CHARLES S. COODY, Magistrate Judge.
In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, plaintiff Curtis Edward Nelson ("Nelson"), a state inmate, complains that, while incarcerated at the Bullock Correctional Facility in Union Springs, Alabama, he was physically attacked and assaulted by the defendants. He names as defendants sergeants Cedric Smith and Edward Haynes as well as correctional officers Paul Phillips and Jay King. (Doc. #28, Amended Compl.) The allegation central to Nelson's complaint is that on June 11, 2014, the defendant correctional officers used excessive force against him. (Id). Nelson seeks a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief and monetary damages for the alleged violations of his constitutional rights.
In accordance with the orders of the court, the defendants filed an answer, special report, and supporting evidentiary material in response to the allegations contained in the complaint. (Doc. # 39). The court then informed the plaintiff that the defendants' special report may, at any time, be treated as a motion for summary judgment, and the court explained to the plaintiff the proper manner in which to respond to a motion for summary judgment. (Doc. # 43). The plaintiff filed a response to the special report filed by the defendants. (Doc. # 49 & 57).
Thus, this case is now pending before the court on the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Upon consideration of the motion, the evidentiary materials filed in support thereof, and the plaintiff's opposition to the motion, the court concludes that the defendants' motion for summary judgment is due to be granted in part and denied in part.
"Summary judgment is appropriate `if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine [dispute]
In civil actions filed by inmates, federal courts
Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 530 (2006) (internal citation omitted). Once the movant meets his evidentiary burden and demonstrates the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to establish, with appropriate evidence beyond the pleadings, that a genuine dispute material to his case exists. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c) ("A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by: (A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or (B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact."). A genuine dispute of material fact exists when the nonmoving party produces evidence that would allow a reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in its favor. Greenberg, 498 F.3d at 1263.
Consequently, to survive the defendants' properly supported motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff is required to produce "sufficient [favorable] evidence" which would be admissible at trial supporting his claims for relief. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). "If the evidence [on which the nonmoving party relies] is merely colorable . . . or is not significantly probative . . . summary judgment may be granted." Id. at 249-250. "A mere `scintilla' of evidence supporting the opposing party's position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the [trier of fact] could reasonably find for that party." Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1576-1577 (11th Cir. 1990) quoting Anderson, supra. Conclusory allegations based on subjective beliefs are likewise insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact and, therefore, do not suffice to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Assocs., 276 F.3d 1275, 1276 (11th Cir., 2001); Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912 (11th Cir. 1995) (grant of summary judgment appropriate where inmate produces nothing beyond "his own conclusory allegations" challenging the actions of the defendants). Consequently, when a party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the moving party. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322; Barnes v. Southwest Forest Industries, Inc., 814 F.2d 607 (11th Cir. 1987).
For summary judgment purposes, only disputes involving material facts are relevant. United States v. One Piece of Real Prop. Located at 5800 SW 74th Ave., Miami, Fla., 363 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11th Cir. 2004). What is material is determined by the substantive law applicable to the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11th Cir. 2004) ("Only factual disputes that are material under the substantive law governing the case will preclude entry of summary judgment."). "The mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat summary judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting the outcome of the case." McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). To demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact, the party opposing summary judgment "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no `genuine [dispute] for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co, Ltd., v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, and pro se complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation by the courts, a pro se litigant does not escape the burden of establishing a genuine dispute of material fact. Beard, 548 U.S. at 525; Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11th Cir. 1990). Thus, the plaintiff's pro se status alone does not mandate this court's disregard of elementary principles of production and proof in a civil case.
The facts as alleged by Nelson are as follows:
Elsewhere in his amended complaint, Nelson alleges the following.
(Doc. # 28 at 2-3, 5).
The defendants, on the other hand, asserts that when Nelson was exiting his cell as ordered, he "kicked a cup filled with a liquid substance that was sitting on the floor, causing the substance to get on Sgt. Haynes." (Doc. # 39 at 7). According to the defendants, the "substance had an odor that smelled like urine." (Id.) The defendants describe the events that then unfolded.
(Doc. #39, Ex. 2 at 2).
The defendants concede Nelson was handcuffed during the altercation, but assert that he only "sustained a small abrasion to his left and right knee." (Doc. # 9 at 7-8).
With respect to any claims Nelson lodges against the defendants in their official capacities, they are entitled to absolute immunity from monetary damages. Official capacity lawsuits are "in all respects other than name, ... treated as a suit against the entity." Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985).
Lancaster v. Monroe County, 116 F.3d 1419, 1429 (11th Cir. 1997).
In light of the foregoing, there is no dispute that the defendants are state actors, and thus, are entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment for claims seeking monetary damages from them in their official capacities. Id., at 1429; Jackson v. Ga. Dep't of Transp., 16 F.3d 1573, 1575 (11th Cir. 1994). The court concludes, therefore, that the defendants are entitled to summary judgment with respect the claims against them in their official capacities.
