GRAY M. BORDEN, Magistrate Judge.
This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is before the court on a complaint filed by Thurmon E. Moore, II, a state inmate, challenging conditions present during his prior term of incarceration at the Staton Correctional Facility. Specifically, Moore alleges that the defendants denied him adequate medical treatment for his osteoarthritis and refused to place him in a chronic care clinic for this condition. He also questions the constitutionality of co-payments assessed for certain treatment provided to him. Finally, Moore contends that correctional officials subjected him to unconstitutional conditions. Moore names as defendants Corizon Medical Services, the contract medical care provider for the state prison system;
The defendants filed a special report and relevant evidentiary materials in support of their report, including affidavits and certified copies of Moore's medical records, addressing the claims raised in the complaint. In these documents, the medical and correctional defendants maintain they did not act with deliberate indifference to Moore's medical needs and the correctional defendants deny they subjected Moore to unconstitutional conditions.
After reviewing the special report filed by the defendants, the court issued an order on March 22, 2016 directing Moore to file a response to each of the arguments set forth by the defendants in their report, supported by affidavits or statements made under penalty of perjury and other evidentiary materials. Doc. 43 at 2. The order specifically cautioned that "unless within fifteen (15) days from the date of this order a party . . . presents sufficient legal cause why such action should not be undertaken . . . the court may at any time [after expiration of the time for the plaintiff filing a response to this order] and without further notice to the parties (1) treat the special report and any supporting evidentiary materials as a motion for summary judgment and (2) after considering any response as allowed by this order, rule on the motion for summary judgment in accordance with the law." Doc. 43 at 3. Moore filed a sworn response to this order on April 18, 2016. Doc. 49.
Pursuant to the directives of the order entered on March 22, 2016, the court now treats the defendants' report as a motion for summary judgment and concludes that summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the defendants.
"Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ("The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."). The party moving for summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the [record, including pleadings, discovery materials and affidavits], which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue [dispute] of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 593 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that moving party has initial burden of showing there is no genuine dispute of material fact for trial). The movant may meet this burden by presenting evidence indicating there is no dispute of material fact or by showing that the nonmoving party has failed to present appropriate evidence in support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-24; Moton v. Cowart, 631 F.3d 1337, 1341 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that moving party discharges his burden by showing the record lacks evidence to support the nonmoving party's case or the nonmoving party would be unable to prove his case at trial).
When the defendants meet their evidentiary burden, as they have in this case, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish, with appropriate evidence beyond the pleadings, that a genuine dispute material to his case exists. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(3); Jeffery, 64 F.3d at 593-94 (holding that, once a moving party meets its burden, "the non-moving party must then go beyond the pleadings, and by its own affidavits [or statements made under penalty of perjury], or by depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file," demonstrate that there is a genuine dispute of material fact). In civil actions filed by inmates, federal courts "must distinguish between evidence of disputed facts and disputed matters of professional judgment. In respect to the latter, our inferences must accord deference to the views of prison authorities. Unless a prisoner can point to sufficient evidence regarding such issues of judgment to allow him to prevail on the merits, he cannot prevail at the summary judgment stage." Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 530 (2006) (internal citation omitted). This court will also consider "specific facts" pled in a plaintiff's sworn complaint when considering his opposition to summary judgment. Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1098 (11th Cir. 2014). A genuine dispute of material fact exists when the nonmoving party produces evidence that would allow a reasonable factfinder to return a verdict in its favor such that summary judgment is not warranted. Greenberg, 498 F.3d at 1263; Allen v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. for Bibb Cnty., 495 F.3d 1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2007). "The mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat summary judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting the outcome of the case." McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). "[T]here must exist a conflict in substantial evidence to pose a jury question." Hall v. Sunjoy Indus. Group, Inc., 764 F.Supp.2d 1297, 1301 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (citation omitted). "When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment." Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).
Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and pro se complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation, a pro se litigant does not escape the burden of establishing by sufficient evidence a genuine dispute of material fact. See Beard, 548 U.S. at 525; Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11th Cir. 1990). Thus, Moore's pro se status alone does not compel this court to disregard elementary principles of production and proof in a civil case.
The court has undertaken a thorough and exhaustive review of all the evidence contained in the record. After this review, the court finds that Moore has failed to demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact in order to preclude entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
To the extent Moore lodges claims against the correctional defendants in their official capacities and seeks monetary damages, these defendants are entitled to absolute immunity. Official capacity lawsuits are "in all respects other than name . . . treated as a suit against the entity." Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). As the Eleventh Circuit has held,
Selensky v. Alabama, 619 F. App'x 846, 848-49 (11th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, a state official may not be sued in his official capacity unless the state has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984), or Congress has abrogated the State's immunity, see Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996).
