MEMORANDUM OPINION

CHARLES S. COODY, Magistrate Judge.

I. Introduction

The plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits pursuant to Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq., and for supplemental security income benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seq., alleging that she was unable to work because of a disability. Her application was denied at the initial administrative level. The plaintiff then requested and received a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). Following the hearing, the ALJ concluded that the plaintiff was not under a "disability" as defined in the Social Security Act, and denied the plaintiff's claim for benefits. The Appeals Council rejected a subsequent request for review. The ALJ's decision consequently became the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner").2 See Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). The case is now before the court for review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties have consented to entry of final judgment by the United States Magistrate Judge. Based on the court's review of the record in this case and the briefs of the parties, the court concludes that the decision of the Commissioner should be affirmed.

II. Standard of Review

Under 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), a person is entitled to disability benefits when the person is unable to

To make this determination,3 the Commissioner employs a five-step, sequential evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.

McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986).4

The standard of review of the Commissioner's decision is a limited one. This court must find the Commissioner's decision conclusive if it is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Graham v. Apfel, 129 F.3d 1420, 1422 (11th Cir. 1997). "Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. It is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). A reviewing court may not look only to those parts of the record which supports the decision of the ALJ but instead must view the record in its entirety and take account of evidence which detracts from the evidence relied on by the ALJ. Hillsman v. Bowen, 804 F.2d 1179 (11th Cir. 1986).

Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987).

III. The Issues

A. Introduction. The plaintiff was 52 years old at the time of the hearing before the ALJ and had completed the eighth grade. (R. 24, 39). Following the hearing, the ALJ concluded that the plaintiff has severe impairments of "chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), status post arthroscopic surgery of bilateral knees, osteoarthritis of knees, bilateral knee edema no (sic) otherwise specified, morbid obesity, and dysthymic disorder versus major depressive disorder." (R. 13). Her prior work experience includes work as a cashier. (R. 24). The ALJ concluded that Carroll could perform her past relevant work, and thus, she was not disabled. (Id.). In the alternative, relying on the testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ concluded that there were jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy that Carroll could perform. (R. 24-25). Consequently, the ALJ concluded that she was not disabled. (R. 25-26).

B. Plaintiff's Claims. Carroll presents three issues for the court's review. As stated by the plaintiff, the issues are as follows:

(Doc. # 18 at 5-6).

IV. Discussion

A disability claimant bears the initial burden of demonstrating an inability to return to her past work. Lucas v. Sullivan, 918 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1990). In determining whether the claimant has satisfied this burden, the Commissioner is guided by four factors: (1) objective medical facts or clinical findings, (2) diagnoses of examining physicians, (3) subjective evidence of pain and disability, e.g., the testimony of the claimant and her family or friends, and (4) the claimant's age, education, and work history. Tieniber v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 1251 (11th Cir. 1983). The court must scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine the reasonableness of the ALJ's decision. See Walker, 826 F.2d at 999. The ALJ must conscientiously probe into, inquire of and explore all relevant facts to elicit both favorable and unfavorable facts for review. Cowart v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d 731, 735-36 (11th Cir. 1981). The ALJ must also state, with sufficient specificity, the reasons for his decision referencing the plaintiff's impairments.

42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1) (emphases added).

A. Fully and Fairly Develop the Record. Carroll first argues that the ALJ failed to properly develop the record when he failed to reconcile an ambiguity in the opinion of the consultative examiner. (Doc. # 18 at 6-7). On January 21, 2014, Carroll underwent a consultative physical examination by Dr. Oluyinka Adediji. Dr. Adediji observed the following.

