MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

TAMARA O. MITCHELL, Bankruptcy Judge.

This adversary proceeding came before the Court on March 14, 2016, for trial1 on the Amended Complaint filed by Plaintiff William S. Kaye, as Liquidating Trustee (the "Plaintiff" or the "Trustee") for Bruno's Supermarkets, LLC n/k/a BFW Liquidation, LLC (the "Debtor" or "Bruno's") against Defendant Blue Bell Creameries, Inc. (the "Defendant" or "Blue Bell"). Appearing before the Court were John D. Elrod and David B. Kurzweil, attorneys for the Trustee; Bill D. Bensinger, attorney for Blue Bell; William S. Kaye, Trustee; and David Rogas, Joel Rogers, and Michael Atkinson, witnesses. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(b), 151, and 157(a) and the District Court's General Order of Reference Dated July 16, 1984, As Amended July 17, 1984.2 This is a core proceeding arising under Title 11 of the United States Code as defined in 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(F).3 This Court has considered the pleadings, arguments of counsel, the testimony of witnesses, the exhibits, and the law, and finds and concludes as follows:4

FINDINGS OF FACTS5

The Debtor filed its bankruptcy case under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code on February 5, 2009 (the "Petition Date"). The Debtor was a Birmingham, Alabama-based grocery store chain with stores in Alabama and the Florida panhandle. Bruno's operated stores under the Bruno's Supermarkets, FoodMax, and Food World banners.

The Trustee was appointed pursuant to the Debtor's Fourth Amended Chapter 11 Plan of Liquidation, which became effective on October 5, 2009. Thereafter, on January 27, 2011,6 the Plaintiff filed this adversary proceeding seeking the avoidance and recovery of $563,869.37 in transfers pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 547 and 550. Further, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 502(d), the Plaintiff sought the disallowance of the Defendant's general unsecured claim of $125,372.90 (the "Claim").

The Plaintiff and the Defendant have stipulated that the prima facie elements of the preference claim contained in § 547(b) have been met with respect to the transfers at issue in this litigation, which are set forth in the following chart (collectively, the "Transfers"):

At trial, Blue Bell asserted two defenses under section 547(c) of the Bankruptcy Code. First, Blue Bell asserts that it has a "subjective" ordinary course of business defense under section 547(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. The Trustee disputes this defense in its entirety.

Second, Blue Bell asserts that it has a subsequent new value defense under section 547(c)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code. While the Trustee acknowledges that the subsequent new value defense applies, he disputes the extent to which this defense applies.

I. Prepetition Relationship between Bruno's and Blue Bell.

Blue Bell manufactured and sold ice cream and related products to Bruno's on credit. According to the testimony of Blue Bell branch manager David Rogas, Blue Bell's salesmen brought products directly to the Debtor's stores, merchandized those products, removed any out-of-date product, and restocked Bruno's ice cream coolers within the grocery stores. Mr. Rogas testified that the payment terms between Bruno's and Blue Bell were weekly — or 7 day — terms. He further testified that historically, Blue Bell received checks from their customers, including Bruno's, at a lockbox at JPMorganChase and from there the checks would be deposited into Blue Bell's account. Blue Bell introduced into evidence copies of several checks from Bruno's with check dates from December 6, 2007 through January 23, 2009. To the right of each copy of a check is a box containing certain information labeled "business date," "reference no.," "seq w/i refno," and "check amount." Mr. Rogas testified that neither Blue Bell nor Bruno's could control the "business date" reflected in each box, and admitted that no one present at trial could testify when a particular check was received by the bank, the date of deposit, or what the notation "business date" referred to.

