VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS, District Judge.
Plaintiff Sheila Denise Fultz ("Ms. Fultz") brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 216(i) and 223 of the Social Security Act (the "Act"). She seeks review of a final adverse decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (hereinafter "Commissioner" or "Secretary"), who denied her applications for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") and Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB").
Ms. Fultz was a 32-year-old female at the time of her hearing before the administrative law judge (the "ALJ") held on December 2, 2009. (Tr. 31, 26). In terms of education, Ms. Fultz completed the ninth grade. (Tr. 31). She did not obtain a GED. (Id.).
Ms. Fultz's prior work experience includes "multiple jobs as a cashier/checker." (Tr. 42). Ms. Fultz also has been a fast food worker and an office clerk. (Id.).
Ms. Fultz protectively applied for DIB and SSI on May 9, 2007. (Tr. 14, 46, 47). Ms. Fultz maintains that she became disabled on January 12, 2007, due to a herniated disc and obesity. (Tr. 14, 46, 47). Her claims were denied initially on July 19, 2007. (Tr. 14, 46, 47).
Ms. Fultz timely filed a request for a hearing that was received by the Social Security Administration on August 20, 2007. (Tr. 14, 60). A video hearing was held on December 2, 2009, in which Ms. Fultz appeared in Gadsden, Alabama, and the ALJ presided from Memphis, Tennessee. (Tr. 14, 26).
On January 11, 2010, the ALJ concluded Ms. Fultz was not disabled as defined by the Act and denied her DIB and SSI applications. (Tr. 14-22). On January 22, 2010, Ms. Fultz submitted a request for review of the ALJ's decision. (Tr. 9-10). On May 26, 2011, the Appeals Council denied review, which resulted in the ALJ's disability determination that was adverse to Ms. Fultz becoming the final decision of the Commissioner. (Tr. 1).
On July 28, 2011, Ms. Fultz initiated her lawsuit with this court asking for a review of the ALJ's decision. (Doc. 1). On January 22, 2012, Ms. Fultz filed a brief (Doc. 12) in support of her appeal, and on February 21, 2012, the Commissioner answered with his responsive brief. (Doc. 14). Ms. Fultz elected not to file a reply brief. This court has carefully considered the record, and for the reasons stated below, affirms the Commissioner's denial of benefits, and remands the case for further development and consideration.
The court's review of the Commissioner's decision is narrowly circumscribed. The function of this court is to determine whether the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence and whether proper legal standards were applied. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002). This court must "scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence." Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983). This court will determine that the ALJ's opinion is supported by substantial evidence if it finds "such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. Substantial evidence is "more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance." Id. Factual findings that are supported by substantial evidence must be upheld by the court.
The ALJ's legal conclusions, however, are reviewed de novo, because no presumption of validity attaches to the ALJ's determination of the proper legal standards to be applied. Davis v. Shalala, 985 F.2d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 1993). If the court finds an error in the ALJ's application of the law, or if the ALJ fails to provide the court with sufficient reasoning for determining that the proper legal analysis has been conducted, the ALJ's decision must be reversed. Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145-46 (11th Cir. 1991).
To qualify for disability benefits and establish her entitlement for a period of disability, the claimant must be disabled as defined by the Act and the Regulations promulgated thereunder.
The Regulations provide a five-step process for determining whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i-v). The Commissioner must determine in sequence:
Pope v. Shalala, 998 F.2d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing to former applicable C.F.R. section), overruled on other grounds by Johnson v. Apfel, 189 F.3d 561 (7th Cir. 1999); accord McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986). "Once the claimant has satisfied steps one and two, she will automatically be found disabled if she suffers from a listed impairment. If the claimant does not have a listed impairment but cannot perform her work, the burden shifts to the Secretary to show that the claimant can perform some other job." Pope, 998 F.2d at 477; accord Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1559 (11th Cir. 1995). The Commissioner must further show that such work exists in the national economy in significant numbers. Foote, 67 F.3d at 1559.
The ALJ found Ms. Fultz had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date of her disability, i.e., January 12, 2007. (Tr. 16 ¶ 2). Thus, the claimant satisfied step one of the five-step test. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b).
Under step two, the ALJ concluded that "[t]he claimant has the following severe impairments: herniated disc L5-S1 status post microdiskectomony, obesity, and carpal tunnel release on the left[.]" (Tr. 16 ¶ 3). Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Ms. Fultz satisfied the second step of the sequential disability evaluative process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c).
At step three, the ALJ determined that Ms. Fultz did not have an impairment or a group of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. 16 ¶ 4). Ms. Fultz does not challenge this determination on appeal.
Regarding Ms. Fultz's residual functional capacity ("RFC"), the ALJ found:
(Tr. 17 ¶ 5).
