore, the claim could only succeed to the extent that Judge Quattlebam wrongly decided the issues in the 2002 state court action. Therefore, this court does not have jurisdiction to review Graham's claim that Wells Fargo, Godwin, and Petty wrongfully "converted" $404,452.15 from his checking account. See Casale, 558 F.3d at 1260 (holding that Rooker-Feldman precludes lower federal court jurisdiction over claims that are so inextricably intertwined with the state court judgment that resolving the claim in the plaintiff's favor "would `effectively nullify' the state court judgment, or [the claims would] succeed[] only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues" (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Because the court concludes that it has no jurisdiction over Graham's state law claims, the court pretermits discussion of the Defendants' arguments that those claims are barred by res judicata, collateral estoppel, and the applicable statutes of limitations.
Accordingly, it is the Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge
1. that the motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Carn (Doc. 13) be
2. that the motions to dismiss filed by Defendant Wells Fargo (Docs. 18, 39) be
3. that the motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Malone (Doc. 21) be
4. that the motion to dismiss filed jointly by Defendants Godwin, Petty, and Wells Fargo (Doc. 25) be
5. that the motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Judges McLauchlin and Quattlebaum (Doc. 29) be
6. that all claims against Judges McLauchlin and Quattlebaum in their official capacities be
7. that all claims against Judges McLauchlin and Quattlebaum in their individual capacities be
8. that all claims against Defendants Wells Fargo, Malone, Carn, Godwin, and Petty for conspiracy to deprive Graham of due process in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 be
9. that all state law claims against Defendants Wells Fargo, Godwin, and Petty be
Further, there being no other claims pending in this case, it is the Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge that this case be
Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in the Magistrate Judge's report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the District Court of issues covered in the report and shall bar the party from attacking on appeal factual findings in the report accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982); see Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982); see also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981, en banc) (adopting as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981).
