NOT FOR PUBLICATION

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

TAMARA O. MITCHELL, Bankruptcy Judge.

This bankruptcy case is before the Court following the January 23, 2014 hearing on the Bankruptcy Administrator's Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative Convert to Chapter 13 with the Debtor's Consent. Appearing before the Court were David Murphree, counsel for the Debtor; Jon Dudeck, counsel for the Bankruptcy Administrator; and the Debtor. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(b), 151, and 157(a) and the District Court's General Order Of Reference Dated July 16, 1984, As Amended July 17, 1984.1 This is a core proceeding arising under Title 11 of the United States Code as defined in 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A).2 This Court has considered the pleadings, arguments of counsel, the Debtor's testimony and the law, and finds and concludes as follows.3

FINDINGS OF FACT4

Tiffany Mills, the Debtor, filed her Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition on July 2, 2013. Along with the petition and schedules she filed a Chapter 7 Statement of Current Monthly Income and Means-Test Calculation (the "Means Test"). Because Ms. Mills's calculations of her income resulted in her being a below-median-income debtor, the "presumption of abuse" did not arise and she did not complete the portions of the Means Test addressing monthly expenses. On September 6, 2013 the Bankruptcy Administrator filed a Motion to Dismiss or Convert alleging that Ms. Mills's income reported on the Means Test had been understated. On October 3, 2013 the Debtor filed an amended Schedule I and an Affidavit explaining that at the time she filed her bankruptcy case she had been receiving short-term disability that, after deduction of taxes, insurance, and $162.50 per month for the personal use of a company car, resulted in a net pay of $697.99 bi-weekly. Ms. Mills also noted in the Affidavit that after her bankruptcy case she would continue to have ongoing student loan payments in the approximate amount of $650.00 per month. On November 12, 2013 the Debtor filed an amended Means Test on which she increased the amount of her Current Monthly Income5 and completed the remainder of the form, incorporating the $162.50 per month that had been deducted from her pay for her use of the company car. The Bankruptcy Administrator filed a response to the amended Means Test, raising objections to some of the deductions Ms. Mills had taken. Specifically, the Bankruptcy Administrator objected to Ms. Mills's claim of "Local Standards: transportation ownership/lease expense" on Line 23 in the amount of $517.00, asserting that the Debtor did not make loan or lease payments on a car at that time. The Bankruptcy Administrator also objected to Ms. Mills's claim of "Other Necessary Expenses: involuntary deductions for employment" in the amount of $162.50 monthly because this expense was already covered in the Line 22A "vehicle operation" expense deduction. In addition the Bankruptcy Administrator objected to Ms. Mills's claim of $523.78 per month for health insurance, asserting that she paid at most $271.00 per month according to her employee income records and schedules. According to the Bankruptcy Administrator, if the amended Means Test had been completed correctly a presumption of abuse of the provisions of Chapter 7 would have arisen. On December 11, 2013, Ms. Mills filed her second amended Means Test, removing the $162.50 per month involuntary deduction for employment and but adding an "additional expense claim" of $425.00 per month in student loan payments. Her health insurance deduction remained the same. Because of the expense deductions Ms. Mills claimed on the amended Means Test the presumption of abuse did not arise. At the hearing on the Bankruptcy Administrator's Motion to Dismiss, Ms. Mills testified that her health insurance costs as reported on the Means Test seemed "high."

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The Bankruptcy Administrator seeks dismissal or conversion6 of this case on the grounds that granting Chapter 7 relief would be an abuse of the provisions of Chapter 7. According to the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 ("BAPCPA"), Congress was concerned with ensuring that debtors who had the means to pay at least a portion of their debts did so:

In re Champagne, 389 B.R. 191, 197 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2008) (quoting S. Rep. 106-49, at 3 (1999) (available at 1999 WL 300934)). Thus, Congress included in section 707(b) a provision allowing a bankruptcy court to dismiss or convert a case when granting relief would be an abuse7 of the provisions of Chapter 7. See § 707(b)(1). According to section 707(b)(2)(A)(i):

