LYNWOOD SMITH, District Judge.
Jacob O'Neal Mears commenced this action against the City of Huntsville and one of its police officers, Brett McCulley, in the Circuit Court of Madison County, Alabama. Based upon the fact that plaintiff's state-court complaint appeared to assert at least two claims based upon the United States Constitution,
The case now is before the court on defendants' motions to enter summary judgment in their favor on all claims alleged in plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint,
Upon consideration of the pleadings, briefs, and evidentiary submissions, the court concludes, for the reasons stated in the remainder of this opinion, that both motions for summary judgment are due to be granted.
A white male entered the Regions Bank branch located at 2015 Sparkman Drive in Huntsville, Alabama, at 9:50 a.m. on November 26, 2008, and slid a note in front of bank teller Jermaine Edwards that read: "I got a gun and I ain't playing. I want all loose bills. 100s, 50s, 20s, 10s, 5s, 1s. Don't act stupid. I will shoot you."
Officers from the Huntsville Police Department, including defendant Brett McCulley, responded to the bank's alarm. The bank teller gave a verbal and written statement describing the perpetrator as a white male in his mid-30s, approximately 6'2" tall, and wearing a blue jacket and baseball cap.
Sherry and William Johnson are the aunt and uncle of plaintiff, Jacob Mears. They viewed a television news broadcast that included coverage of the bank robbery that had occurred earlier in the day. A photograph of the robber taken by the bank's surveillance camera was included in
When Officer McCulley arrived at the school, he first showed the Johnsons a photograph of plaintiff. (The photograph contained identifying information below the image, but the record is unclear as to whether the photograph was a "mug shot," or a driver's license photograph of plaintiff.) Both Sherry and William Johnson identified the individual depicted in the photograph as Sherry's nephew. Officer McCulley then showed the Johnsons a photograph snapped by the bank's surveillance camera.
Officer McCulley returned to his office, where he determined that plaintiff's home address was in Limestone County, Alabama. He also discovered that plaintiff previously had been convicted of armed robbery: he had pled guilty in February of 2001 to a charge of robbery in the second
Officer McCulley then contacted the Limestone County Sheriff's Office, and arranged for two deputies to meet him at a location in Athens, Alabama. McCulley arrived in his unmarked automobile, accompanied by two City of Huntsville uniformed patrol officers driving a marked police cruiser. They met Lieutenant Jay Stinnett and Deputy Jonathan Hinton of the Limestone County Sheriff's Office at a golf course outside Athens at 7:35 p.m. Lieutenant Stinnett and Deputy Hinton were in two marked patrol cars.
Officer McCulley informed Lieutenant Stinnett and Deputy Hinton that Jacob O'Neal Mears was a suspect in the Huntsville bank robbery that had occurred earlier that day because Mears's uncle had seen the surveillance-camera photograph of the perpetrator broadcast during a television news account of the robbery, and telephoned police to say that it was his wife's nephew.
The five officers — Officer McCulley, the two Huntsville uniformed police officers, Lieutenant Stinnett, and Deputy Hinton — proceeded to plaintiff's home in Limestone County, outside the corporate limits of the City of Huntsville. They arrived about 7:45 p.m. Plaintiff was at home with his long-time girlfriend (and, later, wife), Bridget Gatlin, and their two children.
Officer McCulley looked through the glass door as he approached the house, and saw plaintiff run to the back.
Plaintiff was transported to the Huntsville Police Department's North Precinct and placed in an interrogation room. Officer McCulley read plaintiff his "Miranda" rights and warnings. Plaintiff waived his rights, and agreed to speak to McCulley. He related his activities during the day, and explained that it would not have been possible for him to commit the robbery because he was working in Franklin County, Alabama, at the time.
Officer McCulley told plaintiff that he was being charged with robbery in the first degree, and transported him to the Madison County Jail.
Officer McCulley again met with bank teller Jermaine Edwards on December 1, 2008: five days after the robbery. He presented a "photographic line-up" — i.e., a card to which an array of photographs of six different men had been attached, one of whom was plaintiff — and asked Edwards whether any of the individuals appeared to be the person who had robbed the bank. McCulley did not tell Edwards that one of the photographs was of the person police believed to have been the bank robber, but Edwards knew that the police had arrested a suspect. Significantly, Edwards identified the photograph of plaintiff as the bank robber.
