GRAY M. BORDEN, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff Sheri L. Minor is appearing in this appeal pro se and seeking judicial review of the denial of her claim for supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. Doc. 1. The parties have consented to the entry of a final judgment by the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and Rule 73.1 of the court's Local Rules. Docs. 9 & 10. Because the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the "Commissioner")
The court reviews a social security case to determine whether the Commissioner's decision "is supported by substantial evidence and based upon proper legal standards." Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1439 (11th Cir. 1997). The court "may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner," but rather it "must defer to the Commissioner's decision if it is supported by substantial evidence." Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, the court must affirm the Commissioner's decision "if it is supported by substantial evidence and the correct legal standards were applied." Kelly v. Apfel, 185 F.3d 1211, 1213 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Graham v. Apfel, 129 F.3d 1420, 1422 (11th Cir. 1997)).
"Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla—i.e., the evidence must do more than merely create a suspicion of the existence of a fact, and must include such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support the conclusion." Jones ex rel. T.J.J. v. Astrue, 2011 WL 1706465, at *1 (M.D. Ala. May 5, 2011) (citing Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1440). The court must scrutinize the entire record to determine the reasonableness of the decision reached. Hale v. Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007, 1010 (11th Cir. 1987). "If the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, the district court will affirm, even if the court would have reached a contrary result as a finder of fact, and even if the court finds that the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner's decision." Jones, 2011 WL 1706465, at *2 (citing Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991)). The court will reverse the Commissioner's decision on plenary review if the decision applies incorrect law, or if the decision fails to provide the court with sufficient reasoning to determine that the Commissioner properly applied the law. Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145-46 (11th Cir. 1991); Jones, 2011 WL 1706465, at *2 (citing Keeton v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 1994)). There is no presumption that the Commissioner's conclusions of law are valid. Id.
On February 14, 2011, Minor filed a Title II application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits as well as a Title XVI application for supplemental security income. Doc. 14-2 at 19. In both applications, Minor alleged a disability due to back and feet problems, bipolar disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease ("COPD"), and panic attacks with an alleged onset date of January 1, 2009. Doc. 14-2 at 19 & 22. Her claims were denied at the initial administrative level and on appeal by decision of an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") dated October 24, 2012.
On March 22, 2013, Minor filed a second Title II application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits and a Title XVI application for supplemental security income. Doc. 14-2 at 19. In both applications, Minor claimed a new disability onset date of September 1, 2012. Doc. 14-2 at 19. These claims were denied at the initial administrative level on June 11, 2013. Doc. 14-2 at 19.
Minor requested a hearing before an ALJ, which was held on September 9, 2014. Doc. 14-2 at 19. The claimant appeared at the hearing with her attorney and testified. Doc. 14-2 at 19. A vocational expert appeared at the hearing and testified as well. Doc. 14-2 at 19.
At the hearing, Minor amended her disability onset date from September 1, 2012, to her protected filing date of March 22, 2013. Doc. 14-2 at 19. Because of this change, Minor would not have been entitled to the claimed period of disability and disability insurance benefits because she would not have disability insured status on the date of onset. Doc. 14-2 at 19. Therefore, Minor, through her attorney, voluntarily withdrew her hearing request as it pertained to her Title II application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits, making the initial administrative denial of her Title II application the final decision of the Commissioner. Doc. 14-2 at 19. The ALJ then dismissed her hearing request as to that claim and addressed only Minor's remaining claim for supplemental security income under Title XVI. Doc. 14-2 at 19-20.
By decision dated November 12, 2014, the ALJ denied Minor's supplemental security income claim. Doc. 14-2 at 19-29. In his decision, the ALJ found that Minor suffered from the severe impairments of COPD, degenerative disc disease, anxiety-related disorder of post-traumatic stress disorder, and bipolar disorder, but that none of those impairments or a combination of those impairments meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926). The ALJ further concluded that Minor has the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to
Doc. 14-2 at 25. The ALJ ultimately concluded that—considering Minor's age, education, work experience, and RFC—there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that she can perform. Doc. 14-2 at 28. Consequently, the ALJ concluded that Minor is not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act and denied her Title XVI claim. Doc. 14-2 at 28-29.
On August 3, 2016, the court entered an order granting Minor in forma pauperis status and also directing the parties to file briefs addressing the issues in this case. Doc. 3. Specifically, Minor was ordered to file a brief containing a section entitled "Statement of the Issues" and to identify in this section each issue she is challenging in separately numbered paragraphs. Doc. 3. Minor was warned that any issue not presented in this section would not be considered by the court. Doc. 3.
Minor did not comply with these formatting directives. Nevertheless, the court is sensitive to the fact that Minor is proceeding pro se, and therefore it will not reject her appeal solely on this technicality. Indeed, Minor at least attempted to comply with the court's August 3 order by filing a neatly handwritten brief setting forth various complaints about the ALJ's decision. Having carefully and leniently reviewed this brief, the court concludes that Minor is challenging the ALJ's decision on the bases that he applied improper legal standards and that his decision is not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Doc. 12. The Commissioner has addressed these issues in a responding brief. Doc. 13.