Selensky, 619 F. App'x at 849 (citing Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978)). "Alabama has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity in § 1983 cases, nor has Congress abated it." Holmes v. Hale, 701 F. App'x 751, 753 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing Carr v. City of Florence, Ala., 916 F.2d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir. 1990)).
In light of the foregoing, defendants Forniss, Daniels, Thomas and Crow are entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment for all claims seeking monetary damages from them in their official capacities. Selensky, 619 F. App'x at 849; Harbert Int'l, Inc. v. James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1277 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that state officials sued in their official capacities are protected under the Eleventh Amendment from suit for damages); Edwards v. Wallace Comm. College, 49 F.3d 1517, 1524 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that damages are unavailable from a state official sued in his official capacity).
The claims presently before this court address medical treatment provided to Moore from mid-September 2014 until the filing of the instant complaint in early January 2016.
To prevail on a claim concerning an alleged denial of medical treatment, an inmate must—at a minimum—show that the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2000); McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 1999); Waldrop v. Evans, 871 F.2d 1030, 1033 (11th Cir. 1989). Medical and correctional personnel may not subject an inmate to "acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs." Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537, 1546 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding, as directed by Estelle, that a plaintiff must establish "not merely the knowledge of a condition, but the knowledge of necessary treatment coupled with a refusal to treat or a delay in [the acknowledged necessary] treatment").
Hinson v. Edmond, 192 F.3d 1342, 1345 (11th Cir. 1999).
An Eighth Amendment violation requires proof of both objective and subjective elements. Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1099 (11th Cir. 2014). With respect to the requisite objective elements of a deliberate indifference claim, an inmate must first show "an objectively substantial risk of serious harm . . . exist[ed]. Second, once it is established that the official [was] aware of this substantial risk, the official must [have] react[ed] to this risk in an objectively unreasonable manner." Marsh, 268 F.3d at 1028-29. As to the subjective elements, "the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. . . . The Eighth Amendment does not outlaw cruel and unusual conditions; it outlaws cruel and unusual punishments. . . . [A]n official's failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be condemned as the infliction of punishment." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837-38 (internal quotation marks omitted); Campbell v. Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353, 1364 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838) ("Proof that the defendant should have perceived the risk, but did not, is insufficient."); Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1491 (11th Cir. 1996) (same). The conduct at issue "must involve more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner's interests or safety. . . . It is obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith, that characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, whether that conduct occurs in connection with establishing conditions of confinement, supplying medical needs, [providing security for inmates], or restoring official control over a tumultuous cellblock." Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986).
In order to establish "deliberate indifference to [a] serious medical need . . ., Plaintiff[] must show: (1) a serious medical need; (2) the defendant['s] deliberate indifference to that need; and (3) causation between that indifference and the plaintiff's injury." Mann v. Taser Int'l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2009). When seeking relief based on deliberate indifference, an inmate is required to establish "an objectively serious need, an objectively insufficient response to that need, subjective awareness of facts signaling the need and an actual inference of required action from those facts." Taylor, 221 F.3d at 1258; McElligott, 182 F.3d at 1255 (holding that, for liability to attach, the official must know of and then disregard an excessive risk to the prisoner). Regarding the objective component of a deliberate indifference claim, the plaintiff must first show "an objectively serious medical need[] . . . and second, that the response made by [the defendants] to that need was poor enough to constitute an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, and not merely accidental inadequacy, negligen[ce] in diagnos[is] or treat[ment], or even [m]edical malpractice actionable under state law." Taylor, 221 F.3d at 1258 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). To proceed on a claim challenging the constitutionality of medical care, "[t]he facts alleged must do more than contend medical malpractice, misdiagnosis, accidents, [or] poor exercise of medical judgment." Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-33 (1986).
In addition, "to show the required subjective intent . . ., a plaintiff must demonstrate that the public official acted with an attitude of deliberate indifference . . . which is in turn defined as requiring two separate things[:] awareness of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists [] and . . . draw[ing] of the inference[.]" Taylor, 221 F.3d at 1258 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, deliberate indifference occurs only when a defendant "knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the [defendant] must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists and he must also draw the inference." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; Johnson v. Quinones, 145 F.3d 164, 168 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that defendant must have actual knowledge of a serious condition, not just knowledge of symptoms, and ignore known risk to serious condition to warrant finding of deliberate indifference). Furthermore, "an official's failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be condemned as the infliction of punishment." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838. When medical personnel attempt to diagnose and treat an inmate, the mere fact that the chosen "treatment was ineffectual . . . does not mean that those responsible for it were deliberately indifferent." Massey v. Montgomery Cnty. Det. Facility, 646 F. App'x 777, 780 (11th Cir. 2016).
Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1505 (11th Cir. 1991). "[A]s Estelle teaches, whether government actors should have employed additional diagnostic techniques or forms of treatment is a classic example of a matter for medical judgment and therefore not an appropriate basis for grounding liability under the Eighth Amendment." Adams, 61 F.3d at 1545 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To show deliberate indifference, the plaintiff must demonstrate a serious medical need and then must establish that the defendant's response to the need was more than "merely accidental inadequacy, negligence in diagnosis or treatment, or even medical malpractice actionable under state law." Taylor, 221 F.3d at 1258 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Garvin v. Armstrong, 236 F.3d 896, 898 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that "[a] difference of opinion as to how a condition should be treated does not give rise to a constitutional violation"); Hamm v. DeKalb Cnty., 774 F.2d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that the mere fact an inmate desires a different mode of medical treatment does not amount to deliberate indifference violative of the Constitution); Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that prison medical personnel do not violate the Eighth Amendment simply because their opinions concerning medical treatment conflict with that of the inmate-patient); Amarir v. Hill, 243 F. App'x 353, 354 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that defendant's "denial of plaintiff's request to see an outside specialist . . . did not amount to deliberate indifference"); Arzaga v. Lovett, 2015 WL 4879453, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2015) (finding that plaintiff's preference for a second opinion is "not enough to establish defendant's deliberate indifference" as the allegation does "not show that defendant knowingly disregarded a serious risk of harm to plaintiff" nor that defendant "exposed plaintiff to any serious risk of harm").
Moore asserts he suffers pain in his back, hips, and knees due to degenerative bone spurring with swelling to the hands, fingers and toes for which he has been denied appropriate medication to alleviate his pain and diagnostic tests to determine the source of his pain. Doc. 1 at 4. Moore further contends that his attending physicians did not prescribe narcotics or Ultram,
The medical defendants adamantly deny that they acted with deliberate indifference to Moore's medical needs during the time relevant to this complaint or at any other time. Instead, they maintain that Moore had continuous access to health care personnel and received treatment from medical professionals for his chronic pain, including evaluations and examinations by the nursing staff comprised of licensed practical nurses, registered nurses, and certified registered nurse practitioners
The defendants submitted affidavits and relevant medical records in response to the claims presented by Moore. The affidavits are corroborated by the objective medical records contemporaneously compiled throughout the treatment process. In his affidavit, Dr. Hood provides a synopsis of the treatment provided to Moore upon his transfer Draper.
Doc. 42-1 at 11-14 (paragraph numbering omitted and footnote added).
With respect to the treatment provided to Moore since September of 2014, Dr. Ronnie Herring, the Medical Director at Staton, states as follows:
42-2 at 2-9 (paragraph numbering omitted).
Doc. 42-3 at 2-3 (paragraph numbering omitted).
Additionally, Tammra Wood, a Licensed Practical Nurse, asserts that:
Doc. 42-7 at 1-3.
The medical records indicate that on June 26, 2014, a date outside the period of time addressed in this complaint, Defendant Burns, an LPN at Staton, addressed a sick call request filed by Moore on June 25, 2014 in which he sought renewal of his pain medications and a bottom bunk profile. Doc. 42-12 at 16-18. Nurse Burns evaluated the plaintiff's condition, provided over-the-counter medication to him and requested a referral to the medial provider. Doc. 42-12 at 16. As an LPN, Burns could not prescribe medication or issue the requested medical profile. Finally, the remaining medical defendants filed affidavits detailing the limited scope of their interactions with Moore and denying any deliberate indifference to his medical needs. Docs. 42-4, 42-5, 42-6, 42-8 & 42-9.
In addition to the foregoing statements, the Medication Administration Records contradict Moore's assertion that the defendants denied him medication for treatment of the pain associated with his osteoarthritis. Specifically, these records, with respect to information relevant to the claims made the basis of the instant complaint, demonstrate that medical personnel routinely prescribed Moore medications in an effort to alleviate the pain associated with his arthritic condition. From August of 2014 through November of 2015, Moore received prescriptions for an analgesic balm, Ultram, Mobic, Prednisone, and Tylenol. Doc. 42-14 at 18-32. Moreover, it is undisputed that medical personnel issued profiles to Moore when they deemed his condition warranted this action. Doc. 42-14 at 7-8, 13-14, 16 & 18.
