VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS, District Judge.
Plaintiff Robin Karns ("Plaintiff") originally filed this breach of contract action in the Circuit Court of Etowah County, Alabama, on February 2, 2012. (Doc. 1 ¶ 1; id. at Ex. A. at Compl. at 1). According to her complaint, Plaintiff claims that Defendants "wrongly terminated [her] long term disability benefits effective March 7, 2011." (Doc. 1 at Ex. A., Compl. ¶ 4). Because of Defendants' alleged breach of contract, including their bad faith in failing to properly investigate her claim, Plaintiff seeks to recover long-term disability insurance benefits in a lump sum payment equal to the present value of past and future benefits. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 11). Plaintiff identified Defendant American United Life Insurance Company as the party that issued her contract for long-term disability insurance coverage (id. ¶ 1), and she alleged that Defendant Disability Reinsurance Management Services, Inc., served as the claims administrator of the insurance policy. (Id. ¶ 4).
Defendants jointly removed the litigation to federal court on March 12, 2012, asserting federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1441 as the basis for this court's jurisdiction. (Doc. 1 at 1). Namely, Defendants contended that this case is removable because Plaintiff has asserted claims that arise under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq. On March 30, 2012, Plaintiff timely filed a
"It is by now axiomatic that the inferior courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They are `empowered to hear only those cases within the judicial power of the United States as defined by Article III of the Constitution,' and which have been entrusted to them by a jurisdictional grant authorized by Congress." Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 409 (11th Cir.1999) (quoting Taylor v. Appleton, 30 F.3d 1365, 1367 (11th Cir.1994)). "Accordingly, `[w]hen a federal court acts outside its statutory subject-matter jurisdiction, it violates the fundamental constitutional precept of limited federal power.'" Univ. of S. Ala., 168 F.3d at 409 (quoting Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 212, 92 S.Ct. 418, 425, 30 L.Ed.2d 383 (1971)). "Simply put, once a federal court determines that it is without subject matter jurisdiction, the court is powerless to continue." Univ. of S. Ala., 168 F.3d at 410.
"A necessary corollary to the concept that a federal court is powerless to act without jurisdiction is the equally unremarkable principle that a court should inquire into whether it has subject matter jurisdiction at the earliest possible stage in the proceedings." Id. "Indeed, it is well settled that a federal court is obligated to inquire into subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it may be lacking." Id. (citing Fitzgerald v. Seaboard Sys. R.R., 760 F.2d 1249, 1251 (11th Cir.1985) (per curiam)).
Moreover, "[t]he jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of a claim involves the court's competency to consider a given type of case, and cannot be waived or otherwise conferred upon the court by the parties. Otherwise, a party could `work a wrongful extension of federal jurisdiction and give district courts power the Congress denied them.'" Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 678 F.2d 992, 1000-01 (11th Cir.1982) (quoting American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 18, 71 S.Ct. 534, 95 L.Ed. 702 (1951)) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). Furthermore, "[b]ecause removal jurisdiction raises significant federalism concerns, federal courts are directed to construe removal statutes strictly." Univ. of S. Ala., 168 F.3d at 411 (citing Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-09, 61 S.Ct. 868, 85 L.Ed. 1214 (1941)).
Lastly, Congress has decreed and the Supreme Court has confirmed that — with the express exception of civil rights cases that have been removed — orders of remand by district courts based upon certain grounds, including in particular those premised upon lack of subject matter jurisdiction, are entirely insulated from review. More specifically, § 1447(d) provides:
28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (emphasis added); see also Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 642, 126 S.Ct. 2145, 165 L.Ed.2d 92 (2006) (recognizing that "`[w]here the [remand] order is based on one of the grounds enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), review is unavailable no matter how plain the legal error in ordering the remand'") (citing Briscoe v. Bell, 432 U.S. 404, 413 n. 13, 97 S.Ct. 2428, 53 L.Ed.2d 439 (1977)); Milton I. Shadur, Traps for the Unwary in Removal and Remand, 33 no. 3 Litigation 43 (2007); Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 127 S.Ct. 2411, 2418, 168 L.Ed.2d 112 (2007) (holding that when "the District Court relied upon a ground that is colorably characterized as subject-matter jurisdiction, appellate review is barred by § 1447(d)").
The burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction for the purposes of removal to this court is on the removing defendant(s). See Williams v. Best Buy Co., 269 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir.2001) ("Because this case was originally filed in state court and removed to federal court by Best Buy, Best Buy bears the burden of proving that federal jurisdiction exists."). "The court should determine its jurisdiction over the case `based upon the plaintiff's pleadings at the time of removal.'" Fowler v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 256 F.Supp.2d 1243, 1246 (N.D.Ala.2003).
"[B]ecause the jurisdiction of federal courts is limited, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals favors remand of cases that have been removed where federal jurisdiction is not absolutely clear." Lowe's OK'd Used Cars, Inc. v. Acceptance Ins. Co., 995 F.Supp. 1388, 1389 (M.D.Ala.1998) (citing Burns v. Windsor, 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir.1994)). "In fact, removal statutes are to be strictly construed, with all doubts resolved in favor of remand." Lowe's, 995 F.Supp. at 1389 (citing Diaz v. Sheppard, 85 F.3d 1502, 1505 (11th Cir. 1996)).
As stated above, Defendants premise their removal exclusively upon this court's federal question jurisdiction.
Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1310 (11th Cir.2001). "It is the general rule that an action may be removed from state
Although the "vast majority" of federal question cases contain a federal law that creates the plaintiff's cause of action, see Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808, 106 S.Ct. 3229, 92 L.Ed.2d 650 (1986), federal question jurisdiction is not limited to those cases. There are some situations in which, even though the federal law does not create the cause of action, the case depends on the resolution of a federal question sufficiently substantial to "arise under" federal law. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 27-28, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983); see also Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 199, 41 S.Ct. 243, 65 L.Ed. 577 (1921) (explaining that federal jurisdiction exists when the right to relief "depends upon the construction or application" of federal law and the claim "is not merely colorable"). Thus, to sustain federal question jurisdiction in this case, Defendant must plausibly demonstrate either (1) the existence of a federal law that potentially creates a cause of action for Plaintiff based on the allegations of Plaintiff's complaint (as amended), or (2) that disposition of the case, as alleged by Plaintiff, in her complaint, depends on the resolution of a substantial federal question.
Here, Defendants contend that federal question jurisdiction exists because Plaintiff's state law claims are completely preempted by ERISA. The court agrees. Complete preemption occurs when "the pre-emptive force of a statute is so `extraordinary' that it `converts an ordinary state common-law complaint into one stating a federal' claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule." Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1311 (11th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). The Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA") and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") are the only two federal statutes as to which the United States Supreme Court has expressly found the doctrine of complete preemption to apply. Id. As observed by the Eleventh Circuit:
Smith, 236 F.3d at 1311 (quoting BLAB T.V. of Mobile, Inc. v. Comcast Cable Communications, Inc., 182 F.3d 851, 855 (11th Cir.1999)).
There are "two different kinds of ERISA preemption." Butero v. Royal Maccabees Life Insurance Co., 174 F.3d 1207, 1211 (11th Cir.1999); see also, e.g., Hardy v. Welch, 135 F.Supp.2d 1171, 1178 (M.D.Ala.2000) ("Preemption based on ERISA may take one of two forms."). The first form of ERISA preemption, known as "complete preemption" (sometimes called "superpreemption") "arises from Congress's creation of a comprehensive remedial scheme in 29 U.S.C. § 1132 for loss or denial of employee benefits." Butero, 174 F.3d at 1211. The fundamental principle is that, "[w]hen Congress comprehensively occupies a field of law, `any civil complaint raising this select group of claims is necessarily federal in
The other form of ERISA preemption is referred to as "defensive preemption." See, e.g., Cotton v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co., 402 F.3d 1267, 1281 (11th Cir.2005); Butero, 174 F.3d at 1212. Defensive preemption is derived from ERISA's explicit preemption provision, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). Cotton, 402 F.3d at 1281. Section 1144(a) states that ERISA provisions "shall supercede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any [ERISA-governed] employee benefit plan."
