WALLACE CAPEL, JR., Chief Magistrate Judge.
This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is before the court on a complaint filed by Daniel Bartholomew Clark ("Clark" or "Plaintiff"), a state inmate, in which he challenges conditions present during his prior term of incarceration at the Staton Correctional Facility. Specifically, Clark alleges that the defendants denied him adequate medical treatment for injuries received in an altercation with fellow inmates on May 9, 2016. (Doc. 1 at pp. 2-5.) More specifically, he alleges that the medical provider defendants refused to respond to his sick call requests and grievances, failed to treat his purportedly broken teeth, failed to remove the stitch from his lip and failed to provide him with pain medications. He also alleges that Dr. Herring and Nurse Lyndia Likely were responsible for his placement in a holding cell between May 13, 2016 and May 16, 2016, which had no access to a toilet, lights, water or a bed. Finally, Clark contends that the correctional officials were deliberately indifferent for failing to protect him from attack by fellow inmates on May 9, 2016, and were deliberately indifferent to the conditions of his cell between May 13, 2016, and May 16, 2016. Clark names as correctional defendants, Leeposey Daniels and John Crow, wardens at Staton; and Jarmal Sewell, Anthony Wineberg, Terrance Calvin, Jacob Park, William Tate, Phillip Hill, Aaron Tillman, Daniel Grecu, David Wingrove, Travis Ivey, correctional officers at Staton.
The defendants filed special reports and relevant evidentiary materials in support of their reports, including affidavits and certified copies of Clark's medical records, addressing the claims raised in the complaint, as amended. In these documents, the medical and correctional defendants maintain they did not act with deliberate indifference to Clark's medical needs and the correctional defendants deny they subjected Clark to unconstitutional conditions.
After reviewing the special reports filed by the defendants, the court issued an order on October 13, 2016, directing Clark to file a response to each of the arguments set forth by the defendants in their reports, supported by affidavits or statements made under penalty of perjury and other evidentiary materials. (Doc. 56 at 2-3). The order specifically cautioned that "
Pursuant to the directives of the order entered on October 13, 2016, the court now treats the defendants' report as a motion for summary judgment and concludes that summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the defendants.
On May 9, 2016, at about 4:45 p.m., Clark was discovered by Correctional Lieutenant Jarmal Sewell lying on the floor in Dorm D with injuries to his head and facial area. At about 5:10 p.m. on May 9, he was seen in the Health Care Unit for treatment. (Doc. 51-1 at p. 2). Dr. Herring examined Clark and found him "unresponsive and identified significant head trauma with bilateral hematomas (collection of blood) over and around his eyes." (Doc. 55-1 at ¶ 7). Dr. Herring ordered Clark to be transported via ambulance to Jackson Hospital emergency room for treatment. Id. Clark left Staton for Jackson Hospital by ambulance about 5:25 p.m. He was treated at Jackson and returned the Staton about 10:30 p.m. on May 9. Upon his return, he was examined by a nurse at Staton and it was noted that he was awake, and his vital signs were stable. (Doc. 55-1 at ¶ 10). He was assigned to bed number 17 in the medical observation unit and the correctional staff placed a hold on Mr. Clark for his personal safety following the altercation. Id. Clark was checked by the nursing staff at least three times during the night of May 9. (Doc. 55-1 at ¶ 11).
On May 10, 2016, Dr. Herring entered an order for Clark to receive acetaminophen codeine at 300 mg twice a day for three days and ibuprofen (Motrin) at 400 mg three times a day for seven days. (Doc. 55-1 at ¶ 12). On May 11, 2016, he was examined by a nurse and it was noted that his face and eyes were still swollen. (Doc. 55-1 at ¶ 12). On May 13, 2016, Clark's condition had "improved significantly" and he was moved to a holding cell off a hallway in the Staton health care unit. (Doc. 55-1 at ¶ 15). On May 14, 2016, he was examined by a nurse and he was found to be "calm and cooperative". He was "alert and oriented and his breathing was even ad unlabored". (Doc. 55-1 at ¶ 16). On May 16, 2016, Clark was transferred from Staton to Draper. Prior to his transport, a Staton nurse performed a body chart on Clark. It was noted that Clark had "multiple healing abrasions with scabs on his back and shoulder. There was swelling and bruising around both of his eyes . . . and scabs in his nasal area." (Doc. 55-1 at ¶ 17).