Plaintiff has two tattoos, one of which is on the right side of his neck. Consequently, on December 2, 2008, six days after the bank robbery, Officer McCulley had one of the bank's surveillance photographs enhanced, in order to enlarge the image of the right side of the perpetrator's neck, in an effort to determine whether the robber had the same tattoo as plaintiff.
On December 10, 2008, fourteen days after the bank robbery, McCulley interviewed Dale Wise and Daryl McCurry, the
After taking statements from Wise and McCurry, Officer McCulley telephoned the gasoline station in Moulton to which they and plaintiff said they had twice driven on the day of the robbery. The employee who answered the telephone said that McCulley would need to speak to the station manager, Brenda Kilgore. Consequently, the following day, December 11, 2008, McCulley drove to the gasoline station — "J-Mart store number 508" on Alabama Highway 157 — and spoke with Ms. Kilgore. She said that she had seen plaintiff at the station on the morning of the robbery, and that he was wearing a blue windbreaker.
Officer McCulley then drove to the Priceville shop to which plaintiff, Wise, and McCurry said they had taken their truck for repairs on the day of the robbery. McCulley showed the shop owner and employees a photograph of plaintiff, and asked if he had been in the shop on November 26th. The owner and employees all said that they had only a few customers on the day of the robbery, and denied that plaintiff, Wise, or McCurry had been among them.
On December 10, 2008 — the same day that Officer McCulley interviewed Wise and McCurry, talked to Brenda Kilgore, and questioned the owner and employees of the Priceville repair shop — McCulley also received a telephone call from a detective in Kingsport, Tennessee, saying that the physical description of the perpetrator of the Regions Bank robbery in Huntsville and the content of his demand note matched those of the person who had robbed a bank in Kingsport, Tennessee. The detective asked for an extradition hold to be placed on plaintiff.
On January 28, 2009, two months after the Regions Bank robbery, an FBI agent contacted Officer McCulley about Michael Watson, a man suspected of robbing banks in Kingsport and Nashville, Tennessee, as well as Wichita, Kansas. In response, the records division of the Huntsville Police Department sent information about plaintiff to the FBI agent. Watson and his girlfriend were arrested in Hattiesburg, Mississippi on January 30, 2009, for robbing a bank there. Watson's girlfriend provided investigators with information that linked Watson to the robbery of the Regions Bank branch in Huntsville on November 26, 2008.
No one disputes that plaintiff suffered a tragic wrong as a result of his misidentification as the robber of the Regions Bank in Huntsville. Even so, "[t]he Constitution does not guarantee that only the guilty will be arrested." Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979) (alteration supplied). The Fourth Amendment requirement of probable cause to arrest, the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a speedy trial by jury, and the Eight Amendment prohibition against excessive bail were intended to balance society's need to apprehend criminals against the risk of arresting and imprisoning innocent persons. Law-enforcement officers are human, however, and, as such, they are fallible, and occasionally arrest innocent persons, even when acting
42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a remedial vehicle: that is, it provides a means to seek redress against state and local governmental entities and officials whose conduct under color of state law deprives a plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the United States Constitution or federal statutes.
Defendants initially assert that plaintiff did not suffer a deprivation of any rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Alternatively, they assert that, even if plaintiff did suffer a deprivation of federally-protected rights, Officer McCulley is entitled to "qualified immunity," which is a defense to a § 1983 claim, and provides "complete protection for governmental officials sued in their individual capacities as long as `their conduct violates no clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Thomas v. Roberts, 261 F.3d 1160, 1170 (11th Cir.2001) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)).
Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1193-94 (11th Cir.2002); see also, e.g., Chesser v. Sparks, 248 F.3d 1117, 1121-22 (11th Cir. 2001).
A valid qualified immunity defense has three parts. The defendant must first establish that he was acting within his "discretionary authority" when the acts complained of were committed. See, e.g., Lee, 284 F.3d at 1194. If the defendant makes that showing, the burden then
While the determination of the question of whether a federal constitutional or statutory right was violated depends upon the right asserted, a common standard is used to determine whether that right was "clearly established."