II. Bruno's liquidity problems

Joel Rogers, Senior Director at the advisory firm Alvarez and Marsal ("A&M"), testified that Bruno's engaged A&M in August 2008 to provide financial advisory and turnaround management services. According to Mr. Rogers, one reason for A&M's engagement by Bruno's was to assist with cash flow management, as Bruno's was experiencing liquidity issues and was expected to run out of cash. Mr. Rogers testified that beginning in August 2008 A&M began assisting Bruno's with this facet of its finances; to do this, A&M and Rogers developed cash forecasting models which were intended to project Bruno's cash needs over future periods of time. Mr. Rogers explained that prior to A&M's engagement, Bruno's had generally paid certain of its vendors, including Blue Bell, twice weekly. To conserve cash, and upon A&M's recommendation in August 2008, Bruno's began paying its vendors, including Blue Bell, once a week. According to Mr. Rogers, Bruno's began "stretching," or delaying, payments during the ninety days prior to the Petition Date (the "Preference Period"), a practice that sometimes included actually cutting checks but then holding them for a period of time. Mr. Rogers opined that Bruno's had not previously stretched payments because the employees seemed unfamiliar with the concept when he explained it.

Bruno's introduced into evidence the expert witness report (the "Expert Report") of Michael L. Atkinson, who, according to his testimony, is a CPA specializing in financial restructuring and who has been qualified as an expert witness about four times.7 According to Mr. Atkinson's testimony and his Expert Report, over 50% of invoices from Blue Bell to Bruno's were paid (the date of payment being the date the check cleared the bank) within 39 days of the invoice date during the pre-Preference Period,8 and 92% had been paid within 44 days of the invoice date. During the Preference Period, the time by which over 50% of the invoices were paid had increased to 47 days, and only 29% had been paid at 44 days or sooner. See Exh. D to Plaintiff's Exh. 42. In addition, Mr. Atkinson's testimony and the Expert Report reflect that there was an average of 7 days between the date of a check and the date the check cleared the bank in the pre-Preference period (excluding the Restructuring Period), which increased to an average of 16 days between the check date and the check clear date during the Preference period. See Plaintiff's Exh. 42, section IV.

III. Blue Bell's collection efforts

Bruno's presented evidence that shortly before the beginning of the Preference Period Blue Bell began to increase its efforts to collect money owed by Bruno's. The Trustee testified that he has possession of Bruno's computer and email servers, which date from approximately 2003 through the post-petition period. He further testified that, upon his review of Bruno's emails, he found no emails between Bruno's and Blue Bell dealing with collection matters that were dated prior to October, 2008. Blue Bell introduced no evidence to contradict the Trustee's testimony.

The first email introduced into evidence regarding a collection attempt by Blue Bell was dated October 27, 2008. Defendant's Exh. 1. Mr. Rogas testified that initially the emails concerned "skipped" or "mispaid" invoices totaling $14,853.49 but by January 12, 2009, the emails addressed missed weekly payments.9 On January 26, 2009, Mr. Rogas emailed Tim Cano, Bruno's Director of Private Label and Non-Perishable Operations, and Kris Smith, Bruno's Operational Accounting Manager, about payment, indicating that he was getting pressure to have an answer on a payment issue that day. See Defendant's Exh. 9. A January 28, 2009 email sent by Mr. Rogas to certain Blue Bell employees directed that service to Bruno's should be immediately stopped. See Defendant's Exh. 11. Also on that date Mr. Rogas went in person to Bruno's headquarters and picked up checks of $33,186.46 and $48,213.42, a collection technique that Mr. Rogas testified he had not previously employed. See Defendant's Exh. 12. On January 29, 2009, Mr. Rogas instructed via email that service could resume at all Bruno's locations, although the service should be limited to "fronting product," meaning, as he explained at trial, organizing the products in the freezer but not replenishing products. See Defendant's Exh. 13. Also on January 29, Mr. Rogas sent an email to Mr. Cano and Mr. Smith regarding whether Blue Bell should plan to pick up additional checks on February 2 and February 9, 2009, or whether the checks would be sent by mail or FedEx. See Defendant's Exh. 14. A February 2, 2009 email from Mr. Rogas indicates that he ultimately picked up a $37,000 check from Bruno's on that date. See Defendant's Exh. 16. On February 3, 2009, Mr. Rogas emailed instructions that while Blue Bell salesmen should continue to front product at Bruno's locations they should not deliver additional products. See Defendant's Exh. 17.

