VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINSM, District Judge.
This employment discrimination action is before the court on the Motion To Dismiss or For Summary Judgment
For the reasons that follow, the court finds that the Motion is due to be
Plaintiff is an African-American female over the age of 40 who avers that she was "jointly and severally" employed by the three Defendants named in this action.
On February 5, 2010, Plaintiff filed a charge against her employers with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") alleging racial discrimination and retaliation, sex discrimination, age discrimination, and equal pay discrimination.
Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit on July 5, 2011, within 90 days of receiving her Notice of Rights letter. In shotgun fashion,
Thus, Plaintiff alleges claims under the federal constitution and three different federal statutes (Title VII, § 1981, and the ADEA) in addition to her state law claims. Plaintiff asserts federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and original jurisdiction based on her civil rights claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(4) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person ... [t]o recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote."). (Complt. ¶ 2).
The Board of Trustees filed its Motion To Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The Board of Trustees fashions four main arguments for dismissal: (1) Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies on her Title VII and ADEA claims (doc. 13 ¶¶ 1-4); (2) sovereign and Eleventh Amendment immunity bar Plaintiff's claims "under [all] federal statutes other than Title VII" (id. at 5); (3) governmental immunity under the Alabama Constitution bars "[a]ny state law claims" against the Board of Trustees (id. ¶¶ 6-7); and (4) generally, that Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible claim against the Board of Trustees because Plaintiff has not shown that it is her "employer" (id. ¶ 1; doc. 22 at 2-4). Accordingly, the Board of Trustees asks the court to dismiss all claims against it "for lack of jurisdiction." (Doc. 13 at 3).
The Motion, however, fails to designate which of its arguments for dismissal are brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) versus Rule 12(b)(6). Generally, jurisdictional challenges are addressed under Rule 12(b)(1), whereas Rule 12(b)(6) provides for dismissal for failure of a party to state a claim for which relief can be granted. See Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir.2001) (stating that where "a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in conjunction with other Rule 12 motions, the court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before addressing any attack on the merits." (citing Hitt v. City of Pasadena, 561 F.2d 606, 608 (5th Cir.1977)).
Eleventh Amendment immunity is a jurisdictional issue. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 678, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment immunity defense "partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar" sufficient that it may be raised for the first time on appeal); McClendon v. Georgia Dep't of Cmty. Health, 261 F.3d 1252, 1256 (11th Cir.2001) ("Because the Eleventh Amendment represents a constitutional limitation on the federal judicial power established in Article III, federal courts lack jurisdiction to entertain claims that are barred by the Eleventh Amendment." (citation omitted)). However,
McClendon, 261 F.3d at 1257. As a result, courts have treated immunity issues under both 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Compare Shands Teaching Hosp. and Clinics, Inc. v. Beech Street Corp., 208 F.3d 1308, 1310 (11th Cir.2000) (reviewing district court's dismissal based on the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted), with Nat'l Ass'n of Bds. of Pharmacy v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 633 F.3d 1297, 1304 (11th Cir.2011) ("The [district] court dismissed the claims against the Board of Regents, the Members, and the University Officials, who were sued in their official capacities, under Rule 12(b)(1) on the Eleventh Amendment immunity ground.").
The Eleventh Circuit, in an unpublished opinion, recently indicated that Eleventh Amendment immunity analysis is more appropriately conducted under 12(b)(1) where it does not implicate the merits. See Thomas v. U.S. Postal Service, 364 Fed.Appx. 600, 601 (11th Cir. 2010) ("[A] dismissal on sovereign immunity grounds should be pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) because no subject-matter jurisdiction exists." (citing Bennett v. United States, 102 F.3d 486, 488 n. 1 (11th Cir. 1996)); Bennett, 102 F.3d at 488 ("Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides a vehicle for the dismissal of actions for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Nevertheless, where — as here — the existence of subject matter jurisdiction is inextricably intertwined with material facts affecting the merits of the claim, a district court must be guided by the standard for summary judgment motions under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56." (emphasis added) (citations omitted)). Because, the analysis of this Defendant's immunity arguments are not "inextricably intertwined with material facts affecting the merit of the claim," the court feels it is appropriate to consider those arguments under the 12(b)(1) standard.
Therefore, the court organizes its Memorandum Opinion by first analyzing the Defendant's immunity defenses under the Rule 12(b)(1) standard, and then analyzing the Defendant's exhaustion of remedies arguments under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard.
