WALLACE CAPEL, Jr., Magistrate Judge.
This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is before the court on a complaint and amendment thereto filed by Walter Earl Williams ("Williams"), a state inmate incarcerated at the Staton Correctional Facility. In these pleadings, Williams alleges that the defendant, Nurse Stacey Phelps, denied him access to necessary medical care on April 12, 2013, and July 15, 2013, respectively. The defendant filed a special report, supplemental special reports and relevant evidentiary materials, including affidavits and certified copies of medical records, addressing the claims presented against her by Williams. In these filings, the defendant denies she acted with deliberate indifference to Williams's medical needs.
Williams filed responses, a rebuttal and a statement to the defendant's reports. On March 23, 2016, the court entered an order advising Williams that unless "
Upon consideration of the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the evidentiary materials filed in support thereof, the sworn complaint and the plaintiff's responses/rebuttal to the reports, the court concludes that summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the defendant.
"Summary judgment is appropriate `if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (citation to former rule omitted); Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 56(a) ("The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.").
The defendant has met her evidentiary burden and demonstrated the absence of any genuine dispute of material fact with respect to the claims presented by the plaintiff. Based on the foregoing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish, with appropriate evidence beyond the pleadings, that a genuine dispute material to his case exists. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(3) ("If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact by [citing to materials in the record including affidavits, relevant documents or other materials] the court may . . . grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials — including the facts considered undisputed — show that the movant is entitled to it."); Jeffery, 64 F.3d at 593-594 (internal quotation marks omitted) (Once the moving party meets its burden, "the non-moving party must then go beyond the pleadings, and by its own affidavits [or sworn statements], or by depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file," demonstrate that there is a genuine dispute of material fact.). This court will also consider "specific facts" pled in a plaintiff's sworn complaint when considering his opposition to summary judgment. Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1098 (11th Cir. 2014). A genuine dispute of material fact exists when the nonmoving party produces evidence that would allow a reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in its favor. Greenberg, 498 F.3d at 1263; Allen v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. for Bibb Cty., 495 F.3d 1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2007).
In civil actions filed by inmates, federal courts
Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 530 (2006) (internal citation omitted).
To proceed beyond the summary judgment stage, an inmate-plaintiff is required to produce "sufficient [favorable] evidence" which would be admissible at trial supporting his claims of constitutional violations. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). "If the evidence [on which the nonmoving party relies] is merely colorable . . . or is not significantly probative . . . summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-250. "A mere `scintilla' of evidence supporting the opposing party's position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the [trier of fact] could reasonably find for that party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)." Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1576-1577 (11th Cir. 1990). Conclusory allegations based on subjective beliefs are likewise insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact and, therefore, do not suffice to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1564 n.6 (11th Cir. 1997) (A plaintiff's "conclusory assertions . . ., in the absence of [admissible] supporting evidence, are insufficient to withstand summary judgment."); Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912, 916 (11th Cir. 1995) (grant of summary judgment appropriate where inmate produces nothing beyond "his own conclusory allegations" challenging actions of the defendants); Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 557 (11th Cir. 1984) ("Mere verification of party's own conclusory allegations is not sufficient to oppose summary judgment."); Evers v. Gen. Motors Corp., 770 F.2d 984, 986 (11th Cir. 1985) ("[C]onclusory allegations without specific supporting facts have no probative value."). Hence, when a plaintiff fails to set forth specific facts supported by requisite evidence sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to his case and on which the plaintiff will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the moving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322 ("[F]ailure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial."); Barnes v. Sw. Forest Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 607, 609 (11th Cir. 1987) (If on any part of the prima facie case the plaintiff presents insufficient evidence to require submission of the case to the trier of fact, granting of summary judgment is appropriate.); Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (summary judgment appropriate where no genuine dispute of material fact exists). At the summary judgment stage, this court must "consider all evidence in the record . . . [including] pleadings, depositions, interrogatories, affidavits, etc. — and can only grant summary judgment if everything in the record demonstrates that no genuine [dispute] of material fact exists." Strickland v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 692 F.3d 1151, 1154 (11th Cir. 2012).
For summary judgment purposes, only disputes involving material facts are relevant. United States v. One Piece of Real Prop. Located at 5800 SW 74th Ave., Miami, Florida, 363 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11th Cir. 2004). What is material is determined by the substantive law applicable to the case. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248; Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children and Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11th Cir. 2004) ("Only factual disputes that are material under the substantive law governing the case will preclude entry of summary judgment."). "The mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat summary judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting the outcome of the case." McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). "[T]here must exist a conflict in substantial evidence to pose a jury question." Hall v. Sunjoy Indus. Group, Inc., 764 F.Supp.2d 1297, 1301 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (citing Liberty Lobby, supra).
To demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact, the party opposing summary judgment "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no `genuine [dispute] for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). In cases where the evidence before the court which is admissible on its face or which can be reduced to admissible form indicates there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the party moving for summary judgment is entitled to it as a matter of law, summary judgment is proper. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-324 (summary judgment appropriate where pleadings, evidentiary materials and affidavits before the court show no genuine dispute as to a requisite material fact); Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Assocs., Inc., 276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001) (To establish a genuine dispute of material fact, the nonmoving party must produce evidence such that a reasonable trier of fact could return a verdict in his favor.).
Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party and pro se complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation, a pro se litigant does not escape the burden of establishing by sufficient evidence a genuine dispute of material fact. Beard, 548 U.S. at 525; Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11th Cir. 1990). Thus, the plaintiff's pro se status alone does not mandate this court's disregard of elementary principles of production and proof in a civil case.
The court has undertaken a thorough and exhaustive review of all the evidence contained in the record. After such review, the court finds that Williams has failed to demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact in order to preclude entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendant.
On April 9, 2013, Williams completed a medical request form seeking "blood work for cholesterol." Exh. B to the Defendant's Special Report — Doc. No. 9-2 at 51. The following day, a nurse reviewed this request and scheduled Williams a sick call appointment on April 11, 2013, for evaluation by medical personnel. Exh. A to the Defendant's Supplemental Special Report — Doc. No. 17-1 at 7; Exh. B to Plaintiff's Rebuttal — Doc. No. 16-2. The Daily Appointment Schedule listing those inmates given medical appointments for April 11, 2013, was compiled and distributed on April 10, 2013. Id. That schedule clearly references the sick call appointment scheduled for Williams on April 11, 2013. Id. Williams was a "no show" for that appointment. Exh. B to the Defendant's Special Report — Doc. No. 9-2 at 51. Williams, however, appeared at the Staton Health Care Unit on April 12, 2013, without an appointment. On this particular day, only those inmates with previously assigned appointments for evaluation by the medical provider were permitted in the health care unit. Exh. A to the Defendant's Supplemental Special Report — Doc. No. 17-1 at 4. Nurse Phelps advised Williams that because he lacked the requisite appointment he could not be evaluated at that time and ordered Williams to return to his dorm. Id.
On July 10, 2013, Williams prepared a medical request form seeking a new pair of glasses and cream for his athlete's foot. Exh. B to the Defendant's Special Report — Doc. No. 9-2 at 44. After review of that request on July 12, 2013, Nurse Phelps scheduled Williams a sick call appointment for evaluation by medical personnel on July 15, 2013. Id. While conducting sick call at Staton on this date, Nurse Phelps stepped outside.
Id. at 45. The medical records further establish that Williams routinely failed to show for sick call appointments, consistently missed chronic care clinics for evaluation of his hypertension and dyslipidemia (an abnormal amount of lipids or fats in the blood commonly associated with high cholesterol), and was non-compliant with the chronic care treatment prescribed, including the medication regimen, for his these conditions.
To prevail on a claim concerning an alleged denial of medical treatment, an inmate must, at a minimum, show that the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2000); McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 1999); Waldrop v. Evans, 871 F.2d 1030, 1033 (11th Cir. 1989); Rogers v. Evans, 792 F.2d 1052, 1058 (11th Cir.1986).
Hinson v. Edmond, 192 F.3d 1342, 1345 (11th Cir. 1999).
In order to establish "deliberate indifference to [a] serious medical need . . ., Plaintiff[] must show: (1) a serious medical need; (2) the defendant[`s] deliberate indifference to that need; and (3) causation between that indifference and the plaintiff's injury." Mann v. Taser Int'l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1306-1307 (11th Cir. 2009). When seeking relief based on deliberate indifference, an inmate is required to establish "an objectively serious need, an objectively insufficient response to that need, subjective awareness of facts signaling the need and an actual inference of required action from those facts." Taylor, 221 F.3d at 1258; McElligott, 182 F.3d at 1255 (for liability to attach, the official must know of and then disregard an excessive risk to the prisoner). Regarding the objective component of a deliberate indifference claim, the plaintiff must first show "an objectively `serious medical need[]' . . . and second, that the response made by [the defendants] to that need was poor enough to constitute `an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,' and not merely accidental inadequacy, `negligen[ce] in diagnos[is] or treat[ment],' or even `[m]edical malpractice' actionable under state law." Taylor, 221 F.3d at 1258 (internal citations omitted). A medical need is serious if it "`has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.'" Goebert v. Lee Cty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1325 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Hill, 40 F.3d at 1187, abrogated on other grounds by Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002)). In addition, "to show the required subjective intent . . ., a plaintiff must demonstrate that the public official acted with an attitude of `deliberate indifference' . . . which is in turn defined as requiring two separate things `awareness of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists [] and . . . draw[ing] of the inference[.]'" Taylor, 221 F.3d at 1258 (internal citations omitted). Thus, deliberate indifference occurs only when a defendant "knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the [defendant] must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists and he must also draw the inference." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; Johnson v. Quinones, 145 F.3d 164, 168 (4th Cir. 1998) (defendant must have actual knowledge of a serious condition, not just knowledge of symptoms, and ignore known risk to serious condition to warrant finding of deliberate indifference). Furthermore, "an official's failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be condemned as the infliction of punishment." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838.
Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1505 (11th Cir. 1991); Taylor, 221 F.3d at 1258 (citation and internal quotations omitted) (To show deliberate indifference, the plaintiff must demonstrate a serious medical need and then must establish that the defendant's response to the need was more than "merely accidental inadequacy, negligence in diagnosis or treatment, or even medical malpractice actionable under state law."). Moreover, "as Estelle teaches, whether government actors should have employed additional diagnostic techniques or forms of treatment `is a classic example of a matter for medical judgment' and therefore not an appropriate basis for grounding liability under the Eighth Amendment." Adams, 61 F.3d at 1545; Garvin v. Armstrong, 236 F.3d 896, 898 (7th Cir. 2001) ("A difference of opinion as to how a condition should be treated does not give rise to a constitutional violation."); Hamm v. DeKalb Cty., 774 F.2d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir. 1985) (mere fact inmate desires a different mode of medical treatment does not amount to deliberate indifference violative of the Constitution); Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981) (prison medical personnel do not violate the Eighth Amendment simply because their opinions concerning medical treatment conflict with that of the inmate-patient). "Self-serving statements by a plaintiff do not create a question of fact in the face of contradictory, contemporaneously created medical records." Whitehead v. Burnside, 403 F. App'x 401, 403 (11th Cir.2010) (citing Bennett v. Parker, 898 F.2d 1530 (11th Cir.1990)).
An official also acts with deliberate indifference when he intentionally delays providing an inmate with access to medical treatment, knowing the inmate has a life-threatening or urgent medical condition that would be exacerbated by delay. See Hill, 40 F.3d at 1186-87, abrogated on other grounds by Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002); see also Harris v. Coweta Cty., 21 F.3d 388, 394 (11th Cir. 1994). "In contrast, delay or even denial of medical treatment for superficial, non-serious physical conditions does not constitute an Eighth Amendment violation." Hill, 40 F.3d at 1186-87. A medical need is considered serious when delay in treatment results in an inmate suffering "a lifelong handicap or permanent loss." Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lorenzo, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3rd Cir. 1987). An inmate claiming an unconstitutional delay in medical treatment "must place verifying medical evidence in the record to establish the detrimental effect of the delay in medical treatment to succeed." Hill, 40 F.3d at 1188.
Williams complains that Nurse Phelps violated his constitutional right to medical treatment when he appeared at the Staton Health Care Unit on April 12, 2013, without an appointment, seeking blood work regarding his cholesterol level and when he reported to sick call and later the health care unit on July 15, 2013, regarding his request for new glasses and anti-fungal cream for his foot. Williams, however, has presented no medical evidence establishing any detrimental effect suffered due to the actions of the defendant.
Initially, Nurse Phelps asserts that Williams fails to identify any serious medical need he suffered on the dates at issue for which he did not receive treatment. Defendant's Special Report — Doc. No. 9 at 7-8. Moreover, she adamantly denies acting with deliberate indifference to a serious medical need suffered by Williams. In support of this assertion, defendant Phelps maintains, and the medical records demonstrate, that she provided Williams a sick call appointment for April 11, 2013, to address his request for blood work and Williams was a "no show" for that appointment. Exh. B to the Defendant's Special Report — Doc. No. 9-2 at 51. Although Williams challenges the date of that appointment, the exhibit he provided to the court in support of his rebuttal forecloses that argument and establishes that his sick call appointment was, in fact, scheduled for April 11, 2013. Exh. B to Plaintiff's Rebuttal — Doc. No. 16-2. It is likewise clear that Nurse Phelps did not at any time thereafter prevent Williams from filing a medical request form seeking bloodwork nor did she prevent him from receiving treatment upon completion of a medical request form and subsequent appointment. With respect to the lack of treatment at sick call on July 15, 2013, the evidence demonstrates that Williams became impatient and left sick call before Nurse Phelps could evaluate his condition. The evidence further establishes that when Williams appeared later that same day at the Staton Health Care Unit, Nurse Phelps agreed to examine him but he refused to wait for her to complete her examination of another inmate. Williams concedes he left sick call but states he did so because he believed Nurse Phelps stepped outside to smoke a cigarette. However, the reason underlying Nurse Phelps's decision to step outside is not a material fact in this case. Furthermore, Williams does not dispute that he later voluntarily exited the health care unit when Nurse Phelps advised that he would have to wait while she completed her examination of another inmate.
