MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
W. KEITH WATKINS, Chief District Judge.
Before the court is Plaintiffs' Supplemental Motion and Brief to Proceed Anonymously. (Doc. # 41.) Defendants filed a response (Doc. # 45), which incorporates their earlier arguments (Doc. # 28) in response to Plaintiffs' initial motion to proceed anonymously (Doc. # 2). Upon consideration of the parties' arguments and the relevant authority, Plaintiffs' motion will be granted.
I. LEGAL STANDARD
Ordinarily, litigants must disclose their identities when they initiate civil proceedings in federal court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). Where party can demonstrate that his substantial privacy right outweighs the presumption of open judicial proceedings, however, he may proceed anonymously. Plaintiff B v. Francis, 631 F.3d 1310, 1315-16 (11th Cir. 2011). Resolving a motion to proceed anonymously requires examination of all the circumstances surrounding the case. Id. at 1316. The court should consider, among other things, (1) whether the plaintiffs are seeking anonymity challenging governmental activity, (2) whether the plaintiffs will be required to disclose information of the utmost intimacy, and (3) whether the plaintiffs will be compelled to admit that they intend to engage in illegal conduct. Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d 320, 323 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing S. Methodist Univ. Ass'n of Women Law Students v. Wynne & Jaffe, 599 F.2d 707, 712 (5th Cir. 1979)).
II. DISCUSSION
A full treatment of circumstances giving rise to this case and the claims being raised can be found in the court's recent memorandum opinion and order granting in part and denying in part Defendants' motion to dismiss. (Doc. # 51.) Briefly, this action presents constitutional challenges to the Alabama Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act ("ASORCNA"). The legal principles governing Plaintiffs' request will be applied to the particular circumstances of the case. The traditional factors restated in Frank will first be addressed. 951 F.2d at 323. Additional factors germane to the case will also be considered. Plaintiffs are ultimately entitled to proceed anonymously.
First, Plaintiffs are challenging governmental activity. Specifically, Plaintiffs have challenged Alabama's implementation and enforcement of ASORCNA's residency, employment, and identification restrictions. But the significance of this fact should not be overstated. Where the plaintiffs bring an action against private individuals, the defendants' interest in identifying the plaintiffs carries more weight. Wynne & Jaffe, 599 F.2d at 713. This does not mean, however, that the fact the challenged activity is attributable to the government necessarily puts a thumb on the scale in favor of anonymity. Frank, 951 F.2d at 324 ("[T]he fact that Doe is suing the Postal Service does not weigh in favor of granting Doe's request for anonymity."). That Plaintiffs are challenging governmental action here merely means that Defendants do not operate under the same threat of reputational damage that private defendants face. See id.
Second, counseling in favor of anonymity is the fact that Plaintiffs will be required to disclose some intimate information. It is true, as Defendants contend, that ASORCNA registrant information is widely available to the public. See Ala. Code § 15-20A-8. According to Defendants, the fact that Plaintiffs' information is already available means that they have no privacy interest in protecting their identities in relation to this suit. What Defendants fail to appreciate, however, is the station this public information occupies in the context of this lawsuit. As anonymous litigants, Plaintiffs will be able to proceed with their challenge free from fear that members of the general public will use the ASORCNA database to track them down individually. Though their information is generally available via the ASORCNA public registry, the general public is currently unable to identify the particular registrants who brought this action challenging the statutory scheme.
Citing hostility toward sex offenders,1 Plaintiffs contend that they fear that members of the public might seek to retaliate against them for bringing this action. If they are forced to disclose their names in connection with this action, Plaintiffs would reveal more than the information that is already available via the registry. They would be forced to publicly identify themselves as the particular ASORCNA registrants challenging the statutory scheme, allowing those citizens who would do harm to put names with faces and addresses. See id. (providing that registrants must disclose names, addresses, license plate numbers, photographs, physical descriptions, and criminal histories). It is one thing to leave the public guessing as to which registrants dared to challenge a popular statutory scheme by bringing this suit. It is quite another thing to point the public to intimate information they otherwise would not be able to associate with the litigants in this suit. In this sense, denying the relief Plaintiffs request forces them to disclose intimate information. See Frank, 951 F.3d at 324.
Third, weighing in favor of anonymity is the fact that Plaintiffs may be compelled to admit their intention to engage in illegal activity. As part of Plaintiffs' claims, they allege that ASORCNA is unconstitutionally vague. They are unsure, under the language of various ASORCNA provisions, whether certain activities in which they would like to engage are in fact prohibited. By revealing their identities, Plaintiffs make themselves vulnerable to criminal prosecution for activities in which they have expressed interest in engaging. And ASORCNA's provisions are enforceable under penalty of felony conviction. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 15-20A-13(g). Because Plaintiffs have alleged that they would like to engage in certain behaviors that may be considered proscribed under ASORCNA's vague provisions, they would benefit from being allowed to proceed anonymously in this case. See Frank, 951 F.3d at 324.
Fourth, certain additional circumstances counsel in favor of allowing Plaintiffs to proceed anonymously. By virtue of their ASORCNA registrant status, Plaintiffs experience difficulty securing places of residency and employment opportunities. Having their identities revealed in connection with this litigation could exacerbate these already serious issues. Plaintiffs further note the stigma associated with ASORCNA registrant status, a stigma that ventures beyond the realm of mere personal embarrassment. See id. (noting that courts have permitted plaintiffs to proceed anonymously in cases involving stigmatic issues such as mental illness, homosexuality, and transsexuality).