Claims of excessive force by prison officials against convicted inmates are governed by the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. Campbell v. Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353, 1374 (11th Cir. 1999). The standard applied to an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim contains both a subjective and objective component. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1972). The subjective component requires that prison "officials act[ed] with a sufficiently culpable state of mind." Id. (internal quotations omitted). With respect to the objective component, a plaintiff must show that "the alleged wrongdoing was objectively harmful enough to establish a constitutional violation." Id. However, "the use of excessive physical force against a prisoner may constitute cruel and unusual punishment [even] when the inmate does not suffer serious injury." Id. at 4. "An inmate who is gratuitously beaten by guards does not lose his ability to pursue an excessive force claim merely because he has the good fortune to escape without serious injury." Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 38 (2010).
Nelson complains that on June 11, 2014, the four correctional officers used excessive force against him without provocation and for no reason. He maintains that he complied with the officers' orders to him, and that he did not resist the officers at any time. According to Nelson, he was beaten with a club, struck in the head with open fists, sprayed with pepper spray, punched and kicked by the officers while he was handcuffed. Nelson maintains that the defendants' actions constituted an unnecessary and excessive use of force against him because the assault was committed in the absence of need or provocation and done maliciously and/or sadistically. Nelson therefore argues that the defendants' use of force under these circumstances was excessive. The defendant officers deny all allegations regarding the use of excessive force and maintain that they only used an amount of force that was necessary to gain control of the plaintiff. They assert that the force was not used with malicious or sadistic intent.
The defendants describe Nelson's injury as "small abrasions." However, photographs attached in support of the defendants' motion for summary judgment appear to reveal a more significant injury to the plaintiff's leg.
Under Wilkins, the nature of an inmate's injuries is not dispositive of an excessive force claim. Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 34 (Dismissal of "a prisoner's excessive force claim based entirely on ... [a] determination that his injuries were `de minimis' [is improper] ... [as it] is at odds with Hudson's direction to decide excessive force claims based on the nature of the force rather than the extent of the injury. ...").
Id. at 37 quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. The nature of the injuries suffered by Nelson will, however, remain relevant to whether the officers actually used force as described by Nelson and whether they acted "`maliciously and sadistically." Id. at 40. Additionally, "even if [Nelson] succeeds, the relatively modest nature of his alleged injuries will no doubt limit the damages he may recover." Id.
Skrtich v. Thornton, 280 F.3d 1295, 1300-01 (11th Cir. 2002).
Here, Nelson maintains that the officers used pepper spray on him, threw him against a wall, beat him with a club, punched him with fists and kicked him, all while he was handcuffed and offering no resistance. As explained, the defendants have denied Plaintiff's allegations regarding the use of force and maintain that at no time during the incident in question was more force used than necessary to subdue and gain control of Nelson. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Nelson, as the court must at this stage in the proceedings, the court concludes that genuine disputes of material fact exist regarding the use of force and whether the officers acted "maliciously and sadistically" to cause harm. Consequently, the motion for summary judgment with respect to the excessive force claim presented against defendants in their individual capacities is due to be denied.
The defendants also argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity on Nelson's claim of excessive force. The law of this Circuit, however, precludes a defense of qualified immunity in cases alleging excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment because the use of force "maliciously and sadistically to cause harm" is clearly established to be a constitutional violation. Skrtich, 280 F.3d at 1301, citing Hudson, 503 U.S. 1 (1992), and Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986). "[T]here is no room for qualified immunity in Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment excessive force cases because they require a subjective element that is `so extreme' that no reasonable person could believe that his actions were lawful." Danley v. Allen, 540 F.3d 1298, 1310 (11th Cir. 2008) overruled on other grounds by Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). Thus, a qualified immunity defense is not available when a plaintiff asserts the use of excessive force and the only question for a federal district court is whether the plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 1302; see also Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9-10; Harris v. Chapman, 97 F.3d 499, 505 (11th Cir. 1996).
Under the facts as presented by Nelson, genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the incident in question, the need for the use of force, and whether the amount of force used was appropriate. Thus, the defendant officers are not entitled to qualified immunity at this time, Skrtich, 280 F.3d at 1301, and their request for summary judgment with respect to Nelson's excessive force claim is due to be denied.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED and ADJUDGED that
1. The defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to claims against them in their official capacities be and is hereby GRANTED; and
2. The defendants' motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff's § 1983 excessive force claim be and is hereby DENIED.
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In this instance, Nelson claims that the defendants failed to intervene and prevent him from having to take a second shower. According to Nelson, he was ordered to take another shower so the officers "could sit and watch and antagonize [him] while he was in the shower." (Doc. # 28 at 3). This is insufficient, as a matter of law, to state a "failure to protect" claim.
(Doc. #9, Ex. 6 at 4).