REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GRAY M. BORDEN, Magistrate Judge.

On June 27, 2016, Plaintiff James Bryson Graham ("Graham") filed this pro se action against Defendants Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. ("Wells Fargo") and John G. Stump ("Stump") (collectively, "Defendants") to obtain the return of an "unaltered instrument stamped paid-in-full" in purported accordance with the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"). Doc. 1. Before the court is Defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules 8 and 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Doc. 8. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, this matter was referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for review and submission of a report with recommended findings of facts and conclusions of law. Doc. 3. For the reasons that follow, it is the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge that Defendants' motion (Doc. 8) be GRANTED and that Graham's complaint be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

I. JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction over this matter is asserted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question). The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue, and the court finds adequate allegations to support both.

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

The court accepts as true all relevant facts set forth by Graham in the complaint. Graham had a money market deposit account with SouthTrust Bank of Ozark, Alabama, which is now Wells Fargo. Doc. 1 at 2. Graham was a debtor on a promissory note executed in the late 1990s in favor of Wells Fargo. Doc. 1 at 4. On or about June or September 2000, Wells Fargo withdrew $401,452.15 from Graham's money market account to satisfy this unpaid promissory note.1 Doc. 1 at 4. Although Graham alleges that this withdrawal was done without notice or due process, the crux of his complaint is that the promissory note has been paid in full and therefore Wells Fargo must return the "authenticated, original, and unaltered instrument" to him evidencing that this debt has been satisfied.2 Doc. 1 at 3. All of the allegations in Graham's complaint are against Wells Fargo; he makes no specific allegations against Stump.

After Defendants' filed their motion to dismiss, the court entered a briefing order, and on October 12, 2016 Graham filed his response to the Defendants' motion.3 Docs. 15 & 18. On October 20, 2016, Defendants filed their reply. Doc. 19. With briefing completed, this matter is ripe for disposition.4

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

To withstand Rule 12(b)(6) scrutiny and satisfy Rule 8(a), a plaintiff must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face," so as to nudge the claim across the line from conceivable to plausible. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). However, more than labels and conclusions is required, and "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. "As the Eleventh Circuit has explained, Twombly/Iqbal principles require that a complaint's allegations be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Cochran v. S. Co., 2015 WL 3508018, at *1 (S.D. Ala. June 3, 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). Courts are "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). Indeed, the granting of a motion to dismiss is appropriate "when it is demonstrated beyond a doubt the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief." Reeves v. DSI Sec. Servs., 331 F. App'x 659, 661 (11th Cir. 2009).

IV. DISCUSSION

Defendants argue that Graham's complaint is due to be dismissed because he fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.5 Docs. 8 & 9. The court agrees. First, Graham's complaint does not comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in that it does not contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Nor does it contain "simple, concise, and direct" allegations set forth "in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1) & 10(a). No specific causes of action are identified in Graham's complaint, nor are there sufficient factual allegations to support any causes of action against either defendant. See Doc. 1. Indeed, Graham's complaint contains precisely the type of "unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me" accusations that Iqbal prohibits. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In short, even affording Graham significant leniency as a pro se plaintiff, these pleading deficiencies, standing alone, are sufficient grounds on which to recommend dismissal of Graham's complaint.

However, even if the court were to set these pleading deficiencies aside, Graham's complaint still fails as a matter of law. Although Graham does mention a lack of "notice" and "due process" in his complaint, the real crux of his claim is that, under TILA, Wells Fargo must return to him the original, unaltered, and authenticated promissory note that was satisfied by the $401,452.15 setoff from Graham's money market account with Wells Fargo. But TILA does not require production of the original note.6 See Cardin v. Wilmington Finance, Inc., 2013 WL 1123815, at *2 (D. Ariz. Mar. 18, 2013); Vazquez v. Select Portfolio Serv., 2013 WL 5770995, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2013) (explaining that "`show me the note' requests do not fall within the purview of TILA"). Thus, as a matter of law, Graham's complaint fails to plead an actual violation of TILA's terms by either defendant.

Finally, even if Graham had alleged an actionable violation of TILA, his claim is time-barred. Taking Graham's factual allegations as true, as the court must at this stage of the proceedings, Graham executed the promissory note at issue in the late 1990s, and Wells Fargo withdrew funds from Graham's money market account to satisfy his debt on this promissory note in 2000. See Doc. 1. These actions occurred, at the very latest, over 15 years ago, well past TILA's one-year and three-year statutes of limitations. See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (one-year statute of limitations applies to claims for damages); 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) (statute of limitations for actions for rescission is three years from the date of closing). Moreover, Graham does not allege any facts that demonstrate or support the timeliness of his claim, nor does he allege any facts that suggest his claim is subject to some form of tolling. Finally, Graham's attempt to rescind the loan by letter dated May 2016 does not salvage the timeliness of his claim, as the right to rescind under TILA expired three days after the loan closed or, to the extent requisite TILA disclosures were not provided, three years after the loan closed. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f). In short, no matter how Graham's claimed is viewed under TILA, it is untimely. For this reason and the reasons stated above, Graham's complaint is due to be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.7

V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that Defendants' motion to dismiss (Doc. 8) be GRANTED and that Graham's complaint be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.8

It is further ORDERED that the parties shall file any objections to this report and recommendation on or before November 15, 2016. Any objections filed must specifically identify the findings in the Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation to which an objection is being asserted. Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections will not be considered by the district court. The parties are advised that this report and

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in the Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the district court of issues addressed in the report and recommendation, and shall bar the party from attacking on appeal factual findings in the report and recommendation that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. See Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982); Stein v. Reynolds Sec., Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982).