In part, Defendant brings its Motion To Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) of
Attacks on subject-matter jurisdiction take two forms: (1) facial attacks, and (2) factual attacks. Scarfo v. Ginsberg, 175 F.3d 957, 960 (11th Cir.1999) (citing Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir.1990)). Facial attacks on a complaint "require the court merely to look and see if the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a basis of subject matter jurisdiction, and the allegations in [plaintiff's] complaint are taken as true for the purposes of the motion." Lawrence, 919 F.2d at 1529 (quoting Menchaca, 613 F.2d at 511). Factual attacks challenge "the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, irrespective of the pleadings, and matters outside the pleadings, such as testimony and affidavits, are considered." Id. (same).
If a defendant makes a factual attack upon the court's subject matter jurisdiction, submitting evidentiary materials, the plaintiff is "also required to submit facts through some evidentiary method and has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the trial court does have subject matter jurisdiction." Paterson v. Weinberger, 644 F.2d 521, 523 (5th Cir.1981).
"[A] plaintiff must have ample opportunity to present evidence bearing on the existence of jurisdiction." Morrison v. Allstate Indem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1273 (11th Cir.2000) (quoting Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Collins, 921 F.2d 1237, 1243 (11th Cir.1991)). "Although the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the court's jurisdiction, the plaintiff should be given the opportunity to discover facts that would support his allegations of jurisdiction." Morrison, 228 F.3d at 1273 (quoting Majd-Pour v. Georgiana Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 724 F.2d 901, 903 (11th Cir. 1984)).
The Board of Trustees correctly asserts that Eleventh Amendment immunity is applicable to all of Plaintiff's federal claims against it, other than Title VII. (Doc. 13 ¶ 5). In support of its immunity argument, the Board of Trustees cites to Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979), Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 120 S.Ct. 631, 145 L.Ed.2d 522 (2000), and Butts v. County of Volusia, 222 F.3d 891, 894-95 (11th Cir.2000).
The Eleventh Amendment provides that
U.S. Const. amend. XI. "It is firmly established that the Eleventh Amendment immunizes
A court faced with a claim of Eleventh Amendment immunity must first determine whether the plaintiff is suing the state. This often involves deciding whether the entity raising the defense can be considered an "agency or instrumentality" of the state. State law guides this determination. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977); Sessions v. Rusk State Hosp., 648 F.2d 1066, 1069 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981).
The Eleventh Circuit has determined that state universities in Alabama, as arms of the state, are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Harden v. Adams, 760 F.2d 1158, 1163 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment bars suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Troy State University); see also Davis v. Alabama State Univ., 613 F.Supp. 134, 139-40 (M.D.Ala.1985) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment protects Alabama State University from former employee's § 1983 suit). Additionally, in Eubank v. Leslie, 210 Fed.Appx. 837, 844-45 (11th Cir.2006), a panel of the Eleventh Circuit specifically applied this doctrine to the University of Alabama Board of Trustees, deeming it a "state agency" and affirming the district court's decision that the plaintiff's civil rights claims against the Board under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 were barred by state sovereign immunity.
These cases compel the court to find that the Defendant Board of Trustees is an agency or instrumentality of the state that is generally immune from suits brought by citizens for monetary relief, absent consent or waiver, as discussed above.
In her response, Plaintiff acknowledges that while "Defendant would normally enjoy immunity from her age discrimination and § 1981 claims ... this immunity was waived by [D]efendants entering the non-governmental joint venture documented in Exhibit B." (Doc. 17 at 11) (emphasis added). However, as further discussed infra, the court does not consider Plaintiff's Exhibit B, which is completely unauthenticated, as credible or persuasive
An exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity exists concerning prospective
Accordingly, there exists reasonable doubt that the prospective relief exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity reaches state agencies such as the Board of Trustees. In a similar case, Judge Albritton found that the Board of Trustees of Alabama State University was immunized by Eleventh Amendment immunity even against the plaintiff's claims for prospective injunctive relief. Williams, 865 F.Supp. at 793. In Williams, as in this case, the plaintiff sued the Board of Trustees as an entity without naming the individual members of the Board in their official capacities. In dismissing the Board of Trustees, the court stated:
Id. The court finds these cases persuasive, and similarly concludes that the Eleventh Amendment serves to immunize the Board of Trustees from all of Plaintiff's federal claims in this case (except for Title VII), even to the extent they may arguably seek a form of prospective injunctive relief.