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002) (alteration and emphasis supplied). It also can be said that a right is "clearly established" for purposes of the doctrine of qualified immunity if an earlier decision "gave reasonable warning that the conduct then at issue violated constitutional rights." Id. The only decisions that can give such warning are those "of the U.S. Supreme Court, Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, or the highest court of the state where the case arose." Jenkins by Hall v. Talladega City Board of Education, 115 F.3d 821, 826 n. 4 (11th Cir.1997). A right also will be deemed to have been "clearly established"
Durruthy v. Pastor, 351 F.3d 1080, 1092 (11th Cir.2003) (alteration in original).
The actions of a governmental official are deemed to have been committed within the official's "discretionary authority" whenever he or she "was (a) performing a legitimate job-related function (that is, pursuing a job-related goal), (b) through means that were within his power to utilize." Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1265 (11th Cir. 2004). Investigating crimes, conducting searches, and making arrests are legitimate job-related functions within the discretionary
The preface to Count Three of plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint is entitled "FALSE ARREST PURSUANT TO TITLE 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (BRETT MCCULLEY IN HIS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY)."
To establish that an arrest violated the Fourth Amendment, the plaintiff must show that the arrest was "unreasonable."
The doctrine of qualified immunity also shields an officer from an unlawful arrest claim even when the officer had only arguable probable cause to arrest,
The only issue on plaintiff's false arrest claim is one of identity: that is, did Officer McCulley have probable cause, either actually or arguably, to believe that plaintiff was the person who robbed the Regions Bank in Huntsville?
In Rushing v. Parker, 599 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir.2010) (per curiam), a panel of the Eleventh Circuit confronted the issue of liability under § 1983 where the plaintiff was mistakenly identified as the perpetrator of a crime and arrested. There, the victim reported to law-enforcement that he had been victimized by an individual he had hired to repair his roof. Id. at 1265. The victim filed a complaint against the perpetrator by name, but the name given by the victim was not the full name of the perpetrator, but was instead the name of the plaintiff. Id. at 1268. As in the present case, the victim later identified the plaintiff as the perpetrator from a "photographic lineup." Id. The court held that there was "no evidence that [the defendant officer] had reason to believe the perpetrator was anyone other than the Plaintiff, given the victim's complaint and identification"; thus, "a reasonable officer [in the defendant officer's] situation could have followed a similar course of action and believed that probable cause existed." Id. at 1268. In reaching that holding, the court made clear that mistakes, by officers or victims, do not obviate arguable probable cause to make an arrest, so long as the mistake was reasonable. See id. at 1267-68.
The Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Brock v. City of Zephyrhills, 232 Fed.Appx. 925 (11th Cir.2007), also is instructive. Even though the opinion is not binding authority or of precedential value because the decision is unreported, it is a factually similar case. There, an individual robbed a bank, and a police officer named Kirk obtained a video tape from a surveillance camera and statements from witnesses, including a physical description of the perpetrator and a description of his vehicle. Id. at 926. Kirk published photographs from the surveillance camera in the local newspaper and distributed copies to other law-enforcement agencies. Id. A fellow law-enforcement officer, Kramer, identified the plaintiff as the perpetrator. Id. Kramer also showed the picture to several members of the plaintiff's family, all of whom identified their relative as the perpetrator. Id. Based on the identifications by members of the plaintiff's family, identification of the plaintiff in a "photographic lineup" by two out of three witnesses from the bank, and the fact that the plaintiff owned a vehicle matching a description of the perpetrator's vehicle, Kirk arrested the
Plaintiff asserts several grounds for his argument that the identification information supplied to Officer McCulley in this case did not support a finding of either actual or arguable probable cause. First, plaintiff argues that the identification volunteered by his uncle and aunt did not establish probable cause, because neither conclusively identified him as the bank robber.
Plaintiff also argues that all of the identifications made by comparing his appearance to the photograph of the perpetrator taken by the bank's surveillance camera cannot support a finding of either actual or arguable probable cause because of visible differences between plaintiff's appearance and the photograph of the perpetrator. Plaintiff asserts that the photographs of the perpetrator show that the perpetrator "had no hair on the sides or the back of his head below the rim of the baseball cap he was wearing," and that plaintiff had "a full head of hair on the day of the robbery."
