MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER
EMILY C. MARKS, District Judge.
Plaintiff Sanitha Ingram ("Ingram") initiated this suit on March 5, 2019, by filing a complaint in the Circuit Court of Houston County, Alabama against Defendant Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. ("Hobby Lobby"). (Doc. 1-1). Ingram alleges that on or about July 5, 2017, she sustained severe injuries when she slipped and fell on glitter in a store owned and operated by Hobby Lobby in Dothan, Alabama. (Id. at ¶¶ 4-6). Ingram claims that her injuries are the result of Hobby Lobby's negligence and/or wantonness and she seeks compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 3-4.
On March 13, 2019, Hobby Lobby removed the case to this Court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and § 1441. Ingram is a citizen of the state of Alabama, and the notice of removal asserts that Hobby Lobby is a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Oklahoma with its principal place of business in Oklahoma. (Doc. 1 at 2). Although Ingram seeks compensatory and punitive damages, her complaint does not specify an amount of damages. In its notice of removal, Hobby Lobby alleges that the Court has jurisdiction over this matter because the parties are citizens from different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs because Plaintiff's "[c]ounsel submitted a settlement demand . . . plac[ing] the settlement value of her lawsuit against Hobby Lobby at $185,000 in total and offered an abundance of specific information to support her claim for damages." (Doc. 1 at 4, ¶ 11).
On April 11, 2019, the Plaintiff filed a motion to remand (doc. 5) which is opposed by Hobby Lobby. (Doc. 10). The motion to remand is fully briefed, under submission, and ready for resolution without oral argument. Upon consideration of the motion, and for the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that the motion to remand is due to be DENIED.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In examining the issue of jurisdiction upon which the Defendant premises removal, the Court is mindful of the fact that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir. 1994). "They possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute." Dudley v. Eli Lilley & Co., 778 F.3d 909, 911 (11th Cir. 2014). Congress has empowered the federal courts to hear cases removed by a defendant from state to federal court if the plaintiff could have brought the claims in federal court originally. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).
To establish diversity jurisdiction, the removing party must not only demonstrate that the parties are completely diverse, but, where the amount in controversy is not evident from the face of the complaint, that the amount in controversy exceeds the $75,000 jurisdictional minimum set by 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Pretka v. Kolter City Plaza II, Inc., 608 F.3d 744, 752 (11th Cir. 2010).
Removal statutes are to be strictly construed against removal. Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108 (1941); Burns, 31 F.3d at 1095 ("[R]emoval statutes are construed narrowly; when the parties dispute jurisdiction, uncertainties are resolved in favor of remand."). When a case is removed to federal court, a removing defendant's burden to establish federal jurisdiction is "a heavy one." Pacheco de Perez v. AT&T Co., 139 F.3d 1368, 1380 (11th Cir. 1998). The removing party has the burden of proving that federal jurisdiction exists by a preponderance of the evidence, and the removing party must present facts establishing its right to remove. Williams v. Best Buy Company, Inc., 269 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001). Any questions or doubts are to be resolved in favor of returning the matter to state court on a properly submitted motion to remand. Burns, 31 F.3d at 1095. When the defendant fails to meet its burden, the case must be remanded. Williams, 269 F.3d at 1321.
DISCUSSION
The parties agree that there is complete diversity between them — Ingram is a citizen of Alabama, and Hobby Lobby is considered a citizen of the state of Oklahoma. Relying on the Plaintiff's pre-suit demand letter dated December 6, 2018, Hobby Lobby argues that the demand letter is an "other paper" sufficient to establish that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. (Doc. 1 at 3).
On April 11, 2019, Ingram filed a motion to remand (doc. 5) arguing that Hobby Lobby has failed to "unambiguously establish that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 . . ., and . . . remand is warranted." (Id. at 1). Thus, the issue before the Court is whether Hobby Lobby has met its burden of establishing that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00.