The Board of Trustees correctly asserts that it is a state agency entitled to state immunity pursuant to the Alabama Constitution. See, e.g., Hutchinson, 256 So.2d at 282 (affirming that the Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama was entitled to "governmental immunity" under Article I, Section 14 of the Alabama Constitution). Plaintiff does not persuasively controvert the cases and constitutional provision that clearly support Defendant's assertion of state immunity. Therefore, the court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff's state law claims against it are due to be dismissed pursuant to Article I, Section 14 of the Alabama Constitution.
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a motion to dismiss all or some of the claims in a complaint on the ground that its allegations fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Rule 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," in order to "give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests," Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). The court assumes the factual allegations in the complaint are true and gives the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable factual inferences. Hazewood v. Found. Fin. Grp., LLC, 551 F.3d 1223, 1224 (11th Cir.2008) (per curiam). However, "courts `are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.'" Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986)); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ("Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions."). Nor is
The law is well-settled that an employee must timely pursue and exhaust her administrative remedies as a precondition to filing an employment discrimination suit under Title VII or the ADEA.
The Board of Trustees asserts that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies in relation to the Title VII and ADEA claims raised in her EEOC charge for two reasons. The Board of Trustees first contends that because it is not Plaintiff's employer and it was never served with or responded to Plaintiff's EEOC charge, Plaintiff has not exhausted her administrative remedies against it, and therefore cannot state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Second, it argues in the alternative that Plaintiff does not possess a valid EEOC right-to-sue notice because the notice was subsequently revoked.
The court agrees with the Board of Trustees that Plaintiff's allegations are insufficient to sustain a plausible conclusion that the Board of Trustees is her employer and that she successfully exhausted her administrative remedies against it. Both Title VII and the ADEA authorize discrimination claims against an "employer."
The Board of Trustees, however, denies that it is Plaintiff's employer, and provides an affidavit of its HR Director explaining that its records show that Plaintiff is not
The court does not find it at all "clear" that Plaintiff "requested and contended" that her EEOC charge be served on the Defendant Board of Trustees, nor does the court find any allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint sufficient to support a conclusion that the Board of Trustees was named in the EEOC charge, or that it was served with the charge. First, Plaintiff never identified or even mentioned the "Board of Trustees" anywhere in the text of her EEOC charge. (See Doc. 17-1).
Turning to Plaintiffs Complaint, Plaintiffs sole grounds for asserting that the Board of Trustees is also her "employer" (in addition to UAB Health System) rests on her conclusory allegation of joint and several employment. (Complt., Doc. 1 ¶ 11 ("Defendants, at all time relevant herein, jointly and severally, employed, supervised, and controlled Plaintiff in her duties, and were employer(s) as defined by and within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) and 29 U.S.C. § 630(b).")). The court is not bound to accept this type of conclusory legal allegation as true when assessing a Motion To Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ("[C]ourts `are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.'" (quoting Papasan, 478 U.S. at 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932)). Based on the totality of the Complaint and the undisputed facts before the court that unequivocally demonstrate UAB Health System's status as Plaintiff's actual employer, the court cannot plausibly conclude that the Board of Trustees is also her employer for Title VII and ADEA purposes.
Beyond the Complaint, Plaintiff attempts to bolster her joint employment theory in her response to Defendant's Motion To Dismiss by arguing that "[t]he Center for Psychiatric Medicine is the product of a joint operating agreement entered into or extended by the defendants on December 11, 2003." (Doc. 17 at 6). As evidence of this "joint operating agreement," which is not alleged in the Complaint, Plaintiff attached to her response brief "the only summary she could find of this joint agreement as Exhibit B." (Id.). Exhibit B, from best the court can tell, appears to be a portion of a PowerPoint slide or other presentation, of unknown origin and authorship. As the exhibit is completely unauthenticated, and not self-authenticating, the court does not consider it. Moreover, because Defendant disputes its authenticity, the court cannot consider the exhibit without converting to the Rule 56 summary judgment standard. Speaker, 623 F.3d at 1379. As for the argument in Plaintiffs brief that a joint operating agreement exists, statements of counsel do not constitute evidence. United States v. Jacoby, 955 F.2d 1527, 1541 (11th Cir.1992) (recognizing that "statements of counsel are not evidence").