Plaintiff also argues that he has "a tattoo on the side of his neck and a large tattoo on the front of his chest at the neck line," but the photographs from the bank show that the perpetrator "is wearing an open collared shirt and no tattoos are visible."
Plaintiff also argues that the physical description of the bank robber was so dissimilar from his own physical characteristics that a reasonable officer could not believe that he was the perpetrator. Jermaine Edwards, the bank teller, described the robber as a white male in his mid-30s, approximately 6'2 tall, and wearing a blue jacket and baseball cap.
In addition to the identifications of plaintiffs as the perpetrator, other information supporting probable cause to arrest was available to Officer McCulley at the time of the arrest. An individual's prior convictions support a finding of probable cause to arrest, so long as the prior conviction had probative value to the arresting officer in concluding that the arrestee committed a crime. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 172-78, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949) (holding a police officer's knowledge of an individual's prior arrest and pending charges contributed to a finding of probable cause); Lindsey, 482 F.3d at 1292 (holding that the knowledge of police officers that the defendant was previously convicted of armed robbery added to a finding of probable cause to arrest for being a felon in possession of a firearm). See also, e.g., 2 Wayne R. LaFave,
Finally, as previously observed, when Officer McCulley arrived at plaintiff's home, plaintiff ran and McCulley found him hiding in a dark laundry room. An effort to avoid interaction with the police through flight, hiding, or other furtive actions supports a finding of probable cause.
In sum, when the totality of facts known to Officer McCulley at the time he arrested plaintiff is taken into account, it becomes unequivocally clear that a person of reasonable caution could believe in good faith that plaintiff had committed the armed robbery of the Regions Bank branch in Huntsville on November 26, 2008. Thus, Officer McCulley had probable cause to arrest plaintiff, and the arrest did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, summary judgment is due to be entered in favor of Officer McCulley on plaintiff's unlawful arrest claim.
Count Five of plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, like the third count discussed in the preceding section, is neither a model of clarity, nor an example of good pleading. Once again, even though the preface to the claim is entitled "COUNT FIVE — FALSE IMPRISONMENT PURSUANT TO TITLE 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (BRETT MCCULLEY IN HIS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY),"
Some confusion exists regarding the distinction between a Fourth Amendment false arrest claim, on the one hand, and a Fourteenth Amendment false imprisonment claim on the other. As noted in the previous section, the Fourth Amendment provides a right to be "free from unreasonable ... seizures,"
Resolution of that conundrum is not necessary to reach a decision on the defendants' present motions for summary judgment, however, because plaintiff asserts both false arrest and false imprisonment claims. See id. at 1286 ("It is not necessary in this case to determine where Fourth Amendment analysis ends and due process analysis begins, because [the plaintiff] raised claims under both constitutional provisions, and neither party argues that the difference in standards has any bearing on this appeal of the denial of the motion to dismiss.").
As discussed above, § 1983 provides a cause of action only for "the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" of the United States by any person acting under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, because an incarceration gives rise to a § 1983 claim only when the imprisonment is unconstitutional, the § 1983 cause of action is significantly limited in comparison to the common law tort of false imprisonment, as explained in more detail below. See, e.g., Cannon, 1 F.3d at 1562-63.
