RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

CHARLES S. COODY, Magistrate Judge.

Before the court is a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by Alabama inmate Tequan Sabré Graham ("Graham"). Doc. No. 1.1 Graham challenges matters related to (1) the revocation of his probation by the Circuit Court of Houston County on December 13, 2010, and (2) his 2007 second-degree burglary conviction in that court and resulting 20-year sentence.

I. BACKGROUND2

Conviction, Sentence, and (Untimely) Direct Appeal

On November 5, 2007, Graham pled guilty in the Circuit Court of Houston County to a charge of second-degree burglary, in violation of § 13A-7-6, Ala. Code 1975. On November 28, 2007, Graham applied for probation. That same day, the trial court denied Graham's request for probation and sentenced him to 20 years' imprisonment, to be served in a community-corrections program. However, on December 20, 2007, after it was informed that the community-corrections program refused to allow Graham, the trial court removed Graham from the program and ordered him to serve his 20-year sentence in a state penitentiary.

On February 25, 2008, Graham filed a notice of appeal, which the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed as untimely filed. Doc. Nos. 9-2 and 9-5. That court issued a certificate of judgment on April 17, 2008. Doc. No. 9-5.

Rule 32 Petition of May 6, 2008 (Regarding Conviction and Sentence)

On May 6, 2008, Graham filed a petition for post-conviction relief under Rule 32 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure challenging his conviction and sentence. In the petition, Graham alleged:

Doc. No. 9-19 at 5-35.

After the State responded, the trial court summarily dismissed Graham's Rule 32 petition. See Doc. No. 9-6 at 1.

Appeal from Denial of Rule 32 Petition of May 6, 2008

Graham appealed from the denial of his Rule 32 petition. By order dated September 10, 2008, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals remanded the case for the trial court to issue specific written findings of fact regarding the merits of Graham's claims and, if necessary, to conduct an evidentiary hearing on those claims. Doc. No. 9-6.

While the case was on remand, Graham filed an amendment to his Rule 32 petition presenting an additional claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Graham also filed a motion with the trial court to reconsider its denial of his request for probation. On February 17, 2009, the trial court conducted a hearing on Graham's motion to reconsider the denial of his probation. Doc. No. 9-20 at 60-64. Following the hearing, the trial court granted Graham's request for probation, suspended his 20-year sentence, and placed him on probation for three years. Id. at 63. Graham's counsel then indicated that, with the grant of probation, Graham wished to withdraw his Rule 32 petition. Id.

The trial court submitted its return to remand with the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals on March 26, 2009. By order dated April 24, 2009, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals remanded the case a second time for the trial court to conduct a hearing and to "make written findings of fact as to whether Graham knowingly and voluntarily decided not to pursue his Rule 32 petition." Doc. No. 9-7. On May 5, 2009, the trial court conducted a hearing, at which Graham affirmatively indicated that he wanted to withdraw his appeal from the summary dismissal of his Rule 32 petition since he had been granted probation. Doc. No. 9-21 at 13-20.

The trial court submitted its second return to remand with the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals on June 4, 2009. By order dated June 19, 2009, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed as moot Graham's appeal from the summary dismissal of his Rule 32 petition, and issued a certificate of judgment. Doc. No. 9-8.

Probation Revocation and Appeal from Revocation

On July 1, 2010, Graham's probation officer filed a delinquency report alleging that Graham violated the terms and conditions of his probation by committing the new offense of receiving stolen property. See Doc. No. 9-23 at 6-9. A probation-revocation hearing was held on December 13, 2010, after which the trial court revoked Graham's probation and reinstated his 20-year sentence. Doc. No. 9-24 at 3-33.

Graham appealed from the revocation of his probation, alleging:

Doc. No. 15-1.

In an unpublished memorandum opinion issued on September 23, 2011, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court's revocation of Graham's probation, finding:

Doc. No. 9-10.

Graham applied for rehearing, which was overruled on October 14, 2011. Doc. No. 15-2; Doc. No. 9-11. He then filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Alabama Supreme Court, which that court denied on December 9, 2011, issuing a certificate of judgment that same day. Doc. No. 15-3; Doc. No. 9-13.

Rule 32 Petition of February 18, 2012

On February 18, 2012, Graham filed a Rule 32 petition, claiming:

Doc. No. 9-22 at 5-26.

On March 1, 2012, without receiving a response from the State, the trial court summarily dismissed Graham's Rule 32 petition, finding:

Doc. No. 9-22 at 32-33.

Appeal from Denial of Rule 32 Petition of February 18, 2012

Graham appealed from the denial of the Rule 32 petition, arguing:

Doc. No. 15-4.