An investigation of the May 9, 2016 incident concluded that Clark, who was under the influence of a narcotic, approached several inmates and threatened to beat them if they said anything to him. Clark approached inmate Goodwin and swung at him with his right hand. Clark and Goodwin started fighting and inmate Young also joined in the fight against Clark. (Doc. 51-1 at p. 2).
To the extent Clark lodges claims against the correctional defendants in their official capacities and seeks monetary damages, these defendants are entitled to absolute immunity. Official capacity lawsuits are "in all respects other than name, . . . treated as a suit against the entity." Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). As the Eleventh Circuit has held,
Selensky v. Alabama, 619 F. App'x 846, 848-49 (11th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, a state official may not be sued in his official capacity unless the state has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984), or Congress has abrogated the State's immunity, see Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996).
Selensky, 619 F. App'x at 849 (citing Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (consent is prohibited by the Alabama Constitution). "Alabama has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity in § 1983 cases, nor has Congress abated it." Holmes v. Hale, 701 F. App'x 751, 753 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing Carr v. City of Florence, Ala., 916 F.2d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir. 1990)). In light of the foregoing, defendant Jarmal Sewell, and any other defendants whom Clark seeks to sue in their official capacities, are entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment for claims seeking monetary damages from them in their official capacities. Selensky, 619 F. App'x at 849; Harbert Int'l, Inc. v. James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1277 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that state officials sued in their official capacities are protected under the Eleventh Amendment from suit for damages); Edwards v. Wallace Community College, 49 F.3d 1517, 1524 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that damages are unavailable from state official sued in his official capacity).
The law is well-settled that establishment of both objective and subjective elements are necessary to demonstrate a violation of the protections afforded by the Eighth Amendment. Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1099 (11th Cir. 2014). With respect to the requisite objective elements of a deliberate indifference claim, an inmate must first show "an objectively substantial risk of serious harm . . . exist[ed]. Second, once it is established that the official [was] aware of this substantial risk, the official must [have] react[ed] to this risk in an objectively unreasonable manner." Marsh v. Butler Cnty. Ala., 268 F.3d 1014 at 1028-29 (11th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). As to the subjective elements, "the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. . . . The Eighth Amendment does not outlaw cruel and unusual `conditions'; it outlaws cruel and unusual `punishments.'. . . [A]n official's failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be condemned as the infliction of punishment." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837-38 (1994); Campbell v. Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353, 1364 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838) ("Proof that the defendant should have perceived the risk, but did not, is insufficient."); Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1491 (11th Cir. 1996) (same). The conduct at issue "must involve more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner's interests or safety. . . . It is obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith, that characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, whether that conduct occurs in connection with establishing conditions of confinement, supplying medical needs, or restoring official control over a tumultuous cellblock." Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986).
Carter v. Galloway, 352 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2003). A defendant's subjective knowledge of the risk must be specific to that defendant because "imputed or collective knowledge cannot serve as the basis for a claim of deliberate indifference. . . . Each individual Defendant must be judged separately and on the basis of what that person [knew at the time of the incident]." Burnette v. Taylor, 533 F.3d 1325, 1331 (11th Cir. 2008). Moreover, "[t]he known risk of injury must be a strong likelihood, rather than a mere possibility before a [state official's] failure to act can constitute deliberate indifference." Brown v. Hughes, 894 F.2d 1533, 1537 (11th Cir. 1990) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, "[m]erely negligent failure to protect an inmate from attack does not justify liability under section 1983." Id.
Clark alleges that the medical defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs when they denied him adequate medical treatment for injuries received in an altercation with fellow inmates on May 9, 2016. (Doc. 1 at pp. 2-5). More specifically, he alleges that the medical provider defendants refused to respond to his sick call requests and grievances, failed to treat his purportedly broken teeth, failed to remove the stitch from his lip and failed to provide him with pain medications. Furthermore, to the extent Clark can be understood to complain that the correctional defendants, as wardens or correctional officers, are responsible for ensuring that he receive appropriate medical treatment, the court will also address these arguments. (Docs. 1 and 30). These assertions entitle Clark to no relief.
Hinson v. Edmond, 192 F.3d 1342, 1345 (11th Cir. 1999).
