MEMORANDUM OPINION

JAMES J. ROBINSON, Chief Bankruptcy Judge.

Introduction and Jurisdiction

The debtor-plaintiff, Stanley W. Ellswick ("Ellswick"), commenced an adversary proceeding (the "AP") against creditor-defendant, Quantum3 Group, LLC ("Quantum"), and the AP is now before the court on Quantum's Motion to Dismiss (AP Doc. 11).1 The operative facts alleged in the AP complaint are not in dispute, and in accordance with Rule 7012(b)—applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)-(i) to bankruptcy adversary proceedings—the court's ruling on Quantum's Motion to Dismiss is based solely on the parties' pleadings and admissions.

In the AP complaint (AP Doc. 1), Ellswick alleged that the proof of claim—claim 6 in the claims registry—filed by Quantum in Ellswick's chapter 13 bankruptcy case violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq. ("FDCPA"), because filed with the claim was a statement of account information required by Rule 3001(c)(3)(A) for open-end and revolving credit transactions—e.g., VISA and MasterCard charge accounts—but the underlying debt was not open-end or revolving. It was a closed-end credit transaction.2 Quantum filed the claim as agent for Sadino Funding LLC ("Sadino") and Quantum does not dispute that it qualifies as a "debt collector" for the purposes of the FDCPA.3 Sadino was the assignee of the original creditor, Advance America, but neither Sadino nor Advance America were named as defendants in the AP, apparently because they are not "debt collectors" under the FDCPA.

The court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(a), (b) and 1334(a), (b), and the General Order of Reference, as amended, issued July 16, 1984 by the U.S. District Court, Northern District of Alabama. The AP is a core proceeding, as the court found in its prior order at AP Doc. 43, denying Ellswick's Motion to Compel Arbitration in the AP. Thus, the court may enter final judgments and orders pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b).

Background and Findings

Soon after Quantum filed its proof of claim and before the AP was commenced, Ellswick filed an Objection to Claim and Motion to Stay Pending Arbitration. (Docs. 33, 34.) The objection alleged that the debt underlying the claim was void because it violated Title 5, Section 18A of the Code of Alabama, which governs deferred presentment consumer loans—loans advanced against postdated checks.4 Unlike the AP complaint, the objection to claim made no mention of the FDCPA. Ellswick, Quantum, and Sadino agreed that pursuant to an arbitration provision in the consumer credit contract between Ellswick and the original creditor, Advance America, they should submit the objection to arbitration, which they did. (Docs. 57, 65.) Apparently Ellswick prevailed at the arbitration because the claim was later withdrawn. (Docs. 116, 117.)

As previously mentioned, the debt covered by Quantum's proof of claim was a closed-end credit transaction: Advance America made a $500.00 loan to Ellswick on March 3, 2015, that was to be repaid in full on April 3, 2015 with finance charges of $87.50. (See Customer Agreement attached to Doc. 30.) But included with the proof of claim was a statement with a heading that read, "Bankruptcy Rule 3001(c)(3)(A) Statement of Account Information." (Claim 6.) This statement provided the following information: (i) account number; (ii) name of the original creditor; (iii) debtor's name; (iv) debtor's redacted SSN; (v) open date; (vi) current creditor/assignee; (vii) assignor; (xiii) charge off date; (ix) last payment amount; (x) last transaction date; (xi) entity to whom debt was owed at last transaction; and (xii) total balance due and itemization of principal, interest, fees, and costs. Ellswick did not allege that any of this information was incorrect or false, but he did maintain that, although neither the proof of claim nor the statement of account expressly identified the credit transaction as being open-end or revolving (or for that matter, closed-end), the inclusion of the open-end, revolving disclosures with a proof of claim filed for a closed-end obligation violated the FDCPA because it was: (1) a false representation of the character of the debt, although admittedly an implicit rather than explicit representation (see Supplemental Response, AP Doc. 22, 6), in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2); (2) a false representation or deceptive means of collecting the debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10); and (3) an unfair or unconscionable means of attempting to collect the debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692f.5 Ellswick seeks statutory damages as well as actual damages, attorney fees, and costs under the FDCPA and also prays for injunctive relief.6 Ellswick's complaint asserted in its "Facts" recitations that Quantum violated Rule 3001 by failing to provide him with a copy of the credit agreement for the closed-end transaction, and that such failure was "sanctionable under Rule 3001."7