After thoroughly reviewing the record and the parties' arguments, and for the reasons stated herein, the court finds that the ALJ applied proper legal standards and his decision is supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, the ALJ's decision will be affirmed, as set forth below.
To qualify for supplemental security income benefits, a claimant must show she is "unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months." 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(3)(A). A physical or mental impairment is "an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrated by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques." 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(3)(D).
42 U.S.C. § 1382c(3)(B). Minor bears the ultimate burden of proving that she is disabled, and she is responsible for producing evidence to support her claim. See Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003).
Determination of disability under the Social Security Act requires a five-step analysis. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). Specifically, the Commissioner must determine in sequence:
McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986). "An affirmative answer to any of the above questions leads either to the next question, or, on steps three and five, to a finding of disability. A negative answer to any question, other than step three, leads to a determination of `not disabled.'" Id. at 1030 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)-(f)). "Once the finding is made that a claimant cannot return to prior work the burden of proof shifts to the Secretary to show other work the claimant can do." Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1559 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Gibson v. Heckler, 762 F.2d 1516 (11th Cir. 1985)).
The ALJ concluded that Minor had severe impairments but that she retained the RFC to perform light work, with certain limitations, and that there were jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that she could perform such that she is not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. Doc. 14-2. From a review of the ALJ's decision, the court concludes that he applied the proper legal standards and that he explained his findings thoroughly and sufficiently. The ALJ concluded that Minor's severe impairments could reasonably be expected to cause her alleged symptoms but that her statements and other allegations concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of these symptoms were not entirely credible. The ALJ then provided thorough reasoning for this conclusion, stating:
Minor has not pointed to any evidence contradicting these findings, and the court is satisfied that the proper legal standards were applied and that these conclusions are supported by substantial evidence in the record.
As to opinion evidence, the ALJ stated the weight he gave to the opinions and the reasons for assigning that weight. Specifically, the ALJ explained:
Again, having reviewed the record, the court is satisfied that the proper legal standards were applied when evaluating opinion evidence and that the ALJ's conclusions are supported by substantial evidence.
While the court finds that the ALJ's decision applied proper legal standards and is supported by substantial evidence, the court would be remiss not to express its concern over the ALJ's failure to address Minor's inability to pay for medical treatment for her impairments. Minor testified multiple times that she could not afford treatment, and her medical records reflect this as well. The ALJ relied on the fact that Minor has "no continuing mental health treatment" to conclude that her mental impairments are not sufficiently severe to meet one of the listings. Doc. 14-2 at 24.
It is well settled in this Circuit that "poverty excuses noncompliance" with prescribed medical treatment. Dawkins v. Bowen, 848 F.2d 1211, 1213 (11th Cir. 1998). "Additionally, when an ALJ relies on noncompliance as the sole ground for the denial of disability benefits, and the record contains evidence showing that the claimant is financially unable to comply with prescribed treatment, the ALJ is required to determine whether the claimant was able to afford the prescribed treatment." Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Dawkins, 848 F.2d at 1214). The ALJ did not engage in this analysis here.
However, this failing does not undermine the overall sufficiency of the ALJ's decision because his conclusion that Minor is not disabled was not significantly based on a finding of noncompliance with prescribed medical treatment. Indeed, while the ALJ, in finding that Minor's mental health impairments were not sufficiently severe to meet a listing, noted that she did not have continuing mental health treatment, a review of his decision shows that this finding was based primarily on other factors. Specifically, the ALJ stated:
Doc. 14-2 at 24. Moreover, the ALJ explicitly stated that he based his finding of "not disabled" on the testimony of a vocational expert and Minor's RFC, age, educational background, and work experience. Doc. 14-2 at 28. The Eleventh Circuit addressed a similar issue in Ellison v. Barnhart and found that an ALJ's failure to consider a claimant's ability to afford medications was not reversible error when the ALJ's finding of "not disabled was not significantly based on a finding of noncompliance." 355 F.3d at 1275. The Ellison court explained that the ALJ's duty to consider the claimant's ability to afford the prescribed medical treatment comes into play when the ALJ's denial of a disability claim "relied `primarily if not exclusively' on evidence pertaining to the claimant's noncompliance with prescribed medical treatment." Id. (quoting Dawkins, 848 F.2d at 1212). Since the ALJ's decision here did not rely primarily or exclusively on Minor's failure to obtain treatment, the ALJ's failure to consider her ability to afford medical treatment is not reversible error.
The court has carefully and independently reviewed the record, leniently interpreting Minor's pro se challenge to the Commissioner's decision. Upon this review, and for the reasons stated above, the court finds that the decision of the Commissioner is due to be and hereby is AFFIRMED. A final judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered separately.