In order to establish "deliberate indifference to [a] serious medical need . . ., Plaintiff[] must show: (1) a serious medical need; (2) the defendant[`s] deliberate indifference to that need; and (3) causation between that indifference and the plaintiff's injury." Mann v. Taser Int'l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2009). When seeking relief based on deliberate indifference, an inmate is required to establish "an objectively serious need, an objectively insufficient response to that need, subjective awareness of facts signaling the need and an actual inference of required action from those facts." Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254, 1258 (11th Cir. 2000); McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248,1255 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that, for liability to attach, the official must know of and then disregard an excessive risk to the prisoner). Regarding the objective component of a deliberate indifference claim, the plaintiff must first show "an objectively `serious medical need[]' . . . and second, that the response made by [the defendants] to that need was poor enough to constitute `an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,' and not merely accidental inadequacy, `negligen[ce] in diagnos[is] or treat[ment],' or even `[m]edical malpractice' actionable under state law." Taylor, 221 F.3d at 1258 (internal citations omitted). To proceed on a claim challenging the constitutionality of medical care, "[t]he facts alleged must do more than contend medical malpractice, misdiagnosis, accidents, [or] poor exercise of medical judgment." Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-33 (1986).
In addition, "to show the required subjective intent . . ., a plaintiff must demonstrate that the public official acted with an attitude of deliberate indifference . . . which is in turn defined as requiring two separate things[:] awareness of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists [] and . . . draw[ing] of the inference[.]" Taylor, 221 F.3d at 1258 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, deliberate indifference occurs only when a defendant "knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the [defendant] must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists and he must also draw the inference." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; Johnson v. Quinones, 145 F.3d 164, 168 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that defendant must have actual knowledge of a serious condition, not just knowledge of symptoms, and ignore known risk to serious condition to warrant finding of deliberate indifference). Furthermore, "an official's failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be condemned as the infliction of punishment." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838. When medical personnel attempt to diagnose and treat an inmate, the mere fact that the chosen "treatment was ineffectual . . . does not mean that those responsible for it were deliberately indifferent." Massey v. Montgomery Cty. Det. Facility, 646 F. App'x 777, 780 (11th Cir. 2016).
Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1505 (11th Cir. 1991). "[A]s Estelle teaches, whether government actors should have employed additional diagnostic techniques or forms of treatment is a classic example of a matter for medical judgment and therefore not an appropriate basis for grounding liability under the Eighth Amendment." Adams, 61 F.3d at 1545 (citation and internal quotation marks). To show deliberate indifference, the plaintiff must demonstrate a serious medical need and then must establish that the defendant's response to the need was more than "merely accidental inadequacy, negligence in diagnosis or treatment, or even medical malpractice actionable under state law." Taylor, 221 F.3d at 1258 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Garvin v. Armstrong, 236 F.3d 896, 898 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that "[a] difference of opinion as to how a condition should be treated does not give rise to a constitutional violation."); Hamm v. DeKalb Cty., 774 F.2d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that the mere fact an inmate desires a different mode of medical treatment does not amount to deliberate indifference violative of the Constitution); Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that prison medical personnel do not violate the Eighth Amendment simply because their opinions concerning medical treatment conflict with that of the inmate-patient); Amarir v. Hill, 243 F. App'x 353, 354 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that defendant's "denial of plaintiff's request to see an outside specialist . . . did not amount to deliberate indifference."); Arzaga v. Lovett, 2015 WL 4879453, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2015) (finding that plaintiff's preference for a second opinion is "not enough to establish defendant's deliberate indifference" as the allegation does "not show that defendant knowingly disregarded a serious risk of harm to plaintiff" nor that defendant "exposed plaintiff to any serious risk of harm.").
Clark asserts that the medical defendants denied him adequate medical treatment for injuries received in an altercation with fellow inmates on May 9, 2016. (Doc. 1 at pp. 2-5). More specifically, he alleges that the medical provider defendants refused to respond to his sick call requests and grievances, failed treat his purportedly broken teeth, failed to remove the stitch from his lip and failed to provide him with pain medications.
The medical defendants adamantly deny they acted with deliberate indifference to Clark's medical needs during the time relevant to this complaint or at any other time. Instead, these defendants maintain that following the altercation on May 9, 2016, the Staton medical staff prescribed pain medications for him, treated his wounds, ensured his treatment at a local emergency room, referred him for further evaluation by an off-site specialist and ensured the completion of off-site specialty diagnostic studies. The defendants submitted affidavits and relevant medical records in response to the complaint filed by Clark.
