MYRON H. THOMPSON, District Judge.
This is a slip-and-fall case. Plaintiff Bridgett Hooks brings claims of negligence per se, premises liability, and wantonness against defendants Dollar General Corporation, which operates the store where she fell, and Farmers Home Furniture, which leases the premises to Dollar General.
This cause is before the court on the motions for summary judgment filed by Dollar General and by Farmers Home Furniture. Because the two motions mostly raise the same arguments, they are considered together, except where noted. For the reasons stated below, these motions will be granted in part and denied in part.
Summary judgment is appropriate when "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by ... citing to parts of materials in the record, including depositions ... [or] showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).
In making its determination, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party.
Because this is a diversity case, the court applies the substantive law of Alabama, as articulated by the state courts.
Hooks was a regular customer of a Dollar General Store in Enterprise, Alabama. Dollar General leases the store from Farmers Home Furniture.
Hooks had shopped at this store an average of two or three times per week for the five years preceding the incident at issue here. She generally entered and exited the store using the handicap ramp—which was in front of the store and painted blue—because she had knee problems stemming from rheumatoid arthritis and had undergone knee surgeries.
On the day in question, Hooks arrived at the store in the early afternoon. She parked in a `handicap' spot and walked across the parking lot and up the handicap ramp. Because it was drizzling, the ramp was wet. Hooks was wearing flip-flops.
In her deposition, Hooks stated that she did not have any difficulty walking up the ramp as she entered the store. At that time, she did not notice anything wrong with the ramp; specifically, she did not see any broken concrete on the ramp. She was having no trouble with her vision, and nothing obstructed her view of the ramp. On her way into and out of the store, she was cautious, on account of the rain and her knee problems.
On the way out of the store, Hooks took the same path by which she had entered the store. She was carrying one shopping bag. As she stepped on the ramp, she slipped and fell, suffering significant injuries.
Hooks stated that she stepped onto the ramp with her left foot, and that it slid, ending up on the ground beside the ramp. She was clear that she slid, and did not trip. However, she was unable to identify where on the ramp she first stepped, or how many steps she had taken on the ramp prior to sliding.
When asked whether she had "any idea what caused [her] to begin to fall," Hooks initially said no.
Hooks did not report the accident to the store at the time; she later called to make a report.
Hooks seeks damages for injuries she sustained when she slipped and fell on a ramp connecting the parking lot to the sidewalk in front of the store. She alleges that the ramp was constructed in violation of applicable law and was inadequately maintained. Specifically, she raises three claims: (1) that the construction of the ramp failed to comply with the requirements of the Americans with Disabilities Act, and that this failure constituted negligence per se; (2) that the defendants breached the duty of care they owed her as an invitee in how they maintained the ramp, that this breach caused her injury, and that the defendants were therefore negligent under a premises-liability theory; and (3) that the defendants knowingly disregarded the likelihood that injury would result from their inadequate maintenance of the ramp, that this disregard caused her injury, and that the defendants were therefore liable for wantonness. Each claim is addressed in turn below.
Hooks suggests that the ramp on which she slipped and fell was not compliant with the ADA, because it was `built-up,' extending out from the curve, rather than concave (i.e., cut into the curb). Hooks's claim of negligence per se under the ADA fails, however, because, as counsel acknowledged at the pretrial hearing, she has not alleged (much less offered evidence to prove) that this violation of the ADA caused her injuries.
In order for a plaintiff to show that violation of a statute or ordinance constitutes negligence per se in Alabama, she must show: "(1) The party charged with negligent conduct [has] violated the statute; (2) the statute was enacted to protect a class of persons which includes the litigant seeking to assert the statute; (3) the injury was of a type contemplated by the statute; and (4) the statutory violation proximately caused the injury.
Even assuming that the ramp at issue was indeed constructed in violation of the ADA and its implementing regulations, and that Hooks is a disabled person who is protected by the statute, Hooks has failed to identify any evidence in the record suggesting that the design of the ramp proximately caused her to fall. Indeed, Hooks testified in her deposition that it was the loose, broken concrete of the ramp that caused her to fall; she nowhere implicated the cut of the ramp. The defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment on Hooks's claim of negligence per se.