In an unpublished memorandum opinion issued on August 19, 2012, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the denial of Graham's Rule 32 petition. Doc. No. 9-14. Regarding Graham's claim that the trial court erred in not granting him credit for all the time he had spent incarcerated for the second-degree burglary conviction, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals held that the claim was not properly raised in a Rule 32 petition but instead should be presented in a state petition for writ of habeas corpus. Doc. No. 9-14 at 5. The appellate court further held that, in any event, the claim was meritless. Id.

The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals found Graham's two remaining claims to center on his assertion that he was "resentenced" on February 17, 2009, to three years' imprisonment and placed on probation for those three years. Id. However, the appellate court found Graham's assertion in this regard to be "simply false" and that the trial court's placement of Graham on probation for three years did not alter his underlying 20-year sentence. Id. at 5-6. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals went on to observe — in a footnote — that the trial court lacked authority at the February 17, 2009, remand hearing to suspend Graham's 20-year sentence and place him on probation, as such actions were beyond the scope of the remand order and therefore void and, more generally, because a trial court's authority to suspend a sentence and place a person on probation terminates once that person has entered on service of his sentence. Id. at 6. However, the Alabama Court of Criminals found that the placement of Graham on probation did not alter or amend his underlying 20-year sentence and that, "because Graham is in the same position as he would have been had the circuit court not exceeded its authority in 2009 — he is serving his 20-year sentence in confinement," it was unnecessary to set aside the trial court's judgment of February 17, 2009. Id. at 6-7.

Graham applied for rehearing, which was overruled on October 14, 2011. Doc. No. 9-11; Doc. No. 15-2. He then filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Alabama Supreme Court, which that court denied on November 9, 2012, issuing a certificate of judgment the same day. Doc. No. 9-15; Doc. No. 18-6.

Rule 32 Petition of November 11, 2012

On November 11, 2012, Graham filed another Rule 32 petition, arguing:

Doc. No. 9-25 at 6-31.

On December 13, 2012, the trial court, without receiving a response from the State, summarily dismissed Graham's Rule 32 petition, finding that the petition was not sufficiently specific, precluded, and failed to state a claim and that no material issue of fact or law existed that would entitle Graham to relief under Rule 32. Id. at 5.

Appeal from Denial of Rule 32 Petition of November 11, 2012

Graham appealed, reasserting the claims raised in his Rule 32 petition and also arguing that the trial court erred in failing to address his prior convictions for sentencing in violation of § 13A-5-9, Ala. Code 1975. Doc. No. 15-5. In an unpublished memorandum opinion issued on April 26, 2013, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the denial of Graham's Rule 32 petition. Doc. No. 9-16. In relevant part, the appellate court held:

Doc. No. 9-16 at 6-7. Regarding Graham's claim that the trial court erred in failing to address his prior convictions for sentencing in violation of § 13A-5-9, Ala. Code 1975, the appellate court held:

Id. at 6.

Graham applied for rehearing, which was overruled. Doc. No. 9-9; Doc. No. 15-6. He then filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Alabama Supreme Court, which that court denied on August 16, 2013, issuing a certificate of judgment the same day. Doc. No. 9-17.

Graham's § 2254 Petition

On November 20, 2013, Graham initiated this habeas action by filing a § 2254 petition asserting the following claims:

Doc. No. 1 at 10-47.3

The respondents argue that Graham's claims either are procedurally defaulted for purposes of habeas review or were properly adjudicated on the merits by the state courts, or else involve questions of pure state law not cognizable in a federal habeas proceeding. Doc. No. 9 at 12-24. After careful review of the parties' submissions, the record, and the pertinent law, the court finds that Graham is not entitled to habeas relief and that his § 2254 petition should be denied without an evidentiary hearing. Rule 8(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in United States District Courts.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Claims Adjudicated on Merits by State Courts

"When it enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Congress significantly limited the circumstances under which a habeas petitioner may obtain relief." Hardy v. Allen, 2010 WL 9447204, at *7 (N.D. Ala. Sep. 21, 2010). To prevail on a § 2254 claim adjudicated on the merits by the state courts, a petitioner must show that a decision by the state courts was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or was "based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1) & (2); see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-05 & 412-13 (2000).