Specifically, Defendant Dr. Ronald Herring, who was the Medical Director at Staton from July 22, 2015 until September 6, 2016, reviewed the pertinent medical records and testified by affidavit as follows:
(Doc. 55-1 at pp. 1-12). The medical records further confirm that medical personnel at Staton evaluated Clark each time he appeared at sick call or medical appointments with complaints, assessed his need for treatment, prescribed medications to alleviate the pain associated with his condition when they deemed such necessary, issued medical profiles as warranted, and provided treatment to Clark accordance with their professional judgment. (Docs. 55-2 at pp. 1-61; 55-3 at pp. 1-58). Finally, the remaining medical defendants filed affidavits detailing the limited scope of their interactions with Clark and denying they acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs. (Docs. 55-4, Sagers-Copeland Affid.; 55-5, Myra McVay Affid.; 55-6, Jannaye Talley Affid.; 55-7, Tara Parker Affid.; 55-8, Lyndia Likely Affid.; 55-9, Charlene DeJarnett Affid.; 55-10, Cebria Lee Affid).
In addition to the foregoing statements, the Medication Administration Record contradicts Clark's assertion that the defendants denied him medication for treatment of the pain associated with injuries received in the May 9, 2016 altercation. Specifically, these records demonstrate that medical personnel prescribed Clark medications in an effort to alleviate the pain associated with his injuries. On May 10, 2016, Dr. Herring entered an order for Clark to receive acetaminophen-codeine at 300 mg twice a day for three (3) days and ibuprofen (Motrin) at 400 mg three times a day for seven days for any discomfort. (Doc 55-2 at pp. 4-5). Thereafter, on June 1, 2016, Dr. Herring prescribed ibuprofen at 200 mg for Clark to take twice a day for seven days for any discomfort. (Doc. 55-2 at p. 6). A nurse practitioner on the Staton medical staff renewed the ibuprofen prescription on June 6, 2016 and prescribed 200 mg twice a day for seven days through June 14, 2016. (Doc. 55-2 at p. 7). Providers on the Staton medical staff continued prescribing Clark with medications to address his discomfort and any swelling he experienced, including prescriptions dated June 6, 2016, June 20, 2016, July 8, 2016 and July 15, 2016. (Doc. 55-2 at pp. 4-5).
Moreover, it is undisputed that medical personnel issued profiles to Clark when they deemed his condition warranted such action. Specifically, to address Clark's complaints of headaches and photosensitivity, on June 6, 2016, the nurse practitioner provided him with a lay-in profile for one and a half weeks and ibuprofen to take on an as needed basis. (Doc. 55-2 at p. 40). The nurse practitioner instructed Clark to utilize the sick call process if his symptoms had not improved in two weeks. Id. Two weeks later, on June 20, 2016, the nurse practitioner provided Clark with a profile permitting him to avoid standing for more than ten minutes that remained in effect through July 20, 2016. (Doc. 55-3 at p. 4). Thereafter, on July 15, 2016, a nurse practitioner also provided Clark with a profile restricting him from standing for more than thirty minutes that was valid through August 15, 2016. (Doc. 55-3 at p. 2).
With respect to Clark's specific complaints that defendants failed to respond to his grievances, he was not treated for broken teeth and his stitches were not removed in a timely manner, the records show that these complaints are baseless. First, concerning the grievance response, Defendant Michele Sagers-Copeland, Health Services Administrator at Staton, testified by affidavit as follows:
(Doc. 55-4 at ¶ 16). The Court has independently reviewed the supporting grievance documents and concludes that Defendant Sagers-Copeland responded to all of Clark's grievances and advised him how to obtain medication refills, explained the grievance procedure, ensured Clark was seen by the medical provider and refunded his money for a sick call visit. (Doc. 55-2 at pp. 57-60; Doc 55-3 at p. 30).
Second, concerning Clark's teeth, Dr. Herring testified by affidavit as follows:
(Doc. 55-1 at ¶ 33). The Court has independently reviewed the supporting medical records and concludes that Clark's dental records support Dr. Herring's testimony.
Third, concerning the removal of Clark's stitches, Dr. Herring testified by affidavit as follows:
(Doc. 55-1 at ¶ 34). The Court has independently reviewed the supporting medical records and concludes that Clark's medical records support Dr. Herring's testimony. Moreover, the medical records reflect that on June 22, 2016, the medical provider who removed the stitches noted "Skin well healed. 1 suture removed, no complication and Mr. Clark tolerated the procedure very well." (Doc. 55-3 at p. 11).