Under the circumstances of this case, the court concludes that the course of treatment undertaken by the medical staff at Staton did not violate Moore's constitutional rights. In sum, there is no evidence upon which the court could conclude that any member of the medical staff who provided treatment to Moore acted in a manner that was "so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to the fundamental fairness." Harris, 941 F.2d at 1505. Rather, the evidence before the court demonstrates that medical personnel, including the nursing staff and site physicians at Staton, examined Moore for his complaints of pain associated with osteoarthritis, prescribed medications to Moore in an effort to treat his pain, ordered x-rays to aid in treating his condition, and issued special needs profiles when warranted. Whether medical personnel "should have [utilized] additional diagnostic techniques or forms of treatment `is a classic example of a matter for medical judgment' and therefore not an appropriate basis for grounding liability under the Eighth Amendment." Adams, 61 F.3d at 1545 (internal citation omitted). In addition, to the extent Moore complains that his physicians should have allowed continuous prescriptions for narcotic and opioid pain relievers or pursued a mode of treatment other than that prescribed, this allegation does not "rise beyond negligence to the level of [deliberate indifference]." Howell v. Evans, 922 F.2d 712, 721 (11th Cir. 1991); Hamm, 774 F.2d at 1505 (holding that inmate's desire for some other form of medical treatment does not constitute deliberate indifference violative of the Constitution); Franklin, 662 F.2d at 1344 (holding that simple divergence of opinions between medical personnel and inmate-patient do not violate the Eighth Amendment).
As a result, the court concludes that the alleged lack of medical treatment made the basis of the instant complaint did not constitute deliberate indifference. Moore's self-serving statements of a lack of due care and deliberate indifference do not create a question of fact in the face of contradictory, contemporaneously created medical records. Whitehead, 403 F. App'x 401, 403 (11th Cir. 2010); see also Scott, 550 U.S. at 380 (2007) (holding that "[w]hen opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment"); Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach, 707 F.3d 1244, 1253-54 (11th Cir. 2013) (same). In addition, Moore has failed to present any evidence showing that the manner in which the medical defendants addressed his condition created a substantial risk to his health that the attending health care personnel consciously disregarded. The record is therefore devoid of evidence—significantly probative or otherwise—showing that any medical professional acted with deliberate indifference to a serious medical need experienced by Moore. Consequently, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the medical defendants.
Defendants Forniss, Daniels, Thomas, and Crow aver that Moore has access to treatment from professional medical personnel while incarcerated in the state prison system. Doc. 42-10 at 2. And it is clear from the medical records that the correctional defendants are not in any way involved in decisions regarding the medical treatment provided to Moore because these decisions were made solely by healthcare professionals employed by Corizon.
Moore has failed to establish deliberate indifference on the part of Defendants Forniss, Daniels, Thomas, and Crow. Specifically, Moore has not demonstrated that these defendants were aware of facts establishing "an objectively serious medical need" or that these defendants disregarded any known serious risk to Moore's health resulting from his osteoarthritis. Taylor, 221 F.3d at 1258; McElligott, 182 F.3d at 1255 (holding that, for liability to attach, the official must know of and then disregard an excessive risk of harm to the inmate); Quinones, 145 F.3d at 168 (holding that defendant must have actual knowledge of a serious condition, not just knowledge of symptoms, and ignore known risk to serious condition to warrant finding of deliberate indifference); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838 (holding that failure to alleviate significant risk that officer "should have perceived but did not" does not constitute deliberate indifference). Consequently, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the correctional defendants on Moore's claim alleging deliberate indifference arising from the actions of medical personnel in treating his pain.
Insofar as Moore seeks to hold Defendants Forniss, Daniels, Thomas, and Crow liable for the treatment provided by medical professionals, he is likewise entitled to no relief as "[t]he law does not impose upon correctional officials a duty to directly supervise health care personnel, to set treatment policy for the medical staff or to intervene in treatment decisions where they have no actual knowledge that intervention is necessary to prevent a constitutional wrong." Cameron v. Allen, et al., 525 F.Supp.2d 1302, 1307 (M.D. Ala. 2007) (citations omitted).