The court notes, moreover, that the ADA is not relevant to the standard of care applicable to Hooks's premises-liability claims, for much the same reason: ADA standards governing the
Next, Hooks raises a premises-liability claim.
That duty is "to exercise reasonable care to provide and maintain reasonable safe premises for the use of [] customers."
With respect to this claim, the defendants contend that Hooks has failed to create a dispute of material fact as to (1) the cause of her fall and (2) whether the hazard that caused the fall was open and obvious. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Hooks, the court disagrees.
First, the defendants assert that Hooks has offered only speculation as to the cause of her fall. On this point, they cite
However, this case is distinguishable from
Here, while Hooks was not a model of clarity or conviction in her deposition testimony regarding the moments leading up to her fall, she stated that she fell because of "the looseness of the ramp": a piece of the concrete along the edge of the ramp came loose underfoot.
Hooks's testimony could be more compelling, and a factfinder might be persuaded by other evidence at trial that her fall was caused by the rain-slicked surface of the ramp and not by its crumbling edges. But she stated in her deposition that the loose ramp did cause her fall, not that she believed that it did. Although "a court may disregard [the non-moving] party's sworn testimony if the testimony is internally inconsistent" in "determining whether [that] party has created facts sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment,"
In sum, a factfinder that credits Hooks's testimony could decide the case in her favor.
Second, the defendants argue that there is no dispute of material fact as to whether the defect in the ramp that allegedly caused Hooks's fall was open and obvious.
"For a defect to be `known,' [or `open,'] the plaintiff must be made aware of the existence of the condition and must appreciate the danger it involved. `Obvious' means that the condition and risk are apparent to, and would be recognized by, a reasonable person in the position of the invitee. Therefore, the `obvious' test is an objective one, whereas the `known' test is subjective."
Hooks states in her deposition that she did not notice the broken concrete, or appreciate its danger, until after her fall. Subjectively, the defect was not known to her.
The more difficult question is whether the broken concrete was objectively obvious. The defendants repeatedly emphasize that Hooks admitted at her deposition that the damage to the ramp was "in the open" and "obvious" to her
The Supreme Court of Alabama has defined wantonness as "the conscious doing of some act or the omission of some duty, while knowing of the existing conditions and being conscious that, from doing or omitting to do an act, injury will likely or probably result."
The Alabama Supreme Court has held, as Hooks notes, that wantonness claims should be "submitted to the jury unless there is a total lack of evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer" that the defendant was conscious of the serious risk of injury its actions or omissions created,
Critically, for present purposes, evidence that a defendant is aware that another person has previously "fallen in the same area where the pavement [i]s broken," absent evidence showing that the broken pavement is "what caused th[at] fall," does not suffice to carry a plaintiff past the summary judgment stage on a wantonness claim, even under the no-longer-applicable scintilla rule.
Although Hooks has presented evidence that the defendants were aware of two other patrons who fell on the ramp, one in 2009 and one in 2010, she has offered no evidence to suggest that these falls were caused by the defect that she alleges caused hers: loose concrete along the edge of the ramp. In fact, the evidence makes clear that both the 2009 and 2010 falls were due to the ramp being wet.
The documents and deposition testimony in evidence regarding the 2009 incident show that the store recorded, on a form signed by the customer who fell, the "Cause of Incident" to be "slippery ramp."
Finally, Hooks points to an email exchange between a property inspector and a property maintenance supervisor, both employed by Farmers Home Furniture, which occurred a few months before her fall. In it, the inspector stated that the ramp "need[s] to be replaced with one that cuts into the sidewalk." The supervisor replied that there was no "money in the budget for this," but asked whether "painting it with slip resistant paint would ... help the problem with people slipping." The inspector answered in the affirmative, and then informed the supervisor that when Farmers Home Furniture "fix[es] the ramp, [it] will most likely be required to bring all of them up to code. Budget $13,000." Doc. no. 40, ex. F.
While this evidence does suggest that the defendants were aware that their ramp was dangerously slippery, and were quite irresponsible in remedying that problem, Hooks specifically contends that she fell
For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED as follows:
(2) The premises-liability claim will go to trial.