In sum, Plaintiff has not alleged or shown that the Board of Trustees was properly served with the EEOC charge, that it responded to the charge, that it had notice of the charge, or that it had the opportunity to participate in the EEOC's conciliation process. As a practical matter, subjecting a party to litigation when the administrative remedies have not been exhausted as to that party unfairly deprives that party of the two-fold purpose of the EEOC process: notice and the opportunity to participate in the pre-litigation conciliation process. Virgo v. Riviera Beach Assocs., Ltd., 30 F.3d 1350, 1358 (11th Cir.1994) ("Ordinarily, a party not named in the EEOC charge cannot be
For all these reasons, Plaintiff's Title VII and ADEA claims against the Board of Trustees are due to be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
As amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) provides:
42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (emphasis added). Accordingly, § 1981 creates a substantive statutory remedy for employment discrimination. The remedy is similar to, though independent from, Title VII. The procedures for enforcing § 1981 are simpler than Title VII, but the substantive law and remedies are largely the same. See Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 664 F.3d 883 (11th Cir.2011) ("[T]he analytical framework and rules about employer liability under Title VII and § 1981 are the same."). Unlike Title VII, however, § 1981 claims in the employment context are based on the equal right to make and enforce contracts. Additionally, unlike Title VII, § 1981 claims are limited to race discrimination. See Little v. United Technologies, Carrier Transicold Div., 103 F.3d 956, 960-61 (11th Cir.1997) ("It is well-established that § 1981 is concerned with racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts." (emphasis in original)).
Accordingly, the prima facie elements that govern Plaintiffs § 1981 retaliation claim are essentially the same as those governing Title VII retaliation: "A plaintiff asserting a retaliation claim under Title VII must show that: (1) he engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) he suffered a materially adverse action; and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action." Howard v. Walgreen Co., 605 F.3d 1239, 1244 (11th Cir.2010) (footnote omitted).
In the Eleventh Circuit, a § 1981 plaintiff has no direct cause of action against a state actor, such as the Board of Trustees. Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1288 (11th Cir.2009) ("We have held that § 1981 does not provide an implicit cause of action against state actors; therefore, § 1983 constitutes the exclusive federal remedy for violation by state actors of the rights guaranteed under § 1981. See Butts v. County of Volusia, 222 F.3d 891, 894-95 (11th Cir.2000)."). Here, Plaintiff correctly brings her § 1981 claim through § 1983,
To prevail in a civil rights action under § 1983, "a plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of two elements: (1) that the act or omission deprived plaintiff of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) that the act or omission was done by a person acting under color of law." Marshall Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Marshall Cnty. Gas Dist., 992 F.2d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir.1993).
In light of this legal framework, the court assesses Defendant's 12(b)(6) motion as applied to Plaintiff's § 1981 retaliation claim under both § 1981 and § 1983. Ultimately, Plaintiff fails to state a claim under either statute.
First, the Board of Trustees is not a suable entity under § 1983, as it is not a "person" subject to suit under that statute. The Supreme Court in Will v. Michigan Department of State Police squarely addressed the issue of whether a state is a "person" for purposes of § 1983 liability,
The exclusion of states from § 1983 liability naturally extends to state entities and agencies, such as state universities and their boards of trustees. For instance, this court, citing Will and Lapides, has previously held that Alabama A & M, as an agency of the state, is not a "person" that can be sued for money damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Ogburia v. Ala. Agricultural & Mechanical Univ., et al., Case No. 5:06-CV2275-VEH, Doc. 19 at 5 (N.D.Al. Mar. 5, 2007). Likewise, the court here finds that the University of Alabama Board of Trustees is not a "person"
Second, Plaintiff also fails to allege a prima facie § 1981 retaliation claim. In her retaliation claim, Plaintiff alleges that "[a]fter [she] filed her charge with the E.E.O.C., she began to experience instances of retaliation," and alleges by way of a singular example that "her office was taken and she was reassigned to the `urine specimen room' as an office." (Complt., Doc. 1 ¶¶ 60-61). However, nowhere in the Complaint does Plaintiff allege any interference with her right to make or enforce a contract with the Board of Trustees, which highlights the problem of the insufficient allegations of joint employment between the Board and UAB Health System, discussed supra. As previously explained, the court cannot reasonably infer from the Complaint that the Board of Trustees is Plaintiff's legitimate employer (and if the Board was not her employer, it was not in a position to execute the retaliatory actions alleged in the Complaint, which related to her office environment).