A state court's decision is "contrary to" federal law either if it fails to apply the correct controlling authority, or if it applies the controlling authority to a case involving facts "materially indistinguishable" from those in a controlling case, but nonetheless reaches a different result. Williams, 529 U.S. at 404-06; Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). A state court's decision is an "unreasonable application" of federal law if it either correctly identifies the governing rule but then applies it to a new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or it extends or fails to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way that is objectively unreasonable. Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. "Objectively unreasonable" means something more than an "erroneous" or "incorrect" application of clearly established law, and a reviewing federal court may not substitute its judgment for the state court's even if the federal court, in its own independent judgment, disagrees with the state court's decision. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 411; Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 76 (2003). The reviewing court "must determine what arguments or theories supported or . . . could have supported[ ] the state court's decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are zinconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of this Court." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, ___, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786 (2011). "This is a `difficult to meet,' and `highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.'" Cullen v. Pinholster, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011) (internal citations omitted).

Federal courts are likewise directed to determine whether the state court based its findings on "an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). A state court's determinations of fact shall be "presumed to be correct," and the habeas petitioner "shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

1. Sufficiency of Evidence to Support Revocation of Probation

Graham claims that he State presented insufficient evidence at the revocation hearing that he committed the offense of receiving stolen property in the second degree. See Doc. No. 1 at 10, 14-17.4

Graham presented this claim on appeal from the revocation of his probation, where it was addressed by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals:

Doc. No. 9-10 at 3-5.

As the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized, the United States Supreme Court has not established that due process in a probation revocation proceeding requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the probationer committed the alleged violation. See United States v. Taylor, 931 F.2d 842, 848 (11th Cir. 1991) (there is no requirement in a probation revocation hearing to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the alleged acts; all that is required is that the evidence reasonably satisfy the judge that the conduct of the probationer has not been as good as required by the conditions of probation). Here, the evidence presented at Graham's revocation hearing was more than sufficient to sustain the conclusion that he committed a new criminal offense. Graham has failed to demonstrate that the ruling on this issue by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals was contrary to and/or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law, nor has he demonstrated that this decision on the merits was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the State court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1) & (2). Therefore, Graham is not entitled to federal habeas relief based on this claim.

2. Trial Court's Basis for Revocation

According to Graham, the record is unclear as to whether the trial court revoked his probation "because he picked up a new charge, or because [the court] was reasonably satisfied that [he] committed a new offense." See Doc. No. 1 at 12, 14-17.

In Graham's appeal from the revocation of his probation, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals addressed this claim as follows:

Doc. No. 9-10 at 5.

It is clear from the record that the trial court revoked Graham's probation based on his commission of a new criminal offense. Graham has failed to demonstrate that the ruling on this issue by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals was contrary to and/or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law, nor has he demonstrated that this decision on the merits was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the State court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1) & (2). Therefore, Graham is not entitled to habeas relief based on this claim.

3. Whether Graham Is Being Held after Expiration of His Sentence

Graham also contends that the record is unclear as to whether he is being held after expiration of his sentence. See Doc. No. 1 at 13-20, 30-31.5

Graham raised this claim on appeal from the revocation of his probation, and again in his Rule 32 Petition of February 18, 2012, and on appeal from the denial of that Rule 32 petition. In addressing the claim in Graham's appeal from the revocation of his probation, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals stated:

Doc. No. 9-10 at 6.

Addressing essentially this same claim in Graham's appeal from the denial of his Rule 32 petition of February 18, 2012, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals held:

Doc. No. 9-14 at 5-6 (footnote omitted).

Thus, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals held that the record showed the trial court did not resentence Graham to three years' imprisonment when it granted probation, that Graham's 20-year sentence remained in place, and that Graham's sentence had therefore not expired. Graham has failed to demonstrate that this ruling by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals was contrary to and/or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law, nor has he demonstrated that this decision on the merits was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the State court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1) & (2). Consequently, he is not entitled to habeas relief based on this claim.

B. Procedural Default

1. Exhaustion Requirement

Before a § 2254 petitioner may obtain federal habeas corpus review, he must "exhaust" his federal claims by raising them in the appropriate court, giving the state courts an opportunity to decide the merits of the constitutional issue raised. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) & (c); Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 178-79 (2001). To exhaust a claim fully, a petitioner must "invok[e] one complete round of the State's established appellate review process." O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999). In Alabama, a complete round of the established appellate review process includes an appeal to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, an application for rehearing to that court, and a petition for discretionary review — a petition for a writ of certiorari — filed in the Alabama Supreme Court. See Smith v. Jones, 256 F.3d 1135, 1140-41 (11th Cir. 2001); Ala.R.App.P. 39 and 40. The exhaustion requirement applies to state post-conviction proceedings as well as to direct appeals. See Pruitt v. Jones, 348 F.3d 1355, 1359 (11th Cir. 2003).

