Filed: Feb. 05, 2016
Latest Update: Feb. 05, 2016
Summary: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER W. KEITH WATKINS , Chief District Judge . Plaintiffs Ronald Mays, Roberta Mays-Menifee, and Christian Mays bring this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Defendants Anna Thrash, Troy Arnold, Jeremy Ledyard, and Caroline Carr for incidents of unlawful arrest, false imprisonment, and unlawful searches and seizures. (Doc. #1 at 5-8.) Plaintiff Ronald Mays also asserts a state-law claim for defamation against Defendant John A. Yung, IV for allegedly distributing
Summary: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER W. KEITH WATKINS , Chief District Judge . Plaintiffs Ronald Mays, Roberta Mays-Menifee, and Christian Mays bring this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Defendants Anna Thrash, Troy Arnold, Jeremy Ledyard, and Caroline Carr for incidents of unlawful arrest, false imprisonment, and unlawful searches and seizures. (Doc. #1 at 5-8.) Plaintiff Ronald Mays also asserts a state-law claim for defamation against Defendant John A. Yung, IV for allegedly distributing r..
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
W. KEITH WATKINS, Chief District Judge.
Plaintiffs Ronald Mays, Roberta Mays-Menifee, and Christian Mays bring this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Anna Thrash, Troy Arnold, Jeremy Ledyard, and Caroline Carr for incidents of unlawful arrest, false imprisonment, and unlawful searches and seizures. (Doc. #1 at 5-8.) Plaintiff Ronald Mays also asserts a state-law claim for defamation against Defendant John A. Yung, IV for allegedly distributing racist and disparaging literature in Plaintiffs' neighborhood describing Plaintiff Ronald Mays as "our affirmative action, blue gum, burr head monkey." (Doc. #1 at ¶ 31.) In an Order entered on July 30, 2015, the court sua sponte directed Plaintiffs to show cause why the defamation claim should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. (Doc. #23.)
As the Eleventh Circuit has explained, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 "reflects a dichotomy between a federal court's power to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, § 1367(a), and its discretion not to exercise such jurisdiction, § 1367(c)." Lucero v. Trosch, 121 F.3d 591, 597 (11th Cir. 1997). The court has the power to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law defamation claim only if the defamation claim "arise[s] out of a common nucleus of operative fact" as the "substantial federal claim" supplying original jurisdiction. Id. To determine whether the claims share a common nucleus of operative fact, the court "must take the nucleus of facts on which the federal question claims are based and compare it to the nucleus of facts on which the state law claims are based." Upper Chattahoochee Riverkeeper Fund, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 701 F.3d 669, 679 (11th Cir. 2012). This comparison "is ordinarily determined on the pleadings." Lucero, 121 F.3d at 598. Where "each claim involves the same facts, occurrences, witnesses, and evidence," the commonality between the federal and state-law claims "is sufficient to satisfy the constitutional minimum required by section 1367(a)." Palmer v. Hosp. Auth. of Randolph Cnty., 22 F.3d 1559, 1566 (11th Cir. 1994).
Based on the applicable law, the court finds that the state-law defamation claim does not arise out of a common nucleus of operative fact with the § 1983 claim because the claims present different factual occurrences requiring separate proof. As alleged in the complaint, Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims are based on allegations that Defendants Thrash, Arnold, Ledyard, and Carr unlawfully issued and executed warrants for criminal trespass and criminal tampering without probable cause, subjected Plaintiff Ronald Mays to unlawful arrest and false imprisonment, and conducted unlawful searches and seizures of Plaintiffs' property. (Doc. #1 at 5-8.) The § 1983 claim will require evidence that (1) Plaintiffs were deprived of a right secured by the United States Constitution, and (2) "the act or omission causing the deprivation was committed by an individual acting under color of state law." Wideman v. Shallowford Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 826 F.2d 1030, 1032 (11th Cir. 1987). In contrast, the defamation claim will require that Plaintiff Ronald Mays prove that Defendant Yung was at least negligent in publishing a false and defamatory statement to another concerning the plaintiff, which is either actionable without having to prove special harm or actionable upon allegations and proof of special harm. Gary v. Crouch, 867 So.2d 310, 315 (Ala. 2003) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977)) (internal citations omitted).
Thus, the nucleus of facts on which the federal claims are based involves acts and omissions of one set of Defendants who allegedly deprived Plaintiffs of their constitutional rights under the guise of the state's law enforcement and judicial powers, and the nucleus of facts on which the defamation claim is based involves acts and omissions of a private citizen who allegedly published racist slurs about Plaintiff Ronald Mays to other private citizens in Plaintiffs' neighborhood. Although Plaintiffs' claims are all tangentially related to a feud between neighbors, the federal and state-law claims do not involve "the same facts, occurrences, witnesses, and evidence." Palmer, 22 F.3d at 1566. Therefore, the court does not have supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff Ronald Mays's state-law defamation claim.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff's supplemental state-law claim for defamation is DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to § 1367(a). Further, there being no other claims asserted against Defendant Yung, Defendant Yung is DISMISSED from this action.
