RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

CHARLES S. COODY, Magistrate Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

On February 18, 2014, Terrance Maurice Thomas ("Thomas") filed a motion to suppress all evidence seized during an allegedly unconstitutional search of the car in which he was a passenger on December 15, 2012. (Doc. # 52). On March 7, 2014, Thomas filed an amended motion to suppress (doc. # 68) in which he asserts that the officers did not have probable cause or reasonable suspicion to detain him after the driver of the vehicle was given a ticket. According to Thomas, the officer's testimony about the search of his vehicle was not credible and he lacked probable cause to search. Consequently, Thomas argues that the search was violative of the Fourth Amendment.

The court held an evidentiary hearing on the defendant's motion to suppress, as amended, on April 4, 2014. Based on the evidence presented during the hearing, and argument of the parties, the court concludes that the motion to suppress is due to be denied.

II. FACTS

On December 15, 2012, Lieutenant Kenneth Parker ("Parker") and Corporal Lionel Davidson ("Davidson") of the Greenville Police Department were running stationary radars near Interstate 65 and Highway 243 in Greenville, Alabama in an attempt to catch speeders. (Evid. Hr'g Tr. at 10-11). Parker had his canine, Dalton, in his vehicle, and Davidson was in another patrol car. (Id. at 14-15). At approximately 10:45 p.m., Parker observed a vehicle driven by co-defendant Travis Moss ("Moss") "traveling at a high rate of speed and both of our radars displayed 79 MPH."1 (Doc. # 68, Ex. 1; Evid. Hr'g Tr. at 53). Parker initiated a traffic stop. (Evid. Hr'g Tr. at 15). When Parker approached the vehicle, Moss was driving and Thomas was in the passenger seat. (Id. at 17). Parker detected the "strong odor of marijuana coming from the vehicle" at that time. (Id. at 15-16). He also observed that the passenger, Thomas, was "acting nervous." (Id. at 54). Moss was ticketed for speeding.

After giving Moss the speeding ticket, Parker asked for permission to search the vehicle. (Id. at 17). Moss told Parker that he would need to ask Thomas. (Id.) Thomas declined to give Parker consent to search. (Id. at 18). At that point, Parker got Dalton from his vehicle and deployed the dog for a canine sniff. (Id.) Dalton alerted on the passenger side doorjamb. (Id. at 33-34). Parker also testified that he personally smelled marijuana emanating from the trunk of the car. (Id. at 34-35). At that point, Parker searched the vehicle. (Id. at 35).

A firearm, cash, and stems and seeds of marijuana were found inside the vehicle and fourteen (14) bags of marijuana were found in a duffle bag in the trunk. (Id. at 35 & 44-45). Thirteen (13) bags of marijuana were vacuum sealed and one bag was open. (Id. at 43-44). Moss and Thomas were then arrested. (Id. at 46).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Validity of Traffic Stop

The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from "unreasonable searches and seizures" by government officials, and its protections extend to "brief investigatory stops of persons or vehicles." United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002). "As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred." Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996); see also, United States v. Pruitt, 174 F.3d 1215, 1217, fn. 1 (11th Cir. 1999) ("We agree that, because Pena was speeding, and a traffic violation had thus occurred, probable cause existed for the stop. Accordingly, the stop was reasonable for purposes of the Fourth Amendment and withstands review.").2 A police officer "may stop a vehicle when there is probable cause to believe that the driver is violating any one of the multitude of applicable traffic . . . regulations relating to the operation of motor vehicles." United States v. Cooper, 133 F.3d 1394, 1398 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Strickland, 902 F.2d 937, 940 (11th Cir. 1990)). In this case, the officers had probable cause to stop Moss's vehicle because they observed him speeding and the stationary radars confirmed that Moss was exceeding the posted speed limit.3 Parker stopped Moss's vehicle only after having probable cause to believe that he had committed a traffic violation in that he was speeding. Parker testified that he initiated the traffic stop only after his radar indicated that Moss was traveling at 79 mph and after he personally observed that the vehicle was speeding. There is no dispute that the initial traffic stop was valid. Consequently, the court concludes that Parker had probable cause to stop Moss.4