As an initial matter, it is questionable whether Williams suffered a serious medical need on either date he alleges a denial of medical treatment. Nevertheless, even assuming the existence of a serious medical need, there is no evidence that the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to that need.
The evidentiary materials filed by the defendant address the claims made by Williams alleging a lack of adequate medical treatment. A thorough review of those documents demonstrates that the affidavits submitted by the defendant with respect to the material facts are corroborated by the contemporaneously compiled objective medical records. The law is well settled that "[s]elf serving statements by a plaintiff do not create a question of fact in the face of contradictory, contemporaneously created medical records." Whitehead v. Burnside, 403 F. App'x 401, 403 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Bennett v. Parker, 898 F.2d 1530 (11th Cir. 1990)).
In her first affidavit, Nurse Phelps stated that she had "no recollection of seeing Mr. Williams on April 12, 2013," and advised that the medical records did not indicate she examined him on this date. Exh. A to the Defendant's Special Report — Doc. No. 9-1 at 3. However, in a supplemental affidavit, Nurse Phelps avers that after further reviewing Williams's rebuttal she recalled his attempt to receive medical treatment on April 12, 2013. Specifically, Nurse Phelps stated that
Exh. A to the Defendant's Supplemental Special Report — Doc. No. 17-1 at 3-4 (paragraph numbering and parenthetical references to medical records omitted).
With respect to Williams's claims regarding July 15, 2013, Nurse Phelps states, in pertinent part, as follows:
Exh. A to the Defendant's Special Report — Doc. No. 9-1 at 2-3 (paragraph numbering omitted); Exh. A to the Defendant's Supplemental Special Report — Doc. No. 15 at 9-10 ("[On July 15, 2013,] [o]ther inmates were being seen and treated . . . and Williams had to wait to be seen by me. Williams became irritated having to wait for attention and chose to leave [sick call and] the Health Care Unit before being seen. . . . As a LPN, I do not make appointments for inmates, such as Williams, to be seen by a physician at the Health Care Unit. There are policies and procedures in place at the Staton Correctional Facility whereby inmates make appointments to be seen by a physician.").
Nurse Phelps further states that:
Exh. A to the Defendant's Special Report — Doc. No. 9-1 at 3-6 (paragraph numbering omitted). A thorough review of the evidentiary materials submitted by the defendant demonstrates that the affidavits submitted by Nurse Phelps with respect to the material facts are corroborated by the objective medical records contemporaneously complied during the treatment process.
Under the circumstances of this case, the court concludes that the actions of the defendant did not violate Williams's constitutional rights. Specifically, Nurse Phelps, when faced with the recalcitrant actions of Williams, did not act in a manner which was "so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to the fundamental fairness." Harris, 941 F.2d at 1505. It is likewise clear that the allegations presented by Williams simply fail to establish deliberate indifference. The evidence before the court demonstrates that Williams had continuous access to medical treatment from health care personnel at Staton. Moreover, Williams received treatment each time he completed a medical request form, appeared at sick call or the health care unit for his scheduled appointment and remained until a health care provider had the opportunity to evaluate him. Williams also had access to the Chronic Care Clinic for treatment of his hypertension and dyslipidemia. Based on well-settled law cited herein, the court concludes that the alleged lack of treatment on the two dates referenced by Williams did not constitute deliberate indifference. Williams's self-serving statements of a lack of due care and deliberate indifference do not create a question of fact in the face of contradictory, contemporaneously created medical records. Whitehead, 403 F. App'x at 403 (11th Cir. 2010); see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) ("When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment."); Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach, 707 F.3d 1244, 1253-54 (11th Cir. 2013) (same). In addition, Williams has failed to present any evidence which indicates defendant Phelps knew that the manner in which she addressed the situations at hand created a substantial risk to his health and that with this knowledge consciously disregarded such risk. The record is therefore devoid of evidence, significantly probative or otherwise, showing that the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to any serious medical need experienced by Williams on the dates identified in the complaint. Consequently, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the defendant. Carter, 352 F.3d at 1350.
Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:
It is further
ORDERED that on or before