Moreover, similar to the deficient retaliation claim described in Little, 103 F.3d at 961, Plaintiff's retaliation claim, as alleged, is not based on her race but based on her filing of an EEOC charge. She alleges that her office was taken and she was reassigned to the "urine specimen room" as her office as retaliation after filing her EEOC charge. In other words, she does not allege that the retaliation (moving her office) was because of her skin color but because she had filed an administrative grievance. Based on the Eleventh Circuit's analysis in Little, that allegation is not sufficient to establish a prima facie claim of § 1981 retaliation.
Therefore, under either reasoning, Plaintiff does not allege facts sufficient to support a § 1981 retaliation claim against the Board of Trustees because she cannot state a claim under § 1981 or § 1983. The court concludes that, even if it were not barred under Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, see discussion supra, Plaintiff's § 1981 retaliation claim against the Board of Trustees, brought by and through § 1983, is alternatively due to be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides, in part:
U.S. Const. amend. XIV. Thus, the various clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment provide different civil rights remedies. Here, Plaintiff brings her claim pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff asserts her constitutional right to equal protection by and through § 1983, which provides the statutory remedy to address violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (creating a civil right of action to remedy "the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws").
Unlike Title VII and the ADEA, Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim, brought by and through
Further, "[t]he Eleventh Circuit has held that Section 1983 may be used as a parallel remedy to Title VII for gender or race discrimination which violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The elements of such a claim are the same as the elements of a Title VII action. Cross v. State of Alabama, 49 F.3d 1490, 1507-08 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Hardin v. Stynchcomb, 691 F.2d 1364, 1369 n. 16 (11th Cir.1982))." Rice-Lamar v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 54 F.Supp.2d 1137, 1145 (S.D.Fla.1998). "In a traditional employment case brought under the Equal Protection Clause, an employee asserts that he was discriminated against on account of his membership in an identifiable or protected class, such as race, religion, sex, or national origin." Alford v. Consol. Gov't of Columbus, Ga., 438 Fed.Appx. 837, 839-40 (11th Cir.2011) (citations omitted).
As previously stated, the elements for a § 1983 claim are "(1) that the act or omission deprived plaintiff of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) that the act or omission was done by a person acting under color of law." Marshall Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 992 F.2d at 1174.
Here, Plaintiff fails to state a claim under either prong of the § 1983 analysis. For the same reasons stated above, the Board of Trustees is not a "person" acting under color of state law. Therefore, Plaintiff cannot plausibly state a claim against the Board of Trustees under § 1983 as required by the second prong.
Additionally, under the first prong of § 1983 analysis, Plaintiff fails to state a prima facie claim for a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Because the Equal Protection Clause borrows from Title VII elements and analysis, Cross, 49 F.3d at 1507-08, Plaintiff again fails to state a claim because she has not plausibly alleged that the Board of Trustees is her "employer," as discussed supra. Moreover, in her Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection claim (Complt., Doc. 1 ¶¶ 65-72), Plaintiff pleads no specific facts to support her conclusory allegations of intentional discrimination based on race (id. ¶ 68) and disparate treatment based on race (id. ¶ 69). Instead, in shotgun fashion, she simply incorporates by reference all other facts previously described in the Complaint. As the court previously stated, it is not obligated to accept Plaintiff's conclusory legal assertions as true for the purposes of a motion to dismiss. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Threadbare legal conclusions without any factual support will not suffice under Rule 12(b)(6)'s standard, as interpreted by Iqbal and Twombly. The court need not, and does not,
Under either reasoning, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against the Board of Trustees on her Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim. Therefore, the court alternatively finds that Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim against the Board of Trustees, brought by and through § 1983, is due to be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
For all these reasons, the court finds that the Defendant's Motion is due to be
Accordingly, with no claims remaining against it, the Board of Trustees is due to be dismissed from this case. The court will enter a separate Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.
Before the court is the Motion to Dismiss or For Summary Judgment (the "Motion") (doc. 13) filed by Defendant Board of Trustees University of Alabama ("Board of Trustees" or "Defendant"). For the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion, the Motion is hereby
Accordingly, the court
Speaker v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, 623 F.3d 1371, 1379 (11th Cir.2010).
