CHARLES S. COODY, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff Tim Olin Sanders ("Sanders") protectively filed a Title II application for a period of disability and disability benefits and a Title XVI application for supplemental security income, alleging that he became disabled on December 1, 2012. (R. 55, 214-15, 216-17). His applications were denied at the initial administrative level. The plaintiff then requested and received a hearing before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Michael D. Anderson. Following a hearing held on February 18, 2015, (R. 74-96), the ALJ issued a decision denying the claims on May 29, 2015. (R. 52-68). The Appeals Council denied Sanders' subsequent request for review (R. 6-9). The ALJ's decision consequently became the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner").
Under 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) a person is entitled to disability benefits when the person is unable to
To make this determination
McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986).
The standard of review of the Commissioner's decision is a limited one. This court must find the Commissioner's decision conclusive if it is supported by substantial evidence. Graham v. Apfel, 129 F.3d 1420, 1422 (11th Cir. 1997); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). "Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. It is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). A reviewing court may not look only to those parts of the record which supports the decision of the ALJ, but instead must view the record in its entirety and take account of evidence which detracts from the evidence relied on by the ALJ. Hillsman v. Bowen, 804 F.2d 1179 (11th Cir. 1986).
Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987).
(R. 57).
The ALJ further concluded that Sanders' impairments or combination of impairments did not meet or medically equal one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. (R. 58-59). The ALJ found that Sanders was unable to perform his past relevant work but concluded that
(R. 60).
Using the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P., App. 2, as a framework and relying on the testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ concluded that there were significant number of jobs in the national economy that the plaintiff could perform. (R. 66-67). Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that the plaintiff was not disabled. (R. 55, 67).
(Doc. # 11, Pl's Br. at 1, 3, 5).
This court's ultimate inquiry is whether the Commissioner's disability decision is supported by the proper legal standards and by substantial evidence. See Bridges v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 622 (11th Cir. 1987). "Social Security proceedings are inquisitorial rather than adversarial. It is the ALJ's duty to investigate the facts and develop the arguments both for and against granting benefits." Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 110-111 (2000).
Crawford & Co. v. Apfel, 235 F.3d 1298, 1304 (11th Cir. 2000).
An ALJ must also state, with sufficient specificity, the reasons for his decision referencing the plaintiff's impairments.
42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1) (emphases added).
Sanders argues that the ALJ erred in rejecting the opinion of Dr. Richard Cyrus who opined on a "Request for Medical Information" form for food stamps, that Sanders was permanently unable to work. (R. 428). Sanders complains that the ALJ did not "indicate what, if any weight he gave to the opinion of Dr. Cyrus." (Doc. # 11 at 3).
The medical opinion of a treating physician is entitled to substantial or controlling weight unless the ALJ articulates good cause for rejecting that opinion. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2); Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997). The Commissioner, as reflected in his regulations, also demonstrates a similar preference for the opinion of treating physicians.
Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1440 (citing 20 CFR § 404.1527 (d)(2)). The ALJ's failure to give considerable weight to the treating physician's opinion is reversible error. Broughton v. Heckler, 776 F.2d 960, 961-62 (11th Cir. 1985).
However, a treating physician's opinions on legal issues that are reserved to the Commissioner are not considered medical opinions and are not entitled to any special weight. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d)(1). Issues reserved to the Commissioner include opinions that the claimant is "disabled" or "unable to work". 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). Thus, to the extent that the Food Stamp Request for Medical Information form can be construed as Dr. Cyrus' opinion that Sanders is disabled and unable to work, that opinion is not a "medical opinion" and is not entitled to any special weight.
More importantly, however, there are circumstances when the ALJ can disregard the treating physician's opinion. The requisite "good cause" for discounting a treating physician's opinion may exist where the opinion is not supported by the evidence, or where the evidence supports a contrary finding. Good cause may also exist where a doctor's opinions are merely conclusory, inconsistent with the doctor's medical records, or unsupported by objective medical evidence. See Jones v. Dep't. of Health & Human Servs., 941 F.2d 1529, 1532-33 (11th Cir. 1991); Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584-85 (11th Cir. 1991); Johns v. Bowen, 821 F.2d 551, 555 (11th Cir. 1987). The weight afforded to a physician's conclusory statements depends upon the extent to which they are supported by clinical or laboratory findings and are consistent with other evidence of the claimant's impairment. Wheeler v. Heckler, 784 F.2d 1073, 1075 (11th Cir. 1986). The ALJ "may reject the opinion of any physician when the evidence supports a contrary conclusion." Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1240 (11th Cir. 1983).
On December 12, 2014, Dr. Cyrus completed a request for medical information work requirements form from the Alabama Department of Human Resources Food Stamp program. (R. 428). On that form, Dr. Cyrus circled "NO" when asked if "the client is mentally and physically able to work." He circled "YES" when asked if this condition is permanent. (Id.) Dr. Cyrus indicated that Sanders' conditions were back pain and COPD. This is the extent of the information provided on the form.