B. Probable Cause to Search

Parker testified that when he approached the car to talk to Moss, he smelled the odor of marijuana emanating from the car. (Evid. Hr'g Tr. at 15-16, 19, 29, 53-55). He also informed Corporal Davidson that he smelled marijuana when Parker asked Davidson to watch the occupants of the vehicle. (Id. at 58). After lawfully stopping the vehicle, Parker then had the duty to investigate suspicious circumstances.5 United States v. Simmons, 172 F.3d 775, 779 (11th Cir. 1999). The law in this circuit is clear "that the recognizable smell of marijuana gives rise to probable cause supporting a warrantless search." United States v. Lueck, 678 F.2d 895, 903 (11th Cir. 1982). See also United States v. Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506, 1512 (11th Cir. 1991) ("[A]gent's suspicions rose to the level of probable cause, when, as the door stood open, he detected what he knew from his law enforcement experience to be the odor of marijuana."); United States v. Salley, 341 Fed. Appx. 498, 500 fn. 2 (11th Cir. 2009) ("This Court has found that the smell of marijuana satisfied the higher "probable cause" standard."); United States v. Hamilton, 299 Fed. Appx. 878, 882 (11th Cir. 2008) ("We have held that "the recognizable smell of marijuana gives rise to probable cause supporting a warrantless search."). Consequently, as soon as he smelled the strong odor of marijuana coming from the car, Parker had probable cause to search the car. When Parker discovered the gun and drugs in the vehicle, he then had probable cause to arrest Moss and Thomas.

Parker testified that he could smell marijuana coming from the vehicle when he reached into the driver's door to speak to Moss. He further testified that he initially smelled marijuana in the car, and he later smelled marijuana emanating from the trunk. (Evid. Hr'g Tr. at 15-16 & 34). Based on his training and experience as a police officer, he testified that he recognized the smell of marijuana, and he could tell the difference in smell between raw marijuana and burnt marijuana. (Id. at 7-8). When Parker opened the trunk of the car, he smelled marijuana and saw an open, duffle bag containing marijuana in plastic bags.6 (Id. at 17, 63). One of the vacuum sealed bags had a hole cut in it, and marijuana was visible. The court has carefully considered Parker's demeanor during his testimony and concludes that his testimony was credible.7

Thomas argues that Parker's testimony regarding smelling marijuana in the car is simply not credible. According to Thomas, Parker could not have smelled the marijuana emanating from the trunk and that he only deployed Dalton to search after Thomas refused consent to search the car. However, Thomas failed to present any facts to undermine Parker's testimony. Thomas argues that because Parker indicated on the Uniform Traffic Citation ("UTC") that Moss should be released on "his own recognizance," his testimony that he smelled marijuana was not credible. (Doc. # 75 at 3) ("The idea that an officer who, as Lt. Parker has testified, would smell a strong odor of marijuana and then indicate his intention of release of the suspect on the UTC is nonsensical, unless in fact no marijuana had actually been detected to begin with.") Parker's testimony regarding whether he selected the "release on own recognizance" or he had the ability to change the UTC is not as clear as Thomas would like to believe. More importantly, however, Thomas ignores Parker's very clear testimony that he was not free to leave, regardless of what the UTC said.

(Evid. Hr'g Tr. at 24).

The only facts before the court are Parker's testimony that he smelled marijuana, Davidson's testimony that he smelled marijuana,8 and the drug dog's alert to the smell of drugs in the car. Thomas does not challenge the credibility of Davidson's testimony and the court has already found Parker's testimony that he smelled marijuana credible.

Even if the court were to conclude that Parker's testimony was not credible, the fact that the drug dog alerted to the presence of drugs in the vehicle is sufficient probable cause to justify the search. See United States v. Tamari, 454 F.3d. 1259, 1265 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Wilbur, 458 Fed. Appx. 829, 830 (11th Cir. 2012) ("The drug dog alerted to the presence of drugs in [defendant's] vehicle, which gave the officers probable cause to search the vehicle without a warrant[.]"; United States v. Banks, 3 F.3d 399, 402 (11th Cir. 1993) ("probable cause arises when a drug-trained canine alerts to drugs"). Based on the facts of this case, the court concludes that probable cause existed for the search of the vehicle, and that Thomas's motion to suppress should be denied.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons as stated, the court finds that the defendant's rights secured by the Fourth Amendment were not violated. Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that the defendant's motion to suppress be denied. It is further

ORDERED that the parties shall file any objections to the said Recommendation on or before May 5, 2014. Any objections filed must specifically identify the findings in the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation to which the party objects. Frivolous, conclusive or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in the Magistrate Judge's report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the District Court of issues covered in the report and shall bar the party from attacking on appeal factual findings in the report accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981, en banc), adopting as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.