Discussion of a cause of action for false imprisonment under § 1983 was given its first major treatment in the case of Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979). There, the appellant, Linnie McCollan, had a brother, Leonard McCollan, who had obtained a driver's license in Linnie's name, but displaying his (Leonard's) photograph. Id. at 140-41, 99 S.Ct. 2689. Thereafter, when Leonard McCollan was arrested on narcotics charges, he identified himself as his brother, Linnie, was booked as Linnie, and was released on bail as Linnie. Id. at 141, 99 S.Ct. 2689. When Leonard failed to appear on the narcotics charges, a warrant was issued for the arrest of Linnie. Id. It was the misfortune of poor, innocent Linnie to later be stopped by police for a
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Linnie failed to establish a false-imprisonment claim that was cognizable under § 1983. The Court held that a false imprisonment claim under § 1983 implicates the Fourteenth Amendment "protection against deprivations of liberty without due process of law," and distinguished that claim from the common-law tort of false imprisonment on the basis that a § 1983 claim requires that the incarceration be unconstitutional. Id. at 142, 99 S.Ct. 2689. The Court held that Linnie failed to make out a valid § 1983 claim because he could not show an alleged constitutional violation, saying that "a detention of three days over a New Year's weekend does not and could not amount to such a deprivation" of "liberty ... without due process of law." Id. In other words, the Court held that when a person is taken into custody pursuant to a constitutionally valid arrest warrant, or (as in the present case) pursuant to an arrest based upon probable cause, the detention of that person for a short period of time is, despite the person's protests of innocence and actual innocence, not a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment protection against a deprivation of liberty without due process of law. The Court left open the issue of whether, after some unspecified period of custody, the continued detention of an individual in the face of his protests of innocence would be a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Baker, 443 U.S. at 145, 99 S.Ct. 2689 ("We may even assume, arguendo, that, depending on what procedures the State affords defendants following arrest and prior to actual trial, mere detention pursuant to a valid warrant but in the face of repeated protests of innocence will after the lapse of a certain amount of time deprive the accused of `liberty ... without due process of law.'") (quoting U.S. Const. amend. XIV (1868)).
The Eleventh Circuit has recognized a § 1983 false imprisonment cause of action subject to the limitations on that claim imposed by the decision in Baker v. McCollan (see Cannon, 1 F.3d at 1562-63; Douthit v. Jones, 619 F.2d 527, 532 (5th Cir.1980)),
Id. at 840 (alterations supplied).
The parties do not dispute that the elements of a common-law false imprisonment claim are satisfied.
First, in Cannon v. Macon County, 1 F.3d 1558 (11th Cir.1993), a panel of the Eleventh Circuit found deliberate indifference creating a false imprisonment claim based upon the following facts. The plaintiff was traveling, ran out of money, stopped her automobile at a rest area to telephone relatives for help, and spent the night at the rest area while waiting for help to arrive. Id. at 1560. The following day, the plaintiff was questioned by a sheriff's deputy patrolling the rest area, and she provided the deputy with her name. Id. The deputy radioed her name to the sheriff's office, and was informed that a person using the plaintiff's name as an alias was wanted in another state according to information maintained by the National Crime Information Center ("NCIC"). Id. The deputy arrested the plaintiff and transported her to jail. Id. A second sheriff's deputy, Collins, completed an arrest report. Id. Collins copied the identifying information written on the arrest report directly from the NCIC report on the wanted individual, rather than asking plaintiff for the information or copying the information from plaintiff's driver's license that was stored in a filing cabinet in the sheriff's office. Cannon, 1 F.3d at 1560. The plaintiff and the description of the wanted individual from the NCIC report differed in the following ways: the plaintiff was 5'1" tall, whereas the wanted individual was 5'5"; the plaintiff had blue eyes, but the wanted individual had brown eyes; the plaintiff's middle initial was different from the middle initial of the wanted individual; the two had different social security numbers; and the plaintiff was twelve years younger than the wanted individual. Id. The court held that "Collins' failure to take any steps to identify [the plaintiff] as the wanted fugitive was sufficient to raise a question of fact as to his deliberate indifference toward the plaintiff's due process rights." Id. at 1564. The court also held that Collins was not entitled to claim qualified immunity, because the constitutional right allegedly violated was clearly established — "a reasonable official in Collins' position would have known that Collins' conduct could violate Cannon's fourteenth amendment right not to be falsely imprisoned" without due process of law. Id. at 1565.
Returning to the case before this court, plaintiff must show that Officer McCulley knew, or should have known, of a significant risk that plaintiff was wrongfully imprisoned (i.e., was innocent) in order to establish a subjective belief of a significant risk of harm, but the evidence of record does not rise to that level. To the contrary, as discussed above in relation to plaintiff's false arrest claim, Officer McCulley had probable cause to believe at the time plaintiff was arrested that he had robbed the Regions Bank in Huntsville. Additionally, none of the information Officer McCulley learned between the date on which plaintiff was arrested and the date of his release from jail caused, or reasonably should have caused, McCulley to believe that there was a significant risk that he had arrested and detained the wrong man. Admittedly, some of the information was inconclusive as to plaintiff's guilt or innocence, but the information indicating that plaintiff may have been (as he ultimately was determined to be) innocent was not of such quality or strength that Officer McCulley should have believed that plaintiff was innocent.