This is what the ALJ said about Dr. Cyrus' treatment of Sanders at Medical Outreach Ministries. (R. 62-64).
(R. 63-64).
As noted by the ALJ and confirmed by Dr. Cyrus' treatment notes, the record contains evidence that Sanders's COPD improved with treatment and when he reduced his smoking. (R. 391-414). For example, on May 28, 2014, Sanders prescribed Advair, Symbicort and Albuterol for his COPD. (R. 413). On July 7, 2014, Sanders reported smoking "a little less," and his lungs were clear with no wheezing. (R. 403). On August 6, 2014, Dr. Cyrus noted that Sanders' lungs were clear and there was no wheezing or rhonchi. (R. 395).
Dr. Cyrus saw Sanders five times over six months prior to completing the "Request for Medical Information" form. The form itself is not a medical opinion directed at whether Sanders is disabled. In addition, nowhere in Dr. Cyrus' treatment notes does he indicate that Sanders is disabled. Finally, Dr. Cyrus treated Sanders' COPD conservatively with medication. Consequently, Dr. Cyrus' own treatment notes do not support the level of disability he attributes to Sanders on the form seeking food stamps eligibility.
The ALJ examined and evaluated the treatment records for evidence supporting Dr. Cyrus' assessment of Sanders' ability to work, and he considered Sanders' own testimony. Only then did the ALJ determine that Sanders was not disabled, notwithstanding how Dr. Cyrus completed the Request for Medical Information form. The ALJ's discussion of Sanders' medical records shows that the ALJ gave no weight to the form. The ALJ was not required to explicitly state that he gave it no weight. Accordingly, the ALJ applied the correct legal standard by independently assessing Sanders's ability to work and substantial evidence supports the ALJ's conclusions. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.927(d)(1); 404.1527(d).
On March 24, 2015, Dr. Larry Epperson performed a consultative examination which included electromyogram testing ("EMG"). (R. 459-467). Results of the EMG testing were normal and demonstrated "no electrophysiological evidence of bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, a bilateral ulnar neuropathy, bilateral tardy ulnar palsy, C 5-8 radiculopathy or a diffuse sensorimotor peripheral neuropathy in the left or right upper extremities." (R. 459). The ALJ examined in detail Dr. Epperson's consultative report but gave his residual functional capacity assessment "no weight" because
(R. 65).
Sanders argues that the ALJ erred as a matter of law because "there is no indication in Dr. Epperson's assessment that he relied on subjective complaints." (Doc. # 11 at 6). Substantial evidence supports the ALJ's discounting of Dr. Epperson's assessments of Sanders' physical capabilities. Dr. Epperson's conclusory opinion is not substantiated by any notes in his consultative examination except he notes that all of the test results were normal. Even if the ALJ's conclusion that Dr. Epperson's opinion was based on subjective complaints was wrong, it doesn't matter. Dr. Epperson's opinion is not supported by the objective testing. The ALJ was not required to accept Dr. Epperson's opinion about Sanders' physical abilities in forming Sanders' RFC. The ALJ evaluated the evidence before him which led him to conclude that Sanders could perform light work with limitations.
While the ALJ has the responsibility to make a determination of Sanders' RFC, it is Sanders who bears the burden of proving his RFC, i.e., he must establish through evidence that his impairments result in functional limitations and that he is "disabled" under the Social Security Act. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512 (instructing claimant that the ALJ will consider "only impairment(s) you say you have or about which we receive evidence" and "[y]ou must provide medical evidence showing that you have an impairment(s) and how severe it is during the time you say that you are disabled"). See also Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 2001) (it is claimant's burden to prove RFC, and ALJ's responsibility to determine RFC based on medical records, observations of treating physicians and others, and claimant's description of limitations). The ALJ had before him sufficient medical evidence from which he could make a reasoned determination of Sanders' residual functional capacity. Pursuant to the substantial evidence standard, this court's review is a limited one; the entire record must be scrutinized to determine the reasonableness of the ALJ's factual findings. Lowery v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1992).
"Even though Social Security courts are inquisitorial, not adversarial, in nature, claimants must establish that they are eligible for benefits." Ingram v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 496 F.3d 1253, 1269 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1281 (11th Cir. 2001)). See also Holladay v. Bowen, 848 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1988). This Sanders has failed to do. Based upon its review of the ALJ's decision and the objective medical evidence of record, the court concludes that the ALJ properly rejected the opinions of Dr. Cyrus and Dr. Epperson regarding Sanders' limitations and his ability to perform work.
The court has carefully and independently reviewed the record, and concludes that the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence.
A separate order will be entered affirming the Commissioner's decision.