Finally, granting the relief Plaintiffs request will not be unfair to Defendants. In their motion, Plaintiffs represent that they are willing to disclose their names to Defendants so long as documents containing this information are filed under seal. A protective order allowing Defendants to access this information without disseminating it publicly or publicly associating the information with the particular offender will protect Plaintiffs' substantial privacy interests while allowing Defendants to efficiently defend against Plaintiffs' claims.
Based on all the circumstances, the court finds that Plaintiffs' substantial privacy right outweighs the presumption of open judicial proceedings. Francis, 631 F.3d at 1315-16. Plaintiffs' motion will be granted, and the parties will be afforded an opportunity to fashion an appropriate protective order in accordance with Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Plaintiffs' motion to proceed anonymously (Doc. # 41) is GRANTED to the extent that Plaintiffs may withhold their true identities from the public and proceed with their claims as John Doe 1, John Doe 3, John Doe 7, and John Doe 9. It is further ORDERED that Plaintiffs' initial motion to proceed anonymously (Doc. # 2) is DENIED as moot. The parties are DIRECTED to confer and, if possible, file a joint motion for protective order that satisfies Plaintiffs' confidentiality concerns.
CIVIL APPEALS JURISDICTION CHECKLIST
1. Appealable Orders: Courts of Appeals have jurisdiction conferred and strictly limited by statute:
(a) Appeals from final orders pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291: Only final orders and judgments of district courts, or final orders of bankruptcy courts which have been appealed to and fully resolved by a district court under 28 U.S.C.§ 158, generally are appealable. A final decision is one that "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 701 F.2d 1365, 1368 (11th Cir. 1983). A magistrate judge's report and recommendation is not final and appealable until judgment thereon is entered by a district court judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
(b) In cases involving multiple parties or multiple claims, a judgment as to fewer than all parties or all claims is not a final, appealable decision unless the district court has certified the judgment for immediate review under Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). Williams v. Bishop, 732 F.2d 885, 885-86 (11th Cir. 1984). A judg ment which resolves all issues except matters, such as attorneys' fees and costs, that are collateral to the merits, is immediately appealable. Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S.196, 201, 108 S.Ct. 1717, 1721-22, 100 L.Ed.2d 178 (1988); LaChance v. Duffy's Draft House, Inc., 146 F.3d 832, 837 (11th Cir. 1998).
(c) Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a): Appeals are permitted from orders "granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions . . ." and from "[i]nterlocutory decrees . . . determining the rights and liabilities of parties to admiralty cases in which appeals from final decrees are allowed." Interlocutory appeals from orders denying temporary restraining orders are not permitted.
(d) Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and Fed.R.App.P. 5: The certification specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) must be obtained before a petition for permission to appeal is filed in the Court of Appeals. The district court's denial of a motion for certification is not itself appealable.
(e) Appeals pursuant to judicially created exceptions to the finality rule: Limited exceptions are discussed in cases including, but not limited to: Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546, 69S.Ct. 1221, 1225-26, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949); Atlantic Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, Inc., 890 F.2d 371, 376 (11th Cir. 1989); Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 157, 85 S.Ct. 308, 312, 13 L.Ed.2d 199 (1964).
Rev.: 4/04
2. Time for Filing: The timely filing of a notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional. Rinaldo v. Corbett, 256 F.3d 1276, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). In civil cases, Fed.R.App.P. 4(a) and (c) set the following time limits:
(a) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1): A notice of appeal in compliance with the requirements set forth in Fed.R.App.P. 3 must be filed in the district court within 30 days after the entry of the order or judgment appealed from. However, if the United States or an officer or agency thereof is a party, the notice of appeal must be filed in the district court within 60 days after such entry. THE NOTICE MUST BE RECEIVED AND FILED IN THE DISTRICT COURT NO LATER THAN THE LAST DAY OF THE APPEAL PERIOD — no additional days are provided for mailing. Special filing provisions for inmates are discussed below.
(b) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(3): "If one party timely files a notice of appeal, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date when the first notice was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by this Rule 4(a), whichever period ends later."
(c) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4): If any party makes a timely motion in the district court under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of a type specified in this rule, the time for appeal for all parties runs from the date of entry of the order disposing of the last such timely filed motion.
(d) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(5) and 4(a)(6): Under certain limited circumstances, the district court may extend the time to file a notice of appeal. Under Rule 4(a)(5), the time may be extended if a motion for an extension is filed within 30 days after expiration of the time otherwise provided to file a notice of appeal, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause. Under Rule 4(a)(6), the time may be extended if the district court finds upon motion that a party did not timely receive notice of the entry of the judgment or order, and that no party would be prejudiced by an extension.
(e) Fed.R.App.P. 4(c): If an inmate confined to an institution files a notice of appeal in either a civil case or a criminal case, the notice of appeal is timely if it is deposited in the institution's internal mail system on or before the last day for filing. Timely filing may be shown by a declaration in compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746 or a notarized statement, either of which must set forth the date of deposit and state that first-class postage has been prepaid.
3. Format of the notice of appeal: Form 1, Appendix of Forms to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, is a suitable format. See also Fed.R.App.P. 3(c). A pro se notice of appeal must be signed by the appellant.
4. Effect of a notice of appeal: A district court loses jurisdiction (authority) to act after the filing of a timely notice of appeal, except for actions in aid of appellate jurisdiction or to rule on a timely motion of the type specified in Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4).
