RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

TERRY F. MOORER, Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff, an inmate incarcerated at the Kilby Correctional Facility located in Mt. Meigs, Alabama, when he filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, complains that privileges, or immunities afforded him under the Constitution or laws of the United States were abridged by the named Defendants. The named defendants are Warden Frank Albright and Officer Victor Napier. Plaintiff's requests for relief are injunctive in nature. Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated at the Kilby Correctional Facility having been released from the custody of the Alabama Department of Corrections during the pendency of this action. (See Doc. No. 31.) Based on Plaintiff's complaint and the specific relief sought, the undersigned concludes that this action is due to be dismissed as moot.

I. DISCUSSION

Courts do not sit to render advisory opinions. North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971). An actual controversy must exist at all times when the case is pending. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 n.10 (1974). In a case such as this where the only relief requested is injunctive in nature, it is possible for events subsequent to the filing of the complaint to make the matter moot. National Black Police Assoc. v. District of Columbia, 108 F.3d 346, 350 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (change in statute); Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir. 1991) (transfer of prisoner); Tawwab v. Metz 554 F.2d 22, 23 (2nd Cir. 1977) (change in policy).

A claim becomes moot when the controversy between the parties is no longer alive because one party has no further concern in the outcome. Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147 (1975); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968) ("Where the question sought to be adjudicated has been mooted by developments subsequent to filing of the complaint, no justiciable controversy is presented."). Article III of the United States Constitution confers jurisdiction on the district courts to hear and determine "cases" or "controversies." U.S. Const. Art. III, 2. Federal courts are not permitted to rule upon questions which are hypothetical in nature or which do not affect the rights of the parties in the case before the court. Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990). "Article III requires that a plaintiff's claim be live not just when he first brings suit, but throughout the litigation." Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1034 (11th Cir. 1987). Because mootness is jurisdictional, dismissal is required when an action is moot, as a decision in a moot action would be an impermissible advisory opinion. Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 1330, 1336 (11th Cir. 2001).

In Saladin v. Milledgeville, 812 F.2d 687, 693 (11th Cir. 1987), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals determined:

(citations omitted); see also Darring v. Kincheloe, 783 F.2d 874, 876-77 (9th Cir. 1986) (after an inmate is transferred, there is neither a "reasonable expectation" nor a "demonstrated probability" that the inmate will return to the prison against which he sought injunctive relief and therefore claim for injunctive relief is moot). "This case-or-controversy requirement subsists through all stages of federal judicial proceedings, trial and appellate ... [I]t is not enough that a dispute was very much alive when the suit was filed." Id.

"Equitable relief is a prospective remedy, intended to prevent future injuries." Adler v. Duval County School Bd., 112 F.3d 1475, 1477 (11th Cir. 1997). For that reason, "[w]hen the threat of future harm dissipates, the plaintiff's claims for equitable relief become moot because the plaintiff no longer needs protection from future injury." Id.; Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1337 (11th Cir. 1994) ("Logically, `a prospective remedy will provide no relief for an injury that is, and likely will remain, entirely in the past.'" (citation omitted)). In the context of a § 1983 action filed by a prisoner, such as this, the law is settled that a prayer for declaratory or injunctive relief becomes moot upon the transfer or release of that prisoner from the facility where his cause of action arose. See, e.g., Spears v. Thigpen, 846 F.2d 1327, 1328 (11th Cir. 1989) ("[A]n inmate's claim for injunctive and declaratory relief in a § 1983 action fails to present a case or controversy once the inmate has been transferred."); Wahl v. McIver, 773 F.2d 1169, 1173 (11th Cir. 1985) ("[A]n inmate's claim for injunctive and declaratory relief in a section 1983 action fails to present a case or controversy once the inmate has been transferred.").

Plaintiff is no longer an inmate at the Kilby Correctional Facility, having been released from state custody during the pendency of this action. He is, therefore, no longer subject to the conditions about which he complains when he filed the instant matter. There is no indication that Plaintiff will be returned to the Kilby Correctional Facility, much less be returned in the immediate future. "Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a pending case or controversy regarding injunctive relief if unaccompanied by any continuing, present injury or real and immediate threat of repeated injury." Cotterall v. Paul, 755 F.2d 777, 780 (11th Cir. 1985). Absent in this case is any showing of a "continuing, present injury or real and immediate threat of repeated injury" to Plaintiff. See Id. (finding that a transfer of the plaintiff back to the Coffee County Jail if he was again incarcerated at a minimum security facility and charged with a disciplinary infraction was too speculative to satisfy the required injury element).

In light of the foregoing, the court finds that Plaintiff's action is now moot. Because there is no present case or controversy to support the court's jurisdiction over this action, Plaintiff's complaint is due to be dismissed without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.1

II. CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that Plaintiff's complaint be DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.

It is further

ORDERED that on or before July 5, 2013 the parties may file an objection to the Recommendation. Any objection filed must specifically identify the findings in the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation to which a party objects. Frivolous, conclusive or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. Plaintiff is advised that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not appealable.

Failure to file a written objection to the proposed findings and recommendations in the Magistrate Judge's report shall bar a party from a de novo determination by the District Court of issues covered in the report and shall bar the party from attacking on appeal factual findings in the report accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), adopting as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.