OPINION and ORDER
TERRY F. MOORER, Magistrate Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
Timothy W. Tarver ("the former husband") has repeatedly attempted to prevent Susan A. Tarver ("the former wife") from receiving any funds related to disability benefits he receives from the Department of Veterans Affairs. Despite his repeated efforts in both state and federal court, he has been unable to divorce himself from the terms of the settlement agreement.
On June 11, 2012, the Tarvers divorced by a decree of the Circuit Court of Elmore County. See Tarver v. Tarver, No. DR-10-362-R. In its order, the state court incorporated the terms of the parties' settlement agreement executed on May 10, 2012. On appeal, the former husband contested part of the settlement agreement in which he is required to pay his former wife 50 percent of his monthly Department of Veterans Affairs ("VA") disability benefits. On December 19, 2014, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the decision of the Elmore County Circuit Court. On February 27, 2015, the Supreme Court of Alabama entered its certificate of judgment denying the Petition for Writ of Certiorari without opinion.
On November 2, 2015, the former wife filed a Petition for Contempt against her former husband, asserting that the former husband violated the terms of their agreement because he "is in the minimum 100 percent disabled but pays monies to [her] presumably based upon a 90 percent disability rating. . . ." Doc. 1-1, Tarver v. Tarver, No. DR-10-362.02-R.
On December 30, 2015, the former husband removed the state action to this court premised on the basis of federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. On January 29, 2016, the former wife filed a Motion to Remand. This court granted the Motion and remanded the case to the Elmore County Circuit Court. See Tarver v. Tarver, No. 2:15-cv-959-TFM (M.D. Ala., Mar. 25, 2016).
On August 30, 2016, the former husband filed a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief, in which he requests this court to declare "whether the State of Alabama has subject matter jurisdiction . . . to render a valid [and] enforceable order[] to divide and assign the Veteran's VA disability benefits and to force the Veteran to pay said benefits to the Defendant despite express prohibition by 38 U.S.C. § 5301." Doc. 1. On October 24, 2015, the former wife filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), in which she argues the claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and res judicata. Doc. 10. The parties have consented to a United States Magistrate Judge conducting all proceedings in this case and ordering the entry of final judgment, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) and M.D. Ala. L.R. 73.1.
Now pending before the court is the Motion to Dismiss. Upon review of the pleadings, the Motion, the Response, and the evidentiary materials, the court concludes that this case is due to be DISMISSED pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, it is a basic premise of federal court practice that the court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action before it can act. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir. 1994). Thus, federal courts only have the power to hear cases as authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, see Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377, and are required to inquire into their jurisdiction at the earliest possible point in the proceeding. Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999). In addition, Fed R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) requires that "[w]herever it appears . . . that the court lacks jurisdiction, the court shall dismiss the action."
III. DISCUSSION
The former husband requests this court to enter an order declaring that his disability benefits are not assignable under 38 U.S.C. § 5301 and that the Elmore County Circuit Court and the state appellate courts do not have jurisdiction to decide this federal issue. Specifically, he argues that 38 U.S.C. § 5301, the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act ("FSPA"), prohibits the division and assignment of VA disability benefits in any legal process.
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1331 provides that a district court "shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." To determine whether the court has federal question jurisdiction in this action, the court must look to the "well-pleaded complaint" rule. Under this doctrine, a "case does not arise under federal law unless a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's complaint." Whitt v. Sherman Intern. Corp., 147 F.3d 1325, 1329 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing Franchise Tax Bd. of State of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1983). "The existence of federal jurisdiction is tested at the time of removal." Adventure Outdoors, Inc. v. Bloomberg, 552 F.3d 1290, 1294-95 (11th Cir. 2008).
This court recognizes that FSPA prohibits the division of VA disability benefits as community property in a divorce. See Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 594-95 (1989); 38 U.S.C. § 5301(a). However, "the mere presence of a federal issue in a state cause of action does not automatically confer federal-question jurisdiction." Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 813 (1986). In the absence of diversity of citizenship, it is necessary for the court to determine whether there exists a substantial question of federal law sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court. Wyke v. Polk Co. Sch. Bd., 129 F.3d 560, 566 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 537 (1974)).
To the extent the former husband seeks injunctive and declaratory relief from adverse decisions issued or actions taken by the Elmore County Circuit Court in state court proceedings, this court lacks jurisdiction to render such a judgment. "The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents . . . lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by `state-court losers' challenging `state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced.' Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005)." Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 460 (2006). Although "Rooker-Feldman is a narrow doctrine," it remains applicable to bar the former husband from proceeding before this court as this case is "brought by [a] state-court loser[] complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments." Lance, 546 U.S. at 464; District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983) (federal district courts "do not have jurisdiction . . . over challenges to state court decisions in particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings even if those challenges allege that the state court's action was unconstitutional."). Furthermore, "enforcement of [a] settlement agreement is for state courts, unless there is some independent basis for federal jurisdiction." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am 511 U.S. 375, 382 (1994).