Specifically, Officer McCulley learned the following information that supported his belief that plaintiff was the perpetrator after plaintiff's arrest and detention: the bank teller to whom the robber presented his demand note, Jermaine Edwards, identified plaintiff as the perpetrator after viewing a "photographic lineup"; enhancement of surveillance camera footage appeared to show the same tattoo on the perpetrator's neck as the tattoo on plaintiff's neck; and a detective in Kingsport, Tennessee informed Officer McCulley that the description of the perpetrator of the Huntsville Regions Bank robbery matched
Officer McCulley's attempt to compare fingerprints from the crime scene to plaintiff's fingerprints was inconclusive, because no fingerprints of value could be lifted from either the demand note or the crime scene. Also, his attempt to verify plaintiff's alibi by reviewing surveillance footage from the gasoline station that plaintiff said he had visited on the day of the robbery was inconclusive, because the videotape did not bear either a date or time stamp.
McCulley did learn that several individuals allegedly could provide alibi statements for plaintiff. However, he reasonably could have viewed the statements with suspicion for several reasons. First, he knew that Bridget Gatlin was in a longterm, romantic relationship with plaintiff that had produced two children. Second, the alibi provided by Wise and McCurry was contradicted by his investigation. When he drove to the Priceville repair shop that Wise and McCurry said they had visited with plaintiff, the owner and employees all denied that plaintiff, Wise, or McCurry had been there on the day of the robbery.
Even if plaintiff could show that Officer McCulley had a subjective belief of plaintiff's innocence and, therefore, a significant risk of harm flowing from his continued detention, plaintiff cannot show that McCulley acted with more than mere negligence. McCulley went to great lengths in an attempt to determine the validity of plaintiff's alibi. Specifically, he took statements from Wise and McCurry. He traveled to the Moulton gasoline station where plaintiff said they had stopped on the morning of the robbery, spoke to the manager there, and reviewed the surveillance camera footage from the store. He traveled to the Priceville repair shop where plaintiff said that he, Wise, and McCurry had delivered a truck on the day of the robbery, and spoke to the owner and employees there. Officer McCulley also took significant steps to collect other evidence of plaintiff's guilt or innocence. He enhanced photographs of the perpetrator from the surveillance camera footage at the bank to determine whether plaintiff and the perpetrator have the same tattoo on the neck, presented a photographic lineup to the bank teller, and checked to determine if fingerprints had been recovered from the crime scene.
Because plaintiff cannot show that Officer McCulley possessed a subjective belief of his innocence and, thereby, was deliberately indifferent to a significant risk of harm, summary judgment is due to be entered in favor of Officer McCulley on plaintiff's false imprisonment claim.
It is not at all clear that plaintiff asserts that Officer McCulley conducted an unreasonable, warrantless search of his home in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Court One of his complaint reads as follows:
Plaintiff's brief in response to defendants' motions for summary judgment alleges that Officer McCulley's "warrantless and non-consensual entry into plaintiff's residence was illegal."
It should be noted that plaintiff was provided two opportunities to amend his pleadings. He was permitted to file a first amended complaint in response to a motion for a more definite statement and motions to dismiss filed by defendants.
Moreover, even if plaintiff's complaint had specifically alleged that Officer McCulley unconstitutionally searched his home, that claim would fail on the merits as a matter of law. The entry into plaintiff's home by Officer McCulley was lawful because probable cause and exigent circumstances existed. See, e.g., Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, 637, 122 S.Ct. 2458, 153 L.Ed.2d 599 (2002) (holding that law enforcement officers lawfully may enter a home without a warrant when probable cause and exigent circumstances are present). "Exigent circumstances" include "danger of flight or escape, loss or destruction of evidence, risk of harm to the public or the police, mobility of a vehicle, and hot pursuit." United States v. Holloway, 290 F.3d 1331, 1334 (11th Cir.2002).