Under the circumstances of this case, the court concludes that the course of treatment undertaken by the medical staff at Staton did not violate Clark's constitutional rights. Specifically, there is no evidence upon which the court could conclude that any member of the medical staff who provided treatment to Clark acted in a manner that was "so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to the fundamental fairness." Harris, 941 F.2d at 1505. Rather, the evidence before the court demonstrates that medical personnel, including the nursing staff and site physicians, examined Clark following the May 9, 2016 altercation, prescribed medications to Clark in an effort to treat his pain, treated his wounds, ensured his treatment at a local emergency room, referred him for further evaluation by an off-site specialist and ensured the completion of off-site specialty diagnostic studies. (Doc. 55-1 at ¶¶ 4-37; COR 003-06, 019-118). Whether medical personnel "should have [utilized] additional diagnostic techniques or forms of treatment `is a classic example of a matter for medical judgment' and therefore not an appropriate basis for grounding liability under the Eighth Amendment." Adams, 61 F.3d at 1545 (internal citation omitted). In addition, to the extent Clark complains that his physicians should have allowed continuous prescriptions for pain relievers or pursued a mode of treatment other than that prescribed, this allegation does not "rise beyond negligence to the level of [deliberate indifference]." Howell v. Evans, 922 F.2d 712, 721 (11th Cir. 1991); Hamm, 774 F.2d at 1505 (holding that inmate's desire for some other form of medical treatment does not constitute deliberate indifference violative of the Constitution); Franklin, 662 F.2d at 1344 (holding that simple divergence of opinions between medical personnel and inmate-patient do not violate the Eighth Amendment).
As a result, the court concludes that the alleged lack of medical treatment did not constitute deliberate indifference. Clark's self-serving statements of a lack of due care and deliberate indifference do not create a question of fact in the face of contradictory, contemporaneously created medical records. Whitehead, 403 F. App'x 401, 403 (11th Cir. 2010); see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) ("When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment."); Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach, 707 F.3d 1244, 1253-54 (11th Cir. 2013) (same). In addition, Clark has failed to present any evidence showing that the manner in which the medical defendants addressed his condition created a substantial risk to his health that the attending health care personnel consciously disregarded. The record is therefore devoid of evidence—significantly probative or otherwise—showing that any medical professional acted with deliberate indifference to a serious medical need experienced by Clark. Consequently, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the medical defendants.
To the extent Clark argues that the Correctional Defendants acted in a manner to prevent him access to treatment from professional medical personnel while incarcerated in the state prison system, the Court concludes that this argument lacks merit. Indeed, it is clear from the medical records that the correctional defendants were not in any way involved in decisions regarding the medical treatment provided to Clark as these decisions are made solely by healthcare professionals employed by Corizon.
Clark has failed to establish deliberate indifference on the part of the correctional defendants. Specifically, Clark has not demonstrated that these defendants were aware of facts establishing "an objectively serious medical need" nor that these defendants disregarded any known serious risk to Clark's health. Taylor, 221 F.3d at 1258; McElligott, 182 F.3d at 1255 (for liability to attach, the official must know of and then disregard an excessive risk of harm to the inmate); Quinones, 145 F.3d at 168 (defendant must have actual knowledge of a serious condition, not just knowledge of symptoms, and ignore known risk to serious condition to warrant finding of deliberate indifference); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838 (failure to alleviate significant risk that officer "should have perceived but did not" does not constitute deliberate indifference). Consequently, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the correctional defendants on Clark's claim alleging deliberate indifference arising from the actions of medical personnel in treating his pain.
Insofar as Clark seeks to hold the correctional defendants liable for the treatment provided by medical professionals, he is likewise entitled to no relief as
Cameron v. Allen, et al., 525 F.Supp.2d 1302, 1307 (M.D. Ala. 2007).
Even assuming arguendo that the correctional defendants exerted some control over the manner in which those persons responsible for the provision of medical treatment rendered such treatment, the law is well settled "that Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates [or co-workers] under the theory of respondeat superior [or vicarious liability]. . . . A public officer or agent is not responsible for the misfeasances or position wrongs, or for the nonfeasances, or negligences, or omissions of duty, of the subagents or servants or other persons properly employed [alongside,] by or under him, in the discharge of his official duties. Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (internal quotation marks, citation and parentheses omitted); Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that "supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability."); Marsh, 268 F.3d at 1035 (holding that a supervisory official "can have no respondeat superior liability for a section 1983 claim."); Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1234 (11th Cir.2003) (concluding supervisory officials are not liable on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability); Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not allow a plaintiff to hold supervisory officials liable for the actions of their subordinates under either a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.). "Absent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677, 129 S.Ct. 1949. Thus, liability for actions of the correctional defendants could attach to the other named defendants only if these defendants "personally participate[d] in the alleged unconstitutional conduct or [if] there is a causal connection between [their] actions . . . and the alleged constitutional deprivation." Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360.