IV. "New value" provided during the Preference Period

The parties have stipulated that Brunos paid to Blue Bell a total of $563,869.37 during the Preference Period. Mr. Atkinson testified that his expert report included a new value analysis using information from Bruno's books and records. He concluded that if only "unpaid" new value could be used, as Bruno's advocates, that Blue Bell has a net preference liability of $438,496.47. However, if both "paid" and "unpaid" new value could be used, in accordance with Blue Bell's argument, Blue Bell has a net preference liability of $218,144.50. See Exh. C to Plaintiff's Exh. 42. Mr. Atkinson further testified that after counsel for Blue Bell had identified some discrepancies between the books and records of Blue Bell and those of Bruno's, he re-analyzed the preference liability using Blue Bell's numbers, resulting in a net preference liability of $437,758.46 using only "unpaid" new value, and $218,773.66 using both "paid" and "unpaid" new value. See Exh. C-1 to Plaintiff's Exh. 42. Mr. Atkinson indicated that in making his calculations he used the invoice date and the date the check cleared the bank to determine whether new value was provided subsequent to the payment in question.

Blue Bell introduced into evidence a chart prepared by Mr. Rogas which he referred to as a "new value spreadsheet." See Defendant's Exh. 20. He testified that his calculations as to the amount Blue Bell owed after application of new value were made using the invoice date, which is the date the driver made a delivery, and the "check deposit date"10 that he obtained from a copy of each check. According to Mr. Rogas's chart, Blue Bell's preference liability is $207,125.80.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

I. Prima facie case

Because the parties have stipulated that the Plaintiff has satisfied his burden of proof with respect to each of the elements of section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, the prima facie case has been satisfied and the burden of proof shifts to the Defendant regarding its asserted ordinary course of business and subsequent new value defenses.

II. Blue Bell's asserted defenses

a. Burden of proof for defenses under section 547(c)

Pursuant to section 547(g) of the Bankruptcy Code, Blue Bell has the burden of proof regarding its asserted defenses. Marathon Oil Co. v. Flatau (In re Craig Oil Co.), 785 F.2d 1563, 1565 n.4 (11th Cir. 1986). The creditor asserting a defense must prove each element of its defense by a preponderance of the evidence. Jones v. United Sav. and Loan Ass'n (In re U.S.A. Inns of Eureka Springs, Arkansas Inc.,) 9 F.3d 680, 682 (8th Cir. 1993).

b. Ordinary Course of Business Defense

Section 547(c)(2) provides an affirmative defense to creditors that receive payments which would otherwise be voidable preferences if those payments were made in the ordinary course of business. Miller v. Florida Mining and Materials (In re A.W. & Assoc., Inc.), 136 F.3d 1439, 1441 (11th Cir. 1998). To establish an ordinary course of business defense, a creditor must show that the debt was incurred in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs between the parties, and then establish that transfer of property to the supplier was ordinary in the course of business or financial affairs between the parties or was made according to ordinary business terms.11 Carrier Corp. v. Buckley (In re Globe Mfg. Corp.), 567 F.3d 1291, 1297 n.4. The ordinary course of business between the parties is shown by demonstrating that the transfer was consistent with a pattern of previous transfers between the parties. Id. at 1298. The transferee must demonstrate that the transfer was made in a manner falling within these practices.

In contrast to section 547(b), the "purpose of the ordinary course of business exception is to protect the normal, ordinary relationship between debtors and creditors engaged in recurring credit transactions. This exception was created to encourage creditors to continue to deal with troubled debtors without fear of having to disgorge payments, thus stalling bankruptcy and enabling the debtor to continue in business as a going concern, if appropriate." Moltech Power Sys., Inc. v. Tooh Dineh Indus., Inc. (In re Moltech Power Sys., Inc.), 327 B.R. 675, 679 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 2005) (Killian, J.), citing Barrett Dodge Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Crenshaw (In re Issac Leaseco, Inc.), 389 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir. 2004); Fiber Lite Corp. v. Molded Acoustical Prod. Inc. (In re Molded Acoustical Prod., Inc.), 18 F.3d 217 (3rd Cir. 1994); Gonzales v. DPI Food Prod. Co. (In re Furrs Supermarkets, Inc.), 296 B.R. 33, 39 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2003).

As one court has explained:

Moltech Power Sys., 327 B.R. at 680.

In Menotte v. Oxyde Chemicals., Inc. (In re JSL Chemical Corp.), 424 B.R. 573 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2010) (Hyman, J.), the court noted that:

JSL Chem. Corp., 424 B.R. at 579.