As discussed previously, in relation to plaintiff's false arrest claim, Officer McCulley had probable cause to believe that plaintiff had committed the violent crime of armed robbery. Based on the demand note passed to the bank teller, the officers had reason to believe that plaintiff was both armed and willing to use his weapon ("I got a gun ... I will shoot you"). Officer McCulley also knew that plaintiff had previously committed a violent crime due to his conviction for armed robbery. Finally, and most importantly, as the officers approached the home, plaintiff was observed running away from them, toward the back of the home. The officers reasonably could have believed that plaintiff was attempting to evade arrest, or to hide or destroy evidence, or to obtain a weapon in order to attack the officers. Thus, the exigent circumstances of "danger of flight or escape, loss or destruction of evidence, [and] risk of harm to the public or the police" existed when Officer McCulley entered plaintiff's home. Holloway, 290 F.3d at 1334. Due to the presence of probable cause and exigent circumstances,
When Officer McCulley arrested plaintiff, any evidence linking plaintiff to the bank robbery would have remained inside the home and under the control of plaintiff's girlfriend Bridget Gatlin. As plaintiff's girlfriend and the mother of his children, Gatlin's relationship with plaintiff potentially created a motivation for her to hide, remove, or destroy evidence of the crime. See, e.g., United States v. Gardner, 553 F.2d 946, 948 (5th Cir. 1977) (indicating that the risk of the destruction of evidence was heightened because the individual inside the home searched was the defendant's wife). Gatlin was initially untruthful when telling McCulley that plaintiff was not home. It would be reasonable to assume that, if she was willing to lie to the police about plaintiff's whereabouts, she also would be willing to hide, remove, or destroy evidence on his behalf. Additionally, the events that transpired at plaintiff's home began at 7:45 p.m. on November 26, 2008, the day before Thanksgiving. At that time on the day before a major state and national holiday, the delay in obtaining a warrant likely would have been substantial. See, e.g., United States v. Bartelho, 71 F.3d 436 (1st Cir.1995) (observing that "any normal delay in obtaining a warrant might have been exacerbated by the holiday"). For those reasons, Gatlin's presence in the home created a risk that she would remove or destroy evidence, and the probable delay required to obtain a warrant was unreasonable in light of that risk. Thus, the exigent circumstance of the potential destruction or removal of evidence justified Officer McCulley's search of plaintiff's home.
Plaintiff asserts claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and failure to implement proper policies and procedures against the City of Huntsville, alleging that each is based upon "violation of the plaintiff's civil rights pursuant to title 42 U.S.C. § 1983." As discussed in the previous sections of Part A in this opinion, plaintiff has failed to present evidence establishing that Officer McCulley violated his constitutional rights. Consequently, the City of Huntsville is not liable to plaintiff under § 1983, see, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 106 S.Ct. 1571, 89 L.Ed.2d 806 (1986), and summary judgment is due to be entered in favor of the City of Huntsville.
In cases where the court's original jurisdiction is based upon a federal question, the district court has discretion to entertain state-law claims that are supplemental to the federal claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). The Supreme Court added a gloss to this statutory language in Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 108 S.Ct. 614, 98 L.Ed.2d 720 (1988), when observing that
Id. at 349-50, 108 S.Ct. 614 (emphasis supplied) (citing United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-27, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966)). "[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine — judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity — will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims." Carnegie-Mellon, 484 U.S. at 350 n. 7, 108 S.Ct. 614; see also L.A. Draper & Son v. Wheelabrator-Frye, Inc., 735 F.2d 414, 428 (11th Cir.1984) (stating that "if the federal claims are dismissed prior to trial, Gibbs strongly encourages or even requires dismissal of state claims").
Summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of both defendants on plaintiff's federal claims. Therefore, the balance of factors weigh in favor of declining supplemental jurisdiction, and this court exercises its discretion to dismiss plaintiffs' state law claims.
For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motions for summary judgment are due to be, and hereby are, GRANTED in part. Summary judgment is entered in favor of the City of Huntsville, Alabama, and Officer Brett McCulley on all federal claims asserted in plaintiff's second amended complaint, and those claims are dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff's state-law claims are DISMISSED without prejudice. Costs are taxed to plaintiff. The Clerk is directed to close this file.
Doc. no. 1 (Notice of Removal) at 2 n. 1.
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
