MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
W. KEITH WATKINS, Chief District Judge.
Before the court is Defendant's motion requesting a divisional transfer of this products liability action. (Doc. # 31.) Plaintiff Bridgette Nicole Neal filed a response in opposition (Doc. # 33) to the motion, and Defendant filed a reply (Doc. # 35). For the reasons that follow, the motion is due to be denied.
Ms. Neal filed this action in the Northern Division of the Middle District of Alabama on behalf of her minor daughter, A.L.B., based on injuries A.L.B. sustained in an accident involving Ms. Neal's 2002 Pontiac Grand Am and a pick-up truck in Dothan, Alabama. Ms. Neal alleges that the rear passenger seat and seat belts of her Pontiac Grand Am were defective and that the vehicle's defects failed to adequately protect A.L.B. in the crash. Defendant contends that this action should be transferred to the Southern Division of the Middle District of Alabama, but Ms. Neal responds that no reason justifies disturbing her chosen forum.
A district court may transfer a civil action to any other division in which it might have been brought "[f]or the convenience of the parties and witnesses" and "in the interest of justice." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The burden is on the movant to show that the suggested forum is more convenient. In re Ricoh Corp., 870 F.2d 570, 573 (11th Cir. 1989). Ultimately, a district court has "broad discretion in weighing the conflicting arguments as to venue," England v. ITT Thompson Indus., Inc., 856 F.2d 1518, 1520 (11th Cir. 1988), but must engage in an "individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness," Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Section 1404(a) mandates a two-step analysis. First, the court must determine whether venue would be proper in the proposed transferee division. § 1404(a); Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 616 (1964). Second, the court must decide whether "[f]or the convenience of the parties and witnesses" and in the "interest of justice," the action should be transferred. § 1404(a).
Ms. Neal does not dispute that venue is proper in the Southern Division; therefore, the analysis focuses on the second step. Under the second step, several factors guide a district court's determination of whether to transfer an action under § 1404(a):
(1) the convenience of the witnesses; (2) the location of relevant documents and the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (3) the convenience of the parties; (4) the locus of operative facts; (5) the availability of process to compel the attendance of unwilling witnesses; (6) the relative means of the parties; (7) a forum's familiarity with the governing law; (8) the weight accorded a plaintiff's choice of forum; and (9) trial efficiency and the interests of justice, based on the totality of the circumstances.
Manuel v. Convergys Corp., 430 F.3d 1132, 1135 n.1 (11th Cir. 2005).
Defendant argues that the majority of the Manuel factors favor transfer, but the arguments are not convincing. It asserts that, because the accident occurred in the Southern Division and because Ms. Neal also lives in the Southern Division, Ms. Neal's choice of forum is not due much, if any, weight. Contrary to Defendant's assertion, the locus of the operative facts in a products liability action generally is "the place where the business decisions relative to the products liability theories of the case were made . . ., not the site of the accident." Holmes v. Freightliner, LLC., 237 F.Supp.2d 690, 693 (M.D. Ala. 2002). Defendant has not contradicted Ms. Neal's contention that the design and manufacture of the subject vehicle occurred in Michigan. On this record, the fact that the accident occurred in Dothan does not favor a transfer to the Southern Division.
It is true, though, that courts have given a plaintiff's chosen forum less weight when the facts underlying the causes of action did not occur in the forum chosen by the plaintiff and the forum does not encompass the district where the plaintiff resides. See Gould v. Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 990 F.Supp. 1354, 1358 (M.D. Ala. 1998) ("[W]hen the operative facts underlying the cause of action did not occur within the forum chosen by the Plaintiff, the choice of forum is entitled to less consideration" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malaysia Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430 (2007) ("When the plaintiff's choice is not its home forum, . . . the presumption in the plaintiff's favor applies with less force, for the assumption that the chosen forum is appropriate is then less reasonable." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). It is undisputed that Ms. Neal resides in the Middle District of Alabama, but not in the Northern Division where she filed suit, and that the operative facts did not occur in the Northern Division. Based upon these undisputed facts, Sinochem International Co. and Gould support a conclusion that Ms. Neal's divisional choice of forum is not due the usual deference given to a plaintiff's chosen forum. But even if Ms. Neal's selected forum is accorded less deference than usual because she lives outside the division, Defendant has not tipped the scales in favor of a transfer.
Defendant argues that a transfer is warranted because the Southern Division presents a more convenient forum for the majority of the non-party witnesses and that some of the in-state, non-party witnesses may be outside of the court's subpoena power. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(c)(1)(B)(ii) grants the court power to subpoena non-party witnesses in the Dothan area to attend a trial in Montgomery, as long as they will not incur a substantial expense. Defendant has not shown that travel to the Montgomery courthouse in the Northern Division, which is a 108-mile drive from the Dothan courthouse in the Southern Division, even if inconvenient, would cause substantial expense to the in-state, non-party witnesses. The analogy that Defendant attempts to make between the intradistrict transfer at issue here and the district and international transfers at issue in the cited cases is not persuasive. Defendant has not sustained its burden of demonstrating that the convenience of the in-state, non-party witnesses and the availability of process to compel unwilling witnesses to attend trial favor a transfer of this action to a different division.