"[I]f the petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred[,] . . . there is a procedural default for purposes of federal habeas." Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n.1 (1991) (citations omitted); see Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d 880, 891 (11th Cir. 2003). The procedural default doctrine ensures that "state courts have had the first opportunity to hear the claim sought to be vindicated in a federal habeas proceeding." Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971).

2. Adequate and Independent State Ground for Denying Relief

Federal habeas review may also be unavailable for claims that a state appellate court has rejected on state procedural grounds. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729. Federal habeas review reduces the finality of litigation and frustrates states' "sovereign power to punish offenders" and states' "good-faith attempts to honor constitutional rights." Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 487 (1986). When a state prisoner fails to follow state procedural rules, thereby procedurally defaulting on a claim, the authority of federal courts to review the prisoner's state court criminal conviction is "severely restricted." Johnson v. Singletary, 938 F.2d 1166, 1173 (11th Cir. 1991). "Federal review of a petitioner's claim is barred by the procedural-default doctrine if the last state court to review the claim states clearly and expressly that its judgment rests on a procedural bar, and that bar provides an adequate and independent state ground for denying relief." Atkins v. Singletary, 965 F.2d 952, 955 (11th Cir. 1992).

Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n.10 (1989).

3. Graham's Procedurally Defaulted Claims

The following claims in Graham's § 2254 petition are procedurally defaulted because the last state court to address the claims, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, denied review of the claims on adequate and independent state procedural grounds:

Graham first raised each of the above claims in his Rule 32 petition of November 11, 2012, and he pursued each claim on appeal from the trial court's denial of that Rule 32 petition. In affirming the trial court, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals held that each claim was precluded as time-barred under Ala.R.Crim.P. 32.2(c).6 Doc. No. 9-16 at 6. The appellate court noted that the claims arose from the May 5, 2009, proceeding regarding Graham's first Rule 32 petition, which was dismissed as moot on appeal on June 19, 2009 — the same date on which the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals issued a certificate of judgment in the case. Id. Accordingly, under Rule 32.2(c), Graham had one year from June 19, 2009, to timely raise the claims. Id. Because he did not raise the claims until November 11, 2012, they were time-barred under Rule 32.2(c).

Rule 32.2(c) is firmly established and regularly followed by Alabama courts for purposes of applying the doctrine of procedural default.7 See Siebert v. Allen, 455 F.3d 1269, 1271 (11th Cir. 2006); Hurth v. Mitchem, 400 F.3d 857, 863 (11th Cir. 2005); Kuenzel v. Commissioner, Ala. Dep't of Corrs., 690 F.3d 1311, 1314 (11th Cir. 2012). Consequently, Graham's above-listed claims are procedurally defaulted for purposes of federal habeas review.8

In his appeal from the trial court's denial of his Rule 32 petition of November 11, 2012, Graham claimed, as he does in his § 2254 petition, that the trial court violated § 13A-5-9, Ala. Code 1975, by failing to address his prior convictions before declaring him a habitual offender at sentencing. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals held that this claim was not properly before the court on appeal because it was not first presented to the trial court in Graham's Rule 32 petition. See Doc. No. 9-16 at 6. Accordingly, finding the claim to be procedurally barred, the appellate court did not address the merits of the claim. This procedural bar — that issues not raised in the lower court in a Rule 32 petition cannot be raised for the first time on appeal from the denial of the Rule 32 petition — is firmly established and regularly followed by Alabama appellate courts. See, e.g., Boyd v. State, 913 So.2d 1113, 1144 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003); McGahee v. State, 885 So.2d 191, 224 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003); Sims v. State, 869 So.2d 1181, 1184 (Ala .Crim. App. 2003); Arrington v. State, 716 So.2d 237, 239 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997); Cleveland v. State, 570 So.2d 855, 857 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990); Morrison v. State, 551 So.2d 435, 437 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990). Consequently, this claim in Graham's § 2254 petition is procedurally defaulted for purposes of federal habeas review.9

Exceptions to Procedural Default

A habeas petitioner can escape the procedural-default doctrine either through showing cause for the default and prejudice, Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986), or establishing a "fundamental miscarriage of justice," which requires a colorable showing of actual innocence, Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324-27 (1995).

Cause for a procedural default must ordinarily turn on whether the petitioner can show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded efforts to comply with the state's procedural rules or that the procedural default resulted from ineffective assistance of counsel. Murray, 477 U.S. at 488; United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982). To establish prejudice, a petitioner must show that the errors at trial worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, "infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions." Frady, 456 U.S. at 170; see Murray, 477 U.S. at 494.