Even assuming arguendo that Defendants Forniss, Daniels, Thomas, and Crow exerted some control over the manner in which those persons responsible for the provision of medical treatment rendered such treatment, the law is well settled "that Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates [or co-workers] under the theory of respondeat superior [or vicarious liability]. . . . A public officer or agent is not responsible for the misfeasances or positive wrongs, or for the nonfeasances, or negligences, or omissions of duty, of the subagents or servants or other persons properly employed [alongside,] by or under him, in the discharge of his official duties. Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (internal quotation marks, citation, and parentheses omitted); Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that "supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability."); Marsh v. Butler Cnty., 268 F.3d 1014, 1035 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that a supervisory official "can have no respondeat superior liability for a section 1983 claim"); Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1234 (11th Cir.2003) (holding that concluding supervisory officials are not liable on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability); Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11th Cir. 1999 (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not allow a plaintiff to hold supervisory officials liable for the actions of their subordinates under either a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability). "Absent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677. Thus, liability for actions of others could attach to the above-named defendants only if they "personally participate[d] in the alleged unconstitutional conduct or [if] there is a causal connection between [their] actions . . . and the alleged constitutional deprivation." Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360.
The record establishes that Defendants Forniss, Daniels, Thomas, and Crow did not personally participate or have any involvement, direct or otherwise, in the medical treatment provided to Moore. The evidentiary materials before the court further demonstrate that medical personnel made all decisions relative to the treatment provided to Moore and rendered treatment to him in accordance with their professional judgment upon assessment of his physical condition.
In light of the foregoing, Defendants Forniss, Daniels, Thomas, and Crow can be held liable for decisions of medical personnel only if they undertook actions which bear a causal relationship to the purported violation of Moore's constitutional rights. To establish the requisite causal connection and therefore avoid entry of summary judgment in favor of the correctional defendants, Moore must present sufficient evidence which would be admissible at trial of either "a history of widespread abuse [that] put[] [the defendants] on notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation, and [they] fail[ed] to do so" or a "custom or policy [that] result[ed] in deliberate indifference to [his medical needs], or . . . facts [that] support an inference that [the correctional defendants] directed the [facility's health care staff] to act unlawfully, or knew that [the staff] would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so." Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360 (internal punctuation and citations omitted). After extensive review of the pleadings and evidentiary materials submitted in this case, the court concludes that Moore has failed to meet this burden.
The record contains no probative evidence to support an inference that Defendants Forniss, Daniels, Thomas, and Crow directed medical personnel to act unlawfully or knew that they would act unlawfully and failed to stop them. In addition, Moore has presented no evidence of obvious, flagrant, or rampant abuse of continuing duration regarding his receipt of medical treatment in the face of which these defendants failed to take corrective action; instead, the undisputed medical records indicate that Moore had continuous access to medical personnel and received treatment for his pain. The undisputed records also demonstrate that the challenged course of medical treatment did not occur pursuant to a policy enacted by the correctional defendants. Thus, the requisite causal connection does not exist in this case and liability under the custom or policy standard is not justified. Cf. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990); Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
For the foregoing reasons, summary judgment is likewise due to be granted in favor of defendants Forniss, Daniels, Thomas, and Crow with respect to liability based on the theory of respondeat superior. Furthermore, as previously determined, even if Moore had presented a proper basis for the claims lodged against the correctional defendants, Staton healthcare personnel did not act with deliberate indifference to his medical needs.
Moore also complains that the prison system is overcrowded and that this overcrowding causes deficient healthcare services and safety issues. He further alleges that prior to the issuance of his medical profiles he occasionally slept on the floor instead of his assigned top bunk, had to cross various outside yards to reach the dining hall, and stood in line to eat. Under the circumstances of this case, the court finds that the conditions about which Moore complains do not rise to the level of constitutional violations.
Although overcrowding and safety issues exist in the Alabama prison system, these facts, standing alone, are not dispositive of the issues before this court. Only actions that deny inmates "the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities" are grave enough to establish constitutional violations. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). The Eighth Amendment proscribes those conditions of confinement which involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain. Id. at 346. Specifically, it is concerned with "deprivations of essential food, medical care, or sanitation" and "other conditions intolerable for prison confinement." Id. at 348 (citation omitted). Prison conditions which may be "restrictive and even harsh, are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society" and, therefore, do not necessarily constitute cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment. Id. Conditions, however, may not be "barbarous" nor may they contravene society's "evolving standards of decency." Id. at 345-46. Although "[t]he Constitution `does not mandate comfortable prisons' . . . neither does it permit inhumane ones[.]" Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832 (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 349). Thus, a prisoner's conditions of confinement are subject to constitutional scrutiny. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993).