This formula has been incorporated into Bankruptcy Form 22A, Chapter 7 Statement of Current Monthly Income and Means Test Calculation, more commonly known as the "Means Test," which Thus, upon a finding that granting relief in this case would be an abuse of the provisions of Chapter 7, this Court may convert this case to Chapter 13 only with the Debtors' consent; absent consent this Court may only order dismissal of the case. must be completed by every individual debtor filing a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case. For purposes of the Means Test a debtor's actual monthly expenses may or may not be relevant. According to section 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I), "[t]he debtor's monthly expenses shall be the debtor's applicable monthly expense amounts specified under the National Standards and Local Standards, and the debtor's actual monthly expenses for the categories specified as Other Necessary Expenses issued by the Internal Revenue Service for the area in which the debtor resides . . . ." The Bankruptcy Administrator has taken issue with two of the expenses claimed by Ms. Mills; namely, the transportation ownership/lease expense in the amount of $517.00 on Line 23, which is determined by the IRS standards, and the health insurance expense in the amount of $523.78 on Line 34a which is determined by a debtor's actual expenses. The Bankruptcy Administrator asserts that but for these allegedly improper deductions the presumption of abuse would arise under the Means Test.

Line 23 of the Means Test covers a deduction for the "transportation ownership/lease expense" of a vehicle, the amount of which deduction is determined by consulting the IRS standards. Courts were divided as to whether a debtor who owned a vehicle outright could deduct this expense on the Means Test until the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue in Ransom v. FIA Card Services, N.A., 131 S.Ct. 716 (2011). In Ransom, although the debtor owned his car free and clear of liens, he claimed the transportation ownership/lease expense on the Means Test. Id. at 723. The bankruptcy court denied confirmation of the debtor's plan, a decision upheld by the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Id. Affirming the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision, the Supreme Court held:

Id. at 730. The Supreme Court noted that "[a] person who owns a car free and clear is entitled to claim the `Operating Costs' deduction for all these expenses of driving . . . [b]ut such a person is not entitled to claim the `Ownership Costs' deduction, because that allowance is for the separate costs of a car loan or lease." Id. at 725-26.

In Ransom, the debtor owned his vehicle outright and thus had no monthly loan or lease expense. In the case before this Court, Ms. Mills did make payments for her personal use of a company vehicle but had no ownership interest in the vehicle. Although the Supreme Court in Ransom did not address the exact issue before this Court, namely whether payments for the use of a vehicle owned by someone else could entitle a debtor to claim the ownership/lease expense deduction on the Means Test, the Supreme Court specifically held that the ownership/lease expense deduction "covers only loan and lease payments." Ms. Mills has provided no support for her argument that such payments would entitle her to the deduction. Therefore, this Court concludes that Ms. Mills cannot claim the deduction because she made no loan or lease payments on the vehicle.

Without the transportation ownership/lease expense, Ms. Mills's monthly disposable income increases and the presumption of abuse arises even if Ms. Mills properly claimed the entire amount of the health insurance deduction as reported on the Means Test. Nonetheless, the Court will briefly address the issue. According to all versions of her Means Test, Ms. Mills spends $530.78 per month on health and disability insurance.8 The Bankruptcy Administrator points out that per Ms. Mills's amended Schedule I, she spent $271.00 per month on insurance, and that the amount is even less according to her employee income records. Ms. Mills has provided no evidence in support of the amount reported in the Means Test, and in fact, testified that amount of her health insurance premiums reported in the Means Test seemed high. The Court agrees with the Bankruptcy Administrator that the highest insurance expense supported by the record is $271.00. Regardless, even if Ms. Mills could claim the entire $530.78 deduction the presumption of abuse arises without the transportation ownership/lease expense.

Ms. Mills attempts to rebut the presumption of abuse by claiming an additional monthly expense of $425.00 in student loans. There is no evidence that the student loan payments qualify as a "special circumstance" sufficient to rebut the presumption of abuse. See In re Edwards, No. 12-00603 TOM-7, 2012 WL 3042233 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. July 25, 2012).

Because a presumption of abuse arises and has not been rebutted, Ms. Mills's Chapter 7 case is due to be dismissed or converted to a Chapter 13. Therefore, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the Bankruptcy Administrator's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED unless the Debtor files a notice of conversion to Chapter 13 within fourteen days of the entry of this Memorandum Opinion and Order.