Filed: Mar. 27, 2019
Latest Update: Mar. 27, 2019
Summary: ORDER MYRON H. THOMPSON , District Judge . It is ORDERED as follows: (1) Plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint (doc. no. 62) is denied. (2) Defendants' motion to quash post-judgment discovery (doc. no. 65) is denied. * * * Plaintiff brings its motion to amend the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. But that rule "governs amendment of pleadings before judgment is entered; it has no application after judgment is entered." Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic Int'l., Inc., 626
Summary: ORDER MYRON H. THOMPSON , District Judge . It is ORDERED as follows: (1) Plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint (doc. no. 62) is denied. (2) Defendants' motion to quash post-judgment discovery (doc. no. 65) is denied. * * * Plaintiff brings its motion to amend the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. But that rule "governs amendment of pleadings before judgment is entered; it has no application after judgment is entered." Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic Int'l., Inc., 626 ..
More
ORDER
MYRON H. THOMPSON, District Judge.
It is ORDERED as follows:
(1) Plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint (doc. no. 62) is denied.
(2) Defendants' motion to quash post-judgment discovery (doc. no. 65) is denied.
* * *
Plaintiff brings its motion to amend the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. But that rule "governs amendment of pleadings before judgment is entered; it has no application after judgment is entered." Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic Int'l., Inc., 626 F.3d 1327, 1344 (11th Cir. 2010) (emphasis in original). "Post-judgment, the plaintiff may seek leave to amend if he is granted relief under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b)(6)." Id. at 1344-45 (quoting United States ex rel. Atkins v. McInteer, 470 F.3d 1350, 1361 n.22 (11th Cir. 2006)).
The court entered judgment confirming the arbitral award on September 4, 2018. Plaintiff had 28 days after entry of judgment to move to alter or amend that judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). It did not do so.
That leaves Rule 60(b)(6). That rule provides that, upon "motion and just terms," the court may relieve a party "from a final judgment, order, or proceeding" for "any . . . reason that justifies relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). Plaintiff did not move for relief from the court's judgment of September 4, 2018. Nor could it, unless plaintiff wishes to upset a judgment that confirmed an arbitral award in its favor. Because plaintiff did not seek relief under Rules 59(e) or 60(b)(6), its motion to amend the complaint was denied.
As to defendants' motion to quash, they concede that the court's denial of plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint moots their objections to post-judgment discovery. Defendants also state that, notwithstanding their arguments against post-judgment discovery, they "acknowledge and agree that if the Court denies Plaintiff's Motion [to amend the complaint], then Defendants are subject to post-judgment discovery as to the assets and disposition of assets of [defendants] Ravello and Cheyenne." Defendants' Reply (doc. no. 75) at 4. Defendants "also agree" that defendant Rosencrants "would then be subject to such post-judgment discovery, but only insofar as it relates to Ravello and Cheyenne."* Defendants' motion to quash post-judgment discovery was therefore denied based on defendants' concessions.