On the other hand, other reasons weigh heavily against a transfer. One such reason is trial efficiency. The Montgomery courthouse is the only one in the district equipped with advanced technology, and this technology significantly helps streamline the presentation of evidence in complex products liability actions, like this one. The Northern Division, therefore, will allow for a more convenient trial forum. Another reason is that the courtrooms in Montgomery dwarf the 105-year-old courtroom in Dothan. From experience, the court knows that complex cases with extensive exhibits try better in Montgomery, where there is ample space for exhibits and other accoutrements of a complex trial.
Additionally, while § 1404(a) does not set a time limitation for requesting a transfer, "[c]ourts have considered a party's delay in denying a motion to transfer." Peteet v. Dow Chem. Co., 868 F.2d 1428, 1436 (5th Cir. 1989) (collecting cases) (holding that an eighteen-month delay in moving to transfer was unreasonable). Defendant delayed eighteen months in moving for a divisional transfer. And, although Defendant's justifications have been considered, they fail to demonstrate that the delay is reasonable. Therefore, the untimeliness of the motion weighs against transfer.
Based on the totality of the circumstances, see Manuel, 430 F.3d at 1135 n.1, Defendant has not carried its burden of demonstrating that the balance of factors weighs in favor of transferring this case from the Northern Division to the Southern Division of the Middle District of Alabama. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Defendant's motion to transfer (Doc. # 31) is DENIED.
CIVIL APPEALS JURISDICTION CHECKLIST
1. Appealable Orders: Courts of Appeals have jurisdiction conferred and strictly limited by statute:
(a) Appeals from final orders pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291: Only final orders and judgments of district courts, or final orders of bankruptcy courts which have been appealed to and fully resolved by a district court under 28 U.S.C.§ 158, generally are appealable. A final decision is one that "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 701 F.2d 1 365, 1 368 (11th Cir. 1983). A magistrate judge's report and recommendation is not final and appealable until judgment thereon is entered by a district court judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
(b) In cases involving multiple parties or multiple claims, a judgment as to fewer than all parties or all claims is not a final, appealable decision unless the district court has certified the judgment for immediate review under Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). Williams v. Bishop, 732 F.2d 885, 885-86 (11th Cir. 1984). A judg ment which resolves all issues except matters, such as attorneys' fees and costs, that are collateral to the merits, is immediately appealable. Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S.196, 201, 108 S.Ct. 1717, 1721-22, 100 L .Ed.2d 178 (1988); LaChance v. Duffy's Draft House, Inc., 146 F.3d 832, 837 (11th Cir. 1998).
(c) Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a): Appeals are permitted from orders "granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions . . ." and from "[i]nterlocutory decrees . . . determining the rights and liabilities of parties to admiralty cases in which appeals from final decrees are allowed." Interlocutory appeals from orders denying temporary restraining orders are not permitted.
(d) Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and Fed.R.App.P. 5: The certification specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) must be obtained before a petition for permission to appeal is filed in the Court of Appeals. The district court's denial of a motion for certification is not itself appealable.
(e) Appeals pursuant to judicially created exceptions to the finality rule: Limited exceptions are discussed in cases including, but not limited to: Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546, 69S.Ct. 1221, 1225-26, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949); Atlantic Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, Inc., 890 F.2d 371, 376 (11th Cir. 1989); Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 157, 85 S.Ct. 308, 312, 13 L.Ed.2d 199 (1964).
2. Time for Filing: The timely filing of a notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional. Rinaldo v. Corbett, 256 F.3d 1276, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). In civil cases, Fed.R.App.P. 4(a) and (c) set the following time limits:
(a) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1): A notice of appeal in compliance with the requirements set forth in Fed.R.App.P. 3 must be filed in the district court within 30 days after the entry of the order or judgment appealed from. However, if the United States or an officer or agency thereof is a party, the notice of appeal must be filed in the district court within 60 days after such entry. THE NOTICE MUST BE RECEIVED AND FILED IN THE DISTRICT COURT NO LATER THAN THE LAST DAY OF THE APPEAL PERIOD — no additional days are provided for mailing. Special filing provisions for inmates are discussed below.
(b) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(3): "If one party timely files a notice of appeal, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date when the first notice was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by this Rule 4(a), whichever period ends later."
(c) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4): If any party makes a timely motion in the district court under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of a type specified in this rule, the time for appeal for all parties runs from the date of entry of the order disposing of the last such timely filed motion.
(d) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(5) and 4(a)(6): Under certain limited circumstances, the district court may extend the time to file a notice of appeal. Under Rule 4(a)(5), the time may be extended if a motion for an extension is filed within 30 days after expiration of the time otherwise provided to file a notice of appeal, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause. Under Rule 4(a)(6), the time may be extended if the district court finds upon motion that a party did not timely receive notice of the entry of the judgment or order, and that no party would be prejudiced by an extension.
(e) Fed.R.App.P. 4(c): If an inmate confined to an institution files a notice of appeal in either a civil case or a criminal case, the notice of appeal is timely if it is deposited in the institution's internal mail system on or before the last day for filing. Timely filing may be shown by a declaration in compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746 or a notarized statement, either of which must set forth the date of deposit and state that first-class postage has been prepaid.
3. Format of the notice of appeal: Form 1, Appendix of Forms to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, is a suitable format. See also Fed.R.App.P. 3(c). A pro se notice of appeal must be signed by the appellant.
4. Effect of a notice of appeal: A district court loses jurisdiction (authority) to act after the filing of a timely notice of appeal, except for actions in aid of appellate jurisdiction or to rule on a timely motion of the type specified in Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4).