In Craig Oil, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court's determination that payments which were late or made in response to unusual collection activity were not sheltered by the ordinary course of business defense. Craig Oil, 785 F.2d at 1566-68. See also Anderson-Smith & Assoc., Inc. v. Xyplex, Inc. (In re Anderson-Smith & Assoc., Inc.), 188 B.R. 679, 686-87 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995); Florida Steel Corp. v. Stober (In re Indus. Supply Corp.), 127 B.R. 62, 64-65 (M.D. Fla. 1991), aff'd without opinion, 961 F.2d 1582 (11th Cir. 1992) (district court affirmed a bankruptcy court's finding that payments resulted from "extraordinary collection efforts" despite similar payment intervals during and prior to the preference period); Schwinn Plan Comm. v. AFS Cycle & Co., LTD (In re Schwinn Bicycle Co.), 205 B.R. 557, 565-66, 572-73 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997) (weekly or biweekly calls during the preference period from a creditor regarding delinquent payments were not within the parties' ordinary course of business when the creditor "rarely" made such calls prior to that time).

According to the court in Schwinn Plan Committee v. AFS Cycle & Co., LTD (In re Schwinn Bicycle Co.):

In order to demonstrate the applicability of § 547(c)(2)(B), the creditor must prove:

Schwinn Bicycle, 205 B.R. at 572.

For the following reasons, the Court concludes that Blue Bell has not carried its burden of proof regarding its asserted ordinary course of business defense.

i. Payment frequency

As shown by the trial testimony of Joel Rogers, the Debtor's retention of A&M in August 2008 represented a departure from Bruno's ordinary course of business with its vendors, which included Blue Bell. Rogers testified that Bruno's was running out of cash and hired A&M to help manage its liquidity problems. A&M and Rogers were specifically tasked with managing cash, which led to "stretching," or delaying, payments to vendors. Furthermore, Rogers testified that the procedures instituted by A&M resulted in changing from the issuance of two checks per week to one check per week to Blue Bell, and that once cut, checks were often held by Bruno's prior to being sent to Blue Bell. No evidence was introduced at trial which showed that Bruno's had previously managed its relationship with Bruno's in the fashion recommended and implemented by A&M. Accordingly, this represented a departure from the normal relationship, and thus a departure from the ordinary course of business, between Bruno's and Blue Bell.

ii. Increased aging of invoices paid during the Preference Period

In AFA Investment Inc., et al., v. Dale T. Smith & Sons Meat Packing Company (In re AFA Investment Inc., et al.), 2016 WL 908212 (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 9, 2016), Judge Mary Walrath recently ruled that a preference defendant could not avail itself of the ordinary course of business defense where the timing of the invoices changed between the preference period and the pre-preference period. In AFA Investment, prior to the preference period, 97% of all invoices were paid within 16-30 days of the invoice date. AFA Inv., 2016 WL 908212 at *4. Out of the subject payments made within the preference period, 96% were paid "after 30 days." Id. "The weighted average of the invoice-to-payment period nearly doubled from 22.43 days during the parties' historical relationship to 43.95 days during the preference period." Id.

Similarly, in the instant case, during the pre-Preference Period, the Plaintiff's data contained in the Expert Report shows that 92% of invoices were paid at 44 days or sooner. During the Preference Period, by contrast, only 29% of invoices were paid at 44 days or sooner. Further, the average days a check was outstanding increased from 7 days to 16 days, between the pre-Preference Period (excluding the period after A&M was retained) and the Preference Period. As demonstrated by these figures, the timing of the Transfers was outside the range established during the pre-Preference Period. The Court finds that the deviation between the Preference Period and the pre-Preference Period is significant and demonstrates that the Preference Period payments were not in keeping with the normal, ordinary and customary commercial relations between Blue Bell and Bruno's.

iii. Blue Bell's collection activity

Blue Bell's collection activity during the Preference Period was unprecedented during the parties' relationship. Blue Bell presented no evidence to demonstrate that it had taken collection techniques rising to the level of those that Blue Bell employed during the Preference Period. During the Preference Period (and slightly before), various Blue Bell employees began contacting Bruno's employees regarding the status of payments. Additionally, Mr. Rogas's acts, on behalf of Blue Bell, of going in person and picking up the final three checks at Bruno's headquarters, rather than receiving them in the JPMorganChase lockbox was unprecedented in the parties' relationship.

