MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS, District Judge.

I. Introduction

This action originated in the Circuit Court of Etowah County, Alabama, when Plaintiff Randall Huffstutler ("Mr. Huffstutler") filed his complaint on September 1, 2011, against Defendant Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company ("Goodyear"). (Doc. 1 ¶ 1). The lawsuit involves a claim for benefits sought by Mr. Huffstutler under "Goodyear's 1950 Pension Plan (the "Plan"), which is a defined benefit pension plan." (Doc. 11 at 5). Goodyear removed the lawsuit from state court on September 14, 2011, premising such action upon this court's federal question jurisdiction because Mr. Huffstutler's claims arise under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"). (Doc. 1 ¶ 4).

Pending before the court are Mr. Huffstutler's Motion To Determine Standard of Review (Doc. 10) ("Mr. Huffstutler's ERISA Standard Motion"), filed on January 5, 2012, Goodyear's Motion To Determine Standard of Review and Limit Scope of Review and Discovery (Doc. 11) ("Goodyear's ERISA Standard Motion"), filed on January 10, 2012, and Mr. Huffstutler's Motion To Strike Certification (Doc. 14) (the "Motion To Strike"), filed on January 24, 2012. These motions are fully briefed and are now all under submission. (Docs. 12, 13, 16. 17). For the reasons explained below, Mr. Huffstutler's ERISA Standard Motion is GRANTED, Goodyear's ERISA Standard Motion is DENIED, and Mr. Huffstutler's Motion to Strike is GRANTED.

II. ERISA Standard of Review

ERISA does not contain a standard of review for actions brought under § 1132(a)(1)(B) challenging benefit eligibility determinations. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 108-09, 109 S.Ct. 948, 953 (1989) ("Although it is a `comprehensive and reticulated statute,' ERISA does not set out the appropriate standard of review for actions . . . challenging benefit eligibility determinations.").1 Moreover, the case law that has developed over time governing such standards has significantly evolved. A history of the transformation of these principles is useful to understanding the presently applicable framework for evaluating § 1132(a)(1)(B) ERISA challenges.

In Firestone, the Supreme Court initially established three distinct standards for courts to employ when reviewing an ERISA plan administrator's benefits decision: "(1) de novo where the plan does not grant the administrator discretion; (2) arbitrary and capricious where the plan grants the administrator discretion; and (3) heightened arbitrary and capricious where the plan grants the administrator discretion and the administrator has a conflict of interest." Capone v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 592 F.3d 1189, 1195 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Buckley v. Metro. Life, 115 F.3d 936, 939 (11th Cir. 1997) (discussing Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115)). In Williams v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., 373 F.3d 1132, 1137 (11th Cir. 2004), overruled on other grounds by Doyle v. Liberty Life Assur. Co. of Boston, 542 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. 2008), the Eleventh Circuit fleshed out the Firestone test into a six-step framework designed to guide courts in evaluating a plan administrator's benefits decision in ERISA actions. When the Eleventh Circuit created the Williams test, the sixth step of the sequential framework required courts reviewing a plan administrator's decision to apply a heightened arbitrary and capricious standard if the plan administrator operated under a conflict of interest. See id. The Eleventh Circuit later modified this step in response to the Supreme Court's ruling in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 115-17 (2008), which concluded that a conflict of interest should be weighed merely as "one factor" in determining whether an administrator abused its discretion. See Doyle v. Liberty Life Assur. Co. of Boston, 542 F.3d 1352, 1359 (11th Cir. 2008) ("As we now show, Glenn implicitly overrules and conflicts with our precedent requiring courts to review under the heightened standard a conflicted administrator's benefits decision.").

The Eleventh Circuit's latest iteration of the Firestone standard-of-review framework is found in Blankenship v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 644 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 849 (2011):

Id. at 1355.2 All steps of the analysis are "potentially at issue" when a plan vests discretion to the plan administrator to make benefits determinations. See id. at 1356 n.7. Conversely, then, where a plan does not confer discretion, the court simply applies the de novo review standard established by the Supreme Court in Firestone. See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115 ("[W]e hold that a denial of benefits challenged under § 1132(a)(1)(B) is to be reviewed under a de novo standard unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan.").

III. Analysis

A. Motion to Strike

Before reaching the parties' dispute over the applicable ERISA standard of review, the court first decides the merits of Mr. Huffstutler's Motion to Strike. In his Motion to Strike, Mr. Huffstutler seeks to strike the certification (Doc. 12-1) filed by Goodyear on January 19, 2012, in support of its ERISA Standard Motion and in opposition to Mr. Huffstutler's competing motion. (Doc. 14 at 1).

The certification references three separate ERISA-related resolutions. More specifically, the certification does not attach any copies of the actual resolutions,3 but instead indicates Ms. Bell's examination of Goodyear's records has "reveal[ed] . . . the following [as] . . . true and correct cop[ies] of resolutions. . . ." (Doc. 12-1 at 1).