Analysis and Conclusions

Quantum maintains that the facts as alleged in the complaint do not state a claim for damages of any type under the FDCPA, and the court agrees. The Motion to Dismiss accurately analyzed the three counts of the AP complaint in light of the Eleventh Circuit's recent decision in of Miljkovic v. Shafritz & Dinkin, P.A., 791 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2015):

(AP Doc. 11, 8-9.)

Ellswick argued in his response (AP Doc. 20) that he does not have to prove he was harmed by the alleged false representation, because the FDCPA imposes strict liability, and cites Randolph v. IMBS, Inc., 368 F.3d 726, 730 (7th Cir. 2004) for that proposition. Quantum correctly points out that even under the least-sophisticated consumer standard, the Eleventh Circuit requires a "quotient of reasonableness" in assessing claims for damages under the FDCPA. LeBlanc v. Unifund CCR Partners, 601 F.3d 1185, 1194 (11th Cir. 2010); Stewart v. Bureaus Inv. Grp., LLC, No. 3:10-CV-1010-WKW, 2015 WL 7572312 at *15 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 24, 2015) ("[T]o preserve the reasonableness of the FDCPA's application, courts should, in most cases, only impose liability where the misrepresentations at issue actually affect the consumer's behavior", at least in the absence of an affirmative duty under the statute to accurately disclose the information at issue, such as the identity of the creditor in an initial communication.).8

Ellswick alleged nothing in the complaint that would establish any connection between the inclusion in the proof of claim of superfluous open-end, revolving disclosures and how he was, under the standard of a reasonable but least-sophisticated consumer, misled or confused for purposes of § 1692e(2) of the FDCPA, or how he was misled or deceived for purposes of §1692e(10). See Quantum's Reply, AP Doc. 23, 3-4, citing Wahl v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 556 F.3d 643, 645-46 (7th Cir. 2009) (explaining that the least-sophisticated consumer "isn't a dimwit", instead having "rudimentary knowledge about the financial world" and being "capable of making basic logical deductions and inferences", so that "[i]f a statement would not mislead [the least-sophisticated] consumer, it does not violate the FDCPA—even if it is false in some technical sense. . . . For purposes of § 1692e, then, a statement isn't `false' unless it would confuse the [least-sophisticated] consumer."). Further, because he failed to state a claim under § 1692e, he necessarily failed to state a claim under § 1692f. See Miljkovic, 791 F.3d at 1307.

Although not alleged in his complaint, Ellswick argued in one of his briefs that perhaps Quantum wanted to conceal the contents of the credit agreement, and so rather than include a copy of the agreement as it should for a closed-end transaction, chose instead to disguise the transaction by including the open-end, revolving disclosures when filing the proof of claim. (Supplemental Brief, AP Doc. 46, 3-4.) Ellswick's contentions in his brief that the omission of the credit agreement and inclusion of unnecessary information were calculated to hide the true nature of the transaction and the content of the credit agreement are mere conclusions and not supported by plausible factual allegations in the complaint that, even if true, would entitle Ellswick to recover damages or other relief under the FDCA.9 More importantly, based on the facts Ellswick did plead, Quantum's conduct was not sufficient to run afoul of the protections provided to consumers under the FDCPA. The additional information furnished by Quantum, albeit only required for open-end or revolving transactions under Rule 3001(c)(3)(A), was not misleading; in fact it was informative beyond what Rule 3001 requires for closed-end obligations. And while the failure to file a copy of a credit agreement with a proof of claim as required by Rule 3001(b)(1) may cause a creditor to forfeit the evidentiary presumption of validity of the claim under Rule 3001(f)10 and potentially suffer sanctions under Rule 3001(c)(2)(D), such failure is a far cry from being misleading or deceptive under the FDCPA or otherwise, especially where, as was the case here, the debtor had a copy of the credit agreement in his own file or obtained one soon after the proof of claim was filed.11

