WALLACE CAPEL Jr., Magistrate Judge.
Phillip Sanders ("Plaintiff") filed an application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act ("the Act"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 401, et seq., and for supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381, et seq., on August 1, 2012. His applications were denied at the initial administrative level on September 19, 2012. Plaintiff then requested and received a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). Following the hearing, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff had not been under a disability as defined in the Social Security Act, from December 19, 2011, through the date for his decision. The ALJ's decision consequently became the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner").
Under 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), a person is entitled to benefits when the person is unable to
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
To make this determination, the Commissioner employs a five-step, sequential evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2011).
McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986).
The burden of proof rests on a claimant through Step Four. See Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1237-39 (11th Cir. 2004). A claimant establishes a prima facie case of qualifying disability once they have carried the burden of proof from Step One through Step Four. At Step Five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner, who must then show there are a significant number of jobs in the national economy the claimant can perform. Id.
To perform the fourth and fifth steps, the ALJ must determine the claimant's Residual Functional Capacity ("RFC"). Id. at 1238-39. The RFC is what the claimant is still able to do despite the claimant's impairments and is based on all relevant medical and other evidence. Id. It may contain both exertional and nonexertional limitations. Id. at 1242-43. At the fifth step, the ALJ considers the claimant's RFC, age, education, and work experience to determine if there are jobs available in the national economy the claimant can perform. Id. at 1239. To do this, the ALJ can either use the Medical Vocational Guidelines
The grids allow the ALJ to consider factors such as age, confinement to sedentary or light work, inability to speak English, educational deficiencies, and lack of job experience. Each factor can independently limit the number of jobs realistically available to an individual. Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1240. Combinations of these factors yield a statutorily-required finding of "Disabled" or "Not Disabled." Id.
The court's review of the Commissioner's decision is a limited one. This court must find the Commissioner's decision conclusive if it is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Graham v. Apfel, 129 F.3d 1420, 1422 (11th Cir. 1997). "Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. It is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); see also Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004) ("Even if the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner's findings, [a reviewing court] must affirm if the decision reached is supported by substantial evidence."). A reviewing court may not look only to those parts of the record which support the decision of the ALJ, but instead must view the record in its entirety and take account of evidence which detracts from the evidence relied on by the ALJ. Hillsman v. Bowen, 804 F.2d 1179 (11th Cir. 1986).
Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987).
At the time of the ALJ hearing, Plaintiff was thirty-three years old and had completed high school. Tr. 114, 116. Following the administrative hearing, and employing the five-step process, the ALJ found at Step One that Plaintiff "has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since December 19, 2011, the alleged onset date[.]" Tr. 92. At Step Two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffers from the following severe impairments: "hearing deficit, diabetes mellitus, degenerative disc disease, and hypertension." Tr. 92. At Step Three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff "does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments[.]" Tr. 93. Next, the ALJ articulated Plaintiff's RFC as follows:
Tr. 93. Having consulted with a VE at the hearing, the ALJ concluded at Step Four that Plaintiff is "capable of performing past relevant work as an EKG monitor (DOT 678.365-010), sedentary, skilled work with specific vocational preparation (SVP) of five and customer services representative (DOT 249.362-026), sedentary, semi-skilled work with svp of four. This work does not require the performance of work-related activities precluded by the claimant's residual functional capacity[.]" Tr. 103. Finally, at Step Five, and based upon the testimony of the VE, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff "has not been under a disability . . . from December 19, 2011, through the date of this decision[.]" Tr. 103.
Plaintiff presents two arguments for reversal of the Commissioner's decision: (1) "[t]he ALJ failed to give the claimant's treating physician's opinion controlling weight despite the fact that it is consistent with the record as a whole"; and (2) "[t]he ALJ failed to find a ruling of fact; the Plaintiff meets and/or equals Listing 1.04(A)." Pl.'s Br. (Doc. 12) at 7-8.
First, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in failing "to give the claimant's treating physician's opinion controlling weight despite the fact that it is consistent with the record as a whole." Pl.'s Br. (Doc. 12) at 7. Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ "gave a Consultative Examiner's opinion more weight than that of the claimant's treating physician, who unlike the Consultative Examiner, has treated the claimant for a prolonged period and has performed multiple examinations of the claimant."
The opinion of a treating physician "must be given substantial or considerable weight unless `good cause' is shown to the contrary." Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing McGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050, 1053 (11th Cir. 1986)). The Eleventh Circuit has found that "good cause" exists when the: "(1) treating physician's opinion was not bolstered by the evidence; (2) evidence supported a contrary finding; or (3) treating physician's opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with the doctor's own medical records." Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240-41 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1440). When electing to disregard the opinion of a treating physician, an ALJ must clearly articulate his or her reasons for discounting the opinion. Id.
Here, good cause exists for discounting the opinion of Plaintiff's personal treating physician, Dr. Felician Jones ("Dr. Jones"). Dr. Jones completed a Medical Source Statement in October 2013, which concluded that Plaintiff could not work due to diabetes and musculoskeletal pain. Tr. 99, 757-58. Dr. Jones further opined that Plaintiff could stand and sit for no more than thirty minutes at a time; could lift no more than five pounds on an occasional basis; was unable to bend, stoop, or balance; and could stand, walk, or sit no more than 25% of the time during an eight-hour workday. Tr. 757-58. Finally, Dr. Jones rated Plaintiff experienced severe pain 100% of the day. Tr. 758. In according Dr. Jones's opinion "little weight," the ALJ provided the following justification:
Tr. 101-02 (emphasis added). The court concludes that the ALJ clearly articulated his reasons for discounting the opinion of Plaintiff's treating physician, Dr. Jones. Further, after an independent review of the record, the court concludes that the ALJ had "good cause" to discount that opinion, considering it was not bolstered by the evidence, it was not consistent with Dr. Jones's own records, and evidence in the record supported a contrary finding.
Second, Plaintiff asserts that "[t]he ALJ failed to find a ruling of fact; the Plaintiff meets and/or equals Listing 1.04(A)[.]" Pl.'s Br. (Doc. 12) at 8. Plaintiff states that "[i]n reviewing the medical evidence of record, it is evident that the Plaintiff meets and/or equals Listing 1.04([A]) in that he suffers from a disabling back condition, has pain radiating down his legs, positive straight leg raise, and decreased range of motion."
"For a claimant to show that his impairment matches a listing, [the impairment] must meet all of the specified medical criteria. An impairment that manifests only some of those criteria, no matter how severely, does not qualify." Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530 (1990) (emphasis in original). Listing 1.04(A) provides:
20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 (emphasis added).
While the ALJ noted that Plaintiff had a positive straight-leg test,
For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that substantial evidence exists to support the ALJ's determination that Plaintiff is not disabled.
The court has carefully and independently reviewed the record and concludes that, for the reasons given above, the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED. A separate judgment will issue.