In support of his RFC determination, the ALJ relied upon the physical capacity evaluation performed on Ms. Fultz on June 22, 2009, by her treating physician, Dr. Toumah M. Sahawneh ("Dr. Sahawneh"). (Tr. 19; see also Tr. 20, 225 ). However, the ALJ rejected that portion of Dr. Sahawneh's opinion which suggested that Ms. Fultz's "medication . . . might cause sedation and other side effects severe enough to prevent her from performing her job." (Tr. 19; see also Tr. 20, Tr. 339-343).
Against this backdrop, the ALJ concluded that Ms. Fultz's impairments prevented her from performing past relevant employment. (Tr. 20 ¶ 6). Because of the ALJ's finding that Ms. Fultz was unable to perform past relevant work, it was necessary to continue to step five of the sequential analysis. (Tr. 29-30).
Using the Medical-Vocational Guidelines as a framework and relying upon testimony from the vocational expert, the ALJ determined that Ms. Fultz was capable of performing certain sedentary jobs which "exist in significant numbers in the national economy." (Tr. 21). Examples of such possible sedentary positions included employment as a clerical-order clerk, a machine monitor, and a table worker. (Id.).
Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Ms. Fultz was not disabled as defined by the Act, and denied both her DIB and SSI claims. (Tr. 21-22; see also Tr. 21 ¶ 11).
In this appeal, Ms. Fultz raises two issues: (1) "Whether the ALJ failed to properly articulate good cause for according less weight to the opinion of the Plaintiff's treating physician[;]" (Doc. 12 at 6) and (2) "Whether the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the credibility of the Plaintiff's testimony consistent with the Eleventh Circuit Pain Standard." (Id. at 9). As discussed below, the court finds no reversible error in either one of these areas.
In Sharfarz v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 278 (11th Cir. 1987), the Eleventh Circuit summarized the framework for an ALJ's evaluation of medical opinions:
Sharfarz, 825 F.2d at 279-80 (emphasis added). Good cause for rejecting a treating physician's opinion exists when the evidence does not bolster it or supports a contrary finding. Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997). Additionally, good cause ismet when the treating physician's opinion is conclusory or inconsistent with that doctor's own medical records. Id.
Here, the ALJ accepted Dr. Sahawneh's conclusions about Ms. Fultz's exertional abilities as substantiated by the physical capacities evaluation conducted on her, but gave less weight to his opinion about the side effects of medication potentially having a negative impact on Ms. Fultz's ability to work. (Tr. 20; see also Tr. 343 (indicating that Ms. Fultz's "having to take . . . meds, may cause sedation and other side effects severe enough to prevent her from pursuing her job.")).
In discounting this particular opinion, the ALJ reasoned:
(Tr. 20). The court has studied Dr. Sahawneh's treatment records and agrees with the ALJ that they do not disclose complaints by Ms. Fultz about any severe side effects from her medications. (Tr. 302-17, 319-26, 328-29, 346-75, 456-65).
As the Eleventh Circuit has explained regarding side effects as a disabling factor:
Swindle v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 222, 226 (11th Cir. 1990) (emphasis added). Although Swindle addresses discrediting a claimant's subjective complaints about medicinal side effects, the court finds its reasoning persuasive in finding that the ALJ articulated good cause for rejecting Ms. Fultz's treating doctor's opinion.
Additionally, the court finds that good cause supports the ALJ's discounting of Dr. Sahawneh's side effects opinion because of its inherently speculative nature. More specifically, Dr. Sahawneh merely indefinitely suggests that Ms. Fultz's medication "
Ms. Fultz also maintains that the ALJ committed reversible error in his application of the Eleventh Circuit pain standard. The court disagrees.
In Dyer v. Barnhart, the Eleventh Circuit summarized the legal framework for evaluating pain and other subjective disabling symptoms:
Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1210-11.
In this instance, the ALJ has adequately articulated why he only partially credited Ms. Fultz's subjective disabling symptoms. For example (and as discussed above), the ALJ explained why he did not believe that the side effects of Ms. Fultz's medications prevented her from performing all sedentary positions: "[T]he reports of doctor office visits do not show that the claimant has alleged significant adverse side-effects from medications to treating physicians." (Tr. 19).
Moreover, in pursuing her appeal, Ms. Fultz does not contest this observation made by the ALJ by referring the court to contrary medical evidence contained in the record. Therefore, in accordance with Swindle, such reasoning is sufficient to discredit the disabling degree of Ms. Fultz's subjective complaints.
As a further illustration, the ALJ pointed out that the infrequency of Ms. Fultz's follow-up treatment after having surgery on February 22, 2008, was inconsistent with the level of continuing limitations that she attributed to her carpal tunnel condition. (Tr. 18-19). Thus, the ALJ appropriately applied the Eleventh Circuit pain standard and provided good cause for finding "that the claimant's medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant's statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not credible to the extent they are inconsistent with the above residual functional capacity assessment." (Tr. 17).
Based upon the court's evaluation of the evidence in the record and the submissions of the parties, the court finds that the Commissioner's final decision is supported by substantial evidence and applies the proper legal standards. Accordingly, the decision of the Commissioner will be affirmed by separate order.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) (current through June 21, 2012).