A prison official has a duty under the Eight Amendment to "provide humane conditions of confinement; prison officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must `take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.'" Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832 (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984)); Helling, 509 U.S. at 31-32. For liability to attach, the challenged prison condition must be "extreme" and must pose "an unreasonable risk of serious damage to [the inmate's] future health." Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1289-90 (11th Cir. 2004). As with deliberate indifference claims, to demonstrate an Eighth Amendment violation regarding conditions of confinement, a prisoner must satisfy both an objective and a subjective inquiry. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. The court described above the applicable standard for establishing the objective and subjective elements of an Eighth Amendment claim.
The living conditions within a correctional facility will constitute cruel and unusual punishment when the conditions involve or result in "wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain, [or] . . . [are] grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime warranting imprisonment." Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. "Conditions . . . alone or in combination, may deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities. Such conditions could be cruel and unusual under the contemporary standard of decency. . . . But conditions that cannot be said to be cruel and unusual under contemporary standards are not unconstitutional." Id. at 347. In a case involving conditions of confinement generally or several different conditions, the court should consider whether the claims together amount to conditions which fall below constitutional standards. Hamm v. De Kalb County, 774 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1985); see Chandler v. Baird, 926 F.2d 1057 (11th Cir. 1991).
The court's consideration of whether the totality of a plaintiff's claims amount to conditions which fall below applicable constitutional standards is limited by the Supreme Court's admonishment that "
As previously stated, a prison official may likewise be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for acting with deliberate indifference to an inmate's health or safety when the official knows that the inmate faces "a substantial risk of serious harm" and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828. "The known risk of injury must be a strong likelihood, rather than a mere possibility before [the responsible official's] failure to act can constitute deliberate indifference." Brown v. Hughes, 894 F.2d 1533, 1537 (11th Cir. 1990) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). As a result, mere negligence "does not justify liability under section 1983[.]" Id.
Moore's general allegations regarding the conditions present at Staton do not establish that the challenged conditions denied him the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities or subjected him to a wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298-99; Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. The conditions referenced by Moore, though uncomfortable, inconvenient, unpleasant, or objectionable, were not so extreme as to violate the Constitution. See Baird, 926 F.2d at 1289. Moore does not allege, much less demonstrate, that he suffered the deprivation of a single individual human need. Moreover, Moore fails to demonstrate deliberate indifference or reckless disregard by the defendants with respect to the challenged conditions. Specifically, he does not identify any particular condition of which the defendants were aware from which an inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm existed. The record is also devoid of any evidence showing that the defendants drew the requisite inference. Consequently, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the defendants on the plaintiff's claims attacking the conditions of confinement at Staton. See McElligott, 182 F.3d at 1255; Carter, 352 F.3d at 1349-50.
In the complaint, Moore makes a number of references to co-payments charged for treatment provided by medical personnel other than physicians. To the extent Moore challenges the constitutionality of these co-payments, he is entitled to no relief.
The charging of a co-payment for medical treatment provided to an inmate, standing alone, does not violate the Constitution. The simple fact that Moore is charged a nominal fee or co-payment for medical treatment does not in any way deprive him of a protected right, privilege or immunity. Shapley v. Nev. Bd. of St. Prison Comm., 766 F.2d 404, 408 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that imposition of fee for medical treatment provided to an inmate does not amount to a constitutional violation); Jones v. Corizon, 2015 WL 5013954 at *17 (M.D. Ala. 2015) (finding that charging of a co-payment for treatment provided each time inmate seeks treatment through the sick call process is not violative of the Constitution); Bester v. Wilson, 2000 WL 1367984 at *8 (S.D. Ala. August 18, 2000); (finding that "the charging of a fee to prisoners for medical treatment from their [available] funds has been held to be constitutional when challenged on several due process and Eighth Amendment grounds"). There is no evidence before the court that Moore was denied medical treatment due to his inability to pay the applicable fee; instead, the evidentiary materials establish that Moore received medical treatment regardless of whether he possessed the ability to make a co-payment. Since Moore has failed to allege a violation of his constitutional rights with respect to the assessment and collection of fees associated with medical treatment, the defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:
On or before
Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation shall bar a party from a de novo determination by the District Court of factual findings and legal issues covered in the report and shall "waive the right to challenge on appeal the district court's order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions" except upon grounds of plain error if necessary in the interests of justice. 11th Cir. R. 3-1; see Resolution Trust Co. v. Hallmark Builders, Inc., 996 F.2d 1144, 1149 (11th Cir. 1993); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989).