The complaint does not state an amount of damages. Where the amount in controversy is not evident from the face of the complaint, the removing party must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds the $75,000 jurisdictional minimum set by 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Pretka, 608 F.3d at 752; Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1207 (11th Cir. 2007). The Plaintiff argues, however, that because the Defendant relies on the pre-suit demand letter as "other paper," it must "unambiguously establish" that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. (Doc. 5, ¶ 4; Doc. 6, p. 6).
Because the Plaintiff did not specify an amount of damages in her complaint, and because the Defendant removed this case within thirty (30) days of receipt of the complaint, the Court concludes that Hobby Lobby must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy is met. Moreover, even under the heightened "unambiguously established" standard, the Court concludes that the Defendant has established that the amount in controversy is met1
In its notice of removal, Hobby Lobby attached a pre-suit demand letter from Ingram's counsel dated December 6, 2018, that offers to settle all her claims for $185,000. (Doc. 1-3 at 5). The letter describes in detail Ingram's injuries, her medical treatment and expenses, and "[t]he effects of this fall have caused Ingram chronic pain, depression, suffering and financial hardship." (Id. at 4). Counsel for Ingram informed Hobby Lobby that he intended to seek compensatory and punitive damages on behalf of his client. (Id. Ex. B at 1). He listed Ingram's medications and dosages as well as her diagnoses and treatments. (Id. at 2-4). He painstakingly describes her injuries and her prognoses.
Additionally, Ingram had been on a leave of absence from AAA Cooper for a period of one year due to spinal surgery performed in 2016 by Dr. Jeremiah Maddox. She was scheduled to return to work when this fall occurred, but because of said fall, she was unable to do so.
Ms. Ingram's fracture was directly related to the fall she incurred at Hobby Lobby on July 5, 2017 with hip pain exacerbated from this fall. The multiple radiological tests performed during this period indicated that the fracture was distinct and the hip pain was exacerbated by the fall. CAT revealed post-fusion injury to the back and erosion of the distal scaphoid. These declines are confirmed by radiology procedures throughout the treatment period. Ms. Ingram has suffered interference with ADL due to pain upon walking, lying and sitting. Ingram has explicitly followed doctors' orders without elimination of chronic pain doctor reports that radiological results reveal chronic conditions now exist. Arthritis was evidenced on the last radiological procedure that was absent on the initial procedure.
(Id. at 4) (emphasis in the original).
The demand letter enumerates Ingram's medical expenses as of the date of the letter as $37,223.82. (Id. at 4-5). It further states that Ingram is unable to return to work as a result of the fall, and she would continue to have medical expenses associated with her injuries. (Id. at 5). Finally, counsel notifies Hobby Lobby that Ingram will seek punitive damages because "her massive amount of pain and affliction caused her severe distress and anguish." (Id).
There is little dispute that "[a] settlement offer can constitute an `other paper' within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)." Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1213 n.62. And "[w]hile [a] settlement offer, by itself, may not be determinative, it counts for something." Burns, 31 F.3d at 1097. Ingram contends that her pre-suit demand letter was nothing "more than a starting point for negotiation." (Doc. 6 at 5). Relying on Jackson v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., 651 F.Supp.2d 1279 (S.D. Ala. 2009), Ingram labels her letter as "posturing and puffery" and "part of the negotiation process in almost all, if not all, civil cases." (Id. at 6).
