RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

WALLACE CAPEL, Jr., Magistrate Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Byron Keith Cannon ("Cannon"), an Alabama inmate at Bullock Correctional Facility in Union Springs, filed this pro se petition seeking habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Doc. 1. Cannon is incarcerated on a conviction and 8-year sentence imposed by the Elmore County Circuit Court for the offense of possession of obscene matter containing a visual depiction of a person under the age of 17, in violation of § 13A-12-192(b), Ala. Code 1975. He challenges the Alabama Department of Corrections' ("ADOC") denial of correctional incentive time deductions in calculating his minimum release date.

II. DISCUSSION

Cannon contends that he may earn correctional time and that because the ADOC has denied his eligibility for such credit, he is being unlawfully held beyond the end of his sentence. Doc. No. 1 at 5.

Section 14-9-41 of the Alabama Correctional Incentive Time Act ("ACITA") provides, in pertinent part:

Ala. Code § 14-9-41(a)-(e) (emphasis added). Section 15-20-21(5) defines a criminal sex offense involving a child to include "[a] conviction for any criminal sex offense in which the victim was a child under the age of 12 and any offense involving child pornography." Ala. Code § 15-20-21(5) (emphasis added). Alabama's child pornography statutes proscribe dissemination, display, possession, and production of obscene matter depicting persons less than 17 years of age. See, e.g., §§ 13A-12-190(16) & 13A-12-191 through -198, Ala. Code 1975. Cannon was convicted of possession of obscene matter containing a visual depiction of a person under the age of 17, in violation of § 13A-12-192(b), Ala. Code 1975. Therefore, under Ala. Code §§ 14-9-41(e) & 15-20-21(5), Cannon is ineligible for correctional incentive time deductions.1 The DOC correctly denied Cannon such deductions in calculating his minimum release date, and the state courts correctly denied his challenge to the ADOC's decision.

Moreover, even an Alabama inmate eligible for correctional incentive time deductions has no constitutional right or entitlement to receive these deductions from the term of his sentence, nor is any such right created by state law, as granting such deductions under Alabama Code § 14-9-41 is discretionary. See Conlogue v. Shinbaum, 949 F.2d 378, 380-381 (11th Cir. 1991); Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). Although § 14-9-41 contains language delineating which inmates are eligible to receive correctional incentive time — language that bars Cannon from eligibility — the statute does not create an interest in receiving correctional incentive time upon meeting the requisite eligibility criteria, nor does it contain any explicit mandatory language that restricts the discretion of persons charged with deciding whether an inmate should be granted these time deductions. While the eligibility criteria are prerequisites, the statute does not establish a right to receive incentive-time deductions even if the criteria are met. Thus, the failure to grant correctional incentive time to an inmate does not alter or extinguish a protected right or status and therefore does not deprive inmates of any protected liberty interest. Consequently, Cannon's arguments regarding an unconstitutional denial of correctional incentive time are indisputably meritless as they allege "infringement of a legal interest which clearly does not exist." Robinson v. Deloach, 2009 WL 1116838, at *5 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 24, 2009) (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)).

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that the petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 be DENIED and this case DISMISSED with prejudice.

The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to file the Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge and to serve a copy on the petitioner. The petitioner is DIRECTED to file any objections to this Recommendation on or before January 4, 2017. Any objections filed must specifically identify the factual findings and legal conclusions in the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation to which the petitioner objects. Frivolous, conclusive or general objections will not be considered by the District Court.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in the Magistrate Judge's report shall bar a party from a de novo determination by the District Court of factual findings and legal issues covered in the report and shall "waive the right to challenge on appeal the district court's order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions" except upon grounds of plain error if necessary in the interests of justice. 11th Cir. R. 3-1; see Resolution Trust Co. v. Hallmark Builders, Inc., 996 F.2d 1144, 1149 (11th Cir. 1993); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989).