For each of the foregoing reasons, the ordinary course of business defense does not shield any of the Transfers. Because Blue Bell's ordinary course of business defense fails, the Court now considers Blue Bell's asserted subsequent new value defense under 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(4).

c. Subsequent New Value Defense

The Defendant claims a subsequent new value defense under section 547(c)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code. That section provides that:

The Plaintiff and the Defendant disagree over how this defense should be applied. The Plaintiff requests that the Court adopt the application pronounced by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in the case Charisma Investment Co., N.V. v. Airport Systems, Inc. (In re Jet Florida System, Inc.), 841 F.2d 1082 (11th Cir. 1988). In that decision, the Eleventh Circuit held that:

Id. at 1083 (emphasis added). The court went on to find:

Id. at 1083-84 (some internal citations omitted). In Jet Florida, the creditor, a landlord, contended that the debtor's ability to use property that it had leased from the creditor should be considered new value that would prevent the trustee from recovering over $11,000 that the creditor had received during the preference period. Id. at 1082-83. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court, which in turn had affirmed the bankruptcy court's conclusion that the landlord had not extended new value. Id. at 1084. The court opined that if the debtor had made use of the leased property the creditor's forbearance may have qualified as new value; however, as the district court had remarked, the lease had not replenished the estate but instead was "a financial drain." Id. In concluding that the creditor had not provided new value, the Eleventh Circuit did not need to closely examine the second and third elements of the three part test — the new value had been unsecured and had remained unpaid — because those elements "had concededly been satisfied." Id. at 1083.

Several other courts in the Eleventh Circuit have recited the three-part test without the occasion to analyze the "remains unpaid" prong as it was not an issue in those cases. See Alfa Fire Ins. Co. v Memory (In re Martin), 184 B.R. 985, 995 (M.D. Ala. 1995) (Albritton, J.) (citing Jet Florida), aff'd 101 F.3d 708 (11th Cir. 1996); Bender Shipbuilding & Repair Co., Inc. v. Oil Recovery Co. Inc. of Alabama (In re Bender Shipbuilding and Repair Co., Inc.), 479 B.R. 899, 903 (Bankr. S. D. Ala. 2012) (Mahoney, J.) (citing Jet Florida); Crews v. Nat'l Coating, Inc. (In re Nat'l Aerospace, Inc.), 219 B.R. 625, 629 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1998) (Proctor, J.) (citing Jet Florida); Jones v. Ryder Integrated Logistics, Inc. (In re Jotan, Inc.), 264 B.R. 735, 754-55 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2001) (Funk, J.); Moltech Power Sys., 326 B.R. at 183-84 (citing Jet Florida); JSL Chem. Corp., 424 B.R. at 583; Kelley v. McCormack (In re Mitchell), 548 B.R. 862, 895-96 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2016).

In other cases, the "remains unpaid" prong was a contested issue. Some courts cited to Jet Florida as controlling law that new value must remain unpaid, agreeing that such a requirement furthered the policy objectives behind section 547(c)(4). See Braniff, Inc. v. Sundstrand Data Control, Inc. (In re Braniff, Inc.), 154 B.R. 773, 783-85 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993) (Corcoran, J.); Welt v. Samsung Semiconductor, Inc. (In re All American Semiconductor, Inc.), AP No. 09-01443, 2012 WL 3229295, at *4-5 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Aug. 6, 2012); Johnson v. Smith Bros. Oil Co., Inc. (In re Empire Pipe and Dev., Inc.), 152 B.R. 1012, 1015 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993) (Paskay, J.); Drake v. Peeples (In re Topgallant Lines, Inc.), BK No. 89-41996, AP No. 91-4141, 1996 WL 33366600, at *11 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Feb. 29, 1996) (Davis, J.) (finding that the court was bound by Jet Florida but not addressing policy considerations).

