SUSAN RUSS WALKER, Chief Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff Donald Ray Sanderson ["Sanderson"] is a former inmate of the Montgomery County Detention Facility in Montgomery, Alabama, who is now housed at the Limestone Correctional Facility in Harvest, Alabama. In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, Sanderson challenges the medical treatment he received and the conditions of confinement to which he was subjected during his confinement at the Montgomery County Detention Facility from approximately December 29, 2009 until January 26, 2010. Amended Complaint — Doc. No. 8. The remaining defendant is Sheriff D. T. Marshall ["Marshall"].
The defendant filed a special report, supplemental special report, and supporting evidentiary materials addressing Sanderson's claims for relief. Doc. No. 18, Doc. No. 26. In these documents, the defendant denies Sanderson's allegations that he violated Sanderson's constitutional rights. Additionally, the defendant asserts that the complaint is due to be dismissed because Sanderson failed to exhaust an administrative remedy available to him at the Montgomery County Detention Facility with respect to the claims presented in this cause of action. The defendant bases his exhaustion defense on the plaintiff's failure to lodge a grievance with the jail before filing the claim presently pending before this court. Pursuant to the orders entered in this case and governing case law, the court deems it appropriate to treat the defendant's reports as a motion for summary judgment. Order of June 7, 2011 — Doc. No. 23. Thus, this case is now pending on the defendant's motion for summary judgment. Upon consideration of this motion and the evidentiary materials filed in support thereof, the court concludes that the defendant's motion for summary judgment with respect to the exhaustion defense is due to be granted.
"Summary judgment is appropriate `if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11
The defendant has met his evidentiary burden and demonstrated the absence of any genuine dispute of material fact. Thus, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish, with appropriate evidence beyond the pleadings, that a genuine dispute material to his case exists. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11
Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 530 (2006) (internal citation omitted). Consequently, to survive the defendant's properly supported motion for summary judgment, Sanderson is required to produce "sufficient [favorable] evidence" which would be admissible at trial supporting his claims of constitutional violations. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). "If the evidence [on which the nonmoving party relies] is merely colorable . . . or is not significantly probative . . . summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50. "A mere `scintilla' of evidence supporting the opposing party's position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the [trier of fact] could reasonably find for that party." Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11
For summary judgment purposes, only disputes involving material facts are relevant. United States v. One Piece of Real Property Located at 5800 SW 74th Avenue, Miami, Florida, 363 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11
Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party and pro se complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation by the courts, a pro se litigant does not escape the burden of establishing by sufficient evidence a genuine dispute of material fact. Beard, 548 U.S. at 525; Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11
On December 29, 2009, Sanderson was transferred from the Limestone Correctional Facility to the Montgomery County Detention Facility so that he could attend a court proceeding. He was transferred back to Limestone Correctional Facility on January 26, 2010. Robinson Aff. at 1, Def.'s Special Report — Doc. No. 18-4 at 1. The evidentiary materials submitted by the defendant establish that Sanderson did not file a request to see a doctor and he did not file a grievance with jail personnel challenging his medical treatment or conditions of confinement before filing his original complaint in this suit in October 2010. Id. at 2. The defendant therefore maintains that this case is subject to dismissal because Sanderson failed to exhaust the administrative remedy provided at the Montgomery County Detention Facility prior to filing this complaint as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
The Prison Litigation Reform Act ["PLRA"] compels exhaustion of available administrative remedies before a prisoner can seek relief in federal court on a section 1983 complaint. Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) states that "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." "Congress has provided in § 1997(e)(a) that an inmate must exhaust irrespective of the forms of relief sought and offered through administrative remedies." Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 n.6 (2001). "[T]he PLRA's exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong." Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Exhaustion of all available administrative remedies is a precondition to litigation and a federal court cannot waive the exhaustion requirement. Booth, 532 U.S. at 741; Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321, 1325 (11
The record in this case establishes that the Montgomery County Detention Facility provides a grievance procedure for inmate complaints. Def.'s Special Report — Doc. No. 18-3 at 14. The relevant portion of the grievance procedure reads as follows:
Id. Sanderson does not dispute the existence of the grievance procedure, but he claims that he did not receive a copy of the handbook containing the rule. Id. Doc No. 18-4 at 24.
The court entered orders allowing Sanderson the opportunity to respond to the defendant's special reports. Order of June 7, 2011 — Doc. No. 23; Order of June 5, 2013 — Doc. No. 27. In his July 5, 2011, affidavit, Sanderson states that when he arrived at the Montgomery County Detention Facility, officials confiscated the back brace and medication prescribed for him at the Limestone Correctional Facility. Sanderson maintains that his prescription medicine was withheld by jail personnel under the supervision of Marshall. Pl.'s Resp. — Doc. No. 24 at 4. He states that jail officials told him he had to "toughen up," and a doctor said, "Oh well, this is jail, right now no meds," even when Sanderson was in great pain that could have been alleviated by his medicine. Id. Sanderson states that he tried to exhaust his remedies, but "Marshal [sic], Medical Health care providers for Montgomery County Jail would not provide any grievance forms to plaintiff." Id. at 7.