When a settlement letter provides little in the way of support or analysis, courts have afforded such settlement offers little weight —writing them off as "puffing and posturing." Wood v. ADT LLC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187063, at *14-15 (M.D. Ala. 2016) (stating that a settlement offer carries "little weight," when there is an "absence of specific information on the basis of the demand."); Jackson, 651 F. Supp. 2d at 1281 (A settlement offer has "little weight" in the amount-in-controversy calculus when it merely "reflect[s] puffing and posturing"). However, in contrast to the cases cited above, the Plaintiff's demand letter set forth in detail her injuries, treatment, medications, medical procedures, medical expenses, and damages. It meticulously explains the nature of Ingram's injuries, her treatment, and how her injuries would support damages in the amount of $185,000. This is not a case where the Plaintiff made conclusory or boilerplate allegations. The comprehensive description of injuries, medical treatment and damages moves this case from the realm of puffery and posturing into a concrete assessment of damages. Notably, nowhere in Plaintiff's Motion to Remand or supporting documents does she affirmatively represent to the Court that the amount in controversy does not exceed $75,000. Only after facing the possibility of having her case remain in federal court does the Plaintiff characterize her settlement demand as "puffing and posturing."
So, plaintiff's claim, when it is specific and in a pleading signed by a lawyer, deserves deference and a presumption of truth. We will not assume — unless given reason to do so — that plaintiff's counsel has falsely represented, or simply does not appreciate, the value of his client's case. Instead, we will assume that plaintiff's counsel best knows the value of his client's case and that counsel is engaging in no deception. We will further presume that plaintiff's counsel understands that, because federal removal jurisdiction is in part determined by the amount of damages a plaintiff seeks, the counsel's choices and representations about damages have important legal consequences and, therefore, raise significant ethical implications for a court officer.
Burns, 31 F.3d at 1095. The Court will take Plaintiff's counsel at his word and credit his assessment of his client's case as valued at $185,000, an amount of which more than exceeds the Court's jurisdictional requirement.
Furthermore, in Roe v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., the Eleventh Circuit held that, when a case is removed on the basis of an initial complaint that does not plead a specific amount of damages, the removing defendant is required to show by a preponderance of the evidence that more likely than not the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional minimum. 613 F.3d 1058, 1061 (11th Cir. 2010). Under Roe, this Court can apply "judicial experience and common sense" to the allegations of the complaint regarding Ingram's injuries and her inability to return to work, and determine that, more likely than not, when coupled with her medical expenses of $37,223.82 by December 2018, Ingram's damages are sufficient to meet the jurisdictional minimum.
Finally, the Plaintiff argues that the Court should consider the Defendant's assessment of her case in determining the amount in controversy. According to Ingram, Hobby Lobby valued the case at $6000 which qualifies for small claims court in Alabama, and thus, should not have been removed to this Court. See Doc. 6 at 7, Doc. 12 at 2. The Defendant's evaluation of the case is immaterial. While the Plaintiff is the master of her complaint, see Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 391 & n. 7, "the removal statute grants the defendant[] a right to a federal forum." Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 137 (2005). The fact the Defendant valued the case significantly lower than the Plaintiff has no bearing on whether the amount of controversy has been established by a preponderance of the evidence.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons as stated, and for good cause, it is ORDERED that the Plaintiff's motion to remand (doc. 5) is DENIED.
CIVIL APPEALS JURISDICTION CHECKLIST
1. Appealable Orders: Courts of Appeals have jurisdiction conferred and strictly limited by statute:
(a) Appeals from final orders pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291: Final orders and judgments of district courts, or final orders of bankruptcy courts which have been appealed to and fully resolved by a district court under 28 U.S.C. § 158, generally are appealable. A final decision is one that "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 701 F.2d 1365, 1368 (11th Cir. 1983) (citing Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233, 65 S.Ct. 631, 633, 89 S.Ct. 911 (1945)). A magistrate judge's report and recommendation is not final and appealable until judgment thereon is entered by a district court judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Perez-Priego v. Alachua County Clerk of Court, 148 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 1998). However, under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3), the Courts of Appeals have jurisdiction over an appeal from a final judgment entered by a magistrate judge, but only if the parties consented to the magistrate's jurisdiction. McNab v. J & J Marine, Inc., 240 F.3d 1326, 1327-28 (11th Cir. 2001).