However, one court within this district held that new value did not have to remain unpaid to be utilized under section 547(c)(4). HB Logistics, LLC v. Pilot Travel Centers, LLC (In re HB Logistics, LLC), BK No. 11-82362-JAC-11, AP No. 12-80124, 2013 WL 6542866 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Dec. 13, 2013) (Caddell, J.) (ret.). According to Judge Caddell:

HB Logistics, 2013 WL 6542866 at *2. Judge Caddell observed that Jet Florida "involved a single transfer and the case is, therefore, not clearly on point with the facts of the case before the Court which involves numerous transfers on a `running account' basis between the parties." Id. Judge Caddell noted that under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, the section dealing with preferential transfers "limited the amount of the new value setoff to `such new credit remaining unpaid.'" Id. (citing Travis Powers, Inadequate Shorthand: The Circuit Courts are Split as to Whether There Is a "Remains Unpaid" Requirement in the New Value Exception to Preference Liability, 22 J. Bankr. L. & Prac. 4 Art. 5 (2013)). He further noted that under the Bankruptcy Code "§ 547(c)(4) only deprives a creditor of the new value exception `to the extent that (1) new value is secured by an otherwise unavoidable security interest; or (2) after new value is advanced, the debtor makes a transfer to the creditor that is otherwise unavoidable.'" Id. In determining that the creditor "is entitled to assert the subsequent new value defense under § 547(c)(4) to the extent the new value has not been paid by an otherwise unavoidable transfer," he concluded:

Id. at *3. See also Wahoski v. American & Efrid, Inc. (In re Pillowtex Corp.), 416 B.R. 123, 129-30 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009) ("[T]he trustee should not be able to assert the new value was paid if the trustee is asserting that the paying transaction was in fact a preference which the trustee can avoid. By doing so, the trustee will be able to eliminate the effect of the payment for the new value when he recaptures the preferential transfer.") (quoting Boyd v. The Water Doctor (In re Check Reporting Services, Inc.), 140 B.R. 425, 433 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1992)).

While Judge Caddell's reasoning (and that of other courts that have concluded new value does not have to remain unpaid) may be persuasive to some courts, this Court is not inclined to follow HB Logistics without clear direction from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. As in HB Logistics, the facts in this case may differ from those in Jet Florida because multiple transactions between the parties took place within the preference period; thus, it could be argued that Jet Florida is not directly on point in the case before this Court. It is also possible that if the Eleventh Circuit in Jet Florida had the occasion to evaluate the "remains unpaid" prong it would have concluded that new value had to be unpaid, or perhaps the court would have determined otherwise. Nonetheless, the Eleventh Circuit did identify a three-part test for determining when the new value defense is applicable and this Court will strictly apply that test to the facts of this case. Blue Bell is entitled to the new value defense only to the extent that the new value it extended remains unpaid.

As noted above, the Trustee presented evidence that if this Court were to determine that new value must remain unpaid, Blue Bell would have exposure of $438,496.47. As also noted above, the calculations presented by Blue Bell differ from those of the Trustee. The Court determines that the exhibits prepared by Bruno's expert witness, Mr. Atkinson, regarding Blue Bell's preference liability after the application of the new value defense are more detailed, thorough, and reliable than those prepared by Mr. Rogas, Blue Bell's branch manager. Therefore, the Court concludes that the Bruno's is entitled to recover $438,496.47 from Blue Bell as preferential transfers and a judgment to that effect is due to be entered. Further, the claim filed by Blue Bell in Bruno's bankruptcy case is due to be disallowed until the judgment is satisfied; however, Blue Bell shall be granted leave to file an amended claim within 60 days of the date of the satisfaction of the judgment. A separate judgment consistent with this Memorandum Opinion will be entered. Therefore, it is

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the Transfers are avoidable in the amount of $438,496.47 under § 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. It is further

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that pursuant to section 550 of the Bankruptcy Code, $438,496.47 of the Transfers are recoverable against Blue Bell and a judgment in favor of Bruno's and against Blue Bell shall be entered. It is further

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the claim filed by Blue Bell in Bruno's bankruptcy case is due to be disallowed until the judgment is satisfied. Blue Bell shall have leave to file an amended claim within 60 days of the date of the satisfaction of the judgment.