Dr. Adediji noted knee joint pain with active and passive range of motion but "no palpable effusion, tenderness or increased warmth bilaterally." (R. 434). There was "[p]alpable crepitus bilaterally," but no effusion. (Id.) Based on his examination, Dr. Adediji diagnosed "Bilateral Knee Pain: Osteoarthritis." (R. 435). Dr. Adediji observed that "[p]ain is the main limiting factor is pain. (sic) She would need knee protective restrictions like sitting job and avoidance of prolonged standing or repetitive climbing and kneeling." (Id.) Dr. Adediji then completed a medical source statement detailing Carroll's physical abilities. (R. 436-441). Dr. Adediji opined that Carroll could sit for three hours at one time without interruption, stand for thirty minutes at one time without interruption, and walk for thirty minutes at one time without interruption. (R. 437). He further opined that Carroll could sit for six hours total in an eight hour work day, stand for three hours total in an eight hour work day, and walk for three hours total in an eight hour work day. (Id.) The ALJ gave significant but not great weight to Dr. Adediji's opinion specifically reducing Carroll's RFC to light work because of "a limitation to standing and/or walking one hour without interruption and a total of six hours is consistent with Dr. Adediji's conclusion that claimant could engage in each for 30 minutes at a time and a total of three hours." (R.23).

According to Carroll, Dr. Adediji's opinion is ambiguous.

(Doc. # 18 at 6-7).

Although Carroll complains that there is an ambiguity in Dr. Adediji's source statement, the ALJ was not required to accept Dr. Adediji's opinion in whole in forming Carroll's RFC. Jobs in the category of light work require "a good deal of walking or standing," or "sitting most of the time." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) (emphasis added). More importantly, however, Carroll's argument is based on inference, "extrapolation and conjecture [which] remains insufficient to disturb the ALJ's RFC determination, where it is supported by substantial evidence." See Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1213 (11th Cir. 2005). The ALJ evaluated the evidence before him which led him to conclude that Carroll could perform light work with limitations. The RFC adequately accounts for Carroll's limitations, and it is not the province of this court to reweigh evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. Instead the court reviews the record to determine if the decision reached is supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 1211.

While the ALJ has the responsibility to determine the plaintiff's RFC, it is plaintiff who bears the burden of proving her RFC, i.e., she must establish through evidence that her impairments result in functional limitations and that she is "disabled" under the Social Security Act. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512 (instructing claimant that the ALJ will consider "only impairment(s) you say you have or about which we receive evidence" and "[y]ou must provide medical evidence showing that you have an impairment(s) and how severe it is during the time you say that you are disabled"). See also Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 2001) (it is claimant's burden to prove RFC, and ALJ's responsibility to determine RFC based on medical records, observations of treating physicians and others, and claimant's description of limitations). The court has independently considered the record as a whole and finds that the record provides substantial support for the ALJ's RFC determination.

B. Credibility Analysis. Carroll next argues that the ALJ failed to properly assess her credibility. As explained below, the ALJ did not fully credit Carroll's testimony. "Subjective pain testimony supported by objective medical evidence of a condition that can reasonably be expected to produce the symptoms of which the plaintiff complains is itself sufficient to sustain a finding of disability." Hale v. Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007 (11th Cir. 1987). The Eleventh Circuit has established a three-part test that applies when a claimant attempts to establish disability through her own testimony of pain or other subjective symptoms. Landry v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1551, 1553 (11th Cir. 1986); see also Holt v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991). This standard requires evidence of an underlying medical condition and either (1) objective medical evidence that confirms the severity of the alleged pain arising from that condition or (2) an objectively determined medical condition of such severity that it can reasonably be expected to give rise to the alleged pain. Landry, 782 F. 2d at 1553. In this circuit, the law is clear. The Commissioner must consider a claimant's subjective testimony of pain if she finds evidence of an underlying medical condition and the objectively determined medical condition is of a severity that can reasonably be expected to give rise to the alleged pain. Mason v. Bowen, 791 F.2d 1460, 1462 (11th Cir. 1986); Landry, 782 F.2d at 1553. Thus, if the Commissioner fails to articulate reasons for refusing to credit a claimant's subjective pain testimony, the Commissioner has accepted the testimony as true as a matter of law. This standard requires that the articulated reasons must be supported by substantial reasons. If there is no such support then the testimony must be accepted as true. Hale, 831 F.2d at 1012.

At the administrative hearing, Carroll testified that knee pain and COPD are the reasons she cannot work. (R. 44). The ALJ thoroughly detailed the medical evidence and discussed her testimony. The ALJ acknowledged that Carroll has "medically determinable impairments that could reasonably be expected to cause some of the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant's statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not credible for the reasons explained in this decision." (R. 17). If this were the extent of the ALJ's credibility analysis, the plaintiff might be entitled to some relief. However, a review of the ALJ's analysis demonstrates that the ALJ properly considered and discredited Carroll's testimony. Rather than give a synopsis of it, the court will quote it.