The record is clear that the correctional defendants did not personally participate or have any involvement, direct or otherwise, in the medical treatment provided to Clark. The evidentiary materials before the court demonstrate that medical personnel made all decisions relative to the treatment provided to Clark and provided treatment to him in accordance with their professional judgment upon assessment of his physical condition.
In light of the foregoing, the correctional defendants can be held liable for decisions of medical personnel only if they undertook actions which bear a causal relationship to the purported violation of Clark's constitutional rights. To establish the requisite causal connection and therefore avoid entry of summary judgment in favor of the correctional defendants, Clark must present sufficient evidence which would be admissible at trial of either "a history of widespread abuse [that] put [the defendants] on notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation, and [they] fail[ed] to do so" or "a . . . custom or policy [that] result[ed] in deliberate indifference to [his medical needs], or . . . facts [that] support an inference that [the correctional defendants] directed the [facility's health care staff] to act unlawfully, or knew that [the staff] would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so." Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360 (internal punctuation and citations omitted). After extensive review of the pleadings and evidentiary materials submitted in this case, it is clear that Clark has failed to meet this burden.
The record before the court contains no probative evidence to support an inference that the correctional defendants directed medical personnel to act unlawfully or knew that they would act unlawfully and failed to stop such action. In addition, Clark has presented no evidence of obvious, flagrant or rampant abuse of continuing duration regarding his receipt of medical treatment in the face of which these defendants failed to take corrective action; instead, the undisputed medical records indicate that Clark had continuous access to medical personnel and received treatment for his pain. The undisputed records also demonstrate that the challenged course of medical treatment did not occur pursuant to a policy enacted by the correctional defendants. Thus, the requisite causal connection does not exist in this case and liability under the custom or policy standard is not justified. Cf. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990); Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
For the foregoing reasons, summary judgment is likewise due to be granted in favor of the correctional defendants with respect to liability based on the theory of respondeat superior. Furthermore, even had Clark presented a proper basis for the claims lodged against the correctional defendants, the evidentiary materials before the court, including Clark's medical records, demonstrate that health care personnel did not act with deliberate indifference to his medical needs.
Only actions which deny inmates "the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities" are grave enough to establish constitutional violations. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). The Eighth Amendment proscribes those conditions of confinement which involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain. Id. at 346. Specifically, it is concerned with "deprivations of essential food, medical care, or sanitation" and "other conditions intolerable for prison confinement." Id. at 348 (citation omitted). Prison conditions which may be "restrictive and even harsh, are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society" and, therefore, do not necessarily constitute cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment. Id. Conditions, however, may not be "barbarous" nor may they contravene society's "evolving standards of decency." Id. at 345-46. Although "[t]he Constitution `does not mandate comfortable prisons' . . . neither does it permit inhumane ones[.]" Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832 (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 349). Thus, a prisoner's conditions of confinement are subject to constitutional scrutiny. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993).
A prison official has a duty under the Eight Amendment to "provide humane conditions of confinement; prison officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must `take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.'" Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832 (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984)); Helling, 509 U.S. at 31-32. For liability to attach, the challenged prison condition must be "extreme" and must pose "an unreasonable risk of serious damage to [the inmate's] future health." Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1289-90 (11th Cir. 2004). As with deliberate indifference claims, to demonstrate an Eighth Amendment violation regarding conditions of confinement, a prisoner must satisfy both an objective and a subjective inquiry. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. The court previously identified the applicable standard relevant to establishment of the objective and subjective elements of an Eighth Amendment claim. See supra. at 5-6.
The living conditions within a correctional facility will constitute cruel and unusual punishment when the conditions involve or result in "wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain, [or] . . . [are] grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime warranting imprisonment." Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. "Conditions . . . alone or in combination, may deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities. Such conditions could be cruel and unusual under the contemporary standard of decency. . . . But conditions that cannot be said to be cruel and unusual under contemporary standards are not unconstitutional." Id. at 347. In a case involving conditions of confinement generally or several different conditions, the court should consider whether the claims together amount to conditions which fall below constitutional standards. Hamm v. De Kalb County, 774 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1096 (1986); see Chandler v. Baird, 926 F.2d 1057 (11th Cir. 1991).