The form of the disclosure filed with the proof of claim would be entirely meaningless to the least-sophisticated consumer, and the content of the disclosure would merely confirm what he owed and to whom he owed it. As mentioned, Ellswick does not allege that the information on the disclosure was inaccurate, misleading, or confusing, in and of itself—and how could he? The information contained in the disclosure accompanying the proof of claim was correct whether the credit transaction had been open-end, revolving, or closed-end, and those labels— "open-end," "revolving," "closed-end"—were not mentioned in the proof of claim or the disclosure. The bare, unembellished reference to Rule 3001(c)(3)(A) in the heading of the disclosure statement was the only idiom that might imply the transaction was open-end or revolving. However, without further explanation—and there was none—a least-sophisticated consumer would have no inkling that Rule 3001(c)(3)(A) applied to open-end and revolving credit transactions. Indeed, many who consider themselves thoroughly steeped in bankruptcy jurisprudence might not know the particulars of Rule 3001(c)(3)(A) without first glancing at the text of that Rule.

In summary, Ellswick must resort to arguing that by mentioning Rule 3001(c)(3)(A) in the heading of its proof of claim disclosure statement, but without any mention of what that Rule is all about, and making disclosures required for open-end and revolving transactions—but not disallowed for closed-end obligations—Quantum made a technically, albeit implicit, false representation that Ellswick's obligation was closed-end, and that such an implicit representation would qualify as a "representation" under the FDCPA. Ellswick would conclude that nothing more was needed to state a claim under the FDCPA. This court disagrees, and concludes that the act of attaching to a bankruptcy proof of claim accurate disclosures required for open-end and revolving obligations was not a "false representation" under the FDCPA when the obligation was actually closed-end. Thus, the undisputed facts alleged in the complaint are not sufficient to support Ellswick's FDCPA damages claim. See also Hahn v. Triumph Partnerships LLC, 557 F.3d 755, 757-58 (7th Cir. 2009) ("We do not see any reason why materiality should not equally be required in an action based on § 1692e. The statute is designed to provide information that helps consumers to choose intelligently, and by definition immaterial information neither contributes to that objective (if the statement is correct) nor undermines it (if the statement is incorrect).).

The court finds that the recent decisions in Johnson v. Midland Funding, LLC, 823 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 2016 WL 4944674 and Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 758 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2014) do not alter this court's analysis. Both Johnson and Crawford addressed situations in which the cause of action arose because the debt for which the creditor filed a proof of claim was tainted under state law prior to, and apart from, bankruptcy. Unlike in those two cases, the alleged FDCPA causes of action in the instant AP depend completely upon the application of Rule 3001.12 The alleged violations—attaching a statement of information that was not required under Rule 3001(c)(3)(A), and not providing a copy of the credit contract required under Rule 3001(c)(1)—have no possible existence aside from the bankruptcy case, and are not dependent on the underlying credit agreement or non-bankruptcy laws, such as state statutes of limitations.

In the Crawford and Johnson cases, while filing proofs of claim was the triggering event—an attempt to collect a time-barred debt—the pre-petition expiration of the state law statute of limitations was the poison pill that tainted the proofs of claim, and was the operative component of the plaintiffs' FDCPA claims. Under those facts, the Eleventh Circuit found that there was no conflict (or preclusion) between the two statutory schemes at play—the Code and the FDCPA—but instead only overlapping layers of protection. The facts underlying Ellwick's claim for damages in this case only involve the form of Quantum's bankruptcy proof of claim and its attachment, and they do not support claims under the FDCPA.

Finally, because the complaint fails to state a claim under the FDCPA, the court need not address Quantum's argument that the Bankruptcy Code precludes a claim under the FDCPA based solely upon the form of an attachment to a proof of claim under Rule 3001. Accordingly, for the reasons stated above and in furtherance thereof, a separate order will be entered GRANTING the Motion to Dismiss (AP Doc. 11) and dismissing the AP with prejudice.13