(R. 21-22, 23-24).

Where an ALJ decides not to credit a claimant's testimony, the ALJ must articulate specific and adequate reasons for doing so, or the record must be obvious as to the credibility finding. Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1561-62 (11th Cir. 1995); Jones v. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 941 F.2d 1529, 1532 (11th Cir. 1991) (articulated reasons must be based on substantial evidence). If proof of disability is based on subjective evidence and a credibility determination is, therefore, critical to the decision, "`the ALJ must either explicitly discredit such testimony or the implication must be so clear as to amount to a specific credibility finding.'" Foote, 67 F.3d at 1562, quoting Tieniber, 720 F.2d at 1255 (although no explicit finding as to credibility is required, the implication must be obvious to the reviewing court). The ALJ has discretion to discredit a plaintiff's subjective complaints as long as he provides "explicit and adequate reasons for his decision." Holt, 921 F.2d at 1223. Relying on the treatment records, objective evidence, and Carroll's own testimony, the ALJ concluded that her allegations regarding the extent of her pain were not credible to the extent alleged and discounted that testimony. After a careful review of the ALJ's careful, detailed and thoughtful analysis, the court concludes that the ALJ properly discounted the plaintiff's testimony and substantial evidence supports the ALJ's credibility determination. It is undisputed that the plaintiff suffers from pain. However, the ALJ concluded that while Carroll's underlying conditions are capable of giving rise to some pain and other limitations, her impairments are not so severe as to give rise to the disabling intractable pain she alleged.

The medical records support the ALJ's conclusion that while Carroll's impairments could reasonably be expected to produce some pain, the records do not corroborate her testimony of debilitating pain. On December 17, 2008, Carroll presented to Dr. Thornbury complaining of pain, swelling and stiffness in both knees. (R. 266). A physical examination revealed

(R. 267).

Dr.Thornbury diagnosed "early degenerative arthritis with chondromalacia, medial compartment and probably patellofemoral also." (Id.). He injected both knees with Depo-Medrol and Xylocaine, and prescribed Relafen. (Id.).

On January 19, 2009, Carroll returned to Dr. Thornbury complaining that she was having more pain and swelling in her right knee. (R. 265). An examination revealed "mild effusion" of the right knee, tenderness in the medial joint space and retropatellarly, and reduced range of motion. (Id.) Dr. Thornbury suspected "[p]ossible internal derangement of the right knee with a degenerative meniscal tear." (Id.) He ordered a MRI. (Id.)

On January 29, 2009, Carroll again complained to Dr. Thornbury of pain and popping in her right knee. (R. 264). At that time, she had "a lot of tenderness retropatellarly, crepitus to range of motion, and medial and lateral joint line tenderness." (Id.) The MRI did not reveal a tear but indicated "mild to moderate osteoarthritis." (Id.; R. 268).

On August 10, 2009, Carroll returned to Dr. Thornbury complaining of pain, swelling and stiffness in her right knee. (R. 263). On August 21, 2009, Carroll underwent arthroscopic surgery for "debridement of the patella femoral joint . . . [and] synovectomy." (R. 269). Surgery revealed a "small tear in the posterolateral right meniscus" which was repaired. (Id.). On August 26, 2009, Carroll returned to Dr. Thornbury five days after her right knee surgery. (R. 262). At that time, she had "absolutely no pain." (Id.) She had "minimal palpable tenderness." (Id.)

On October 5, 2010, Carroll presented to Dr. Kenneth Taylor complaining of left knee pain. (R. 279). An examination revealed Carroll

(Id).

Dr. Taylor recommended an MRI to "[r]ule out internal derangement versus inflammatory process." (Id.). On October 19, 2010, Carroll complained to Dr. Taylor of unchanged left knee pain. (R. 278). She "ambulates with a left antalgic gait" but there was "no effusion or synovitis of the left knee." (Id.). A MRI "showed no internal derangement." (Id.). Dr. Taylor diagnosed "[m]edial compartment gonarthrotis of the left knee." (Id.)