(b) In cases involving multiple parties or multiple claims, a judgment as to fewer than all parties or all claims is not a final, appealable decision unless the district court has certified the judgment for immediate review under Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). Williams v. Bishop, 732 F.2d 885, 885-86 (11th Cir. 1984). A judgment which resolves all issues except matters, such as attorneys' fees and costs, that are collateral to the merits, is immediately appealable. Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 201, 108 S.Ct. 1717, 1721-22, 100 L.Ed.2d 178 (1988); LaChance v. Duffy's Draft House, Inc., 146 F.3d 832, 837 (11th Cir. 1998).
(c) Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a): Under this section, appeals are permitted from the following types of orders:
i. Orders granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions; However, interlocutory appeals from orders denying temporary restraining orders are not permitted. McDougald v. Jenson, 786 F.2d 1465, 1472-73 (11th Cir. 1986);
ii. Orders appointing receivers or refusing to wind up receiverships; and
iii. Orders determining the rights and liabilities of parties in admiralty cases.
(d) Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and Fed.R.App.P. 5: The certification specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) must be obtained before a petition for permission to appeal is filed in the Court of Appeals. The district court's denial of a motion for certification is not itself appealable.
(e) Appeals pursuant to judicially created exceptions to the finality rule: Limited exceptions are discussed in cases including, but not limited to: Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 1225-26, 93 S.Ct. 1528 (1949); Atlantic Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, Inc., 890 F.2d 371, 376 (11th Cir. 1989); Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 157, 85 S.Ct. 308, 312, 13 L.Ed.2d 199 (1964).
2. Time for Filing: The timely filing of a notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional. Rinaldo v. Corbett, 256 F.3d 1276, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). In civil cases, Fed.R.App.P. 4(a) and (c) set the following time limits:
(a) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1): A notice of appeal in compliance with the requirements set forth in Fed.R.App.P. 3 must be filed in the district court within 30 days after the order or judgment appealed from is entered. However, if the United States or an officer or agency thereof is a party, the notice of appeal must be filed in the district court within 60 days after such entry. THE NOTICE MUST BE RECEIVED AND FILED IN THE DISTRICT COURT NO LATER THAN HE LAST DAY OF THE APPEAL PERIOD — no additional days are provided for mailing. Special filing provisions for inmates are discussed below.
(b) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(3): "If one party timely files a notice of appeal, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date when the first notice was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by this Rule 4(a), whichever period ends later."
(c) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4): If any party makes a timely motion in the district court under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of a type specified in this rule, the time for appeal for all parties runs from the date of entry of the order disposing of the last such timely filed motion.
(d) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(5) and 4(a)(6): Under certain limited circumstances, the district court may extend or reopen the time to file a notice of appeal. Under Rule 4(a)(5), the time may be extended if a motion for an extension is filed within 30 days after expiration of the time otherwise provided to file a notice of appeal, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause. Under Rule 4(a)(6), the time to file an appeal may be reopened if the district court finds, upon motion, that the following conditions are satisfied: the moving party did not receive notice of the entry of the judgment or order within 21 days after entry; the motion is filed within 180 days after the judgment or order is entered or within 14 days after the moving party receives notice, whichever is earlier; and no party would be prejudiced by the reopening.
(e) Fed.R.App.P. 4(c): If an inmate confined to an institution files a notice of appeal in either a civil case or a criminal case, the notice of appeal is timely if it is deposited in the institution's internal mail system on or before the last day for filing. Timely filing may be shown by a declaration in compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746 or a notarized statement, either of which must set forth the date of deposit and state that first-class postage has been prepaid.
3. Format of the notice of appeal: Form 1, Appendix of Forms to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, is a suitable format. See also Fed.R.App.P. 3(c). A pro se notice of appeal must be signed by the appellant.
4. Effect of a notice of appeal: A district court lacks jurisdiction, i.e., authority, to act after the filing of a timely notice of appeal, except for actions in aid of appellate jurisdiction or to rule on a timely motion of the type specified in Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4).