The first section defines who are the members of Goodyear's "Pension Board and the ERISA Appeals Committee[.]" (Doc. 12-1 at 1). The second part indicates that the Pension Board and ERISA Appeals Committee are bestowed with:

(Doc. 12-1 at 1).

The third section states:

(Doc. 12-1 at 1).

The certification does not clarify when Goodyear adopted each one of these resolutions. Instead, the document only generally advises that Goodyear adopted them at a meeting "held on the 23rd day of January, 2004, as last amended on April 12, 2011." (Doc. 12-1 at 1). The certification further states that said resolutions are in full force and effect at the date hereof[.]" (Id.). Assistant Secretary of Goodyear, Bertram Bell ("Ms. Bell"), executed this certification on January 17, 2012. (Id. at 2.).

Mr. Huffstutler raises several grounds in support of his Motion to Strike, including the timing of the executed certification, which post-dates Goodyear's final consideration and denial of Mr. Huffstutler's claim on July 13, 2011, the absence of any attached resolutions, and the lack of personal knowledge asserted within the certification. (Doc. 11-2 at 1). Goodyear responds in part to some of the issues raised by Mr. Huffstutler. (See generally Doc. 16).

However, noticeably absent from Goodyear's opposition is any argument that counters Mr. Huffstutler's points that the certification lacks copies of the actual resolutions as well as any reference to Ms. Bell's personal knowledge of the resolutions. Additionally, the certification is not filed as a sworn to affidavit or as an unsworn declaration under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746. Goodyear also has not suggested that the certification, which purportedly summarizes various resolutions agreed to over a period of time by Goodyear, is admissible under some other federal statute or rule.

As the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama has observed:

Amazing Grace Bed & Breakfast v. Blackmun, No. 09-0298-WS-N, 2011 WL 606126, at *3 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 11, 2011). Therefore, similar to Amazing Grace, because Goodyear has not "fairly presented" its opposition to Mr. Huffstutler's challenge of the admissibility of the certification, the court will not speculate as to any undeveloped avenues under which it should or could consider the evidence.

In sum, Goodyear, as the proponent of this proof, has not met its burden in supporting the court's consideration of it. Accordingly, the Motion to Strike is GRANTED.

B. ERISA Standard of Review

In this case, the parties dispute the appropriate standard of review for the court to apply.4 Mr. Huffstutler asserts that de novo review is called for, while Goodyear maintains that discretionary or arbitrary and capricious review is required.5

While Mr. Huffstutler bears the burden of proving his entitlement to ERISA benefits under Goodyear's Plan, Horton v. Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., 141 F.3d 1038, 1040 (11th Cir. 1998), Goodyear bears the burden of proving that the arbitrary and capricious standard of review applies. Anderson v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 414 F.Supp.2d 1079, 1095 (M.D. Ala. 2006) (citations omitted). Based upon the terms of the Plan, and the lack of affirmative substantiating proof from Goodyear as discussed more fully below, the court finds that Goodyear has failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that arbitrary and capricious review is proper. Accordingly, the court agrees with Mr. Huffstutler that applying de novo review is appropriate.

As the Eleventh Circuit explained in Jett v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 890 F.2d 1137 (11th Cir. 1989), regarding the de novo versus abuse of discretion distinction:

Firestone, 109 S. Ct. at 956.

Jett, 890 F.2d at 1138-39 (emphasis added). Therefore, in Jett, the court first looked to the language of the plan in order to evaluate the standard of review issue.6 Accord Cagle v. Bruner, 112 F.3d 1510, 1517 (11th Cir. 1997) ("Accordingly, we look to all of the plan documents to determine whether the plan affords the Fund enough discretion to make the arbitrariness standard applicable.").

Here, Goodyear's Plan contains the following relevant language:

(Doc. 10-18 at 6 ¶ 6 (emphasis added)). Thus, the Plan bestows the Pension Board with discretionary authority when a decision is made by that particular body.

The Plan describes the Pension Board as follows:

(Doc. 10-18 at 6 ¶ 5) (emphasis added).

Mr. Huffstuttler does not dispute that the Plan unambiguously vests discretion in the Pension Board to interpret its terms and make pension benefits determinations, but instead argues that de novo review applies for the following reasons:

The Pension Board was not the decision maker.

(Doc. 10 at 14).

Regarding Mr. Huffstutler's first argument, he points out that Gary Dannemiller ("Mr. Dannemiller"), not the Pension Board, denied relief on January 7, 2002, March 11, 2002, and September 16, 2002. Mr. Huffstutler does not reference the final denial dated July 13, 2011, which was signed by a representative of Goodyear's ERISA Appeals Committee. This correspondence also does not in any manner suggest that the entity, bestowed with the discretionary authority under the Plan, i.e., the Pension Board, was the final decision maker. (Doc. 11-2).

The court acknowledges that Goodyear suggests in a footnote that "[t]he Pension Board is the same as the ERISA Appeals Committee (the "EAC"), the body that is referenced in the [July 13, 2011] letter setting for[th] the Decision." (Doc. 11 at 3 n.2). In support of this point, Goodyear indicates that it has attached "[t]he corporate resolution affirming the relationship between the two bodies-the Pension Board and the EAC. . . ." (Id.).