Prisoners asserting actual innocence as a gateway to review of defaulted claims must establish that, in light of new evidence, "it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found [the] petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. This standard "is demanding and permits review only in the `extraordinary' case."10 House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538 (2006). A petitioner must show "factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency." Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623-24 (1998).

Here, Graham does not attempt to demonstrate cause for his failure to present his defaulted claims to the state courts in compliance with applicable procedural rules. Nor does he make the showing of actual innocence required to overcome his procedural default. Consequently, his procedurally defaulted claims are foreclosed from federal habeas review.

4. Credit for Time Served

Graham also claims that the trial court failed to award him sufficient "credit for time served in confinement." Doc. No. 1 at 28, 44. Graham raised this claim in his Rule 32 petition of February 18, 2012, and again in his Rule 32 petition of November 11, 2012.

In Graham's appeal from the denial of his Rule 32 petition of February 18, 2012, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals held:

Doc. No. 9-14 at 5.

In Graham's appeal from the denial of his Rule 32 petition of November 11, 2012, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals again noted, "any claim regarding failure to be credited with the time served on his sentence is a matter for a [state] petition for writ of habeas corpus, not a Rule 32 petition." Doc. No. 9-16 at 6.

As the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeal found, Graham failed to raise his claim regarding credit for time served in compliance with Alabama's requirement that such claims be presented in a state petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the circuit court of the county where the defendant is incarcerated. See, e.g., Adcock v. State, 710 So.2d 938, 940-41 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998); § 15-21-6, Ala. Code 1975. This procedural rule is firmly established and regularly followed in Alabama. See, e.g., Adcock, 710 So.2d at 940-41; Graves v. State, 710 So.2d 535, 536 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997). Graham makes no attempt to demonstrate cause for his failure to present this defaulted claim to the state courts in compliance with applicable procedural rules. Nor does he make the showing of actual innocence required to overcome his procedural default. Consequently, this procedurally defaulted claim is foreclosed from federal habeas review.

Even if the independent state-ground doctrine were not a basis for finding Graham's claim to be procedurally defaulted, the claim was correctly rejected on the merits by the state appellate court. As noted above, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals found that Graham received all the jail credit to which he was entitled — i.e., that time he spent incarcerated "prior to revocation" — and that there was no merit to Graham's claim he was entitled to jail credit for time spent in the county jail after his probation was revoked but before he was transferred to the Alabama Department of Corrections. See Doc. No. 9-14 at 5. Graham fails to demonstrate that this ruling by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals was contrary to and/or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law, nor has he demonstrated that this decision on the merits was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the State court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1) & (2). Consequently, he is not entitled to habeas relief based on this claim.

C. Trial Court's Failure to Conduct Evidentiary Hearing on Rule 32 Petition

Graham claims that the trial court erred by failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing on his Rule 32 petition of February 18, 2012. Doc. No. 1 at 32-33.

The failure of a state court to conduct an evidentiary hearing addressing a state post-conviction petition does not implicate the United States Constitution, as states have no obligation to provide this avenue of relief, and when they do, nothing in the Constitution requires that an evidentiary hearing be held. See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 6-8 (1989); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557 (1987); Golston v. Attorney General of the State of Alabama, 947 F.2d 908, 911 (11th Cir. 1991). An attack on a state collateral proceeding does not entitle a petitioner to federal habeas relief in respect to his conviction, because it is an attack on a proceeding collateral to the detention and not the detention itself. See Nichols v. Scott, 69 F.3d 1255, 1275 (5th Cir. 1995).

To the extent Graham bases this claim on alleged violations of state law (e.g., Ala.R.Crim.P. 32.9(a)),11 he is likewise entitled to no relief, because a state court's interpretation of its own laws and rules provides no basis for federal habeas relief. Beverly v. Jones, 854 F.2d 412 (11th Cir. 1988). A federal court has no authority to re-examine state court determinations on questions of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991). Consequently, Graham is due no relief with respect to his claim that the trial court erred in denying his Rule 32 petition without conducting an evidentiary hearing.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that the petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 be DENIED and this case be DISMISSED with prejudice.

It is further ORDERED that the parties shall file any objections to this Recommendation or before April 6, 2016. A party must specifically identify the factual findings and legal conclusions in the Recommendation to which objection is made; frivolous, conclusive, or general objections will not be considered. Failure to file written objections to the Magistrate Judge's findings and recommendations in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) will bar a party from a de novo determination by the District Court of legal and factual issues covered in the Recommendation and waives the right of the party to challenge on appeal the District Court's order based on unobjected—to factual and legal conclusions accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982); 11th Cir. R. 3-1. See Stein v. Lanning Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).