Here, Defendants raise only the doctrine of complete preemption (see Notice of Removal, Doc. 1 ¶ 6), and the court agrees that it applies; therefore, the court need not reach the issue of defensive preemption. Turning to the question of whether Plaintiff's claims are subject to the doctrine of "complete," or "superpreemption,"
Butero, 174 F.3d at 1212 (boldface emphasis supplied); see also Hicks v. Am. United Life Ins. Co., Civil Action No. 5:10-cv-1401-CLS, Doc. 26 (N.D.Ala. Jan. 19, 2011) (Smith, J.) (applying the four-part Butero analysis); Geren v. Omni Transport Sys., Ala., LLC, Case No. 4:09-cv-1928-VEH, Doc. 7 (N.D.Ala. Nov. 17, 2009) (same); Abston v. The Murfee Grp., Civil Action No. 06-00482-KD-B, Doc. 31 (S.D.Ala. Dec. 11, 2006) (same); Tidwell v. Coldwater Covers, Inc., 393 F.Supp.2d 1257 (N.D.Ala. Feb.7, 2005) (same); but cf. Doc. 1 at 4 (applying the two-step test Davila test presented in Conn. State Dental Ass'n v. Anthem Health Plans, Inc., 591 F.3d 1337, 1344 (11th Cir.2009) (citing Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 124 S.Ct. 2488, 159 L.Ed.2d 312 (2004))).
Applying the four-part Butero analysis to the facts of this case, the court finds that Defendants have satisfactorily established each element. In their Notice of Removal, Defendants alleged facts demonstrating that the insurance policy Plaintiff referenced in her complaint was governed by ERISA and attached a copy of the relevant policy as Exhibit B. Defendants also pointed the court to several opinions of other district judges in Alabama who have evaluated the same employee organization — the Alabama Education Association ("AEA") — and concluded that it is governed by ERISA; therefore, those judges found that complete preemption applied in the context of analyzing disability benefits claims in similar policies.
The court's conclusion is consistent with one of the undersigned's previous opinions that assessed a complaint containing similar claims to the Plaintiff's complaint in this case, wherein the court determined that the claims were completely preempted by ERISA. See Langley v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., Case No. 2:06-cv-786-VEH, Doc. 10 (N.D. Ala. June 29, 2006). In Langley, the court reasoned as follows:
Similar to Langley, Plaintiff's complaint in the instant case is based upon the existence of an employee benefit plan. Likewise, Plaintiff's Alabama state law claims are for breach of contract (failure to pay benefits), "bad faith" denial of benefits, and "fail[ure] to properly investigate the claim or to subject the results of the investigation to a cognitive evaluation and review prior to terminating benefits and prior to refusing to reinstate benefits." (See generally Doc. 1 at Ex. A, Compl.). Therefore, Plaintiff's claims — like the claims in Langley — are subject to complete ERISA preemption.
Plaintiff's only argument for remand is that "Plaintiff's claim does not arise under ERISA because Plaintiff is a public school teacher." (Doc. 7 at 1). Plaintiff also conclusorily argues that "[t]his claim is not preempted by ERISA." (Id.; see also Doc. 1 at Ex. A, Compl. ¶ 5). Finally, Plaintiff conclusorily argues that Defendants have not sustained their burden of proof to establish that ERISA preemption justifies removal. (Doc. 7 at 1, 4). As noted above, Plaintiff elected not to reply to the Defendants' response in opposition to her motion to remand.
Contrary to Plaintiff's conclusory argument that Defendants have not sustained their removal burden, Defendants sufficiently alleged that the insurance policy referenced by Plaintiff in her complaint was issued to the AEA to insure the long-term disability component of the AEA Plan. (Doc. 1 at 5). Defendants provided a copy of the Group Long-Term Disability Policy No. VDIE (the "policy") at Exhibit B to their notice of removal. (Doc. 1, Ex. B). Notably, Plaintiff has not contested the validity of the policy documents supplied by Defendants.
As to Plaintiff's argument concerning her status as a public school teacher, this court finds Judge Lynwood Smith's opinion in Hicks particularly instructive, and persuasive. The plaintiff in Hicks had been employed by the Cullman County Board of Education as a teacher at Parkside Elementary School prior to her disability benefits lawsuit. Hicks, 5:10-cv-1401-CLS, Doc. 26 at 2.
Id. Judge Smith reviewed the disability benefits plan at issue and found that it did not fall within ERISA's regulatory safe harbor provision and, additionally, that the AEA was considered an "employee organization" for ERISA purposes. Id. at 20. Accordingly, he found that the policy at issue was governed by ERISA, and as such, the defendants in that case had met their burden of establishing federal subject matter jurisdiction for the purposes of removal. Id. Accordingly, the plaintiff's motion to remand was denied. Id.
As determined above, Plaintiff's Motion To Remand is due to be, and is hereby,