The court has studied the referenced Exhibit C (Doc. 11-3) and finds it to be deficient in support Goodyear's standard of review position for several reasons. One, the attached exhibit is not an actual resolution, but rather is a certification signed by Ms. Bell on January 9, 2012, which attempts to summarize the resolutions purportedly agreed to by Goodyear on April 12, 2011.7 Two, the certification lacks any indication of personal knowledge or attestation by Ms. Bell.

Three, the court finds the summary of the resolutions by Ms. Bell for April 12, 2011, to be conflicting and unreliable as some of the resolution language contained in her January 9, 2012, certification is not included in her subsequent January 12, 2012, one (and vice versa) even though she has indicated that both documents reflect resolutions from April 12, 2011. See discussion supra at 6 n.3. In sum, the court finds the certification to suffer from the same admissibility and reliability issues as Ms. Bell's subsequent January 17, 2011, certification, which the court struck above.

Four, even if the court were to accept the January 9, 2012, certification as admissible probative evidence of a shared and/or identical relationship between the Pension Board and the ERISA Appeals Committee, the document still does not substantiate a delegation of discretionary authority by the Pension Board to the ERISA Appeals Committee. The certification also does not indicate that Goodyear's Plan has been amended to bestow the ERISA Appeals Committee with discretionary authority. Furthermore, Goodyear does not offer any evidence that otherwise confirms that the ERISA Appeals Committee has the same discretionary power that Goodyear expressly afforded to the Pension Board under the Plan (e.g., such as through administrative by-laws or procedures that establish an in-house delegation of authority from the Pension Board to the ERISA Appeals Committee).

Fifth, even if the court were to accept the January 9, 2012, certification as admissible probative evidence of a shared relationship between the Pension Board and the ERISA Appeals Committee and were to assume that Goodyear had actually and validly bestowed the ERISA Appeals Committee with discretionary authority to decide disputed benefit claims, the court still would be unable to verify that the person who signed the final July 13, 2011, denial was, in fact, a duly authorized representative of the ERISA Appeals Committee, as set forth in the first summarized resolution of Exhibit C. (Doc. 11-3 at 1).

More specifically, the court cannot tell from the denial letter or otherwise from the record if Ginnie Lowers ("Ms. Lowers"), who signed the letter as a "representative" for the ERISA Appeals Committee is Goodyear's "General Counsel, the senior Human Resources Officer, the Controller, the head of the Company's Off-Highway Business [or] a Director of HR . . ." who comprise that body. (Doc. 11-3 at 1). As a result, the court cannot determine if Ms. Lowers appropriately signed the denial on behalf of the ERISA Appeals Committee or even properly participated in the deliberative process as the letter seems to indicate. (Doc. 11-2 at 2 ("The Committee requested that we follow up with Bette Pierce on several additional items before making a final determination.") (emphasis added); id. at 2-3 ("We are required to inform you of your right to now bring an action under Section 502(a) of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act, as amended (ERISA).") (emphasis added))).

As this court has previously discussed in the comparable case of Glover V. Amcor Pet Packaging, USA, Inc.:

Glover, No. 4:09-CV-65-VEH (Doc. 45 at 14-16) (N.D. Ala. Feb. 4, 2010).

Similar to Baker,8 in this instance, the record only shows that "[Goodyear's Pension Board], and not [Mr. Dannemiller, the ERISA Appeals Committee, or Ms. Lowers], was given the [fiduciary] authority to review claim denials; nor was [Mr. Dannemiller, the ERISA Appeals Committee, or Ms. Lowers] given the [fiduciary] power to formulate policy or terms of eligibility under the Plan." Further, no competent evidence of (i) a delegation of fiduciary authority to either Mr. Dannemiller, the ERISA Appeals Committee, or Ms. Lowers; (ii) an amendment of the Plan; or (iii) an adherence to administrative by-laws or procedures authorized by the Pension Board exists in the record that might otherwise support the application of the discretionary standard to this decision.

As the district court similarly explained in Anderson, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 1096:

Anderson, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 1096 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).

Therefore, consistent with Baker, Glover, and Anderson, Goodyear has not met its burden of showing that an "authorized party" "with a proper delegation of powers" determined Mr. Huffstutler's benefit dispute under the Plan. Accordingly, Mr. Huffstutler is correct that a de novo standard of review applies to the rejection of his claim, and the court does not need to reach any of the other issues relating to the standard of review addressed by the parties. Further, consistent with this de novo ruling, the court will allow Mr. Huffstutler the right to conduct discovery.

IV. Conclusion9

Accordingly, Mr. Huffstutler's ERISA Standard Motion is GRANTED, Goodyear's ERISA Standard Motion is DENIED, and Mr. Huffstutler's Motion to Strike is GRANTED.

DONE and ORDERED.