A copy of this checklist is available at the website for the USCA, 11th Circuit at www.ca11.uscourts.gov Effective on December 1, 2013, the new fee to file an appeal will increase from $455.00 to $505.00.
CIVIL APPEALS JURISDICTION CHECKLIST
1. Appealable Orders: Courts of Appeals have jurisdiction conferred and strictly limited by statute:
(a) Appeals from final orders pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291: Only final orders and judgments of district courts, or final orders of bankruptcy courts which have been appealed to and fully resolved by a district court under 28 U.S.C.§ 158, generally are appealable. A final decision is one that "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 701 F.2d 1365, 1368 (11th Cir. 1983). A magistrate judge's report and recommendation is not final and appealable until judgment thereon is entered by a district court judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
(b) In cases involving multiple parties or multiple claims, a judgment as to fewer than all parties or all claims is not a final, appealable decision unless the district court has certified the judgment for immediate review under Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). Williams v. Bishop, 732 F.2d 885, 885-86 (11th Cir. 1984). A judg ment which resolves all issues except matters, such as attorneys' fees and costs, that are collateral to the merits, is immediately appealable. Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 201, 108 S.Ct. 1717, 1721-22, 100 L.Ed.2d 178 (1988); LaChance v. Duffy's Draft House, Inc., 146 F.3d 832, 837 (11th Cir. 1998).
(c) Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a): Appeals are permitted from orders "granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions . . ." and from "[i]nterlocutory decrees . . . determining the rights and liabilities of parties to admiralty cases in which appeals from final decrees are allowed." Interlocutory appeals from orders denying temporary restraining orders are not permitted.
(d) Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and Fed.R.App.P. 5: The certification specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) must be obtained before a petition for permission to appeal is filed in the Court of Appeals. The district court's denial of a motion for certification is not itself appealable.
(e) Appeals pursuant to judicially created exceptions to the finality rule: Limited exceptions are discussed in cases including, but not limited to: Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546, 69S.Ct. 1221, 1225-26, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949); Atlantic Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, Inc., 890 F.2d 371, 376 (11th Cir. 1989); Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 157, 85 S.Ct. 308, 312, 13 L.Ed.2d 199 (1964).
2. Time for Filing: The timely filing of a notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional. Rinaldo v. Corbett, 256 F.3d 1276, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). In civil cases, Fed.R.App.P. 4(a) and (c) set the following time limits:
(a) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1): A notice of appeal in compliance with the requirements set forth in Fed.R.App.P. 3 must be filed in the district court within 30 days after the entry of the order or judgment appealed from. However, if the United States or an officer or agency thereof is a party, the notice of appeal must be filed in the district court within 60 days after such entry. THE NOTICE MUST BE RECEIVED AND FILED IN THE DISTRICT COURT NO LATER THAN THE LAST DAY OF THE APPEAL PERIOD — no additional days are provided for mailing. Special filing provisions for inmates are discussed below.
(b) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(3): "If one party timely files a notice of appeal, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date when the first notice was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by this Rule 4(a), whichever period ends later."
(c) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4): If any party makes a timely motion in the district court under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of a type specified in this rule, the time for appeal for all parties runs from the date of entry of the order disposing of the last such timely filed motion.
(d) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(5) and 4(a)(6): Under certain limited circumstances, the district court may extend the time to file a notice of appeal. Under Rule 4(a)(5), the time may be extended if a motion for an extension is filed within 30 days after expiration of the time otherwise provided to file a notice of appeal, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause. Under Rule 4(a)(6), the time may be extended if the district court finds upon motion that a party did not timely receive notice of the entry of the judgment or order, and that no party would be prejudiced by an extension.
(e) Fed.R.App.P. 4(c): If an inmate confined to an institution files a notice of appeal in either a civil case or a criminal case, the notice of appeal is timely if it is deposited in the institution's internal mail system on or before the last day for filing. Timely filing may be shown by a declaration in compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746 or a notarized statement, either of which must set forth the date of deposit and state that first-class postage has been prepaid.
3. Format of the notice of appeal: Form 1, Appendix of Forms to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, is a suitable format. See also Fed.R.App.P. 3(c). A pro se notice of appeal must be signed by the appellant.
4. Effect of a notice of appeal: A district court loses jurisdiction (authority) to act after the filing of a timely notice of appeal, except for actions in aid of appellate jurisdiction or to rule on a timely motion of the type specified in Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4).