The court's consideration of whether the totality of a plaintiff's claims amount to conditions which fall below applicable constitutional standards is limited by the Supreme Court's admonishment that "
As previously noted, a prison official may likewise be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for acting with deliberate indifference to an inmate's health or safety when the official knows that the inmate faces "a substantial risk of serious harm" and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828. "The known risk of injury must be a strong likelihood, rather than a mere possibility before [the responsible official's] failure to act can constitute deliberate indifference." Brown v. Hughes, 894 F.2d 1533, 1537 (11th Cir. 1990) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). As the foregoing makes clear, mere negligence "does not justify liability under section 1983[.]" Id.
Clark claims that from May 13, 2016, until May 16, 2016, he was "locked in a room in Staton C.F. Health Unit . . . and there was no toilet, water, lights nor bed. I had to piss in cups and on the wall, floors, and I had to deficate in a brown paper sack." (Doc. 1 at p. 3). The correctional defendants adamantly deny these allegations.
Indeed, Eighth Amendment violations "typically require the presence of intolerable conditions, far worse than those Plaintiff alleges." Id. at *7 (collecting cases); See McCord v. Maggio, 927 F.2d 844, 848 (5th Cir. 1991) (Finding Eighth Amendment violation where a prisoner was forced to live and sleep for two years in an unlit cell with sewage backup and roach infestation); McBride, 240 F. 3d at 1292 (Finding Eighth Amendment violation where inmate was forced to remain in a feces-covered cell for three days); DeSpain v. Uphoff, 264 F.3d 965, 974 (10th Cir. 2001) (Finding Eighth Amendment violation where, for thirty-six hours, after a riot the water overflowed to standing depth of four inches and prisoners urinated into the water where feces and uneaten food floated.) However, the Eleventh Circuit has recognized the existence of an Eighth Amendment violation where the plaintiff alleged "he was denied the ability to use the bathroom or clean himself for a full two days" and "he was `forced to lie in direct and extended contact with this own feces without the ability to clean himself, while confined to a hospital bed in maximum security constraints." Brooks v. Warden Powell, 800 F.3d 1295, 1305 (11th Cir. 2015).
Brooks is distinguishable on its facts from the instant case because Clark does not allege that he was made to lie in contact with his own feces without a manner to clean himself. To the contrary, the facts show that for three days Clark was housed in Hallway cell #1, which had a toilet and running water (Doc. 48-3 at p. 2), and the correctional officers repeatedly inquired about his need to use the restroom and assisted him. (Doc. 48-8; Doc. 48-10; Doc. 50-1). Nevertheless, Clark urinated on the walls and floor of Hallway cell #1 and correctional officer Wingrove cleaned up the mess and brought him a jug to use in case he could not make it to the toilet. (Doc. 48-8; Doc. 50-1). Assuming the truth of Clark's statement, which the Court must do on summary judgment, that he was forced to defecate in paper bag, the Court concludes that this single incident does not rise to the level of the conduct in Brooks where an inmate was shackled to his bed and forced to defecate in his jumpsuit without being cleaned for 2 days. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the plaintiff's allegations fail to satisfy the objective element of an Eighth Amendment violation and summary judgment is therefore due to be granted on this claim. Caldwell, 748 F.3d at 1099.
Clark alleges that the correctional defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his safety by failing to protect him from an assault which occurred in D Dormitory on May 9, 2016. His claim is unavailing. "A prison official's duty under the Eighth Amendment is to ensure reasonable safety, a standard that incorporates due regard for prison officials' unenviable task of keeping dangerous men in safe custody under humane conditions." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844-45. (internal quotations and citations omitted). Officials responsible for prison inmates may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for acting with "deliberate indifference" to an inmate's safety when the official knows that the inmate faces "a substantial risk of serious harm" and with such knowledge disregards the risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. Id. at 828. A constitutional violation occurs only "when a substantial risk of serious harm, of which the official is subjectively aware, exists and the official does not respond reasonably to the risk." Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1358. "It is not, however, every injury suffered by one prisoner at the hands of another that translates into constitutional liability for prison officials responsible for the victim's safety." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. "Within [a prison's] volatile `community,' prison administrators are to take all necessary steps to ensure the safety of . . . the prison staffs and administrative personnel. . . . They are [also] under an obligation to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates themselves." Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984). The Eleventh Circuit has, however, "stress[ed] that a `prison custodian is not the guarantor of a prisoner's safety." Purcell ex rel. Estate of Morgan v. Toombs County, Ga., 400 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Popham v. City of Talladega, 908 F.2d 1561, 1564 (11th Cir. 1990)). "Only `[a] prison official's deliberate indifference to a known, substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment.' Marsh, 268 F.3d 1014 at 1028-29 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc).'" Harrison v. Culliver, 746 F.3d 1288, 1298 (11th Cir. 2014). "In order to state a § 1983 cause of action against prison officials based on a constitutional deprivation [under the Eighth Amendment], there must be at least some allegation of a conscious or callous indifference to a prisoner's rights, thus raising the tort to a constitutional stature." Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1380 (11th Cir. 1982).