In his July 8, 2013, response, Sanderson refers to exhibits and affidavits attached to the response, but the filing included no such attachments, and the document itself is not notarized or sworn to under penalty of perjury. Pl.'s Resp. — Doc. No. 30 at 4. In the July 8, 2013, response, Sanderson describes in detail the number of times over the course of his nearly month-long stay that he asked for medical help. Id. at 4-6. He alleges that the defendant is withholding evidence. Id. at 5. Sanderson states that an officer said that Sanderson would get his back brace and his pills when he left the jail after his court hearing. Id. at 5. Sanderson maintains that he was never called to go to court, and he lay on the floor in pain, hardly able to walk because officers did not return his back brace to him. Id. He asserts that during the first week of his stay at the Montgomery County Detention Facility, he sent four written requests for his pain medication. Id. He states that he sent a total of eight requests for help during the time he was at the facility and gave them to nurses and officers, but they "apparently never made it to [the] person in charge of the jail . . . or they were just thrown away when they arrived at her office." Id. at 6. He states that there are pages missing from the defendant's submitted documents, including Sanderson's statement to officers that he "was dying without" his back brace and medication. Id. at 7. Sanderson states that he could not climb to the top bunk and was forced to sleep on the floor, among rodents and spiders, because he could not climb to the top bunk. Id. at 10, 14.
Sanderson has not submitted evidence beyond his own, self-serving statements to prove that he tried to submit a grievance or medical request to jail personnel regarding his back brace, medication, pain, inability to climb to the top bunk, and filthy living conditions. A self-serving statement may, if adequately detailed and objective, be sufficient to create a fact question that precludes summary judgment. See Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach, 707 F.3d 1244, 1253 (11
Here, Sanderson's most detailed statements, filed July 8, 2013, were not made under penalty of perjury. Thus, they may not be considered in opposition to defendant's summary judgment motion. See Holifield, 115 F.3d at 1564. The remaining admissible evidence before the court is both self-serving and conclusory, and it does not create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Sanderson attempted to, but was prevented from, filing a grievance regarding his medical care before he filed suit in this case. Based on the record before the court, it is undisputed that Sanderson failed to exhaust an administrative remedy available to him, which is a precondition to proceeding in this court on his claims. Specifically, Sanderson did not file a grievance with respect to the claims presented in this cause of action, as allowed by the grievance procedure in effect at the Montgomery County Detention Facility, before filing this case. The court therefore concludes that the claims presented in this cause of action are subject to dismissal. Ngo, 548 U.S. at 87-94.
Sanderson is no longer at the Montgomery County Detention Facility; thus, the administrative remedy provided by the defendant for the instant claims is no longer available to Sanderson. Under these circumstances, dismissal with prejudice is appropriate. Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368, 1375 & n.11 (11
Even if the court considered all the statements in Sanderson's response to the summary judgment motion, his claims against defendant Marshall would not entitle him to relief. An official may be held liable under the United States Constitution for acting with "deliberate indifference" to an inmate's safety when the official knows that the inmate faces "a substantial risk of serious harm" and with such knowledge disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994). Based on the record before the court, however, Marshall had no personal involvement with Sanderson, and
Cameron v. Allen, 525 F.Supp.2d 1302, 1307 (M.D. Ala. 2007).
To the extent that Sanderson seeks relief from defendant Marshall for the treatment provided by jail medical personnel or actions taken by jail personnel due to the defendant's position as sheriff, assuming arguendo that Marshall exerted some authority over the manner in which those persons responsible for the provision of medical treatment rendered such treatment, the law is well settled "that Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under the theory of respondeat superior [or vicarious liability]. . . . Robertson v. Sichel, 127 U.S. 507, 515-16 (1888) (`A public officer or agent is not responsible for the misfeasances or position wrongs, or for the nonfeasances, or negligences, or omissions of duty, of the subagents or servants or other persons properly employed by or under him, in the discharge of his official duties'). Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009); Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11
Sanderson, however, has offered no evidence which would create a genuine issue of disputed fact with respect to the claims presented against defendant Marshall. The record is devoid of evidence indicating that Marshall personally participated in or had any involvement, direct or otherwise, with the medical treatment provided to Sanderson during his confinement at the Montgomery County Detention Facility; rather, it is undisputed that Marshall did not participate in the provision of treatment to Sanderson. The evidentiary materials before the court demonstrate that medical personnel made all decisions relative to the course of treatment provided to Sanderson, that they provided treatment to Sanderson in accordance with their professional judgment upon assessment of his condition, and that jail officers assisted in carrying out the medical treatment. Marshall did not participate in the treatment of Sanderson, nor did he ever receive notice of any concern regarding Sanderson's treatment.
In light of the foregoing, defendant Marshall can be held liable for decisions of medical personnel only if his actions bear a causal relationship to the purported violation of Sanderson's constitutional rights. To establish the requisite causal connection and therefore avoid entry of summary judgment in favor of Marshall, Sanderson must present sufficient evidence which would be admissible at trial of either "a history of widespread abuse [that] put[] [the defendant] on notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation, and [he] fail[ed] to do so. . . ." or "a . . . custom or policy [that] result[ed] in deliberate indifference to constitutional rights, or . . . facts [that] support an inference that [Marshall] directed the [facility's health care or jail staff] to act unlawfully, or knew that [the staff] would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so." Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360 (alterations added, internal punctuation and citations omitted). A thorough review of the pleadings and evidentiary materials submitted in this case demonstrates that Sanderson has failed to meet this burden.
The record before the court contains no probative evidence to support an inference that Marshall directed medical or jail personnel to act unlawfully or knew that they would act/acted unlawfully and failed to stop such action. In addition, Sanderson has presented no evidence of obvious, flagrant or rampant abuse of continuing duration in the face of which Marshall failed to take corrective action. Finally, the undisputed evidentiary materials submitted by defendant Marshall demonstrate that the challenged actions did not occur pursuant to a policy enacted by Marshall. Thus, the requisite causal connection does not exist in this case, and liability under the custom or policy standard is not warranted. Summary judgment is therefore due to be granted in favor of defendant Marshall.
For the foregoing reasons, it is
ORDERED and ADJUDGED that:
A separate Final Judgment will accompany this memorandum opinion.