Carroll returned to Dr. Taylor on March 24, 2011 complaining of pain in her left knee. An x-ray revealed "mild degenerative changes in the medial compartment of the left knee." (R. 277). Dr. Taylor injected the knee with Dexamethasone and prescribed Toradol. (Id.) On April 21, 2011, Dr. Taylor recommended a "left knee arthroscopic debridement." (R. 276).

On May 4, 2011, Carroll underwent arthroscopic surgery on her left knee. (R. 284). Dr. Taylor repaired a partial tear of the medial meniscus and resected a portion of the medial synovial plica. (Id.). On May 19, 2011, Carroll reported that she was only have "mild left knee pain." (R. 275). She had full extension of her left knee. (Id.).

Thereafter, Carroll did not return to Dr. Thornbury or Dr. Taylor but on April 23, 2013, she complained to Dr. Sargent, her primary care physician of pain in both knees. (R. 443). The musculoskeletal examination revealed normal gait and station. Her lower right extremity was normal. Her left knee and lower leg had no edema, normal reflexes and normal pulses. (R. 446). She had moderate knee joint effusion but no masses or crepitation. (Id.). Dr. Sargent diagnosed bilateral osteoarthritis in the knee joints and prescribed Naprosyn. (R. 447). Thus, despite Carroll's complaints, after her 2009 right knee surgery and her 2011 left knee surgery, she did not complain again of knee pain until April 2013.

After a careful review of the record, the court concludes that the ALJ's reasons for discrediting the plaintiff's testimony were both clearly articulated and supported by substantial evidence. To the extent that the plaintiff is arguing that the ALJ should have accepted her testimony regarding her pain, as the court explained, the ALJ had good cause to discount her testimony. This court must accept the factual findings of the Commissioner if they are supported by substantial evidence and based upon the proper legal standards. Bridges v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 622 (11th Cir. 1987).

C. Residual Functional Capacity. Finally, Carroll asserts that the ALJ failed to include the nonexertional limitation of pain in his residual functional capacity assessment. (Doc. # 18 at 13). The ALJ concluded that the plaintiff has the residual functional capacity

(R. 16).

An ALJ is required to independently assess a claimant's residual functional capacity "based upon all of the relevant evidence." 20 CFR § 404.1545(a)(3) ("We will assess your residual functional capacity based on all of the relevant medical and other evidence."); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c) ("Responsibility for assessing residual functional capacity at the administrative law judge hearing . . . level. If your case is at the administrative law judge hearing level . . ., the administrative law judge . . . is responsible for assessing your residual functional capacity.") See also Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997) ("The residual functional capacity is an assessment, based upon all of the relevant evidence, of a claimant's remaining ability to do work despite [her] impairments."). "Residual functional capacity, or RFC, is a medical assessment of what the claimant can do in a work setting despite any mental, physical or environmental limitations caused by the claimant's impairments and related symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)." Peeler v. Astrue, 400 F. App'x 492, 494 n.2 (11th Cir. 2010).

Carroll's argument that the ALJ's RFC determination is flawed because it does not include any mention of pain is without merit. In determining Carroll's RFC, the ALJ specifically considered Carroll's limitations arising from her complaints of pain.

(R. 23-24).

It is undisputed that Carroll suffers from pain in her knees but as already explained, the medical records do not demonstrate that her pain is as severe as alleged. The ALJ took into consideration Carroll's pain by limiting her to light work, and the RFC adequately accounts for her knee pain. It is clear from the context of the ALJ's opinion, and from the record as a whole, that the ALJ reviewed and considered all the medical evidence in the record in determining Carroll's RFC. The court has independently considered the record as a whole and finds that the record provides substantial support for the ALJ's conclusions.

Pursuant to the substantial evidence standard, this court's review is a limited one; the entire record must be scrutinized to determine the reasonableness of the ALJ's factual findings. Lowery v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1992). Given this standard of review, the court finds that the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence.

V. Conclusion

The court has carefully and independently reviewed the record and concludes that the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence and is due to be affirmed.

A separate order will be entered.