Consequently, to proceed beyond the properly supported motion for summary judgment filed by the defendants, Clark must first demonstrate an objectively substantial risk of serious harm existed and "that the defendant[s] disregarded that known risk by failing to respond to it in an objectively reasonable manner." Johnson v. Boyd, 568 F. App'x 719, 721 (11th Cir. 2014), citing Caldwell, 748 F.3d at 1100. If he establishes these objective elements, Clark must then satisfy the subjective component. To do so, Clark "must [show] that the defendant[s] subjectively knew that [he] faced a substantial risk of serious harm. The defendant[s] must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and [they] must also draw the inference." Id. (internal citation omitted).
Johnston v. Crosby, 135 F. App'x 375, 377 (11th Cir. 2005).
Clark alleges that on May 9, 2016, he was "beaten for over 10 to 20 mins. There was only one officer assigned to the dorm that had over 200 inmates & (3) three bays and C.O. Hill was outside." (Doc. 1 at p. 3). However, there is no evidence before the court that "an objectively substantial serious risk of harm", Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828, was posed by the two inmates with whom Clark fought on May 9, 2016. Rather, the incident report states as follows:
(Doc. 51-1 at p. 2). Thus, the evidentiary materials indicate that Clark initiated the altercation with inmates Goodwin and Young. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Clark has failed to demonstrate the objective component necessary to establish deliberate indifference.
Even if Clark had satisfied the objective component, his deliberate indifference claim nevertheless fails as he presented no evidence that the defendants were subjectively aware of any risk of harm to him posed by the other inmates. Specifically, Clark does not allege, and the evidentiary materials do not indicate that he informed any correctional officers that Goodwin or Young had threatened him or presented any danger to him. Johnson, 568 F. App'x at 722 (holding that complaint properly dismissed for failure to state a claim because "[n]owhere does the complaint allege, nor can it be plausibly inferred, that the defendants subjectively foresaw or knew of a substantial risk of injury posed by [inmate-attacker]."); Murphy v. Turpin, 159 F. App'x 945, 948 (11th Cir. 2005) ("[W]e readily conclude the district court did not err by dismissing [Plaintiff's] failure-to-protect charge for failure to state a claim. Simply put, the allegations of [Plaintiff's] complaint do not show the requisite subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm, and, thus, do not state a claim for deliberate indifference resulting from a failure to protect. . . . Put another way, because [Plaintiff] alleged no facts indicating that any officer was aware of a substantial risk of serious harm to him . . . and failed to take protective measures, his claim fails."); Johnston, 135 F. App'x at 377 (holding that defendants were entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff provided no evidence that prison officials "had subjective knowledge of the risk of serious harm presented by [inmate attacker]" and "introduced no evidence indicating that he notified [the defendants] of any particularized threat by [his attacker] nor of any fear [he] felt [from this particular inmate]."); see McBride v. Rivers, 170 F. App'x 648, 655 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that district court properly granted summary judgment to the defendants as Plaintiff "failed to show that the defendants had subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm" because plaintiff merely advised he "had problems" with fellow inmate and was "in fear for [his] life."); Chatham v. Adcock, 334 F. App'x 281, 293-94 (11th Cir. 2009) (Where Plaintiff did "not identif[y] any specific `serious threat' from [fellow inmate]" or report any such threat to the defendants, mere "fact that [attacker] was a `problem inmate' with `violent tendencies' simply `does not satisfy the subjective awareness requirement.'"). In light of the foregoing, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the correctional defendants on the claim alleging they acted with deliberate indifference to Clark's safety.
Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:
On or before
Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation shall bar a party from a de novo determination by the District Court of factual findings and legal issues covered in the report and shall "waive the right to challenge on appeal the district court's order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions" except upon grounds of plain error if necessary in the interests of justice. 11th Cir. R. 3-1; see Resolution Trust Co. v. Hallmark Builders, Inc., 996 F.2d 1144, 1149 (11th Cir. 1993); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989).