In this case, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives this court of jurisdiction over the former husband's request. It is undisputed that the former husband lost in state court and that the Certificate of Judgment was issued in the Alabama Supreme Court on February 27, 2015. Thus, the former husband was a "state-court loser[] complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments." See Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 284, 125 S.Ct. at 1521-22. This court therefore concludes that the former husband's request that this court declare and issue injunctive relief on the grounds that the state court violated federal law when it enforced a provision in the divorce decree requiring him to pay his ex-wife half of his VA disability benefits is due to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See McSparin v. McSparin, 489 Fed.Appx. 348 (11th Cir. 2012).
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that, to the extent the defendant moves to dismiss this action for lack of jurisdiction, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).
CIVIL APPEALS JURISDICTION CHECKLIST
1. Appealable Orders: Courts of Appeals have jurisdiction conferred and strictly limited by statute:
(a) Appeals from final orders pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291: Only final orders and judgments of district courts, or final orders of bankruptcy courts which have been appealed to and fully resolved by a district court under 28 U.S.C.§ 158, generally are appealable. A final decision is one that "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 701 F.2d 1365, 1368 ( 11th Cir. 1983). A magistrate judge's report and recommendation is not final and appealable until judgment thereon is entered by a district court judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
(b) In cases involving multiple parties or multiple claims, a judgment as to fewer than all parties or all claims is not a final, appealable decision unless the district court has certified the judgment for immediate review under Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). Williams v. Bishop, 732 F.2d 885, 885-86 (11th Cir. 1984). A judg ment which resolves all issues except matters, such as attorneys' fees and costs, that are collateral to the merits, is immediately appealable. Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S.196, 201, 108 S.Ct. 1717, 1721-22, 100 L.Ed.2d 178 (1988); LaChance v. Duffy's Draft House, Inc., 146 F.3d 832, 837 (11th Cir. 1998).
(c) Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a): Appeals are permitted from orders "granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions . . ." and from "[i]nterlocutory decrees . . . determining the rights and liabilities of parties to admiralty cases in which appeals from final decrees are allowed." Interlocutory appeals from orders denying temporary restraining orders are not permitted.
(d) Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and Fed.R.App.P. 5: The certification specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) must be obtained before a petition for permission to appeal is filed in the Court of Appeals. The district court's denial of a motion for certification is not itself appealable.
(e) Appeals pursuant to judicially created exceptions to the finality rule: Limited exceptions are discussed in cases including, but not limited to: Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546, 69S.Ct. 1221, 1225-26, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949); Atlantic Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, Inc., 890 F.2d 371, 376 (11th Cir. 1989); Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 157, 85 S.Ct. 308, 312, 13 L.Ed.2d 199 (1964).
2. Time for Filing: The timely filing of a notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional. Rinaldo v. Corbett, 256 F.3d 1276, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). In civil cases, Fed.R.App.P. 4(a) and (c) set the following time limits:
(a) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1): A notice of appeal in compliance with the requirements set forth in Fed.R.App.P. 3 must be filed in the district court within 30 days after the entry of the order or judgment appealed from. However, if the United States or an officer or agency thereof is a party, the notice of appeal must be filed in the district court within 60 days after such entry. THE NOTICE MUST BE RECEIVED AND FILED IN THE DISTRICT COURT NO LATER THAN THE LAST DAY OF THE APPEAL PERIOD — no additional days are provided for mailing. Special filing provisions for inmates are discussed below.
(b) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(3): "If one party timely files a notice of appeal, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date when the first notice was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by this Rule 4(a), whichever period ends later."
(c) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4): If any party makes a timely motion in the district court under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of a type specified in this rule, the time for appeal for all parties runs from the date of entry of the order disposing of the last such timely filed motion.
(d) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(5) and 4(a)(6): Under certain limited circumstances, the district court may extend the time to file a notice of appeal. Under Rule 4(a)(5), the time may be extended if a motion for an extension is filed within 30 days after expiration of the time otherwise provided to file a notice of appeal, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause. Under Rule 4(a)(6), the time may be extended if the district court finds upon motion that a party did not timely receive notice of the entry of the judgment or order, and that no party would be prejudiced by an extension.
(e) Fed.R.App.P. 4(c): If an inmate confined to an institution files a notice of appeal in either a civil case or a criminal case, the notice of appeal is timely if it is deposited in the institution's internal mail system on or before the last day for filing. Timely filing may be shown by a declaration in compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746 or a notarized statement, either of which must set forth the date of deposit and state that first-class postage has been prepaid.
3. Format of the notice of appeal: Form 1, Appendix of Forms to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, is a suitable format. See also Fed.R.App.P. 3(c). A pro se notice of appeal must be signed by the appellant.
4. Effect of a notice of appeal: A district court loses jurisdiction (authority) to act after the filing of a timely notice of appeal, except for actions in aid of appellate jurisdiction or to rule on a timely motion of the type specified in Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4).
